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ABSTRACT 
This research examines the new urban policy that, in the last decades, has put emphasis on urban 
regeneration based on urban renewal and city marketing, particularly through the use of events and 
mega projects by global star architects. Through the case study of Valencia (Spain), which, in the last 
years, has become a good example of an entrepreneurial city, the study sets out to, first, discover the 
implications of the new urban policy for the built environment, planning practices and democratic 
governance, second, analyse the economic, political, social and cultural factors that have led to the use 
of such urban policy and, third, understand the actual processes and actors involved in it. 
Although emblematic projects are expected to generate economic activity and employment, this 
research has shown that – given their very limited effectiveness for economic and social regeneration 
and their inequality in the distribution of benefits – the main reasons for the implementation of these 
projects are related to the economic, political and professional interests of different groups and, to 
ideational reasons, such as the ‘politics of self-esteem’. The case of Valencia has particularly shown 
the significance of a hegemonic project such as the creation of a new regional state from a political, 
economic and identity viewpoints. 
It has also highlighted the crucial role in the implementation of the urban policy played by a boosterist 
urban regime, brought together and kept in place by the local and regional governments. Also, the 
involvement of and, relationship between local and global actors, particularly in processes of 
mediation and translation of interests. 
Finally, it has provided evidence of how mega projects and events have become a conduit of state 
restructuring and neoliberal globalisation by fostering a mode of governance characterized by the 
privatisation of decision making and the lack of transparency and democratic control. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background and problem statement 
In the last decades it has been possible to observe urban changes in big and small cities throughout the 
Western World, from suburbanisation processes that have expanded the peripheries of the cities - often 
creating monotonous residential landscapes - to the construction of mega projects with the aim of 
economically regenerating urban areas or, the gentrification of city centres and old blue-collar 
neighbourhoods, which for Smith (2002:443) have become ‘an increasingly unassailable capital 
accumulation strategy for competing urban economies’. 
Urban regeneration through inter-urban competitive strategies has greatly contributed to one of the most 
publicised phenomena, the proliferation of iconic buildings (Jencks, 2006; Sklair, 2005, 2006a, 2006b). 
Architectural icons - which according to Sklair (2006b:25) are defined by a ‘unique combination of fame 
with symbolism and aesthetic quality’- include corporate and commercial buildings. For instance, Foster’s 
Swiss Re (Gherkin) in London or, the Future Systems building for Selfridges in Birmingham easily spring 
to mind. However, lured by regeneration money, global architects have sharpened their weapons of 
seduction to convince politicians that their city needs an icon signed by them, while politicians have 
gladly succumbed to the promises of tourism and economic affluence for their cities made by the gurus of 
the architectural profession. Mitterrand’s grand projets in 1990s Paris are a notable example but the list of 
initiatives is long, including - to mention just a few –buildings such as Rem Koolhaas’ Casa da Musica in 
Porto, The National Museum of the XXI Century Arts (MAXXI) by Zaha Hadid in Rome, Herzog and De 
Meuron’s Tate Modern in London or The Jewish Museum in Berlin by Daniel Libeskind. 
Indeed, the most visible change is the emergence of emblematic architectural projects that have 
transformed urban landscapes but, if we observe more attentively, it is also possible to perceive a change 
in the discourse of politicians and urban governors. For them these iconic projects connect cities to so-
called “global flows” and are the key to economic regeneration in a globalised era that has intensified 
competitiveness. 
Urban change - particularly in relationship to flagship projects - has been studied and explained from 
different, and interrelated, perspectives. Indeed, these processes of change are linked to wider societal 
changes. On the one hand, post-modern values that emphasise the moral superiority of individual choice in 
contrast to collective decision-making have transformed consumption in the differentiating element that 
configures social identity. In this way, consumption has lost the integrating and equalising role that it had 
during fordism and has caused the disintegration of citizenship in groups of consumers. 
The new technologies have contributed to such fragmentation and polarisation processes (Graham and 
Marvin, 2001). The new technologies, together with the new forms of production and consumption, have 
changed the perceived and real ways in which time and space are experienced. Thus, as explained by 
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Harvey (1993), the uneven layout of networked infrastructures causes a time-space compression that 
breaks down temporal and spatial barriers in order to underpin the capital accumulation of the favoured 
classes whilst segregates less favoured urban areas and social groups. 
In the same way, planning has adapted to the new global economic climate by focusing, first, on the 
elaboration of large scale urban projects – faced by the difficulty of producing comprehensive urban plans 
in the fragmented city – and, second, on the land market management needed to implement those projects. 
It could be argued that urban planning is facing a ‘paradigm crisis’ whilst the market has taken over 
(Ezquiaga, 1998; Roch, 2001; Benabent, 2001; Sánchez, 2003). According to Portas (2003), this fact has 
effected a mutation, probably irreversible, that has led from the city as traditionally known to a continuum 
of undefined urbanised land. This territorial model has been supported by various factors, such as, the 
convergent changes in social values and in the role of the state and the development of the informational 
technologies (Portas 2003).  
Looking specifically into the emergence of the use of ‘global architecture’ as a regeneration strategy, 
academics have generally resorted to notions such as globalisation and urban restructuring (Jessop, 2000; 
Brenner, 1999), inter-city competition and the “rise of the entrepreneurial city” (Harvey, 1989; Jessop, 
1997, 1998; Hubbard and Hall, 1998; Leitner and Sheppard, 2002)  and, city marketing (Philo and Kearns, 
1993; Hall, 1998; Crilley, 1993; Miles, 2007), iconic architecture (Sklair, 2005, 2006), the Transnational 
Capitalist Class and the Global Intelligence Corps (Olds, 1996; Sklair, 2005; Ward, 2005). They have 
contended that, on the one hand cities are being restructured to become new centres of accumulation; on 
the other hand they are trying to become important as a place of governance of the global. In this way, the 
economic and political scalar restructuring associated to globalisation processes has been considered to 
put cities and cities’ economies in the centre of attention. It has been argued that, the changes in the role of 
the state due to globalisation and decentralisation have fostered a tendency towards political fragmentation 
(Lefèvre, 2003). States have lost power and cities and regions, which are more flexible in adapting to the 
changing conditions of markets, technology and culture, have become the main economical actors 
(Castells and Hall, 1994) and compete as such in the marketplace. 
At the same time, such global competition has provoked physical, social and economic fragmentation 
within the cities. This is mainly due to the increasingly common practice of selecting certain areas of the 
metropolis to develop strategic projects directed to ‘brand’ the city whilst other areas are abandoned and 
social and geographical cross-subsidies withdrawn. In this way, the same logics of late capitalism are 
used, that is to say, picking out the most profitable consumers and causing the less lucrative ones to drop 
out.  
In order to increase their competitive edge, cities have oriented their strategies beyond the national 
boundaries, trying to attract new forms of investment within the city (in competition with other cities). 
This competitive response in cities that has made some authors call them entrepreneurial cities. Not 
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surprisingly, place promotion has become one of the main activities of entrepreneurial cities and iconic 
architecture has proved a very powerful advertising tool.   
For some (Sklair, 2005; Olds, 1996), the agents of change who are most responsible for the promotion of 
iconic architecture as a tool for urban revitalisation, are the transnational capitalist class – a group of elite 
professionals with globally linked economic interests which includes a very small number of architects 
that are designing iconic architecture around the world, which Olds (1996) has called the Global 
Intelligence Corps. However, it has been recognised that, the transnational capitalist class has both 
globalising and localising agendas and globalising processes are in part driven and amplified by bottom-up 
processes. This is reflected in the vigorously negotiated and contested economic politics of place and the 
politics of identity. 
In Spain, urban planners agree that Spanish cities, or city-regions, are going through similar processes of 
fragmentation and polarisation to those commented for a more general case (Ferrer, 2005). Spanish cities 
are affected, on the one hand, by the new economic dynamics and social demands that force them to 
undergo internal restructuring and, on the other hand, by competitiveness, both of which have arisen the 
politicians’ interest in urban mega-projects designed by ‘star’ architects. In Moix’s (2010:9) words,  
‘Between the end of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st Centuries, Spain believed in miracles. 
Specifically in the miracles that star architects could perform. It was enough that Bilbao built the 
Guggenheim and, that thanks to it the city jumped from postindustrial greyness to the brightness 
of a service economy, for other regions, cities and towns to place a part of their hopes for the 
future in the hands of the most famous architects’. 
Thus, for example, Barcelona –with an already long tradition in hiring global architects – launched an 
event called the international Forum of Cultures 2004 which included the remodeling of a section of the 
city with buildings such as the Forum building, a landmark by Herzog and de Meuron. The Galician 
regional government initiated the City of Culture by Peter Eisenman, Córboba a convention centre by Rem 
Koolhas and, Zaragoza held the international exposition Expo 2008, which gathered buildings designed by 
different prestigious architects including the symbol of the event, a pavilion by Zaha Hadid.  
In Valencia, politicians’ bedazzlement by global architecture and the glamour of international events has 
gone as far as to be one of the main causes of the bankruptcy of the regional government. In a newspaper 
article on the New York times entitled ‘First a Building Spree, Now the Ax Is Falling’ (Carvajal and 
Minder, 8 July 2012), commenting on the regional government’s financial difficulties due to the 
investment on mega-projects, the initiatives to blame were described;  
Valencia’s other investments included a harbour for superyachts, an opera house styled like the 
one in Sydney, Australia, a futuristic science museum, the biggest aquarium in Europe and a sail-
shaped bridge, not to mention an airport that never had a single arrival or departure. It also 
attracted extravagant events like the America’s Cup and Formula One racing.  
  CHAPTER 1  
 
14 
But, the most paradigmatic case is global architect Santiago Calatrava’s seduction of Valencia’s local and 
regional governors to produce a ‘monoculture of Calatrava’ in the city (Moix, 2010:37). As member of 
parliament of the regional government Blanco states referring to the city of Arts and Sciences by 
Calatrava, the project represents ‘the symbol of an epoch, of the irresponsibility and delusions of grandeur 
of the governors who have ruined us as a people and left the regional government on the verge of 
bankruptcy’ (Arabí, 5 May 2012). 
It is within this context that my research can be situated. Therefore, my topic is the use of global 
architecture as the key strategy for addressing urban economic and social decline. More specifically, the 
object of the research is the new urban policy that, in the last decades, has put emphasis on urban 
regeneration based on urban renewal, particularly through the use of spatially targeted emblematic 
projects. Emblematic projects are expected to generate economic activity and employment but, their main 
objective is to improve the tax basis by increasing the value of urban land. However, extensive empirical 
evidence (Barnekov, Boyle and Roch, 1988; Hubbard and Hall, 1998; Holcomb, 1993; Leitner and 
Sheppard, 1998) has demonstrated that not only have they had very limited effectiveness for economic 
regeneration but can have negative effects such as the draining away of public funds. 
In short, in spite of the existing evidence of their ineffectiveness and negative social and environmental 
impacts spatially targeted emblematic projects as a means to achieve urban revitalisation and economic 
regeneration are being widely used in different contexts. This suggests that the motives behind urban 
regeneration deserve closer inspection. 
1.2 Purpose and objectives of the research 
The object of this thesis is the use of spatially targeted emblematic projects as a means to achieve urban 
revitalisation and economic regeneration.  The main aims are to examine the different economic, political, 
social and cultural factors that have led to the use of such regeneration strategy, to understand the actual 
processes and actors involved in it and the implications for the built environment and for planning 
practices. 
The specific objectives of the research are to 
a) find out the implications for planning practices and for the shaping of the city’s physical form of 
the urban policy that uses spatially targeted emblematic projects as a means to achieve urban 
revitalisation and economic regeneration, (What) 
b) conceptualise and identify the causes of the formulation of such urban policy and, (Why) 
c) identify and analyse the economic and political actors and processes at different scales and their 
interplay involved in the formulation and enactment of such urban policy. (How) 
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The three main research questions entail the investigation of several issues linked to them.  
To answer the question about the implications of the urban policy (the what type question), the physical, 
economic, social and political returns and impacts of the mega-projects need to be analysed, but also the 
governance changes that they bring about, particularly through the introduction of new delivery bodies. 
To answer the question about the causes of the urban policy (the why type question) it is necessary to 
investigate several issues. First, the interests of various groups need to be analysed. The interests to 
consider are economic but also of other types, for instance professional interests – in the case of architects 
– or political and electoral interests –in the case of politicians. Also the accumulation strategies prioritised 
and the role of the state in strategy-making, financing, and bringing together the interests of different 
groups need to be studied. Finally, ideational factors such as how different ways of interpreting the world 
influence the formulation of the urban policy need to be taken into consideration. 
To answer the question about the processes and actors involved in the enactment of the urban policy (the 
how type question) the influence of different global and local actors and the alliances they form need to be 
studied. Also, which issues generate agreement or dissent and, how and with the aid of which instruments 
consensus over the urban policy is generated need to be considered. 
1.3 Valencia as a case study  
My study is focused on the city of Valencia in Spain, a city which has become in the last years a good 
example of an entrepreneurial city that has been restructuring very rapidly. Valencia, with approximately 
800,000 inhabitants, is the third biggest city in Spain and, its metropolitan area is home for 1,400,000 
people. It is situated at approximately the same distance from Madrid and Barcelona and within the so-
called European Mediterranean Arch that spans approximately from Cadiz to Naples. Economically is the 
natural port of Madrid and culturally has, through history, been second to Barcelona in the Catalan 
speaking sphere. Also, like Barcelona, it was an important industrial city that after deindustrialisation had 
to find its place in the Spanish and European system of cities and create a new identity. On the other hand, 
in 1982, some years after Franco’s death, a new State of the Autonomies was instated in Spain. Valencia, 
then, became the capital city of the Valencian Autonomous Community and took an administrative 
function as seat of the regional government. 
Thus, being secondary to both Barcelona and Madrid, Valencia’s identity has had to be negotiated in 
between the need for being “independent” from central Spain but, at the same time, differentiating from 
Barcelona, the hegemonic centre of “Catalan” culture. Moreover, Valencia’s hierarchy in Spain has lead it 
to specialise and take other functions, in this case, the city’s only one function at European level is 
tourism, although it holds important commercial fairs (for instance one of the three most important 
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furniture fairs in Europe) and has a European stock market (Rozemblat, 2003). See a map situating the city 
and its region within Spain in figure 1.1. 
Figure 1.1 Valencia city and region in Spain 
 
Source: Adapted from a map by Daniel Dalet 
Indeed, political decentralisation and cultural regionalism are crucial to understand the context for urban 
and economic development in Valencia. The “Generalitat Valenciana” is the regional government of the 
Valencian Autonomous Community and its president is the head of the regional government. The 
President of the “Generalitat Valenciana” is elected by the Valencian parliament and has the power to 
elect the “consellers” who take charge of the different areas of the regional government that include 
education, cultural and language policy, health, tourism promotion, environmental regulation and land use 
planning. Therefore, the regional government has exclusive legislative authority over regional and urban 
planning and the local authorities are responsible for urban planning practice in the municipality, from 
design to the implementation phase (Trapero, 1999). 
In the last two decades, pursuing a distinct political project the local and regional governments of Valencia 
have worked together with the objective of connecting the city to the global flows of capital and 
knowledge, and entering the global tourist circuit as clearly spelled out in the strategic plan (CeyD, 2006). 
They have tried to achieve their goal through large public investments in infrastructure, prestige projects 
and the organisation of international events, in order to re-image the city and make it attractive to investors 
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and tourists, and which have lead the Valencian government to be one of the most indebted in Spain. The 
initiatives include, for instance, the City of Arts and Sciences, the International Convention Centre, the 
regeneration of the historic centre and the restructuring of the port and surrounding areas to host the 
America’s Cup and Formula One competitions. Also infrastructural development that includes the 
extension of the airport, the high-speed train connecting with Madrid and the improvement of the 
motorway network, are part of the territorial project. 
Valencia’s peculiarity is that the same strategy of “using architecture to boost culture, leisure and 
business.” (Torres, 2005, p. 143) has been used over time across different political colours in both the 
regional and local governments. This fact points out to urban regime theory (Stone, 1989, 1993; 
Mossberger, 2001) since, for regimes to be considered as such, there must be long-term cooperation. 
Therefore, in Valencia’s case, where there is durability of the strategy over the electoral cycle, regime 
theory seems to offer a useful theoretical instrument of analysis. The different political periods run as 
follows. The first regional president to be elected in 1982 was Joan Lerma from the socialist party (PSPV-
PSOE) and was in office until 1995 when the conservative party (PP) won the elections. Meanwhile, 
locally the socialist party governed from 1979 (the first democratic municipal elections after Franco) to 
1991 when Rita Barberá from the conservative party, and who is still in office, was elected. 
The boosterist strategy can be considered to have been started by the socialist regional government in the 
1980’s with projects such as the IVAM (Valencian Institute of Modern Art), a museum created in 1986 
which has entered the international circuits of modern art, and continued by the conservative party in 
1995, when they took over the ongoing project of the City of Sciences, conceived by Lerma in 1989. In 
fact, there has been some controversy over whether the socialists or the conservatives are to take credit for 
the project. Thus, the architecture and urban design produced have been aimed to the activation of the 
global flows.  To that effect, town planning, accused of being inflexible, slow and inefficient, has been 
substituted by ‘strategic planning’ although with little or ineffective citizen participation.  
Also urban planning legislation has supported the developist strategies. In 1994, the LRAU, a new Act 
that regulated urban planning activity in the Valencian Autonomous Community, was approved. The 
LRAU, with the introduction of the “urbanising agent” has been considered to be the most innovative 
contribution to contemporary Spanish urbanism and the one which has had the most evident effects on the 
patterns of urbanisation (Olmos, 2005; Díaz, 2006). Indeed it has been very influential as shown by the 
fact that it has been used as a model by many other regional governments and their respective new 
urbanism laws, for instance, Castilla la Mancha and la Rioja in 1998, Castilla-León in 1999, and, Canarias, 
Murcia and Madrid in 2001 (Domínguez, 2002).  
The new law favoured the involvement of the private initiative in the planning and development processes 
through the figure of the “urbanising agent” defined as a private agent that manages a public service that is 
the layout and preparation of the land for development, and is controlled by the local authority. The 
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landowners of the land being prepared for development must pay the urbanising agent either in land or in 
money. In this way, the urbanising agents have accumulated immense quantities of land in the last years. 
The LRAU, together with the liberalising Spanish 1998 Act that regulates land ownership and 
classification, expedited the availability of urban land, causing an enormous increase in development 
activity. For instance, in the case of the city of Valencia Miguel Domínguez (2002), the responsible for 
urbanism in the local authority, boasted that, from 1994 to 2002, more than 4,450,000 square metres of 
urban land had been or were being laid out and prepared for city development and 29,722 new dwellings 
built or being built although, according to Simó (2004), there were more than 60,000 empty dwellings in 
the city. In 2005, the Valencian government urged by the European Commission, substituted the LRAU, 
which did not respect European Directives in public contracting, by the LUV (Ley Urbanística 
Valenciana). 
On the other hand, the political project of construction of a new identity that involves the re-imaging of 
Valencia through the use of global architecture has been carried out unfailingly although being contested 
by grassroots movements. Furthermore, politicians have allied with finance and real estate interest groups 
to launch city marketing operations directed not only to investors but to citizens, too. In fact, they have 
tried to win votes by hiring global star architects to legitimate their projects and by calling on patriotic 
feelings of pride.  
Therefore, it could be argued that, in most cases, iconic architecture and infrastructural development, 
supported by regulatory practices, have gone hand in hand with real estate speculation and financial 
interests, contributing to the configuration of Valencia as a diffuse, fragmented and polarised city-region 
and, consequently, to its perverse environmental and social effects. 
To conclude, there are many reasons why the Valencian case is interesting from an academic viewpoint.  
First, Valencia is unique in terms of long standing and continuous emphasis on global architecture. There 
are several flagship projects not just a few which indicates the significance for the case. Second, the 
strategy of using emblematic architecture has been used by different political parties and has remained the 
same over time and across different levels of government. As Calatrava puts it when explaining one of 
Valencia’s key strategic projects 
“The importance of the City of Arts and Sciences is that during the fifteen years during which 
work has progressed, the political parties in power have changed, but all have recognized the 
importance of this project. This is the reason for it to continue independent of politics. The City 
of Arts and Sciences is the achievement of a democracy and celebrates democracy.” (Calatrava in 
Torres, 2005:143) 
Third, it offers an excellent example of Regionalism and construction of local identity in the context of 
globalisation and political re-scaling (Prytherch, 2005). In this sense it can be compared to Madrid where 
there is not such impelling need for building a regional identity and to Barcelona where the construction of 
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a regional identity has encountered more political stability. Commenting on the re-territorialisation of the 
European political economy Prytherch (2003), claims that  
 “No city demonstrates the culturally complex and politically contested dimensions of urban 
change more clearly than Valencia. For the kind of state-led urbanization typified by the City of 
Arts and Sciences must come at the expense of some of the richest farmlands in Europe, which 
surround the city of Valencia on nearly every side.” (Prytherch, 2003, p.426) 
Finally, it has not only imported models but produced them too, as other Spanish regions have used the 
Valencian Urbanism Act (LRAU) as a model for their own laws. After full competencies on urbanism and 
town planning were transferred to the Autonomous Communities, the regional governments endeavoured 
to elaborate their own urbanism laws. The LRAU, approved by the Valencian regional government in 
1994, was considered the first regional law to introduce important innovations with regard to the previous 
Spanish law and, therefore, other Autonomous Communities took it as a model for their own regulations.   
1.4 The flagship projects 
This study describes Valencia’s urban policy to then analyse three flagship developments in depth. The 
research has tried to unearth processes and to determine the relative importance of the actors to see how 
those processes can be challenged. Therefore, my data has needed to be comprehensive in the range of 
actors to investigate rather than in the number of projects. Given that the different projects are subject to 
the same general economic and political trends, they were expected to show similarities in processes under 
similar conditions. The selected projects are of different kinds but all of them have the same approach, the 
use of emblematic architecture and urban design to achieve urban revitalisation and economic growth. I 
am not trying to evaluate a particular strategy (culture-led, property-led, creative quarters...) but to analyse 
the common ‘way of doing’ they have. The studied flagship projects are The City of Arts and Sciences, 
the projects linked to the celebration of the America’s Cup sailing competition in 2007 and, a housing 
development called Sociopolis. Table 1.1 summarises the main background data of the three projects. 
The City of Arts and Sciences is a prestige cultural project entirely paid for by the regional government. 
The 350,000 square metres complex includes a planetarium, a science museum, a museum of 
oceanography, an opera theatre and the Agora, a multifunctional space.  It was presented in 1989 by the 
first president of the regional government some years after Valencia became capital city of the Valencian 
Autonomous Community. The project was considered part of the “modernisation” of the city, the 
institutions and even “the economy” after the dictatorship, which both local and regional governments saw 
as their mission. Also, it was seen as a strategy to market Valencia.  
The complex has taken a long time to be completed. The first building to be finished was the planetarium 
in 1998, followed by the museum of science and car park in 2000. The museum of oceanography was 
  CHAPTER 1  
 
20 
opened in 2003, the opera theatre in 2005, and the last building - the Agora – in 2009. During that period 
there have been 4 different regional presidents, all of them committed to the project. 
Table 1.1 Background table of the projects under study 
 
City of Arts and Sciences America’s Cup      (Infrastructural work) Sociopolis 
Start year 1989 2003 2003 
Year of completion 2009 2006 Ongoing 
Functions 
Cultural complex including: 
planetarium, science 
museum, museum of 
oceanography, opera theatre 
and multifunctional building 
Infrastructure for the sailing 
competition including: a new 
canal to communicate the 
inner harbour with the open 
sea, the docking of mega 
yachts, the team bases, urban 
design of the inner harbour 
and  iconic building for 
guests of teams and sponsors 
Residential development 
including approximately 
3,000 dwellings 
Location Urban position: Riverbed East of the city 
Urban location: inner 
harbour of port of Valencia 
Southern periphery of 
Valencia 
Land area 350,000 m2 330,000 m2 350,000 m2 
Estimated final cost 1,300 million euro 450 million euro - 
Investors 
Valencian regional 
government 
Consortium Valencia 2007, 
through a credit given by the 
Official Institute of Credit 
(ICO) 
Valencian regional 
government trough the 
Valencian Institute of 
housing (IVVSA) and 
private developers 
Source: Author 
On the other hand, the celebration of the America’s Cup was the source of an extensive urban 
transformation, particularly in the harbour area. Valencia was designated in 2003 as a venue for the 2007 
America’s Cup. The designation, based on just a few sketches of the port, was considered to be a 
demonstration of Valencia’s entrepreneurialism. As Fernández Galiano explains  
“on the one hand, it [the designation] reflects the ambition, dynamism and determination of 
Spain’s third city, able to compete successfully in the demanding urban leagues for the 
organization of planetary events; on the other, it provides an alibi to boost its large projects of 
urban renewal and to show the world its accomplishments.”  (Fernández-Galiano, 2005:3). 
When Valencia was elected to hold the 32nd America’s Cup, the applicable General Plan of 1988 did not 
include any detailed project for the seafront (Olmos, 2005). Immediately afterwards many projects were 
proposed for the redesign of the seafront as well as “embellishing projects” for the city such as the renewal 
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of the Avenida del Puerto (Olmos, 2005). Also the transport network was to be improved. The airport and 
the underground network were extended while the central government was urged to speed up the arrival of 
the high speed train from Madrid (Fernández-Galiano, 2005).  
However, the main focus of the America’s Cup was the inner harbour and, therefore, in 2004, the 
“Consorcio Valencia 2007” approved an investment plan of 444 million Euros for the works to be 
conducted in the area, including the construction of a new canal that would communicate the inner 
harbour with the open sea, in preparation of the event (Boira, 2007). The decision of opening the canal 
was highly controversial because it was thought to be the first step towards the extension of the freight 
port (Olmos, 2005) which would have evil effects on the neighbouring beaches and natural spaces (Boira, 
2007).  
The other key project was the Foredeck, a representative building that was commissioned to David 
Chipperfield and Fermín Vázquez as a result of an international competition.  The Foredeck, renamed 
“Veles e Vents”, has won the LEAF (Leading European Architects Forum for intelligent design) award 
and has been short listed in the European Award of Contemporary Architecture (Boira, 2007). 
But, the America’s Cup was to trigger more development. In 2004 Jean Nouvel presented “Valencia 
Litoral” a project for the inner harbour and a residential development in the neighbouring areas which was 
the first to consider the sailing event (Olmos, 2005). The project did not go forward but, in 2006, the 
consortium organized an international ideas competition, presented in the Venetian Biennale, for the inner 
harbour, new marina and a section - of nearly 340,000 square metres – of the Grao, an urban quarter 
located by the inner harbour (PAI del Grao).  The site comprised a total of 1.3 million square metres of 
land and 565,000 square metres of water. The first prize ex-aequo was given to the German office GMP 
International Architects and to the joint proposal of Jean Nouvel and José María Tomás (Boira, 2007). 
In 2007, it was decided that, the following year, the Formula One competition would go to Valencia in an 
urban circuit that runs around the inner harbour and into the Grao. The redevelopment of the Grao was 
adapted to the needs of the competition. 
Finally, Sociopolis is a new urban quarter of 350,000 square metres located by the river to the South of the 
city. It is an initiative of the Regional government, through the “Instituto Valenciano de la Vivienda” 
(Valencian institute of Housing) to build social housing for immigrants, handicapped people, young and 
old people with difficulties to access the free market. The idea of such a quarter was presented in the 
Valencia Bienal in 2003. 
Sociopolis includes 18 buildings that contain 2,809 subsidized dwellings designed by internationally well-
known architects such as Vicente Guallart, Duncan Lewis+Block, Greg Lynn Form, Sogo Arquitectos, 
Manuel Gausa, Willy Müller, Jou Min Lin, José María Torres Nadal, Ábalos y Herreros, MVRDV, Josep 
Lluís Mateo, María Colomer, Eduardo Arroyo, Toyo Ito, François Roche and Young Joon Kim.  
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The development, master-planned by Vicente Guallart and María Díaz, has been marketed as a socially 
sustainable urban quarter where social interaction is encouraged by the well-designed urban environment 
and which is integrated in the Valencian farm lands as a way of preserving the city’s cultural identity 
(Guallart Architects, www.guallart.com), and has arisen enormous interest both in the general public and 
within the architectural profession. 
Sociopolis was planned to be finished in 2007 but construction works are still ongoing. 
1.5 Thesis structure 
Having discussed the scope and research objectives of the thesis, given an outline of research 
methodology and, discussed the political-economic background of the case under study together with its 
academic relevance in Chapter One, Chapter Two provides a critical review of the literature which sets 
this thesis in the wider theoretical context.  
Chapter Two covers different bodies of literature on theories of globalisation, globalisation and city 
building, inter-urban competition, and actors of both globalisation and localisation. 
The first set of literature, starts off from the suggestion that globalisation is one of the why causes driving 
change in cities and therefore outlines interpretations regarding globalisation in general and different 
aspects of globalisation, considering cities as nodes within the global economy. Cities appear as key sites 
within the global economy. They condense many of the forces of globalisation and therefore are 
laboratories in which to explore these processes. 
The second set of literature focus on city competitiveness and the ‘rise of the entrepreneurial city’. It also 
critically discusses place promotion and symbolic architecture as competitive strategies frequently used by 
cities. 
The last set of literature addresses the issue of the actors who drive globalisation, both local and global. 
Concepts such as the transnational capitalist class and the global intelligence corps are discussed. 
However it is not just global actors but also local actors that drive globalisation. Therefore local coalitions 
of interests and the manner in which they come together are also discussed. 
Chapter Three goes on to establish the theories and concepts that will be used to analyse and interpret the 
empirical findings. Three bodies of literature are reviewed to build a theoretical framework. 
The first body of literature reviews regulation theory, the strategic-relational approach, cultural political 
economy and the politics of scale literature to point to the restructuring of the 'national' state and the 
emergence of the metropolitan and regional scale. This, as we will see, is highly relevant to Spain where 
particularly regions have been importantly empowered in the urban arena. 
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The second deals with the politics of urban regeneration. It includes the growth coalition and urban regime 
literature to address the question of how politics of regeneration is instituted differently in different places. 
Finally, the literature on the implications of the new politics of regeneration explores the rise of new 
delivery organisations and forms and, their outcomes in terms of impacts on democratic decision-making, 
planning possibilities and, social and economic cohesion. This rise is clearly visible in Valencia where, 
new delivery organisations such as foundations and public corporations have flourished along with the 
urban policy based on mega-projects and events, strongly impacting democratic decision making and 
control.   
Chapter Four is a methodology chapter where the rationale behind the research strategy, the research 
protocol and the research methods used in this thesis are explained. The design of the case study, the logic 
that links the collected data to the research questions and, the analytical strategy and theoretical approach 
to data analysis are also discussed in this chapter. Finally, the organisation system used to write the case 
study in the following chapters is explained. 
Chapter Five presents the city of Valencia as a case under study. It also analyses and interprets the 
findings that provide the context for the three selected flagship projects. 
The following three chapters - Chapter Six, Chapter Seven and Chapter Eight – are empirical chapters 
which examine the empirical findings related to each of the flagship projects and present their 
interpretation. They are not organised by project but by theme, or research question. 
Chapter Six examines the impacts of the spatially targeted regeneration policy, placing special emphasis 
on new practices and modes of governance. First, it examines the physical changes and the changes in the 
perception of the city. Then, it analyses the political, economic and social returns of the policy, and 
finally, it discusses issues of governance such as privatisation, participation, democratic accountability, 
new bodies created, transfer of public money to private hands, etc. 
Chapter Seven approaches the why type research question. It explores on the one hand political and 
economic issues, analysing the interests of different groups and at different scales. It focuses on the role of 
the state and the political projects at different scales - national, regional and local - with special emphasis 
on the construction of a new Valencian regional state.  
On the other hand it discusses relevant ideational issues such as the semiotic construction of state or the 
complex of inferiority which has led Valencian politicians to institute a politics of self-esteem, but also the 
importance of local ideas of modernity, modernisation and globality.  
Chapter Eight deals with the question of how spatially targeted regeneration policies based on urban 
mega-projects by global architects are instituted. It discusses the findings regarding the different actors 
and coalitions of interest at different scales and their relationship, in particular how local actors mediate to 
introduce global actors in the scene and, the role of global actors in the creation of local and regional 
coalitions of interest. It stresses the importance of individual actors in decision-making and the role of 
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personal relationship and very particularly the relevance of politics –and tactics - versus planning – and 
strategy. Finally it discusses the ways in which consensus is created and popular consent built.  
Lastly, in Chapter Nine final conclusions are drawn. This final chapter reviews the findings and their 
interpretation and, discusses them in relationship to theory. To conclude, the chapter includes directions 
for further research on the topic. 
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2. CITY-BUILDING IN AN ERA OF GLOBALISATION 
2.1 Introduction  
The last decades have seen the ubiquitous emergence of eye-catching urban developments and 
flagship projects which have transformed the appearance of small and big cities through the Western 
world. The spectacular resultant urban landscapes – often referred to as ‘post-industrial landscapes’ of 
consumption - are seen to express post-modern values of consumerism and entertainment (Harvey, 
1990; Zukin, 1995; Hubbard, 1996; Ward, 1998). Beyond the evident physical transformation it has 
been also possible to observe a change in the discourse of politicians and city governors. For them, the 
key to economic regeneration after de-industrialisation seems to lay in favourably situating the city in 
the global stage and connecting to the so-called ‘global flows’. Even the architecture of the new 
developments is expected to be suitable to the space of flows. Thus, words such as, the ‘informational 
city’, the ‘new economy’, the ‘knowledge society’ and so forth are tirelessly cited in the rhetoric of 
city leaders and the numerous new strategic plans that have been produced.  
In short, the discourse, although generally too abstract, reflects that globalisation is considered to be a 
driving force of change. Typically, globalisation is presented as an unstoppable force. Flows seem to 
float in the air with no relationship to geographical space and no reference is made as to how and by 
whom those flows are mobilised (Olds, 1996). However, the transformation of the fabric of the cities 
is clearly visible and the claimed links to globalisation processes deserve closer inspection. 
2.2 Cities as nodes within the global economy  
Indeed, globalisation is used as a discourse by many city leaders to explain and justify the changes 
that have been transforming the landscapes of Western cities since the 1970s. It is nevertheless clear 
that cities are undergoing processes of economic, political and social restructuring and there is a 
strong suggestion that globalisation – be it considered a discourse or a factual reality - is a driving 
force of change. In fact, there are different interpretations of globalisation, whether the impacts of the 
new technologies, the time-space compression of economic activity, the stretching of social relations 
over time and across the globe or the political processes through which globalisation is constructed, 
are emphasised (Martin and Sunley, 1997). Whereas some commentators (Castells, 1989, 1996, 1998; 
Appadurai, 1996) have focused on the analysis of material – people, commodities, money - and non-
material – information, identities, images - global flows others - criticizing the decontextualisation of 
the ‘space of flows’ - have focused on the re-scaling and reconfiguration of territorial organisation that 
allow such flows (Brenner, 1999, 2000, 2003; Swyngedouw, 1996, 1997; Jessop, 2000; MacLeod and 
Goodwin, 1999). 
In any case, the concept is controversial and the debate very much polarised between what Held 
(2002) has called ‘globalists’ and ‘sceptics’ and Dicken, Peck and Tickell (1997) ‘boosters’ and 
‘hypercritics’. For sceptics, such as Callinicos (1994), Hirst (1997) or Hoogvelt (1997), ‘rather than 
globalization, current trends reflect a process of ‘internationalization’ (Held, 2002:3). They argue that 
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globalisation proves to be a useful concept for the legitimisation of a neoliberal global project 
consisting of the creation of a global free market. Hirst (1997) goes as far as to claim that 
globalisation merely amounts to Westernisation or Americanisation. On the other hand, globalists, 
such as Castells (1996) or Dicken (1997) highlight the spatial attributes of globalisation and assert that 
it has rendered national territorial boundaries obsolete as social, economic and political activity 
transcend them and are independent from them (Held, 2002).  
Their differing positions regarding globalisation become evident in their economic, political and 
cultural analysis. In economy their major points of disagreement are, first, that whereas for globalists 
national economies as autonomous systems have been substituted by a single global economy, 
sceptics assert that there is no single global market but a process of internationalisation of economic 
activity. Second, sceptics discard the idea that the liberation of capital from territorial constraints has 
caused the emergence of a global capitalism whereby corporate capital rather than states holds 
economic power. Finally, globalists contend that a new global division of labour, in which developed 
countries are moving towards a service economy and developing countries are taking up 
manufacturing activities, has been forging. On the contrary, sceptics argue that the shift to a service 
economy is due to neoliberalisation and technological change and that, however, developed countries 
still control trade in manufactured goods (Held, 2002). 
Concerning politics, whereas for sceptics the national state remains the main political element through 
which international order is established, for globalists political power has been restructured as states, 
immerse in webs of global interconnectedness, have lost the capacity to act independently and 
exercise national power to achieve policy objectives, and therefore are unable to secure the delivery of 
fundamental goods and services (Held, 2002). The issue has important associations since in one case 
states are granted the capacity of pursuing welfarist strategies while in the other their only option is to 
compete in the marketplace to achieve a good position in the global division of labour. 
When it comes to culture, sceptics contend that the new technologies and communication systems 
reinforce rather than diminish the importance of national and regional identities since they help 
intensify social interaction within one culture. For globalists global corporations - through their 
consumer goods, channels of distribution and the impact of the mass media - have become the main 
sources of cultural creation and, consequently, also of values and identity generation (Held, 2002). 
According to Dicken, Peck and Tickell (1997) the debate between the supporters of the globalisation 
thesis and the sceptics is pointless since it has been reduced to a mere question of quantification when, 
what is required is to qualify through a conceptual distinction between globalisation and 
internationalisation. From their point of view, globalisation would imply a functional integration of 
economic activities, the constriction and conditioning of national political strategies by extra-national 
forms and the complex rearticulation of cultural relationships. The question remains unresolved,  
however, there is a broad consensus that the increasing economic interconnectedness and the 
stretching of social and cultural relations have generated new interregional inequalities - of wealth, 
power, privilege and knowledge - and, transborder problems and challenges that would need political 
coordination at a global level to be confronted effectively (Held, 2002).  
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From a conceptual point of view, one of the main issues that marks the different positions in the 
globalisation debate, and the one which has furthest reaching implications, is whether globalisation is 
treated as an inevitable process that advances relentlessly as it were a natural force, thrusting the 
nations and regions into global competition between each other, or, on the contrary, it is interpreted as 
a political-economic project that can be challenged. On this issue, I will draw on Jessop’s (2000) 
distinction between structural and strategic moments of globalisation. According to him, the structural 
moment involves the ‘processes whereby increasing global interdependence is created among actions, 
organizations and institutions within different functional subsystems’ and the strategic moment the 
various actors’ attempts to coordinate their activities in order to produce global effects (Jessop, 2000: 
339). Thus considered globalisation, on the one hand, can be challenged since it is ‘strategically 
constructed’ but, on the other, brings about structural changes that can be observed, and must be 
acknowledged. To the different global projects that can be potentially pursued the global becomes a 
horizon of action rather than a present scenario. This is important because although actions remain in 
different scales the global must be strategically taken into account. Therefore, at the same time that 
globalisation is promoted at different geographical scales, it can be resisted at such less inclusive 
scales too (Jessop, 2000). Moreover, there is another implication to this standpoint, namely, that 
global and local actors become important from an empirical point of view, as components of the 
globalising trend, and, as agents of change. In Dicken, Peck and Tickell’s words ‘national states, 
transnational corporations, institutions of global and supranational governance, regional and local 
states an so on are both responding to and reproducing globalization tendencies’ (Dicken, Peck and 
Tickell, 1997:165). 
On the other hand, I will follow the socio-economic paradigm which considers economic action as a 
form of social action that is socially situated and constructed. Consequently, although some points, in 
the heartlands of capitalism, have become global producers and distributors of cultural commodities 
(Scott, 2000), globalization does not imply cultural homogenisation since not only imported cultural 
products are indigenised but also, cultural global flows are filtered through the specific socio-cultural 
parameters and re-interpreted accordingly (Olds, 1996; Appadurai, 1996). 
As a result, my conceptualisation of globalisation has various important dimensions. First, 
globalisation, rather than a singular causal mechanism is a contingent and non-unidirectional outcome 
of a complex of processes (Jessop, 2000). Second, it involves the accelerated and expanded flow of 
commodities, capital, money, people and information - which has been called time-space compression 
- and the stretching out of social relations over time and space - which has been called time-space 
distantiation (Brenner, 1999; Jessop, 2000). In this way it has increased the interconnections at many 
geographical scales. Third, globalisation processes are socially constructed ‘in specific institutionally, 
historically and geographically specific sites’ (Dicken, Peck and Tickell, 1997:165). Thus, time-space 
compression needs the existence of relatively fixed spatial infrastructures to allow the flows (Brenner, 
1999). Fourth, globalisation neither is uniform or homogeneous nor causes homogenisation. Instead, it 
reinforces differences. Fifth, since it goes hand in hand with uneven development it is highly 
conflictual and contested (Jessop, 2000; Held, 2002). Finally, globalisation does not imply a scalar 
move from less inclusive scales to the global but it entails a reorganisation of the relationships 
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between scales. Moreover, it is produced at different scales (Dicken, Peck and Tickell, 1997; Jessop, 
2000). 
The scalar restructuring associated to globalisation processes has relevant implications for cities. As 
noted above, different globalisation projects are promoted from different scalar viewpoints. The 
competition among different scales to become important as a place of regulation and governance of 
the global has triggered off essential changes in the position of the urban. In the currently prevailing 
globalising project capitalist economic globalisation is dominant. As the national economy loses its 
primacy as the main object of state intervention and as the measure of economic performance, 
different political-economic spaces compete to become the new nodes of capital accumulation. This, it 
is claimed, has increased the importance given to regional and local economies whether directly 
caused by globalisation or as a reaction to it (Jessop, 2000; Brenner, 1999). On the other hand, capital 
flows are abstract and therefore need to be valorised in space. Cities do that through infrastructures 
that are spatially fixed and need to be accordingly built and adapted (Harvey, 1982; Harvey, 1985; 
Brenner, 1999; Jessop, 2000). In this way, as Neil Brenner (1999: 432-433) has pointed ‘new 
geographies of global urbanization and capital accumulation’ and state regulation have emerged both 
at supranational and sub-national scales, most importantly represented by increased inter-urban 
competition. 
In short, cities and states are being reconfigured and re-scaled to secure the valorisation of capital. 
Although both scales remain crucial forms of territorial organisation for the circulation of capital, 
globalisation has effected changes in the relative importance of cities within the global economy. On 
the one hand, leading cities have increased in size while new hierarchies of cities at a world level have 
crystallized. On the other, cities have oriented their strategies beyond the national boundaries in their 
entrepreneurial attempt to increase their economic competitive edge (Brenner, 1999; Jessop, 2000). 
Thereby, economic and political restructuring have put cities in the centre of attention. But there are 
other reasons why cities are important as units of analysis of globalisation processes. Firstly, they are 
important because they condense many forces of globalisation. In them not only trends at different 
scales interplay and can be observed but also globalisation’s physical outcomes – such as the 
transformation of the urban landscapes - become evident. As Sassen (2007: 163) puts it, ‘multiple 
processes of globalisation become concrete and localised’ in big cities. Finally, cities contain both the 
‘losers of globalisation’, that is migrants and non-qualified workers, and the ‘winners’ such as global 
corporations and economic elites, and therefore it is in them where ‘the contradictions of economic 
globalisation materialise’ (Sassen, 2007:163). 
2.3 Globalisation and inter-city competition for flagship projects  
Since the 1970’s, an entrepreneurial approach to urban governance in order to achieve economic 
growth has spread out in developed capitalist countries both geographically – in big and middle size 
cities -  and across political views  (Hubbard and Hall, 1998; Harvey, 1989). An approach that is not 
new to US cities but that has developed different characteristics in Europe (Gold and Ward, 1994; 
Haila, 1998) and which has been termed entrepreneurialism by Harvey (1989), and referred to as ‘the 
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politics of the global city’ (Haila, 1998) or the ‘new urban politics’ (Hubbard and Hall, 1998; Cox and 
Mair, 1988).  
The objectives of the new urban policy are inherently growth-oriented. They entail the political 
prioritisation of local economic development by seeking to expand the tax base, enhance property 
values and attract new forms of investment within the city territory. Definitively, the aim of such 
policies is to promote the comparative advantages of the city in relation to other cities which may be 
competing for similar forms of investment. For that purpose, local public resources previously used 
for the provision of welfare are utilised for the promotion of the private sector, especially to foster 
small firms’ economic growth (Hubbard and Hall, 1998; Leitner and Sheppard, 1998). In fact, 
entrepreneurial policies are typically characterised by the cooperation of local governments and 
business elites through public-private partnerships in which, very often, the public sector takes the 
risks and the private sector the benefits. This fact is seen by several commentators to signify the deep 
transformations occurred in urban governance (Harvey, 1989; Hubbard and Hall, 1998; Jessop, 1997), 
in Hubbard and Hall´s words it conforms an ‘organisational and institutional shift from urban 
government to urban governance’ (Hubbard and Hall, 1998:8). 
As noted above, the focus of such policies is on speculative urban investment rather than job creation 
and social welfare and therefore, David Harvey has pointed out, the political economy of place with 
its associated speculative construction of place  becomes more important  than the ‘amelioration of 
conditions within a particular territory’ (Harvey, 1989: 8). Thus, the politics of the global city is 
defined as that which creates the image of the city in order to attract investments, especially real estate 
investment (Haila, 1998). The construction of an attractive built environment is seen to attract 
investment by two means. On the one hand, it appeals to professionals and tourists (Leitner and 
Sheppard, 1998). On the other hand, an appropriate image reduces the perceived risk of real estate 
investment - which is typically based on estimates of future increases in rents and value - by 
signifying the city compromise with the real estate sector (Haila, 1998). Not in vain, the real estate 
sector has replaced the industrial sector in a time when consumption rather than production is 
highlighted as the key to prosperity.  
Although the specific strategies used by cities to attract investment vary, their success is always, to 
some extent, dependent on market forces, and imply some sort of inter-urban competition in the city’s 
attempt to enhance its comparative advantages (Harvey, 1989; Jessop, 1997; Leitner and Sheppard, 
1998). The activities typically include the re-imaging of the city through place promotion, the 
construction of place-specific mega projects and the promotion of knowledge-based industries. 
The reasons why this entrepreneurial politics are so wide-spread have to be sought at two levels, one 
is the success of a neo-liberal discourse, which stresses ideas of entrepreneurship, competitiveness, 
flexibility, innovation, and the effectiveness of the private sector, and is reflected in urban governors’ 
policy choices. The other is to be found in structural trends linked to globalisation processes. First, 
Financial markets have become more integrated geographically and institutionally and therefore, 
allegedly enhanced capital mobility, which can easily flow from one city to another (Leitner and 
Sheppard, 1998; Begg, 2002). Second, the new technologies and communications revolution have 
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meant that firms have a greater choice over location given that the importance of geographical 
accessibility has declined. This also implies that there is more scope for cities to increase their 
competitive edge through incentivation strategies such as introducing small changes in legislation and 
taxation (Harvey, 1989). Third, deindustrialisation has changed the economic sectors that drive 
growth, generating a need for cities to physically transform their obsolete infrastructure and socially 
reorganise themselves (Leitner and Sheppard, 1998). These trends have increased both the real and 
perceived economic insecurity of cities, introducing city leaders to the logic of competitiveness and 
entrepreneurship (Martin and Sunley, 1997; Hubbard and Hall, 1998; Leitner and Sheppard, 1998). 
Thus, in order to justify their entrepreneurial attitude city governors often mention, on the one hand, 
the economic instability, fiscal austerity and unemployment triggered off by de-industrialisation and, 
on the other hand, the idea that the accelerated mobility of capital and the economic dominance of 
transnational firms have made cities economically more vulnerable (Gold and Ward, 1994; Hubbard 
and Hall, 1998). 
Moreover, also national states have adhered to the neoliberalist logic of the virtues and benefits of 
competing in a free market, putting pressures on cities to act entrepreneurially, reducing expenditure 
in welfare, privatising public services, and withdrawing social and economic redistribution measures 
(Jessop, 1997; Leitner and Sheppard, 1998). In this way, cities have been deprived of an important 
source of investment and found more reasons to lure global private capital. At the same time, state 
restructuring has offered cities new opportunities. On the one hand, the decentralisation processes that 
have transferred power from the national to the regional and local levels and, on the other, the 
increasing importance of supranational economic institutions have contributed to put cities in a better 
position than states to negotiate for investment (Leitner and Sheppard, 1998; Harvey, 1989). 
All these factors have provoked a competitive response in cities that has induced some authors to give 
them the name of entrepreneurial cities (Harvey, 1989; Jessop, 1997, 1998; Hubbard and Hall, 1998; 
Leitner and Sheppard, 2002). Thus, according to Parkinson and Harding (1995:66-67) the 
entrepreneurial city can be defined as 'one where key interest groups in the public, private and 
voluntary sectors develop a commitment to realising a broadly consensual vision of urban 
development, devise appropriate structures for implementing this vision and mobilise both local and 
non-local resources to pursue it'. 
However, some commentators, based on Schumpeter’s definition of entrepreneurship as ‘the creation 
of opportunities for surplus profit through 'new combinations' or innovation’ (Schumpeter, 1934 in 
Jessop, 1998: 79)  have problematised the characterization of all so-called ‘entrepreneurial cities’ as 
entrepreneurial. Jessop (1998: 79), drawing on Cox’s distinction between strong competition – aimed 
to ‘improve the overall (structural) competitiveness of a locality through innovation’ - and weak 
competition – aimed to the ‘reallocation of existing resources at the expense of other localities’ - has 
argued that, most ‘entrepreneurial cities’ are engaged in weak forms of competition such as regulatory 
and city re-imaging measures to attract footloose capital and therefore cannot be properly called 
entrepreneurial. Leitner and Sheppard (1998: 305) have called such weak or soft competitive 
strategies ‘inward investment types of entrepreneurial strategies’. 
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David Harvey (1989) has identified four, non-exclusive, entrepreneurial options for cities. Cities can 
compete within the international division of labour, over acquisition of control and command 
functions, for central government redistribution capital or within the spatial division of consumption. 
The last one is the more extended as it focused on weak types of competition such as the attraction of 
tourism and quality of life by physical upgrading of the urban environment and the provision of 
consumer attractions and entertainment.  
Although, according to Bob Jessop (1998) most cities would not enter the category of entrepreneurial, 
the narratives of the entrepreneurial city have been very successful to present cities as such, becoming 
regularly used by local governors in their rhetoric to justify and legitimate their policies (Hubbard and 
Hall, 1998; Haila, 1998).  Jessop has argued that the success of the discourse is due to its plausibility 
and to the fact that it resonates with personal stories. In his words, ‘the entrepreneurial city or region 
as subject, site, and stake in economic competitiveness’ ‘has been constructed in and through public 
narratives’ (Jessop, 1997:30). Thus, as the city has been re-imagined as an entrepreneurial entity that 
needs to enhance its competitiveness, its governance has been transformed to involve private sector 
actors which, allegedly, are more efficient and competitive. At the same time, the narratives of the 
entrepreneurial city have presented competitiveness as an unavoidable approach to resolving the 
cities’ economic problems in a globalised world, thus, avoiding debate (Jessop, 1997). 
In addition, the conceptualisation of a city as entrepreneurial poses several further problems. First, 
treating a city as an economic actor, as a unity, is questionable. On the one hand, cities are 
representations (MacNeill, 1998). As Harvey (1989) has argued, they are constituted by complex sets 
of social relations and different interests and therefore cannot be equated with their political leaders or 
coalitions. On the other hand, there is the risk of considering cities as firms that compete among 
themselves in the marketplace. The analogy, Leitner (1998) has argued, rests on the assumption that 
cities are economic actors that compete on an even playing field where all cities have the same access 
to resources and are equally equipped for competition. These assumptions ignore that cities depart 
with differences, they are embedded in ‘a set of national and regional institutions, regulatory systems, 
traditions and norms that condition the nature and possible outcomes of local initiatives’ (Leitner and 
Sheppard, 1998:300). Moreover, cities are territorially defined and local governments’ democratic 
legitimation is subject to the achievement of goals other than economic profit, such as the welfare of 
their residents. Second, a focus on the entrepreneurial characteristics of a city may divert attention 
from other relevant narratives and interpretations, especially, locally and empirically centered 
(MacNeill, 1998). Third, as noted above, cities that present themselves as entrepreneurial are very 
often not engaged in innovation but just selling their image (Jessop, 1998), so more than real 
entrepreneurship we are in front of a zero-sum competition among cities. 
And this takes us to the question of the effectiveness of such strategies. Indeed, there is wide 
consensus that policies based on investing money and subsidising firms with the aim of relocating 
economic activities and attracting footloose capital are ineffective and counter-productive from a 
regional point of view since they do no generate wealth but transfer investment from one place to 
another (Agnew, 2000; Leitner, 1998; Begg, 2002). Moreover, as entrepreneurial strategies are copied 
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by new competitors – and competitive weak strategies are easy to imitate - their effectiveness declines 
since the competitive advantage fades, creating in this way the necessity of continually introducing 
new ideas (Leitner, 1998; Jessop, 1998; Harvey, 1989). In this cyclic process of introduction of new 
strategies and imitation the inequalities between cities increase. Thus, Harvey (1989) has pointed out 
that, as more and more cities ‘feel compelled’ to enter the competition game there will be losers as 
well as winners. Dominant cities will exploit their advantaged position while cities of lower hierarchy 
or worse positioned to compete, will struggle to follow them. This trend is enhanced by the support 
given by national states to the most competitive cities and regions and the withdrawal of the nationally 
provided welfare funds (Martin and Sunley, 1997). 
On the other hand, empirical studies have suggested that entrepreneurial strategies, while actually 
renovating the urban landscape and giving an impression of economic regeneration, have failed to 
redress their employment, social and fiscal situation (Barnekov, Boyle and Roch, 1988; Hubbard and 
Hall, 1998; Holcomb, 1993; Leitner and Sheppard, 1998; García, 2005). They have also provoked in 
many cases the increasing indebtedness of local and regional governments. 
Even when entrepreneurial strategies do succeed in attracting investment they have proved to 
exacerbate distributive inequalities of wealth and income. They increase the social and economic 
problems of the disadvantaged communities, while those with economic interests, such as property 
owners, in favoured areas or highly skilled workers of certain sectors benefit (Hubbard and Hall, 
1998; Agnew, 2000; Harvey, 1989; Leitner, 1998).  Some reasons have been pointed out to explain 
why entrepreneurial strategies are bound to producing inequity. First of all, concentration on image 
diverts attention – and investment in welfare provision for the disadvantaged social groups - from 
economic and social problems. Second, the kind of activities often favoured by city governors, 
generally small businesses and service sector activities based on consumption and entertainment, 
generate jobs in opposite poles of income (Harvey, 1989). Also, it has been argued that such 
strategies, through the resort to public-private partnership have amounted to a net transfer of public 
resources to the private sector, as cities subsidise the cost of relocation of firms in order to attract 
investment, provide the infrastructures and absorb the risk (Harvey, 1989; Leitner, 1998). In addition, 
by subsidising capital in their competition with each other, cities have facilitated the relocation of 
economic activity thereby increasing their economic insecurity. On the other hand, according to David 
Harvey, inter-urban competition has facilitated the transition to flexible accumulation as ‘urban 
governments have been forced into innovation and investment to make their cities more attractive as 
consumer and cultural centres’ (Harvey, 1990: 256), and  it has ‘opened up the urban spaces to new 
patterns of development’ (Harvey, 1989:11). Therefore, it is clear that ‘soft’ or ‘inward investment 
types of entrepreneurial strategies’ are not only ineffective but produce negative impacts, too.  
In response to the drawbacks of entrepreneurialism different alternatives to it have been proposed. 
Those alternatives include the promotion of the enterprise society that would focus ‘on personal and 
community enabling and empowerment rather than private enterprise and private profit; and on the 
learning region rather than the entrepreneurial city’ (Jessop, 1998:98), the enhancement of the 
competitive rather than the comparative advantage of a city or region by engaging in innovation 
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(Begg, 2002; Agnew, 2000) or the defence of policy integration as a mechanism to compensate the 
negative effects of competition in terms of welfare and wealth and income distribution (Savitch and 
Kantor, 1995; Hubbard and Hall, 1998; Begg, 2002; Portas, 2003). The more widely extended 
proposal has been the resource to cooperation in the form of city networks. This option has been 
embraced by both progressives, such as Portas (2003) - as an alternative to markets – and neoliberals - 
as a vehicle for promoting free markets. For progressives, by cooperating with the other cities of the 
network, they become better equipped to challenge the power of capital while for neoliberals the 
networks allow the markets to function adequately by providing the necessary trust (Leitner and 
Sheppard, 2002). 
However, Leitner and Sheppard (1998 and 2002) have argued that networks are not an alternative to 
competitiveness since they just elevate competition to the scale of the network, excluding the less 
prosperous cities and citizens from the benefits of collaboration. Moreover, given that networks are 
embedded in pre-existing state structures, really existing networks show a tendency towards 
‘hierarchy, inequality, imitation, and exclusion’, characteristics that have contributed to turn them into 
‘channels of neoliberalisation’ (Leitner and Sheppard, 2002:514). 
2.4 Cities and global architecture  
Place promotion, particularly through key developments promoted as flagship projects, has become 
one of the main strategies deployed by city leaders of ‘entrepreneurial cities’ in order to achieve 
economic regeneration. It has a long tradition, especially in North America – represented, for instance, 
by the City Beautiful schemes of the early twentieth century – which, from the beginning, exported 
models to Europe and the rest of the world. However, only in the last decades it has become a global 
phenomenon. Increasingly, also Europe has started to provide models – particularly for cultural 
strategies - as shown by the diffusion of the cases of Glasgow, Newcastle, Bilbao and Barcelona 
(Ward, 1998; Gold and Ward, 1994, Bailey et al., 2004, Miles, 2005a; Miles, 2005b; Miles and 
Paddison, 2005). Physical rejuvenation and re-imaging are the most common devices used to signal 
change for tourists, and investors, and they are so widely used that cities have ended up having a 
uniform appearance. 
The practice has been called place selling, place promotion, place marketing or place advertising, 
often used as synonymous. Philo and Kearns have defined place selling as a practice that ‘entails the 
various ways in which public and private agencies - local authorities and local entrepreneurs, often 
working collaboratively - strive to 'sell' the image of a particular geographically-defined 'place', 
usually a town or city, so as to make it attractive to economic enterprises, to tourists and even to 
inhabitants of that place’ (Philo and Kearns, 1993:3). 
For Tim Hall, however, there is a fundamental difference between selling and marketing that can be 
applied to cities too. Whereas selling consists on persuading the buyers that they ‘want or need what 
one has to sell’ and therefore it is determined by the product itself, marketing, through advertising, 
actually shapes the product one is trying to sell (Hall,1998:29). Consequently, drawing on Fretter’s 
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work (1993) Hall (1998) has argued that place marketing, more than just selling the city to lure firms 
to relocate in the area and tourists, is actually shaping the city in the sense that it is guiding its 
development in order to achieve a desired environment.  Also Gold and Ward have incorporated a 
clear reference to marketing in their definition of place promotion which, in their words is ‘the 
conscious use of publicity and marketing to communicate selective images of specific geographical 
localities or areas to a target audience’ (Gold and Ward, 1994:2). In fact, two of the main activities 
that place promotion involves are the manipulation of culture and the use of history to enhance the 
appeal of places (Philo and Kearns, 1993; Ward, 1998; Crilley, 1993; Miles, 2007). Indeed, not only 
urban landscapes but the histories behind them need to be aesthetisized and packaged in order to make 
a place attractive. An image of cultural diversity, sometimes even of exotism - albeit conveniently de-
politicised and sanitised - is directed to an audience of consumers of housing, culture and 
entertainment. Therefore, the most attractive images are selected and appropriated while ‘any 
problems are played down’ (Ward, 1998:1). 
In this light, the objectives of place promotion can be considered twofold.  Apart from the spelled out 
goal of achieving economic regeneration by attracting investment and tourist expenditure, place 
promotion is aimed, via the media, press and advertising to ‘galvanise local support and foster civic 
pride’(Hubbard, 1996:1443). And, thereby, by attempting to convince citizens of the virtues of 
competitive strategies it becomes a form of social control (Philo and Kearns, 1993; Hubbard, 1996), 
what Harvey (1989) has referred to as 'bread and circuses'. Therefore, as Phil Hubbard has pointed 
out, ‘city images, cultures and experiences have become every bit as important to the accumulation of 
social and political power by hegemonic groups as more traditional material concerns’ (Hubbard, 
1996:1443). Nevertheless, the manipulation of image is likely to provoke tensions and conflicts over 
representation. According to Zukin (1995), different interest groups – corporations, community 
groups, professional groups - have their own vision and exercise political pressure to imprint it on the 
urban landscape. Moreover, as Hubbard (1996) has pointed out, while an attractive urban landscape 
can produce the effect of diverting attention from more essential issues it can also render evident the 
high level of expenditure and lead citizens to question who actually profits from entrepreneurial 
strategies. Although city marketers often use techniques to anticipate conflict such as, using references 
to the local history and culture in architecture, urban design and public art or accusing oppositional 
groups of being against progress these methods not always work and, very often, conflict does arise 
(Boyle and Hughes, 1991; Philo and Kearns, 1993; Hubbard, 1996). Some commentators have even 
argued that the typical oppositional group constituted by academics, professionals and businessmen 
rather than being representative of the local population serves as an alibi to entrepreneurial governors 
to claim that they have co-operated with the public (Robinson and Shaw, 1991; Hubbard, 1996). 
Thereby, not surprisingly, place promotion has received much academic criticism. On the one hand, 
cities engaged in place promotion are accused of presenting an image of regeneration that differs from 
a reality of unemployment and social problems which have not been adequately addressed (Hall, 
1998). This fact makes evident that importance is given to surface rather than to content. Thereby, the 
individuality of a place is just superficial for surface differences suffice to make an image attractive, 
draining any controversial content from it (Philo and Kearns, 1993). And, by wanting to differentiate 
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themselves in such a superficial way, marketed places end up giving a sense of homogeneity (Philo 
and Kearns, 1993), what Harvey (1989) has called serial reproduction. On the other hand, the 
appropriation of image by economic and political elites in order to constitute ‘an “official” urban 
image’ very often involved in place marketing tends to be exclusionary (Hall, 1998:28; Zukin, 1995). 
In Tim Hall’s words; ‘because the audiences for place promotion are predominantly white and 
wealthy, the people who populate the imagined cities of place promotion are similarly white and 
wealthy’ (Hall, 1998:28). In short, cities involved in place promotion are most commonly accused of 
dualism of image, superficiality, homogeneity and of fostering the appropriation of urban identity by 
politically and economically powerful groups. In addition, from a public policy viewpoint, analysts 
agree that, place promotion objectives are difficult to reconcile with more welfarist ones because in 
order to achieve the first public expenditure is diverted into speculative image construction (Ward, 
1998; Hubbard, 1996). 
Although there are many ways of promoting places such as advertising and, bidding for and 
organizing special events - sports, Olympics, capital of culture, expos - the most extended - and 
generally included in the others - is the use of architecture and urban design for, some physical reality 
in needed in order to support the image of regeneration that is being marketed (Ward, 1998). For that 
reason, architecture has become one of the most effective forms of advertising. Indeed, it constitutes a 
powerful device deployed to signify a city’s economic regeneration and urban vitality (Crilley, 1993). 
The mechanism in play is the mobilisation of symbolic capital, which, according to Pierre Bourdieu, 
is “the collection of luxury goods attesting the taste and distinction of the owner” (in Harvey, 1990). 
Emblematic buildings are a source of symbolic capital, generated not only by mere aesthetics but 
through the association with architects with cultural credentials, who also advertise themselves in 
glossy architectural magazines (Crilley, 1993). Sklair has called such structures iconic architecture, 
defined as ‘buildings or spaces that are famous for architects or the public and have special 
symbolic/aesthetic significance attached to them’ (Sklair; 2005:485). 
In their analysis of architecture as an advertising tool, many commentators have argued that the post-
modernist architectural paradigm – with its emphasis on symbolism and narration – is the most 
adequate for the practice of place marketing (Crilley, 1993; Harvey, 1990; Philo and Kearns, 1993). 
Post-modern architecture is seen to coincide with the ethos of place promotion in different ways. On 
the one hand, linked to the idea of urbanity, post-modern architects seek in their architecture qualities 
such as difference and diversity. The result is an ornamental mode of expression that uses 
recognisable elements In fact, in opposition to the stylistic unity and purity of modernism, post-
modern architecture is eclectic. It makes use of historical styles and vernacular traditions to familiarise 
the public with the urban landscape (Crilley, 1993). Thus, ‘the resources of culture and history readily 
get stirred into the post-modern melting-pot’ in order to appeal to the nostalgic feelings of the 
observer (Philo and Kearns, 1993:22). On the other hand, it is claimed that post-modern architects 
have learnt from market research and apply techniques such as the segmentation of markets in order to 
make their architecture attractive to different aesthetic tastes and cultures (Crilley, 1993). 
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By those means, post-modernism in architecture is considered to divert attention from content to 
surface, from the social relations of production to style (Crilley, 1993). In Ghirardo’s words: 'builders 
and developers could not in their wildest dreams have designed a strategy of such academic and 
intellectual status that it would successfully direct analysis toward trivial matters of surface and away 
from much more vexing matters of substance' (Ghirado, 1990:236 in Crilley, 1993). Other 
characteristics of post-modern architecture have received academic critique too. The collage approach 
to design - which mixes elements from different styles and materials - not only has the effect of 
familiarising the public with the urban landscape but, also contributes to the draining of meaning and 
socio-political content through excessive decontextualisation (Philo and Kearns, 1993). Therefore, 
postmodern architecture, in spite of the alleged fact that it seeks to be ‘more democratic’ by appealing 
to a wider audience in response to the univalence of modern architecture, is not other than a new 
stylistic form adopted by the architecture of power in order to mobilise meaning in support of the 
status quo (Philo and Kearns, 1993; Hubbard, 1996). Thus, according to David Harvey (1990), post-
modernism in architecture has facilitated the transition to a regime of flexible accumulation. Although 
he acknowledges that post-modernism can be interpreted in more sympathetic ways, and as instances 
he mentions Aldo Rossi and Frampton’s critical regionalism, Harvey insists in the impact on the city 
of postmodern architecture connected to flexible accumulation. 
For other commentators such as Olds (1996) modernist architecture – or, in its latest period also called 
neo-modernist architecture- with its preference for space and spectacular huge buildings and its 
abstract international style that can be applied in whatever spot of the world, is more consistent with 
the entrepreneurial approach and with creating buildings which are meant to connect with global 
flows.    
Whatever style is preferred, it is true that lately the interest of architects – post-modernist or neo-
modernist – has been directed towards the surface. Thus, increasingly neo-modernist architecture 
focuses attention on the use of new and eye-catching materials in the facades. Also, very often, 
achieving a building with a breathtaking sculptural form becomes more important than the perception 
of space typically prioritised by modernist architects.  Thereby, architecture becomes a means to 
produce eye-catching images that can be reproduced in glossy architectural journals in order to 
advertise, at the same time, the architect, those who have commissioned the project and, as noted 
above, the place where the work of architecture is located. In this light, the criticisms to post-modern 
architecture, especially the interest in surface rather than content, could in many senses be applied to 
neo-modernist architecture as well. 
Whereas post-modern architecture aims to achieve social control by means of its eclectism, use of 
history and local traditions, decontextualisation and multiple narratives, neo-modernism resorts to a 
strategy of admiration and impact. Thus, when the idiosyncrasy of a place requires that a sense of 
looking forwardness and pride in local achievement is highlighted, the attributes preferred are 
monumentality and grandeur as for instance in the case of the City of Arts and Sciences in Valencia 
with its futuristic look. Therefore, I am more inclined to follow Hubbard (1996) in not equating a 
specific ‘style’ - post-modern architecture - with a form of governance - entrepreneurialism. Although 
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the argument that post-modernism has furbished effective ideological and empirical design tools for 
place marketing through architecture is convincing that does not mean that the same goals - place 
selling and social control - cannot be achieved by resorting to other mechanisms and architectural 
languages. As Philo and Kearns (1993) have pointed out, urban elites have been exercising social 
control through cultural practices since very early on in history. In this sense, according to Phil 
Hubbard ‘the direct mapping that is frequently made between post-modern architectural forms and 
urban entrepreneurialism fails to recognise the complex institutional and social processes involved in 
the production of the built environment, and the complex manner in which  meaning  is appropriated 
and  redesignated through local processes of social and spatial differentiation’ (Hubbard, 1996:1459). 
In any case, whatever the architectural approach to city building, there is wide consensus that 
architecture –especially iconic architecture - produces both space and symbols, in an intimately linked 
manner. Zukin (1995) has theorised it making use of the concept of the symbolic economy. For her, 
cities have always had symbolic economies, that is to say “a continual production of symbols and 
spaces that frames and gives meaning to ethnic competition, racial change, and environmental renewal 
and decay” but modern cities owe them to the devise of place entrepreneurs (Zukin, 1995:256). 
But, in a globalising world, other issues about the production of symbols must be taken into account. 
On the one hand, the production of symbols has shifted from local to global images. The stretching of 
relationships of power associated to globalisation processes has implied that also the meanings and 
symbols attached to power have acquired global dimensions. Thus, global symbolism is also being 
used in iconic architecture. The audience to which the message is directed is wider than the local 
communities as it intends to reach ‘globally’ through mass media circulation of images and tourism. 
Therefore it has to be ‘legible’ as a symbol for a ‘global’ audience even when in some way it is 
intended to express a distinct ‘local identity’.  
Thereby, culture has become, at the same time, both place-bound and global in scope. In order to 
analyse the global cultural economy Appadurai (1996) has proposed a framework that considers the 
‘relationships among flows of persons, technologies, finance, information, and ideology’ (Appadurai, 
1996:47). These interrelated flows or what he has called ethnoscapes, technoscapes, finanscapes, 
mediascapes and ideoscapes impact on the construction of the built environment. Therefore, in the 
production of iconic architecture, not only flows of images and symbols are involved, also other flows 
–such as finance and real estate flows - and processes related to globalisation are important. As Leslie 
Sklair (2005:485) has pointed out ‘one of the consequences of capitalist globalization is a 
transformation in the production, marketing and reception of iconic architecture’. 
On the one hand, the internationalisation of financial markets has increased the funds available for the 
construction of spectacular developments (Haila, 1998; Olds, 1996). On the other hand, the spread of 
similar methods of construction (Haila, 1998) and the globalisation of real estate markets (Olds, 1996) 
has facilitated the operation of transnational companies in the development industry. 
However, property markets are not as globalised as it is often claimed. Wood (2004) in his study of 
the property development industry in Columbus (Ohio) concluded that the development industry has a 
parochial and fragmented form that at the same time, places importance on local politics and 
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networking. Also, in his words, ‘the inherently speculative nature of the industry places a significant 
premium on local knowledge, which, in turn, encourages the development and reproduction of a 
locally embedded organizational form’ (Wood, 2004:137). Therefore, in contrast to the thesis that 
globalisation implies a scalar transformation of economic activity, Wood highlights the cultural 
embeddedness of economic practices and also the importance for analysts to focus on developers 
rather than finance.  
Finally, the stretching of social relations has meant that global actors are working to construct the 
image of the cities around the world, especially global elite architects, who move from city to city to 
design the urban landscape and thereby contribute to the  dissemination of  urban development 
models.  
2.5 Cities and global actors  
In order to understand the changes that cities are currently undergoing it is necessary to consider 
general trends towards globalisation and liberalisation. Nevertheless, it is also essential that the actors 
driving those changes are situated and interpreted not only as subject to systemic forces but as agents 
of change too. If globalisation and global flows are social constructs that are culturally embedded then 
they are not abstract entities but formulated by actors with the ability to activate such flows and the 
power to shape globalising trends. Therefore, on the one hand individual actors respond to external 
pressures that are due to the general trends, as well as to internal motivations, while, on the other hand 
the aggregate of their actions contribute to form the general trends (Massey, 1985; Olds, 1996; 
Fainstein, 2001). 
Increasingly, as a result of the stretching of social relations characteristic of globalisation, different 
social and ethnic groups, and economic and political formations operate at transnational levels 
(Appadurai, 1997). This is especially true of transnational cultural and professional elites which have 
been given much academic attention as ‘conduits’ of globalisation (Sklair, 2005; Olds, 1996; Sassen, 
2007). Indeed, social contacts, networking and travelling are becoming more important for 
transnational elites, contributing to the emergence of transnational professional communities that 
share knowledge and expertise (Ward, 2005). 
Sklair (2005) has called this group of transnational elite professionals the transnational capitalist class  
and defined them as ‘people from many countries who operate transnationally as a normal part of their 
working lives and who more often than not have more than one place that they can call home’ (Sklair, 
2005:485). They are transnational in the sense that they have ‘globally linked economic interests and 
outward-oriented globalising perspectives, seek to exert economic control locally and internationally, 
share similar life-styles and project images of themselves as citizens of the world as well as of their 
places of birth’ (Sklair, 2005: 486). 
Under processes of globalisation transnational elites of professionals have acquired increasing 
relevance, however, they are more connected to the geographical territory than is typically depicted. 
As Sklair (2005) has pointed out, the transnational capitalist class has both globalising and localising 
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agendas. According to Saskia Sassen (2007) they are embedded in dense local social contexts and, 
moreover, in order to be hypermobile they need an advanced infrastructure which, to a great extent, 
has to be provided by the states where they work. The production of this platform is related to the 
partial denationalisation of certain institutional domains. Therefore the trasnational class of 
professionals is situated in an intermediate position between the global and the national scale (Sassen, 
2007). 
To the transnational elite, Sassen (2007) adds another two global classes. The first one is the class 
formed by transnational civil servants that must coordinate their activities around the world such as 
judges, migration agents or police officers specialised in finance flows of global terrorism. The other 
one is constituted by transnational social activists and migrant communities. In order to conceptualise 
the politics of big cities with global aspirations both global capital and the global migrant workforce 
must be considered. According to Saskia Sassen (2007) these classes are partially denationalised but 
still embedded in national spheres. This implies that their socio-political structures may be more 
affected by policies and governmental mechanisms than is usually believed and, thus, they could be a 
bridge between dense national spheres and the global dynamics (Sassen, 2007). 
However, it is the transnational capitalist class, Leslie Sklair (2005) has argued, the one which is most 
responsible for the promotion of the use of iconic architecture as a means of economic development. 
Thus, regarding the production of urban space, the transnational capitalist class includes four fractions 
- the corporate fraction, the state fraction, the consumerist fraction and the technical fraction – and 
each fraction includes groups of people with different links to iconic buildings (Sklair, 2005). The 
corporate fraction is constituted by those who control the major transnational architectural and 
engineering corporations and their local affiliates. The state fraction includes politicians and 
bureaucrats who decide what gets built where and how. In ‘entrepreneurial cities’, they very often 
form coalitions of interest with global economic actors to promote iconic architecture projects. The 
consumerist fraction includes the merchants and media. The media contribute to raise the profile of 
iconic architecture and architects while, at the same time, academics who write for architectural 
journals have joined the ‘starchitecture system’ (Sklair, 2005). The technical fraction includes the 
globalising professionals. According to Olds (1996) globalisation processes are dependent on the 
knowledge of experts, which are considered agents of globalisation - in the case of mega-projects they 
depend on property developers, government officials and professional elites involved in their design, 
implementation and management around the world. Moreover, these epistemic communities work 
through the formation of globalised relationship networks among them (Olds, 1996). 
Although the origins of international professional practice in architecture and urban planning, 
according to Stephen Ward (2005), must be traced back to the end of the 19th century and are related 
to the structural context as well as with the inherent characteristics of the profession, under 
globalisation processes, the tendency towards international practice has intensified. On the one hand, 
the spread of entrepreneurial policies has widened the scope for iconic architecture. On the other hand, 
iconic architecture tends to involve mega projects rather than piecemeal development and as projects 
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become of bigger scale the companies involved in their production need to be bigger too. This 
generally implies that their global links are more extended too.  
Therefore, the need for specialised firms in big scale projects has given elite architects the opportunity 
to work in cities around the world that are willing to acquire global credentials. This has increased 
their expertise and symbolic capital at the same time. In this way, they have gained more advantage 
over potential competitors and, therefore, reduced the number of star-architects who can aspire to big 
commissions. This is where the interests of star architects regarding mega-projects come into play. In 
fact, it is just a small group of architects who are producing the majority of iconic buildings. The term 
Global Intelligence Corps (GIC) is used to designate this ‘very small number of élite architectural and 
planning firms that aspire for prestigious commissions in cities around the world’ (Olds, 1996:142).  
Typically, these few firms are not big corporations but what Sklair (2005) has called ‘strong ideas 
firms’, namely architectural studios lead by signature architects rich in symbolic capital. Kris Olds 
(1996) has argued that it is through professional discourses that elite architects are constituted. Thus 
prestigious architects take part in competitions and exhibitions, engage in the dissemination of their 
work through books, specialised journals and general press and, even lecture at university in order to 
increase the symbolic capital needed to obtain important commissions. 
Yet, elite architects, apart from increasing their symbolic capital, need to devote much effort to 
networking with global actors such as members of professional bodies, of the press, financiers or 
transnational property developers, since they are dependent on the willingness of economic and 
political elites to hire them (Olds, 1996).  
It is mainly the GIC who help other elite public and private actors to profit from the changes that 
mega-projects are conduit of, and from the economic benefits they entail (Olds, 1996). As Moulaert et 
al. (2005) have discussed, the interest groups participating in iconic mega-projects belong to business, 
political and professional elites while citizen and grassroots movements are excluded from not only 
decision-making but the benefits too.  Certainly, although mega-projects can be studied in relationship 
to global flows, they also represent the territorialisation of capital, which benefits local and global 
elites (Olds, 1996; Moulaert et al., 2005). The viability and profitability of these projects - which 
become speculative real estate investments - often depend on the future materialisation of urban rents 
Swyngedouw et al., 2005a, 2005b). In this territorialisation of capital, the state plays a mediating role 
(Swyngedouw et al., 2005b). Politicians, at the same time, depend on private capital investment and 
on real estate revenues for funding but also need democratic legitimisation and are subject to 
grassroots pressures from citizens. Iconic architecture designed by elite professionals have proved to 
be a useful tool for the popular good reception of mega-projects and electorally profitable for 
politicians. 
2.6 Globalisation and localisation  
On closer inspection, globalisation processes clearly appear to be linked to localisation processes in 
various ways. First of all, globalisation is not only shaped in global institutions but is also locally 
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produced through political activity conducted at local, regional and national scales.  The majority of 
states, albeit via different paths, have qualitatively reorganised and implemented policies that facilitate 
economic globalisation (Sassen, 2007; McLeod, 2001; in MacLeod: Anderson, 1996; Le Gales, 
1998b; Peck, 2000). Therefore, different scales, from the local to the global are involved in processes 
of globalisation, which, it has been argued, have changed the nature of the relationships between 
scales (Dicken, Peck and Tickell 1997; Jessop, 2000). The fact that globalisation is constructed at 
different scales implies that not just global actors but also local actors drive globalisation. Moreover, 
even global actors, as discussed in the previous section, are more connected to the geographical 
territory than is typically depicted given that economic activity is socially and culturally embedded. 
Particularly in property development, networking is a fundamental activity for engaging in business. 
Local networks, on the one hand, generate, circulate and valorise the local knowledge that a spatially 
fixed industry needs. On the other hand, they enable the involvement of those responsible for land 
regulation in the support of development practices (Wood, 2004). Thus, not only star architects but 
also property developers need to establish links with local politicians, a fact that contributes to embed 
property development practices within local contexts. 
Second, globalisation has made place and identities connected to it, become economically and 
politically more important. According to Harvey (1993) this is due to the facts that on the one hand 
globalisation is perceived as a threat to local identities and on the other, through entrepreneurial 
activities and inter-urban competition, place distinctiveness has become an economic asset. This is 
reflected in the different strategies pursued by cities and firms in order to enhance and exploit local 
differences, such as glurbanisation and glocalisation (Swyngedouw in Brenner, 1999; Jessop, 2000). 
At the same time, speculative place construction has fostered economic accumulation via real estate 
activity as shown by the appearance of local growth coalitions. Place identity is linked to property 
values and property values are determined economically but also socially because they are a means of 
social differentiation (Zukin, 1995). As a consequence they are used for the accumulation of both 
capital and power.  
Yet, place identity is not only important because of its economic and social value for also its 
symbolism invokes feelings of belonging to imagined communities such as nation or ethnicity. Thus, 
in the politics of place, struggles over representation become intertwined with those related to 
economic interests and relationships of power (Harvey, 1993). It is through the increased importance 
given to place identity that globalisation has contributed to the emergence of different nationalisms 
which, political elites have come to use as a weapon to justify the need for the decentralisation of 
power and thereby pursue their political project. It is in this context that McNeill and Tewdwr-Jones 
(2003), drawing on Billig's (1995) concept of 'banal nationalism' have argued that architecture has 
become one of the main vehicles of national or regional identity. Iconic architecture becomes thus 
imbued with further meanings while the image of urban revitalisation appears connected to the 
resurgence of a national or regional identity. 
Furthermore, in the struggle among different scales to become the relevant institutional arena in a 
globalising world, political-economic elites of cities, regions and even nations have resorted to 
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different kinds of localisms from an economic perspective too. According to Brenner and Theodore 
these elites are ‘aggressively attempting to promote economic rejuvenation from below’ (Brenner and 
Theodore, 2002:342). In this sense, regions are being increasingly viewed by many as the territorial 
framework where economic development can be effectively pursued. As explained by Scott (1998), 
from his perspective, the world economy is constituted by a 'global mosaic of regional economies' in 
which regional economies are lead by the specialised economies of their major cities (Scott, 1998: 
70). Both academics and politicians have adhered to this view of the regional political economy. The 
body of work produced by the increasing number of scholars that have proclaimed the re-emergence 
of the regional economies and consequently emphasised ‘the significance of the region as an effective 
arena for situating the institutions of post-Fordist economic governance’ has been described as the 
New Regionalism (McLeod, 2001:807). The thesis of the New Regionalists has been used to guide 
policy choices and has permeated political discourses. 
Certainly, when studying globalisation and localisation processes linked to iconic mega-projects, the 
regional scale - as the Valencia case study will show – has increasingly become a crucial object of 
analysis from an economic, political and identity viewpoints, particularly in the Spanish context where 
since the 1980s competencies accumulated by central governments during the development of the 
welfare state – such as education, health and urban planning – have been decentralized and handed to 
the regional tier of government. However, a focus on the regional without further considering inter-
scalar relationships entails the risk of ignoring the social and political embeddedness of economy as 
well as the importance of power relations. In John Lovering’s words, New Regionalism shows ‘a 
reluctance to place regional change within a wider political economy that is increasingly characterized 
by fiscal restraint and welfare retrenchment’ (Lovering, 1999: 388). 
In fact, despite the new regionalist interest in highlighting the importance of regional economies, 
many large cities and regions in the Western World have very little political autonomy and are 
embedded in national political structures (Agnew, 2000). Lovering has also suggested that such 
alleged regional resurgence ‘reflects the rise of a new regional service class’ of ‘economic 
development professionals’(Lovering, 1999:390) to which it could be added that it signifies the 
potential promise of a new source of political power and influence at a sub-national level. 
Furthermore, a focus on micro-economic scale and disregard of the fact that economy is socially and 
politically constructed implies a bias towards neoliberalism. On the one hand, placing the 
responsibility for economic development at a regional level contributes to the justification of the 
dismantlement of welfarist redistributive structures at higher scale levels (Lovering, 1999). On the 
other hand, considering regions or cities as economic actors that compete as if they were firms tends 
to foster neoliberalism by focussing attention on the specific activities that cities undertake and 
diverting it from the wider political and ideological context. In this way, the perception of the 
increased importance of regional economies disguises the real relevance of the capitalist global 
economic interests in promoting the competitive game in which cities feel compelled to take part 
(McLeod, 2001). By this means, global elements of neoliberalism have been, particularly since the 
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1980’s, transferred internationally, but as such experiments have been translated to local contexts they 
have been in part driven and amplified by bottom up processes. 
2.7 Conclusion  
It is clear that both globalisation and localisation processes are closely linked. Jointly considered they 
will help make sense of the changes observed in cities as well as of the increasing interest of urban 
governors and economically powerful groups in iconic architecture and flagship projects. On the other 
hand, taking account of the fact that both local and global actors drive globalisation and are agents of 
change, closer attention must be directed to the political, economic, cultural and professional elites, 
who have more power to influence the shaping of such globalisation and localisation processes (Olds, 
1996). 
As discussed in the previous section, general trends towards globalisation and liberalisation are in part 
driven and amplified by bottom-up processes as reflected in the vigorously negotiated and contested 
economic politics of place and the politics of identity. Consequently local politics matter and this 
means that it is important to understand how local coalitions of interests work and the way in which 
they come together. But it is evident too that further issues related to the global scale have become 
intermingled with more localist views. In consequence, in an era of globalisation, the underlying 
interests involved in local politics are not only local in scope but strategically directed to the global 
scale too. This means that it is necessary to take into account on the one hand global actors, and on the 
other local actors with their global connections and motivations. 
To conclude, not only growth coalitions, political elites and the like but also grassroots associations 
and migrant communities must be situated in the wider context with their multiple global associations 
in order to adequately conceptualise the politics of globalising metropolitan regions. 
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3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: THE POLITICS OF URBAN 
REGENERATION IN A GLOBAL ERA 
3.1 Introduction 
In the last decades, the new urban policy has put emphasis on economic regeneration. As discussed in 
the previous chapter, the promotion of growth and competitiveness - particularly through the use of 
‘global architecture’ - has been the key strategy for addressing urban economic and social decline. 
Thus, urban regeneration - generally based on physical renewal - has become central to economic 
regeneration policies, which have been directed to restructuring urban economies after de-
industrialisation in order to position them favourably in the global economic stage (Swyngedouw et 
al., 2002; Brenner, 2003; Rodríguez et al., 2005; Coaffee, 2007a, 2007b).  
Gradually, Keynesian distributional policies have been substituted by spatially targeted interventions 
(Swyngedouw et al., 2002). Thus, regeneration is seen as a place based activity whereby places are 
regenerated rather than the necessities of the population met. Regeneration is understood as ‘the 
transformation of a place—residential, commercial or open space—that has displayed the symptoms 
of physical, social and/or economic decline’ (Evans, 2005:967). Such transformation combines social, 
economic and physical aspects and therefore urban regeneration can be defined as ‘a comprehensive 
integrated vision and action which leads to the resolution of urban problems and which seeks to bring 
about lasting change in the economic, social, physical and environmental condition of an area that has 
been the subject of change’ (Roberts and Sykes, 2000:17 in Coaffee, 2007:150). 
Various models for economic regeneration have been put forward.  The most important and widely 
spread are property-led and culture-led regeneration. In the first case, the development or 
improvement of buildings for ‘occupation and investment purposes’ (Turok, 1992:362) is considered 
to be the engine of change while in the second it is cultural activity, generally represented by a 
flagship cultural venue or event - expo, city of culture or even the organisation of the Olympic Games 
- which is used as the symbol of regeneration (Evans, 2005). Indeed, art or sport events are considered 
perfect catalysts for regenerating large urban areas because they combine local pride, the attraction of 
tourism and urban physical renewal (García, 2004b; Kitchin, 2007). 
Anyway, both models use spatially targeted emblematic projects as the preferred instrument of 
regeneration. In this way, the large-scale urban project or urban mega-project has become the 
alternative to comprehensive planning. This approach to planning has the alleged advantage of being 
flexible and - since urban mega-projects invariably contain high-profile prestige architecture - of 
having great symbolic capacity (Beazley, 1997; Swyngedouw et al., 2005a). 
Large-scale urban projects, as Swyngedouw (2002, 2005a) has explained, are expected to generate 
economic activity and employment but, their main objective - given that local governments highly 
depend on land rent based tax returns for financing - is to improve the tax basis by revaluing urban 
land. However, extensive empirical evidence has demonstrated that prestige urban mega-projects have 
had very limited effectiveness for economic regeneration as shown, according to Evans (2005), by the 
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fact that in many cases cities such as for example Bradford, Barnsley, Salford, Liverpool, Valencia, 
Marseilles, Rotterdam, Toronto and Montreal are on their second or third round of  investment in 
flagship projects. 
From a property-led regeneration perspective, the use of prestige mega-projects is not a solution for 
economic regeneration for many reasons.  First, it does not produce a rise of economic activity (Imrie 
and Thomas, 1999). Second, its alleged role in encouraging private sector development or investment 
has not proved to be true (Cochrane, 1999). Third, construction activity does not necessarily imply 
more local employment. In addition, the employment that is generated is insecure and low-wage 
unskilled work (Turok, 1992). Finally, the evidence of the invariably mentioned trickle-down effect 
on local communities happening is absent or very limited (Cochrane, 1999; Imrie and Thomas, 1999). 
On the other hand, the evidence regarding the contribution of cultural flagships to the social and 
economic needs of the area shows that the benefits are limited and often displaced by the 
gentrification that they bring about (Zukin, 1995; Gómez, 1998; García, 2004a; Evans, 2005). 
Moreover, only major cities can sustain them and even then their long term sustainability is 
problematic (Evans, 2005). 
In short, in spite of the existing evidence of their ineffectiveness and negative social and 
environmental impacts (Turok, 1992; Swyngedouw, 2002; Evans, 2005; Coaffee and Johnston, 2007) 
spatially targeted emblematic projects as a means to achieve urban revitalisation and economic 
regeneration are being widely used in different contexts. As Evans has pointed out, maybe flagship 
developments ‘are less about regeneration than the conventional wisdom portrays them’ (Evans, 
2005:975). 
For that reason, in order to analyse both the causes why and the processes through which urban 
change takes place the theoretical framework I have adopted will situate the problem in a context 
where economic forces are considered but that asserts that politics matter and where the formal and 
strategic dimensions of the state take centre stage. Thus, structural causes are crucial for the 
understanding of urban change but there is also space for human agency, which allows for a greater 
emphasis on empirical analysis. 
Other important elements of my theoretical framework are the conceptualisation of scale as socially 
constructed and the emphasis on the spatial aspects for capital needs to be valorised in space and in 
our case this is done through spatially targeted urban mega projects. In this way, globalisation 
processes are considered at both a ‘structural’ level - to point out to state restructuring and the transfer 
of global elements of neoliberalism - and at an ‘agency’ level to take into account political and 
economic interests at different and superimposed scales. As discussed in Chapter two globalisation 
and localisation processes are closely linked and need to be considered jointly. Urban mega projects 
are expressions and mediators of contemporary restructuring processes and, therefore, through them 
the channels of integration of the local and the global, the restructuring of scales and the creation of 
new scales can be analysed (Swyngedouw et al., 2005b). They also offer a lens to study agency at 
different scales, as they are embedded in different economic and institutional frameworks. 
                                                                                                                                            CHAPTER 3 
 46 
With these objectives, I will draw, as explained in the following sections, on a combination of 
strategic-relational theory, Cultural Political Economy and the literature on the politics of scale - to 
consider globalisation and its scalar and spatial effects - with urban regime theory and notions of 
translation of interests between geographical scales. 
Finally, for the study of the implications for planning practices of the politics of regeneration I will 
draw on the literature on neoliberalism as a mode of governance and a range of empirical analyses of 
the impacts of urban mega-projects and flagship developments. 
3.2 Cities, globalisation and the politics of scale 
With the objective of investigating the motives and driving forces of urban regeneration I will look at 
the different approaches that academics have adopted in order to explain urban change. On the one 
hand, neoliberal theorists have produced accounts that reify markets and consider globalisation almost 
as a natural force, neglecting agency in this way. Alternatively, within a Marxist tradition, there have 
been various theories and concepts introduced and refined in order to understand the transformations 
of urban governance. Following that tradition, regulation theory was developed in the 1970s and early 
1980s by a group of Marxist economists including Michel Aglietta, Robert Boyer and Alain Lipietz as 
a critique of Althusserian structuralism and orthodox economics (Painter, 1996; Collinge, 1999). 
Although its initial aim was to explain ‘how capitalism could survive even though the capital relation 
itself inevitably produced antagonisms, contradiction, and crises’ (Jessop, 1990:170 in Collinge, 1999) 
several academics working in the fields of urban theory, political geography and political science 
started to resort to it in the 1980s to explain the broad shifts in urban politics that were taking place. 
They drew on it because regulation theory offers an account of the changing role of cities within the 
capitalist economy that integrates economic and non-economic – social, political and cultural - 
spheres and, contrary to other versions of orthodox Marxism, assigns an important role to political 
processes (Painter, 1996).   
Regulation theory has most typically been deployed to explain the re-structuring of capitalism, mainly 
the transition from Fordism to post-Fordism (Tickell and Peck, 1992; Jones, 1997) but influential 
proponents of regulationism such as Jessop and Boyer have stressed its methodological character, 
preferring to refer to it as an approach rather than as a theory (Tickell and Peck, 1992; Painter, 1996).  
Thus, instead of a unified school of regulation theory there are different strands. The most influential 
of them is the Parisian school - mainly represented by Aglietta, Boyer and Lipietz - but all of them 
share the same framework or method of analysis (Tickell and Peck, 1992; Painter, 1996; Collinge, 
1999). Both its scientific realism approach and its concern with on the one hand the reproduction of 
capital as a social relation and on the other the political economy of capitalism derived from historical 
materialism have their roots in Marxism (Tickell and Peck, 1992). Thus, regulation theory studies the 
regulation of capital as a social relation (Jessop, 2000), that is to say the processes that mitigate the 
inherent contradictions and tendencies towards crisis and rupture in the capitalist accumulation 
process (Peck and Tickell, 1992; Hubbard and Hall, 1998) and displace them in space or time 
(Goodwin and Painter, 1996). Those processes include not only the economic conditions of 
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accumulation in a strict sense but also other social practices (Jessop, 2000) which, albeit may result in 
successful regulation have frequently been undertaken with different objectives (Painter, 1996; 
Goodwin and Painter, 1996). Therefore regulation is an unintentional process rather than ‘an 
inevitable, automatic or structurally necessary process’ (Goodwin and Painter, 1996:638). However, 
regulation is only a partial and temporary solution to the contradictions and crisis tendencies of the 
capitalist mode of production (Peck and Tickell, 1992). 
There are two core concepts deployed by mainstream regulationists: the regime of accumulation and 
the mode of regulation or mode of social regulation. The regime of accumulation is a set of 
arrangements or macroeconomic relations that allow the accumulation of capital and comprises the 
relationship between the systems of production and consumption and with investment (Collinge, 
1999; Painter, 1996). The mode of regulation or mode of social regulation refers to the social 
framework constituted by the institutions, rules and social practices which ensures that the 
relationships between the systems of production and consumption are conducive to capital 
accumulation (Painter, 1996; Goodwin and Painter, 1996; Collinge, 1999; Jessop, 2000). As discussed 
above, such institutions, rules and practices are not established with the intention of sustaining 
accumulation and are prone to loosing effectiveness over time (Painter, 1996; Collinge, 1999). 
In some regulationist accounts there are differences in the terminology. For instance, according to 
Peck and Tickell (1992) the relationship between investment, production and consumption is an 
accumulation system. Only when it is successfully realized through different procedures that 
constitute a mode of social regulation we have what is called a regime of accumulation. Thus, a 
regime of accumulation includes two elements; an accumulation system and a mode of regulation and 
it is defined as a ‘macroeconomically coherent phase of capitalist development’ (Tickell and Peck, 
1992:192). However, the underlying approach is the same and social regulation is considered a 
‘historically specific’ (Jessop, 2000:327) ‘temporary institutional fix’ (Peck and Tickell, 1992:348) 
that ‘can never permanently resolve the contradictions of capitalism, but only translate acute crises 
into crisis tendencies’ (Painter, 1996:95). 
Crisis is therefore another important concept of regulation theory and is defined as a ‘rupture in the 
reproduction of a social system’ (Goodwin and Painter, 1996:638). It can be structural or conjunctural 
(Tickell and Peck, 1992). Also microcrises that affect fractions of capital have been identified but 
according to Tickell and Peck (1992) they have little theoretical importance. A structural crisis 
threatens the rupture of the whole system in which case it means that the mode of regulation can no 
longer secure accumulation. It can only be eventually resolved if an alternative mode of regulation 
develops (Tickell and Peck, 1992; Goodwin and Painter, 1996). In a conjunctural crisis it is only a part 
of the system which is under threat and therefore can be resolved within the system through minor 
adjustments (Tickell and Peck, 1992; Goodwin and Painter, 1996). 
Therefore, regulation theory, and this is one of the reasons why I am interested to draw upon it, is a 
useful framework to analyse broad political and economic re-structuring processes that affect cities 
avoiding economic determinism by integrating in the approach the political, economic, social and 
cultural spheres and the relationships between them (Tickell and Peck, 1992; Painter, 1996). 
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However, the approach has also received many criticisms, vigorously responded and addressed by 
regulationists. First, the definition of mode of regulation has led some commentators to accuse 
regulation theory of presenting a tendency to functionalism because it implies that a mode of 
regulation appears in order to fulfil a necessity of the capitalist accumulation process. Effectively, 
according to regulation theory only modes of regulation that are compatible with the accumulation 
process will succeed and therefore they are economically determined in the last instance (Tickell and 
Peck, 1992; Painter, 1996; Jones, 1997; Collinge, 1999). Second, regulation theory is considered to be 
limited to explain urban politics and local transformation given that it places emphasis on the nation-
state and the wider social and economic context but is unable to fully explain uneven spatial 
development and specific political shifts at the local scale (Peck and Tickell, 1992; Painter, 1996; 
Jones, 1997, Kratke, 1999). Peck and Tickell (1992, 1995) tried to talk of local modes of social 
regulation but all that came out of that was a little unsatisfactory and few have taken it further. Third, 
political intervention and social conflict, particularly within a coupling of regime of accumulation and 
mode of regulation, are underplayed. Similarly, empirical study of individual institutions and 
consideration of agency are neglected (Painter, 1996; Jones, 1997). 
In order to overcome its shortcomings, regulation theory, considered as an incomplete project by its 
proponents, has been developed and refined through different generations. According to Jones’ (1997) 
periodisation first-generation regulationism is focused on the national scale and concerned mainly 
with labour processes and the wage relation. Second-generation accounts are concerned with the 
insertion of nation-states capital in the global economy. It is third-generation regulationists who start 
to address the role of space and its relationship with accumulation and regulation in order to account 
for local transformation. They also introduce important elements in their analysis such as the state and 
political action to counter charges of functionalism and economic reductionism. Brenner (2003) adds a 
fourth generation to the account which is concerned with analysing the different processes and 
strategies deployed at different scales to mediate crisis.   
Thus, as noted above, in order to avoid functionalism it has been suggested that the state should again 
take centre stage within regulation theory, where, as several commentators have argued (Hubbard and 
Hall, 1998; Collinge, 1999; Swyngedouw, 2005b) drawing on the writings of the Parisian school, it 
always was. Indeed, regulation theory maintains that ‘the role of the state within processes of social 
and economic regulation is to facilitate the transition of the economy in the interest of capital 
accumulation while absorbing the social costs of this transition’ (Hubbard and Hall, 1998:17). To the 
state, Collinge (1999) assigns the role of meta-regulation, defined as ‘the systemic process of 
restructuring the corrective regulatory mechanisms when these begin to fail, and when normal crises 
become 'structural'‘, and which underpins regulation: ‘the social process of control over the relations 
of accumulation, and involves norms and institutions that may contribute to viable accumulation by 
correcting 'normal' crises’ (Collinge, 1999:559). 
In the 1980s, Jessop, within a regulationist theoretical context and drawing both on Gramscian 
theories of hegemony and the work of state theorists Offe and Poulantzas, introduced what he terms 
the strategic-relational approach. Jessop addresses the analysis of the state from a neo-Gramscian 
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perspective, focusing on exploring how the institutions and informal networks related to its apparatus 
mediate leadership (MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999). Moreover, his conceptualisation of the state as 
relatively autonomous of external social forces and as a site of strategy comes from a neo-Gramscian 
reading to Poulantzas, with whom he also shares the emphasis on the importance of politics to achieve 
hegemony (Jones, 1997). Hegemony is understood as the ‘interpellation and organisation of different 
‘class relevant’ (but not necessarily class conscious) forces under the political, intellectual and moral 
leadership of a particular class (or class fraction) or, more precisely, its political, intellectual, and 
moral spokesmen’ (Jessop 1983b: 100 in Collinge and Hall, 1997). 
From Offe, Jessop takes the concept of structural selectivity of the state which explains how a 
particular state form is more conducive to privileging some economic or political strategies than 
others and therefore to include the interests of certain social groups while excluding others (Jones, 
1997; Collinge, 1999; MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999). However, determinism is not implied for the 
internal structure of the state is the result of past strategies (MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999). Thus, as 
explained by Collinge (1999), there are two processes at play. On the one hand, changes in the 
institutional structure developed through conflicting strategies. On the other hand, the selection of the 
changes that better contribute to the reproduction of capital.  
In short, the strategic-relational approach develops an account of the role of the state in the process of 
social regulation seeking to avoid structuralism by introducing a political dimension, and 
instrumentalism by ‘recognising the impossibility of monistic control and emphasising the 
participation of a plurality of interests within the political process, forming a ruling coalition or 
hegemonic bloc’ (Collinge and Hall, 1997:134). Thus, the state is considered to be a mediator between 
groups whose interests gravitate around different regimes of accumulation (Collinge and Hall, 1997). 
In such mediation the state favours the interests of some groups over others in a process – structural 
selectivity - whereby class interests are translated into effective political influence on the basis of both 
material power and discourse (Collinge and Hall, 1997). This privileging can also be direct and often 
takes the form of economic and symbolic rewards such as access to contracts, inclusion in public-
private decision-making bodies, etc.  In this way the state acquires a legitimating role and at the same 
time becomes not only a product of strategy but a generator of strategy. By analysing both the 
structural and the strategic dimensions of the state, Jessop emphasises political action and finds a way 
between structure and agency (Collinge and Hall, 1997; Jones, 1997; MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999; 
Swyngedouw, 2005).  
This approach is given substance by the deployment of two core concepts: accumulation strategy and 
hegemonic project. The concept of accumulation strategy combines politics and economics and is 
defined as ‘a specific economic growth model complete with its various extra-economic preconditions 
and outlines the general strategy appropriate to its realisation’ (Jessop, 1983b: 91 in Jones, 1997). 
Different groups may have conflicting accumulation strategies but if one of them achieves general 
acceptance from powerful elements of society it becomes hegemonic. For that reason, Jessop’s 
concept of accumulation strategy has been considered a way of resolving the necessity to understand 
how regimes of accumulation form (Tickell and Peck, 1992). The concept of hegemonic project 
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introduces ideology and political action to the accumulation strategies and involves the ‘mobilisation 
of support behind a concrete, national popular program of action which asserts a general interest in the 
pursuit of objectives that explicitly or implicitly advance the long-term interests of the hegemonic 
class (fraction) and which also privileges particular 'economic-corporate' interests compatible with this 
program’ (Jessop, 1983b:100 in Jones, 1997). Therefore, a hegemonic project includes concerns that 
are wider than mere economic interest, such as ‘military expansion, moral regeneration, social reform, 
or political stability’ (Jessop 1983a:155 in Collinge and Hall, 1997) and serves to give direction to the 
activities of the state (MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999). 
In that respect, ideational factors can be taken into account in the strategic-relational approach by 
resorting to cultural political economy. Thus, semiosis - which entails the social production of 
meaning – is considered to be a foundational moment in the strategic relational approach (Jessop, 
2007; Jessop and Sum, 2010) and - as cultural political economy contends - it plays an important role 
in the production of hegemony. Cultural political economy, in the version developed by scholars at 
Lancaster University (Jessop, 2007; Jessop and Oosterlynck, 2008; Sum, 2009; Jessop and Sum, 
2010) ‘interweaves Foucauldian concerns with discourse, discipline, and governmentality and 
Gramscian concerns with language, domination, and hegemony’ (Sum, 2009:185) and integrates them 
into ‘a broader historical materialist framework influenced by Marx and Gramsci’ (Sum, 2009:186). 
Drawing on the discursive and extra-discursive dimensions of both analyses, cultural political 
economy considers the complex relationships that meanings and practices have, for culture – from a 
historical materialism viewpoint - is conceptualised as comprising every aspect of social life, 
including behaviour and thought (Jessop, 2007; Jessop and Oosterlynck, 2008; Sum, 2009). Therefore, 
both materiality and the dialectic of discursivity are considered important to explain the production 
and reproduction of hegemony. The semiotic formation, selection, privileging and retention of certain 
imaginaries in interaction with extra-semiotic practices ‘gives relatively successful economic and 
political imaginaries their performative, constitutive force in the material world’ (Jessop, 2007:240). 
The evolutionary process consists first in the continuous intentional or unintentional variation of the 
imaginaries and discourses through which actors explain, define and redefine their projects, strategies 
and ideas, and, second, in the selection and retention of some of those imaginaries and discourses 
(Jessop and Oosterlynck, 2008). Semiotic and extra-semiotic factors are involved in this process. The 
power of discourses depends on their relationship to other structural mechanisms and on whether they 
resonate with other social forces. Therefore, discourses will be more likely to be retained when - in 
Jessop and Oosterlynck’s (2008:1160) words - ‘they correspond to (or successfully shape) underlying 
material transformations, can mobilize different elites to form a new power bloc, can organize popular 
support, disorganize opposition, and marginalize resistance’. 
On the other hand, it has been argued that the strategic-relational approach is limited in its ability to 
explain local transformation because it is not sensitive enough to space for it focuses on the national 
level and privileges macroeconomic interpretations (Jones, 1997; Collinge and Hall, 1997). However, 
as some commentators have pointed out the concepts of hegemonic project and accumulation strategy 
can be used at a different scale (Jessop, 1997c in MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999). In fact, the approach 
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has been more and more widely applied to study changes at sub-national scales (e.g. Mayer, 1991; 
Painter, 1991; Goodwin, 1993; Peck, 1995 in Hubbard and Hall, 1998:17; Collinge and Hall, 1997). 
In my opinion, the strategic-relational approach has the potential to provide useful insights into the 
restructuring of urban and regional governance by allowing us to look through the lens of specific 
political projects - which, as would be the case in Valencia, can be shared by different political parties 
- at how the structurally selective activities of successive governments have sought to achieve a 
certain configuration. Moreover, these state projects or strategies – which can be pursued by national 
or regional ‘states’- have privileged certain social groups, spatial fixes and policy paradigms - 
including urban policy paradigms (MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999). It also provides a framework to 
analyse local accumulation strategies in relationship with hegemonic national and regional state 
hegemonic projects in order to situate them in a wider social and political context. For these reasons I 
will also draw on the concepts provided by the strategic relational approach in order to explore the 
driving forces and motives of urban regeneration. However, both regulation theory and the strategic-
relational approach remain inappropriately sensitive to space and therefore are unable to explain 
uneven development. Moreover, the use of the concepts drawn from regulation theory to the local 
scale remains problematic.  
Various solutions have been proposed in order to overcome such shortcomings. Thus, Jessop has 
explained the restructuring of the state in a globalising era resorting to the notion of ‘hollowing out’ 
processes whereby the national state power is eroded and moved ‘upwards, downwards, and 
sideways’ through strategic selectivity (Jessop, 1997a: 18 in MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999; Jones, 
1997; Collinge, 1999). For Jones (1997) the strategic-relational approach needs to be complemented 
with the concept of spatial selectivity of the state in order to correct its insensitivity to space. By 
spatial selectivity it is meant that the state tends to privilege the places that are more supportive and 
compatible with its objectives within accumulation strategies and hegemonic projects. Jones contends 
that this privileging is both material and ideological. Therefore, in Jones’ words: ‘the impetus for 
spatial selectivity is ultimately driven by political ideology, a need by the state to maintain hegemony, 
suppressing counter hegemonic interests and in the process attempting to gain, through pursuing a 
particular accumulation strategy, international competitiveness’ (Jones, 1997:849). 
Others address the analysis of local transformation through the application of the concepts of 
regulation theory adapted to the sub-national scale.  For instance, Peck and Tickell (1992) suggest that 
distinct modes of regulation can be found at different scales, therefore there can be different regional 
couplings of system of accumulation and social modes of regulation, which they call local modes of 
regulation. However, Goodwin (2001) cautions against the search for local modes of regulation on the 
grounds that it does not allow for appropriate comparative work as different scales of regulation 
cannot be compared. 
From my point of view, a more promising strand of literature than the concept of local modes of 
regulation is that concerned with the politics of scale, which would also help take forward the notion 
of spatial selectivity of the state. The importance of problematising scale has been recognised in the 
work of many geographers, social and political scientists, and urban theorists particularly from the 
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beginning of the 1990s and acquired increasing relevance due to the re-structuring of scales and the 
changes in the relationships between them produced due to globalising processes. Thus, the notion of 
geographical scale as a given has been challenged and the notion of it as socially constructed 
emphasised. Scale - considered as socially constructed - is an outcome of social processes which are 
always conflictory and politically contested but, at the same time, it is implicated in the generation of 
such processes (Delaney and Leitner, 1997; Collinge, 1999; Brenner, 2000; Swyngedouw et al., 
2005b). 
Swyngedouw’s concept of ‘glocalisation’ captures the notion that spatial scale is being re-organised as 
a result of globalisation. It refers to both ‘the contested restructuring of the institutional, regulatory 
level (the level of social reproduction) from the national scale both upwards to supranational and/or 
global scales and downwards to the scale of the individual body, the local urban or regional 
configurations’ and ‘the strategies of global localization of key forms of industrial, service and 
financial capital’ (Swyngedouw, 1997:170). The spatial dimension becomes a central element of the 
definition for the reorganisation of scales implies a territorial reconfiguration both at an accumulatory 
and regulatory level. 
On the one hand, glocalisation can be a state strategy to fix capital within its boundaries. Indeed, even 
in an allegedly globalising economy, capital needs to be valorised in space - which, as in our case, is 
increasingly being done through spatially targeted urban projects. On the other hand, it can become a 
strategy whereby the state reconfigures its spatiality in order to promote competitiveness. Thus, I will 
draw on the concept of glocalisation and the literature on the politics of scale in order to introduce a 
spatial dimension to state strategy and selectivity and, crucially, taking into consideration 
globalisation processes.  
As a consequence of globalisation, the spatial configurations that support capital accumulation have 
been reorganised as sub- and supra-national scales have become more important and displaced the 
nation-state as the main site of accumulation and regulation (Brenner, 1999; Jessop, 2000). However, 
as none of those scales has become the dominant regulatory or accumulatory scale, the possibility of 
turning scale itself into the object of socio-political struggle has emerged. In Jessop’s words, there is 
‘a continuing and still unresolved search process to find new forms of state and new modes of 
governance on different scales to secure new spatio-temporal fixes within which accumulation on a 
world scale can be maintained – or to find new forms of state and new modes of governance with 
which to brake the (il)logics of accumulation on a world scale and develop alternative ways of 
organizing global-local order’ (Jessop, 2000:357). This struggle among different fractions of capital 
and state and governance institutions in which scale is at the same time site and object has been 
described as ‘the politics of scale’ (Smith, 1993, 1995 in Brenner, 1999; Jessop, 2000).  
It is in this context that Swyngedouw (1996, 2005b) and Brenner’s (1999) conceptualisation of the 
state as a ‘glocalised’ state must be understood.  The glocalisation of the state refers to its re-
organisation that takes form through, on the one hand, an externalisation of its functions through 
privatisation, de-regulation and decentralisation, and on the other hand a re-scaling of governance 
                                                                                                                                            CHAPTER 3 
 53 
both upwards – to a supranational level- and downwards - to the level of the city or the region 
(Swyngedouw, 1997, 2005; Brenner, 1999).  
This re-scaling of the state has manifold implications that must be considered as empirical trends 
rather than explanatory concepts. First, as already noted, city-regions have acquired increased 
importance as sites of governance, often by-passing the national state. Second, since this restructuring 
is embedded in the spread of a neoliberal ideology, the glocalisation of the state has been seen as a 
strategy to promote investment in the most competitive regions while enhancing their locational 
advantages through the involvement of private actors – particularly business elites -  in a more 
‘entrepreneurial’ and elitist approach to governance. Third, the state, in cooperation with the private 
sector, has become the sponsor of such entrepreneurial initiatives (Swyngedouw, 1996, 2005b; 
Brenner, 1999). In Brenner’s words: ‘a major goal of these 'glocally' oriented state institutions is to 
enhance the locational advantages and productive capacities of their territorial jurisdictions as 
maximally competitive nodes in the world economy’ (Brenner, 1999:440). Yet, the transformation of 
urban governance cannot be explained just by means of state re-structuring, but, the question of scale 
has become central to analysing urban/regional institutional and political changes. Crucially, urban 
regions must be viewed as ‘glocal’ spaces where social, economic and political processes take place at 
multiple and superimposed scales and where the struggle over the scale of governance has become 
central (Brenner, 1999, 2000, 2003). Therefore urban and regional governance must be analysed on 
different scales from the local to the global.  
As already discussed, the strategic-relational approach combined with the insights provided by the 
analysis of the politics of scale offers a powerful structural framework to understand urban 
governance from a perspective that adequately situates the state in a globalising era. However, such a 
framework has empirical limitations. Collinge and Hall (1997) have argued referring to Neo-
Gramscian theories of hegemony that, on the one hand, they tend to downplay the importance of 
political process, particularly how to build the capacity to govern effectively, and on the other hand, 
they neglect empirical investigation of how the relationship between hegemonic projects and 
accumulation strategies is articulated by hegemonic groups. In short, this framework can help us to 
address the why question of what the driving forces and motives of urban regeneration are but, in 
order to understand how the politics of regeneration are instituted – and they are instituted differently 
in different places - it is necessary to turn to other theories that raise issues of capacity building and 
prioritise empirical analysis. In this sense, many have pointed to the theories developed within 
American political science such as urban regime or growth machine (Collinge and Hall, 1997). 
3.3 The politics of urban regeneration 
Urban regime theory (Stone, 1989, 1993; Stoker and Mossberger, 1993; Lauria, 1997) and growth 
machine analysis (Logan and Molotch, 1987) have been, since the 1980s, the two most influential 
political economy approaches for the study of urban transformation (Harding, 1997; MacLeod and 
Goodwin, 1999). 
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Logan and Molotch developed the concept of growth machine as an alternative approach to the 
‘reigning sociological paradigm of ‘urban ecology’’ (Logan, 2007: viii). For them urban development 
is influenced by the market, which cannot be considered free, but also by ‘conflicting interests, 
contested plans, and policy choices’ (Logan, 2007: viii). Thus, in their analysis, they consider the 
‘underlying 'structural' relations’ (Logan, 2007:12) but place emphasis on human agency by giving 
‘primary attention to the strategies, schemes, and needs of human agents and their institutions at the 
local level’ (Logan, 2007:12). Drawing on Henri Lefebvre they contend that space is socially 
produced and, through an empirical approach, set out to explore how it is produced (Logan, 2007). 
Their main focus and where their explanation of urban change lies is the conflict between use and 
exchange values of real estate (Logan, 2007). 
The growth machine model is focused on the conflict between use and value interests which brings 
about the formation of coalitions of local property owners and other ‘place entrepreneurs’ with the 
objective of promoting growth (Wood, 1996; MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999). The consensus over 
economic growth - represented by the intensification of land uses - is what maintains the collaboration 
within the coalition (Molotch, 1976). Thus, according to Logan, uncovering who rules is as important 
as investigating ‘for what’ they govern (Logan, 2007). The elites pursue their growth objectives by 
trying to influence public policies to prioritise growth over residents’ necessities and create a good 
‘business climate’ – for instance providing tax incentives, vocational training, protection of property 
and social control to avoid conflict (Molotch, 1976, 1979; Wood, 1996; Logan, 2007). They also 
compete with other groups and localities for public funds, subsidies and infrastructure (Molotch, 
1976; Logan, 2007). Yet, not only those who make money from land or from generating rent are 
interested in participating in the growth coalition, also other actors, such as business people, corporate 
capitalists, local media, leaders of public or quasi-public agencies (e.g. universities, utilities), 
politicians, museums, theatres, professional sports, union leaders, self-employed professionals and 
small retailers, feel that have a stake in it since growth is considered to bring jobs, prestige and, a 
wider clientele, audience or even constituency (Molotch, 1976, 1979; Logan, 2007). In later work 
(Logan et al., 1997, Molotch et al., 2000) the growth machine model has been revised and updated by 
stressing the importance of amenities and cultural consumption to explain growth and urban economic 
vitality, to take into account more recent developments in the economic restructuring of post-industrial 
cities. The focus has turned to competition based on livability rather than on land use intensification. 
According to Clark et al. (2002:496), ‘in many locations, smart or managed growth strategies have 
replaced the growth machine as the driving civic ideology’.  
Urban regime theory was also developed in the US within the pluralist tradition as a response to neo-
classical economic accounts of urban redevelopment and local government, and can be situated in the 
middle ground between the structuralist and liberal positions (Collinge and Hall, 1997; Hubbard and 
Hall, 1998; Fainstein, 2001; Mossberger, 2001). The focus of the analysis is on decision-making based 
on individual choice and rejecting economic determinism (Fainstein, 2001; Mossberger, 2001). 
However, the approach recognises that access to urban politics is uneven and depends on the structural 
position of the actors (Hubbard and Hall, 1998). Governments need to build the capacity to govern 
and, given the separation between market and state, search for collaboration outside their boundaries. 
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In short, the model of power adopted is of social production in which the elites, through coalition 
building and their access to informal networks are able to mobilise the powers within the local 
government and achieve pursued policy outcomes (Collinge and Hall, 1997; Mossberger, 2001). 
Stone defined an urban regime as ‘the informal arrangements by which public bodies and private 
interests function together in order to be able to make and carry out governing decisions’ (Stone, 
1987:6 in Hubbard and Hall, 1998) or ‘the set of agreements (or perhaps substantive policy 
dispositions) by which the division of labour between political and economic institutions is managed’ 
(Stone 1993:2 in Collinge and Hall, 1997). It is constituted by a number of interest groups that 
cooperate to achieve their objectives in terms of policies (Ward, 1996; Mossberger, 2001). 
But, as Mossberger (2001) has explained drawing on Stone’s writings from 1989 to 1993, in order to 
be able to conceptualise an urban regime as such, additional properties are needed. First, there must be 
government and business participation in the coalitions. Governments need the economic capacity of 
businesses and the popular support that their economic activity can generate, while businesses need 
the government’s democratic legitimacy. The respective position of business and urban governments 
varies in different regimes depending on how much governments need business-sourced taxes and to 
what extent businesses are economically successful (Stoker and Mossberger, 1993). Second, 
collaboration must be achieved through informal networks as well as trough formal institutions. This 
cooperation is often problematic and not free from conflict since the interests and points of view of 
such a diversity of participants can be contradictory and therefore, consensus and a common line of 
action must be constructed (Stoker and Mossberger, 1993). Third, policy agendas depend on the 
composition of the coalition and therefore it must be possible to identify them in relation to the 
participants. The interests of different groups are brought together in a regime and reflected in the 
policies that are implemented. For instance, in places where a policy based on mega-projects and 
events is instituted – such as Valencia - the interests typically found can be electoral for politicians 
because mega-projects and events often have popular support, professional and economic for 
architects and construction companies because they benefit from appealing contracts and, economic 
for the owner’s of mega-events because they find support for their business. Fourth, there must be 
long-term cooperation although temporary coalitions may be considered as ‘failed regimes’. Finally, 
collaboration tends to produce consensus over policy although agreement over values and beliefs is 
not necessary. Popular agreement with the policy initiatives is not a necessary condition although, it is 
recognised by urban regime theorists that popular politics are important since citizen mobilisation and 
opposition can disrupt successful regimes (Stoker and Mossberger, 1993). 
Therefore, as derived from above, the specific agendas of urban regimes are not a component of the 
conceptualisation since they vary depending on the participants of the coalition. However, based on 
policy objectives, different types of regime have been defined to facilitate analysis (Collinge and Hall, 
1997; Mossberger, 2001). The main types according to Stone are: maintenance or caretaker regimes, 
development regimes that are concerned with changing land use to promote growth; middle-class 
progressive regimes, which include aims such as environmental protection, historic preservation, 
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affordable housing, and linkage funds; and lower-class opportunity expansion regimes (Mossberger, 
2001).  
To summarise, the urban regime approach rejects economism and places stress on politics and the 
need for electoral legitimacy (Ward, 1996; Collinge and Hall, 1997). It uses a social production model 
of power in contrast with a social control power. This means that attention is drawn not towards who 
has the power over but to how the power to is achieved. (Mossberger, 2001) Thus, the building of 
political alliances and construction of coalitions become essential activities in order to achieve the 
capacity to govern. On the other hand, participation in the governing coalitions is achieved through 
the distribution of economic or symbolic incentives (Collinge and Hall, 1997). Public collaboration 
with private actors is considered imperative in order to produce the capacity to govern given the 
division of labour between market and state and the necessity of both resources - electoral legitimacy 
and capital (Hubbard and Hall, 1998; Mossberger, 2001). In this way, the participation of a plurality 
of interests is emphasised given that the impossibility of control in a liberal democracy is 
acknowledged (Mossberger, 2001). Finally, the structure of power and the policies adopted depend on 
the composition of the governing coalition and therefore the impact of economic interests is accounted 
for through the participation of the business elites in the governing coalitions (Collinge and Hall, 
1997; Mossberger, 2001). 
Both approaches have obvious similarities, mainly that they reject economic determination and 
emphasise the central role of the elites in urban governance (Wood 1996). Yet, while the growth 
machine approach focuses on specifying the interests involved in the governing coalitions, which it 
links to urban development and real estate (Harding, 1997), urban regime theory focuses on the 
analysis of the construction of electorally legitimated coalitions (Wood 1996). Thus, regime theory 
tries to explain how the capacity to govern is achieved (Hubbard and Hall, 1998; MacLeod and 
Goodwin, 1999).  
The focus of the urban regime and growth machine models on the social processes involved in the 
production of space and urban governance suggests that they may be useful for the analysis of how the 
politics of regeneration are instituted. They have directed attention to the social and economic actors 
outside the formal institutions of government, who are involved in governance and decision-making. 
However, they share weaknesses too. In both cases, the stress on internal alliances, coalition building 
dynamics and local actors, it has been argued, has implied a voluntarist emphasis on agency, a neglect 
of structure and the wider social and economic context beyond the urban (for instance globalisation 
processes) and, therefore, a localist focus (Ward, 1996; Wood 1996; Harding, 1997; MacLeod and 
Goodwin, 1999). Thus, although some (Mossberger, 2001) see the combination of structure and 
agency in its analysis as one of the strengths of urban regime theory others have accused it of being 
voluntarist, undertheorised, empiricist, localist and of disregarding structural forces (Wood 1996; 
Collinge and Hall, 1997; MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999; Fainstein, 2001; Mossberger, 2001). 
According to Fainstein (2001:14) ‘while regime theory recognizes the importance of economic 
structure, it does not incorporate the forces creating that structure into its argument.’  
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This localism and undertheorisation has meant that the urban regime and growth machine models do 
not travel well. Moreover, having emerged within the US context, both models are open to charges of 
ethnocentrism. In fact, they are an abstraction of the American urban politics where local governments 
are highly dependent on private capital (Wood 1996; Harding, 1997; Mossberger, 2001; Pierre, 2005). 
Moreover, as with other structural forces, the form of the state, its role and structural relationships are 
neglected for it is only taken into account as part of a regime or growth coalition (Collinge and Hall, 
1997; MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999). This is problematic for various reasons. First, it is often the state 
that sets the rules and controls the formation of regimes and coalitions, for instance, appointing 
members of local quangos (Goodwin and Painter, 1996; MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999). Second, not 
only they are subject to the policies and demands of national and increasingly supra-national levels of 
government but are very often highly dependent on state funding (Ward, 1996; Harding, 1997). In 
Ward’s words, regimes and coalitions ‘may appear 'bottom-up' because that is the way they have been 
studied’ (Ward, 1996:432).   
On the other hand, both models over-simplify the problem of scale in relation to the conceptualisation 
of state and in the consideration of the spatial context of analysis (Ward, 1996; MacLeod and 
Goodwin, 1999). Particularly, they do not take into consideration the scalar complexity of 
globalisation processes and the implications for the state and for economic interests, which they place 
mainly in the local and regional level and divide, in a simplistic way, in local and non-local (Goodwin 
and Painter, 1996; Phelps and Wood, 2006). 
In short, the weaknesses that the growth machine and urban regime theories need to overcome are 
similar: ethnocentrism, voluntarism, empiricism and undertheorisation, neglect of the role of the state, 
localism and an unproblematised consideration of scale. However, the applicability of the growth 
machine approach is more restricted because it places too much emphasis on real estate property and 
rent, failing to account for a range of interests in the local economy other than growth. In the same 
way social interests are reduced to those of residents neglecting, for instance, questions of production 
and therefore labour interests (Wood 1996; MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999). Therefore, the urban 
regime model, with the necessary modifications, will be of greater interest for my purpose.  
Regarding the charges of ethnocentricity, the transfer of the urban regime concept to the European 
context is difficult since it was developed for the US context where the relationships of the 
governments at different levels and with the private sector are different. However, it has been argued 
that the spread of neoliberal policies has brought about a convergence between the US and Europe in 
economic regeneration strategies, competitiveness or entrepreneurialism, and in institutional structures 
with the emergence of public-private partnerships that has made the understanding of the dynamics of 
urban governance more relevant and widened the scope for the use of the American political economy 
approach, especially the urban regime model (Wood 1996; Mossberger, 2001; Logan, 2007). 
Thus, some commentators have used the urban regime concept in Europe, at regional, local and even 
at the borough level in the case of London (Wood 1996; Mossberger, 2001). For instance, Stewart 
(1996 in Stewart, 2003) identified an ‘incipient regime’ in Bristol and, later, DiGaetano and 
Klemanski (2000 in Stewart, 2003) characterised it as a pro-growth regime. Also, in their study of the 
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regeneration process, Collinge and Hall (1997) identified an urban regime in Birmingham. Harding 
(1997) studied five European cities - Amsterdam, Copenhagen, Edinburgh, Hamburg and Manchester 
– and concluded that, although there are important differences with the American cases, it is possible 
to find development coalitions and informal networks of governance.  
Although there are also variations between different countries in Europe some conclusions as to the 
general contrast between US and Europe emerge from the empirical studies. First, in Europe local 
governments tend to receive resources from central governments and own land for public 
development. Therefore they are less dependent on private sector capital, have more control over the 
development process than local governments in the US and are less autonomous from central 
governments (Harding, 1997; Mossberger, 2001). Second, the balance of power and of participation in 
partnerships between the public and the private sector differs. In Europe, the participation of the 
different levels of government and of public or quasi-public agencies tends to be higher (Harding, 
1997; Mossberger, 2001). Moreover, in many cases the local authorities take up the role of 
coordinating urban regimes (Hubbard and Hall, 1998; Quilley, 1999). Also central governments 
become important partners by sponsoring and encouraging the formation of coalitions (Harding, 1997; 
Mossberger, 2001). For those reasons, urban regimes in Europe also tend to be less stable. 
In this way - through the comparison of case studies and the classification of empirical characteristics 
– the urban regime concept has been developed. Stoker and Mossberger (1993) developed a typology 
of regimes based on their general purpose and described their empirical characteristics with respect to 
the motivations of the participants, the congruence of their interests, their sense of common purpose 
and the strategies they use to deal with other levels of government and the wider environment. It 
included three types of regime: instrumental, organic and symbolic regimes. Instrumental regimes – 
which are dominant in the US – aim to maintain the status quo, organic regimes are focused on the 
realization of specific projects and, symbolic regimes have the purpose of redirecting the ideology or 
image of a city. Within the symbolic type Stoker and Mossberger (1993) described a subtype which 
they called urban revitalization regimes. This kind of regime intends to change the image of the city in 
order to attract investment. Through the use of symbols they aim to mobilize positive attitudes about 
the city which can help the city to attract new investment. Remarkably, the description of this type of 
regime corresponds with the description of entrepreneurial cities engaged in city marketing discussed 
in Chapter two, and brings to mind Valencia’s case study. 
Although the procedure of comparing case studies and classifying them according to their empirical 
characteristics has been defended as appropriate for the study of a dynamic process (Mossberger, 
2001), the construction of theory based on case studies is problematic (Ward 1996). In this sense, 
although the concept has been modified to expand its applicability to a wider number of cases and 
ideal typologies have been developed in order to construct a common framework for analysis (Stoker 
and Mossberger, 1993; Mossberger, 2001) there are fundamental aspects, such as the conditions and 
mechanisms underpinning regime formation and maintenance, that cannot be clarified by referring to 
prototypical regimes (Ward 1996). 
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In order to explain regime formation Cox (in Wood, 1996; Ward, 1996; MacLeod and Goodwin, 
1999) proposed the concept of local dependence defined as ‘a relation to locality that results from the 
relative spatial immobility of some social relations, perhaps related to fixed investments in the built 
environment or to the particularization of social relations’ (Cox and Mair, 1989:142 in Wood 1996). It 
means that the interests of particular actors, including local governments, are attached to a locality in 
diverse forms and are ‘effectively realised through the growth of the local economy’ (Wood 
1996:1291). However, although the concept is useful for the analysis of the relation with space of the 
capitalist economy it does not have enough explanatory power to identify concrete interests – as in the 
case of utilities – or to account for the scalar complexities of governance and the territoriality of the 
state (Wood 1996; MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999; Mossberger, 2001). 
Several other solutions have been proposed in order to overcome the undertheorisation of the urban 
regime model. Some commentators have suggested increasing the level of abstraction through the use 
of concepts such as policy network or governance. Policy network includes different types of cross-
institutional collaboration from those integrated by a low number of participants and a stable 
relationship to those with a large number of participants and a limited interconnection, and therefore 
can include urban regimes (MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999; Mossberger, 2001). This approach tries to 
go beyond the dualism between public and private interests by considering that different departments 
and institutions within the government have certain degrees of autonomy, and to incorporate the 
different levels of government into the analysis in order to avoid localism in decision-making (Jones, 
1997; MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999). But, as with urban regime, the concept has been criticised for 
neglecting structure and the wider social and economic contexts (Jones, 1997; MacLeod and 
Goodwin, 1999). In this way, it remains useful to inform us about the processes at play but gives little 
information as to why they occur. 
On the other hand, Pierre (1999) has proposed the use of the concept of governance –within 
institutional theory - to ‘bring together regime theory, theories of the local state, and urban political 
economy into a broader analytical framework’ (Pierre, 1999:376). From this perspective, a ‘regime 
should be conceived of as a culturally and historically specific model of urban governance’ (Pierre, 
2005:446) ‘in terms of the configuration of actors, the types of goals and objectives pursued, and so 
on’ (Pierre, 2005:453). Governance as a theory is concerned with processes of ‘regulation, 
coordination, and control’ (Pierre, 1999:376), whereby ‘local authorities, in concert with private 
interests, seek to enhance collective goals’ (Pierre, 1999:374). In this way the role of government 
becomes an empirical question for ‘urban governance makes no prejudgment about the cast of actors 
involved in shaping the urban political agenda, nor does it make any assumptions about the normative 
direction and objectives of the governing coalition’ (Pierre, 2005:452). Such a framework for urban 
politics, he contends, would allow for comparative research between different regional or national 
contexts and, by integrating urban regime within it, theorise its underpinnings. Moreover, according to 
Pierre (1999:376), ‘the governance approach to urban politics highlights the wide range of constraints 
on local authorities' abilities to bring about change in the local community’. 
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In general, moving to higher levels of abstraction entails the risk of explaining the processes in less 
depth instead of understanding the causes behind them. Therefore, in my opinion a more fruitful 
approach is to combine urban regime theory with theories at higher levels of abstraction. By doing 
that, undertheorisation can be avoided and the structure and the role of the state considered. In this 
sense, various have been the suggestions. For instance, on the one hand, Ward (1996) and Wood 
(1996) have pointed to regulation theory. On the other hand, Collinge and Hall (1997) have proposed 
the combination of regime theory with neo-gramscian theory. Also MacLeod and Goodwin (1999) 
have suggested this alternative since for them combining regime theory with regulation theory to 
overcome its undertheorisation causes methodological ambiguity. Having discussed both theories in 
the previous section, suffice it to say now that, in my opinion, a strategic-relational approach can serve 
as a framework that helps link urban regimes with structural processes and - with the aid of the 
politics of scale literature – situate the (re-structuring) state, which at present plays an important role 
in the formation and maintenance of regimes. Moreover, linking urban regime with theories at 
different scale can help avoid reading local change off from global change.  
Although they come from different traditions urban regime theory and the strategic-relational 
approach are philosophically compatible. First of all, both of them take into consideration the role of 
structure and agency.  
The strategic-relational approach addresses the analysis of the state from a neo-Gramscian 
perspective. Seeking to avoid structuralism, it recognizes that in order to achieve hegemony politics 
matter. Given that the state cannot exercise control on its own, a ruling coalition in which a plurality 
of interests participate needs to be formed (Collinge and Hall, 1997). The state is considered a 
mediator between groups whose interests gravitate around different regimes of accumulation 
(Collinge and Hall, 1997). Leadership is mediated by the institutions and informal networks related to 
the state apparatus.  
Urban regime theory - which appeared within the pluralist tradition - can be situated in the middle 
ground between the structuralist and liberal positions. It adopts a social production model of power in 
which the elites, through coalition building and their access to informal networks are able to mobilise 
the powers within the local government and achieve pursued policy outcomes (Collinge and Hall, 
1997; Hubbard and Hall, 1998; Fainstein, 2001; Mossberger, 2001). However, it recognizes that 
access to urban politics is uneven and depends on the structural position of the actors (Hubbard and 
Hall, 1998).  
In this way, the strategic-relational approach, finds a way between structure and agency by 
introducing a political dimension (Collinge and Hall, 1997; Jones, 1997; MacLeod and Goodwin, 
1999; Swyngedouw, 2005) while urban regime theory, although more focused on agency, introduces 
structure by taking into account the structural position of the actors. 
On the other hand, the strategic-relational approach emphasizes the importance of the state as site of 
strategy and mediator between different interests. The state acquires a legitimating role and becomes a 
generator of strategy, as well as a product of strategy (Collinge and Hall, 1997). As different studies 
have pointed out (Harding, 1997; Hubbard and Hall, 1998; Quilley, 1999; Mossberger, 2001), in 
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Europe, not only the participation of government in urban regimes is higher but, in many cases the 
local authorities take up the role of coordinating them too. In this manner, the importance of state 
leadership for regime formation has been recognized. Therefore, leadership provides a link between 
strategic relational approach and urban regime theory. In Valencia’s case, it is clearly local and 
regional governors who provide leadership. 
Regarding leadership, the role of the ideational - semiosis and discourse - is of great relevance. As 
previously discussed, both the strategic relational approach –through cultural political economy – and 
urban regime theory –particularly in the case of symbolic regimes (Stoker and Mossberger, 1993) – 
emphasise the significance of semiosis and discourse. The case of Valencia also shows how 
politicians, besides providing leadership, provide vision, along with star architects, 
The ideational is, therefore, intimately related to the construction of hegemonic projects but also to 
urban regime formation. Discourse and the strategic use of symbols, language and symbolic rewards, 
can motivate participation in regimes and help to build ‘a common sense of purpose’ (Stoker and 
Mossberger, 1993) or contribute –alongside the material – to the achievement of consensus around a 
program of action, resulting in the generation of a hegemonic project. For instance, the construction – 
including the semiotic construction - of a regional state in Valencia can be considered a hegemonic 
project, which is intimately linked to the use of symbols, particularly architectural symbols. In this 
way, concepts such as hegemonic project can help overcome the problem of undertheorisation of 
urban regime theory. 
There is another reason why concepts such as hegemonic projects and the processes through which 
they are formed are useful to avoid undertheorisation. Although regime theory emphasises the 
existence of negotiation to arrive to a common sense of purpose, it maps policy outcomes directly to 
the different interests of the participants in the regime. Cultural political economy, instead, by 
considering both the conditions of action which go unacknowledged by actors and the struggles to 
transform those conditions of actions, avoids pure social constructivism (Jessop and Oosterlynck, 
2008).  
Therefore, although methodologically the combination of the strategic-relational and urban regime 
theory presents us with the difficulty of deciding the most appropriate way to interpret different 
empirical findings, by combining both approaches it is possible to build on the empirical strengths of 
regime theory while providing a firmer theoretical grounding. 
However, in order to further develop an approach which combines strategic relational and regime 
approaches we need to take into consideration globalisation processes. Just like they have been 
considered in relationship to the state and, in order to overcome localism, globalisation processes have 
to be taken into account when considering the interests at play in urban regimes. Thus, political and 
economic interests at different and superimposed scales must be considered, not privileging one scale 
over the others and avoiding a simplistic distinction between global and local interests. In this sense I 
will draw on the work of Phelps and Wood (2006) about what they have termed 'inward investment 
regimes'. In it they propose the notion of translation, a process whereby the interests of transnational 
capital, instead of being represented in a top-down manner, are modified when transferred between 
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geographical scales. This approach puts stress on the complex relationships between actors involved 
in translation processes at different scales and considers the interests of such actors as ‘only relatively 
autonomous from one another’ (Phelps and Wood, 2006:494).‘Inward investment regimes’ are 
organizationally coherent coalitions which are territorialized locally but at the same time engaged with 
interests at multiple scales, and whose components, being involved in multiscalar networks of power, 
‘translate between the interests of transnational capital and more local interests’ (Phelps and Wood, 
2006:508). Thus, in contrast with traditional coalitions, ‘inward investment regimes’ are multiscalar in 
nature and less bounded to a certain geographical scale (Phelps and Wood, 2006). In short, the notion 
of translation, applied to the context of urban regeneration, can help us emphasise the complex scalar 
organisation of political and economic interests and to acknowledge the possible role of transnational 
elites in local coalition building. 
3.4 The implications of the new politics of regeneration 
Considered at structural level, processes of globalisation entail the transfer of global elements of 
neoliberalism as economic regeneration policies based on entrepreneurial strategies spread. Urban 
mega projects, as discussed in Chapter two, are conduits of globalisation and therefore of neoliberal 
practices – such as, for instance, the privatisation of management - too. Consequently, the literature on 
neoliberalism is useful to look for the implications –particularly at a governance level – of the urban 
policy based on mega projects and events. However, as Cochrane (2007) warns, although 
‘neoliberalism’ can provide a tool to identify broad characteristics of contemporary urban policy, there 
is the danger of taking everything that occurs in contemporary politics as an example of neoliberalism,  
and this brings us to the problem of conceptualisation. 
As Leitner, Peck and Sheppard (2007:316-317) have pointed out, some authors approach 
neoliberalism as ‘a diffuse regime of political-economic power’ while for others it is ‘a very loose 
bundle of political practices and governmentalities’. In this respect, in this section, neoliberalism will 
be considered as an effect rather than to explain the motives behind the urban policy, although 
neoliberal ideology – looked at from a cultural political economy viewpoint - is also important in the 
semiotic selection of certain policies and the success of particular hegemonic projects. In short, 
neoliberalism will be considered as a mode of governance. As explained by Keil (2002:239), ‘the 
concrete implementation of new technologies of power has played a key role in these processes of 
neoliberalization’.  
The literature identifies the key features of neoliberalism, understood as technologies of power, that is; 
privatisation of management and public services, the ‘use of market style approaches in the public 
sector’ (Jessop 2002: 454) - for instance an ‘emphasis on performance, efficiency, and marketability 
of knowledge’ (Keil, 2002:234), the redefinition of citizens as clients, an approach to governance 
based on public private partnership and authoritarism, and the lack of democratic accountability (Keil, 
2002; Jessop 2002; Peck and Tickell, 2002). The analysis of examples of urban regeneration from that 
perspective provides a more detailed overview of the implications of the new urban policy based on 
mega projects and events.  
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As a result of the new approach to urban regeneration new organisations for the delivery of spatially 
targeted emblematic projects have proliferated. For instance, the Urban Development Corporations in 
the UK constitute a well documented instance of the kind of delivery organisations that characterise 
this new approach and one which can teach us many lessons (Imrie and Thomas, 1999; Colenutt, 
1999; Cochrane, 1999; Brownhill, 1999). In Spain two paradigmatic and well-known cases of 
spatially targeted urban regeneration based on architecture and urban design where it is possible to 
find new delivery organisations are Barcelona – with the creation of the Olympic Holding, later 
transformed into the Agencia Metropolitana Barcelona Regional, SA -  and Bilbao – with the 
constitution of Bilbao Metropoli 30, an association which included universities, business associations 
and other private organisations  (Monclús, 2003; Gómez, 1998; Gómez, 1998). 
These organisations are often project related and are considered to provide a more effective 
entrepreneurial approach to solving urban problems (Cochrane et al., 1996; Rodríguez et al., 2005; 
Swyngedouw et al., 2005b). This has been described as a shift from government to a governance 
system in which private actors – informal institutions, agencies, and business associations - are 
involved in the design and delivery of regeneration strategies (Swyngedouw, 1996; Hubbard and Hall, 
1998; Rodríguez et al., 2005).  
An approach to governance that entails the mobilisation of key private actors - through business elite 
leadership but more often through public-private partnerships – is defended, from a neoliberal 
perspective, on the grounds of allegedly being more technically efficient, flexible, collaborative and 
participative (Cochrane et al., 1996; Jessop, 1997; Ward, 1998; Tewdwr-Jones and McNeill, 2000; 
Rodríguez et al., 2005; Gold, 2007). Thus, the practice of partnership has become the preferred 
organisational model of spatially targeted urban regeneration intervention and granted the private 
sector a greater influence over planning decision-making (Ward, 1998; Colenutt, 1999; Tewdwr-Jones 
and McNeill, 2000; Swyngedouw et al., 2005a). However, a growing number of empirical studies 
have brought to light the potentially new outcomes in terms of impacts on democratic decision-
making, planning possibilities and social and economic cohesion of this approach to regeneration and 
of the flagship developments themselves.  
One of the legacies of regeneration experiences such as the Urban Development corporations in the 
UK or the Barcelona Olympics is the belief that economic success is linked to symbolism, tourism and 
business prosperity while other aspects and needs –welfare benefits, public transport and affordable 
housing – are neglected (Cochrane, 1999; Monclús, 2003). This new discourse has spread and rooted 
in the minds of politicians and regulators. In this way, market objectives of growth and economic 
success have been prioritised over social needs while the communities have been promised a mere 
trickle down (Beazley, 1997; Cochrane, 1999; Swyngedouw et al., 2002, 2005). Indeed, prestige 
urban projects focus on economic feasibility, are designed to capture global economic flows and 
adapted to international events and the use by affluent groups rather than to meet the everyday needs 
of local communities (Beazley, 1997; Gómez, 1998; Brenner, 1999; García, 2004a; Evans, 2005).  
In addition, because the viability of large-scale urban projects depends on the returns from land 
revalorisation they tend to displace population either for the development of key urban sites or due to 
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gentrification processes, as the increase in rent prices the less affluent population out of the area 
(Zukin, 1995; Evans, 2005). Thus, real estate markets contribute to the creation of fragmented urban 
landscapes and accentuate socio-spatial polarisation and exclusion processes (Swyngedouw et al., 
2002; Evans, 2005). On the other hand, the benefits of the revalorisation of the land and the built 
environment are almost exclusively reaped by the elite. However, given the speculative nature of the 
investment there is financial risk involved and this is carried by the public sector for prestige mega-
projects are almost always state-led and state financed (Swyngedouw et al., 2002; Rodríguez et al., 
2005). Again, social and economic polarisation processes are enhanced by what has been described as 
a transfer of wealth from the public to the private sector through the built environment (Swyngedouw 
et al., 2002).  
Another legacy of the use of flagship projects and events - such as the Urban Development 
Corporations, the Manchester Olympic bid, the Athens Olympics and so on - is the emphasis on an 
approach that entails elite networking and public-private partnership in order to achieve competitive 
and pro-growth objectives (Cochrane, 1999; Gold, 2007). Thus, stakeholder participation has become 
normative and new committees, managing bodies and partnerships that cut across different levels of 
government and private sector organisations have flourished and acquired greater strategic and 
decision-making power (Swyngedouw et al., 2005a). 
This shift towards quasi-private management structures - based on the premise that the performance of 
the private sector in managing resources is better - and the consequent partial loss of public control 
over the decision-making and development processes has been described as a privatisation of 
governance and planning since the new delivery bodies have displaced governmental and planning 
institutions (Cochrane et al., 1996; Collinge and Hall, 1997; Imrie and Thomas, 1999; Rodríguez et 
al., 2005; Swyngedouw et al., 2005a). This privatisation entails the redistribution of power and 
competencies away from elected local governments and towards the private sector through the 
subordination of the local authorities to such quasi-private bodies and the redefinition of their role to 
becoming mere strategic enablers of the regeneration process (Imrie and Thomas, 1999; Swyngedouw 
et al., 2002, 2005a). 
The growth of partnerships can be considered an instance of the broader move towards a more 
flexible, less hierarchical and stake-holder based style of decision-making (Rodríguez et al., 2005). 
Although this new approach is often portrayed as more bottom-up and participatory, in practice only a 
limited group of professionals and members of the elite - architects, planners, engineers, developers, 
economists, financiers, business leaders - are allowed to take part in decision-making. The general 
public input is restricted and postponed to very advanced stages of the process when the important 
decisions have already be made given that the main responsibility lies on the ‘experts’ (Beazley, 1997; 
Swyngedouw et al., 2002, 2005; Rodríguez et al., 2005; Coaffee and Johnston, 2007). In this way, 
certain groups are excluded from the decision-making process while the interests of the city are 
identified with those of the members of the business elites and privileged social groups.  
The focus of the local political apparatus on the creation of adjunct means of governance is one of the 
ways in which the state is being glocalised, in an exercise of strategic selectivity of the state which 
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takes place through the formation of new elite coalitions and strengthening of the existing. Offering a 
link between regime theory and strategic selectivity, the new governance bodies, can also be seen as 
one of the vehicles where the arrangements for the cooperation between the public sector and private 
institutions characteristic of urban regimes crystallize and can take place. 
Elitist decision-making means that democratic debate about costs and benefits is generally avoided 
and information about the real financial costs of the projects is not made available to the public 
(Beazley, 1997; Swyngedouw et al., 2005a). Thus, as Swyngedouw (2002, 2005a) has argued, the 
need for creating networks of collaboration between the elites and the public sector in order to achieve 
the necessary stability to compete for state and private investment has enhanced the secrecy of the 
regeneration activities by leading them to restrict the access to information and data in order to 
prevent externals actors from de-stabilising the cohesion of the networks. 
Therefore, the consequences of the privatisation of planning and the stakeholder approach to 
regeneration are an erosion of democratic decision-making, a deficit of representativity, an inadequate 
citizen participation, the exclusion of disadvantaged groups from decision-making and, a lack of 
political accountability and transparency (Gómez, 1998; Swyngedouw et al., 2002,2005a; Moulaert et 
al., 2005a). In short, a more autocratic style of governance, with its associated mechanisms of 
inclusion and exclusion, is adopted (Swyngedouw et al., 2005a). In this way, contestation is 
minimised for mega projects are marketed as promoting growth for all (Lehrer and Laidley, 2008) 
and, furthermore, the transfer of public funds to private hands already mentioned occurs in an obscure 
way ‘and since relatively few people are directly injured, it is difficult to mobilize opposition’ (Orueta 
and Fainstein, 2008:761). 
Finally, this trend is enhanced by the spread of the practice of considering exceptionality measures for 
the design and implementation of the urban mega-projects which is justified on the grounds of a their 
scale, significance for the whole of the city, the need for greater technical efficiency and shorter times 
of delivery (Swyngedouw et al., 2002, 2005a). As a consequence of their ‘exceptionality’ urban mega-
projects are poorly or not at all integrated into urban plans of higher level (Swyngedouw et al., 2002). 
A style of planning through projects is instituted while, at the same time, the integrated plan at city 
level is replaced by a more business-like model of planning - the strategic plan (Monclús, 2003). This 
is not surprising given the involvement of the business elites in the planning process.  
3.5 Conclusion 
In order to answer the research questions theoretical and empirical tools are necessary. This chapter 
has dealt with theory. The adopted theoretical framework situates the problem in a context where 
economic forces are considered but that asserts that politics matter and where the formal and strategic 
dimensions of the state take centre stage. It considers that structural forces are very important for 
understanding urban change but it leaves space for human agency to allow for a greater emphasis on 
empirical analysis. In addition, scale is conceptualised as socially constructed. Last but not least, 
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emphasis is put on the spatial aspects because capital needs to be valorised in space and in our case 
this is done through flagship projects. 
Therefore, with these premises, a combination of different theories and concepts has been useful from 
a theoretical perspective. On the one hand, I have drawn on the strategic-relational approach, cultural 
political economy and the literature on the politics of scale with the aim to consider globalisation and 
its scalar and spatial effects. On the other hand, I have drawn on urban regime theory combined with 
notions of translation of interests between geographical scales in order to consider globalisation and 
overcome localism.  
Finally, for the study of the implications for planning practices of the politics of regeneration I have 
drawn on the literature of neoliberalism as a mode of governance and, a range of empirical analyses of 
the impacts of flagship developments.  
The next chapter will deal with the empirical approach taken to answer the research questions. It will 
discuss the combination different research methods used to obtain the necessary data – mainly semi-
structured interviews, press coverage analysis and analysis of documents - and the methodology and 
conceptual framework used for the analysis of the data collected. 
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4. RESEARCHING URBAN POLITICS IN VALENCIA 
4.1 Introduction 
This thesis examines the use of spatially targeted emblematic projects as a means to achieve urban 
revitalisation and economic regeneration and, it is focused on the city of Valencia. With the support of 
a theoretical framework and an empirical methodology which provide guidance on the collection and 
analysis of data, this thesis aims to examine the different economic, political, social and cultural 
factors that have led to the use of such regeneration strategy, to understand the actual processes and 
actors involved in it and, to identify the implications for the built environment and for planning 
practices. A mix of research methods are used to collect the necessary data to help answer the main 
research questions, which include a why, a how and a what type question. 
Thus, the main objectives of this thesis are to: 
a) find out the implications for planning practices and for the shaping of the city’s physical 
form of the urban policy that uses spatially targeted emblematic projects as a means to 
achieve urban revitalisation and economic regeneration,  
b) conceptualise and identify the causes of the formulation of such urban policy and, 
c) identify and analyse the economic and political actors and processes at different scales and 
their interplay involved in the formulation and enactment of such urban policy. 
4.2 Case study research  
This research is intended to analyse the current social, political and economic forces that are 
transforming cities, taking as a starting point the supposition that different cultural and political 
traditions, technical rules and social practices greatly influence city production processes in a specific 
context. My standpoint is that globalisation is a heterogeneous phenomenon, dependent ‘on the social 
and specifically cultural character of the economy’ (Wood, 2004:124). 
In my opinion, case study research, which has been defined as ‘an empirical inquiry that investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between 
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident’ (Yin, 1994:13) is optimum for the topic I am looking 
at. Furthermore, I follow Flyvberg (2006) in the belief that more detailed case studies are needed for 
the production of a contextualised and effective social science. 
Therefore, my research adopts a case study strategy which uses detailed evidence to investigate a 
contemporary phenomenon in a specific geographic, political and cultural context. On the one hand, 
the phenomenon studied - global architecture and urban development - is difficult to separate from the 
context and, on the other hand it is spatially fixed due to the ‘secondary circuit of capital’ (Harvey, 
1978). Development industries and, land and property markets are place-specific and therefore must 
                                                                                                                          CHAPTER 4 
68 
be studied within their context. In addition, my case fits in the typical situation where a case study 
strategy is preferred, that is, according to Yin (1994), when the questions being posed are of a ‘how’ 
and ‘why’ type and the researcher has little control over events.  
The selected case study is the city of Valencia in Spain, where, in the last two decades, both the local 
and regional governments have tried to reimage the city to make it attractive to investors and tourists 
through large investments in infrastructure, prestige projects and the organisation of international 
events. Indeed, Valencia is a good example of city entrepreneurialism. Moreover, the urban and 
economic regeneration strategies represented by a myriad of emblematic projects have fuelled the 
development of a diffuse, fragmented and polarised city-region and, consequently, contributed to its 
perverse environmental and social effects. 
Being an in-depth single case study, its significance is not statistical but it is related to ‘what it tells us 
about the world in which it is embedded’ (Burawoy et al., 1991:281). There are many reasons why the 
Valencian case is relevant from an academic perspective. First, Valencia is unique in terms of long 
standing and continuous emphasis on global architecture. There are several flagship projects not just a 
few, which indicates the significance for the case. Second, the strategy of using emblematic 
architecture has been used by different political parties and has remained the same over time and 
across different levels of government.  Third, as argued by academics such as Prytherch (2003, 2005), 
it offers an excellent example of Regionalism and construction of local identity in the context of 
globalisation and political re-scaling.  Finally, it has not only imported models but produced them too, 
as other Spanish regions have used the Valencian Urbanism Act as a model for their own laws. 
On the other hand, regarding the design of the case study, it includes three flagship projects as units of 
analysis, which are the City of Arts and Sciences, the projects linked to the celebration of the 
America’s Cup sailing competition and Sociopolis. I study three projects because, since I am trying to 
unearth processes and the relative importance of the actors, my data needs to be comprehensive in the 
range of actors to investigate rather than in the number of projects. The processes analysed in each of 
the projects show several parallels since all of the flagships have been subject to very similar 
economic and political general trends. 
Furthermore, the selected projects are of different kinds - a cultural mega-project, a sporting event and 
a housing development - but all of them have the same approach, the use of emblematic architecture to 
achieve urban revitalisation and economic growth. The purpose is not to analyse different approaches 
to regeneration – culture-led or property-led for instance - but to analyse the common ‘way of doing’ 
they have. What their commonalities in terms of processes, interests and actors can tell us about the 
causes, operation modes, and consequences of the use of spatially targeted emblematic projects as a 
means to achieve urban revitalisation and economic regeneration. 
Finally, the projects are in different phases of development and started at different times. The City of 
Sciences can be considered the first ‘competitive’ mega-project in the city and the one which has 
taken longer to be completed. This cultural mega-project was first conceived at the end of the 1980s 
                                                                                                                          CHAPTER 4 
69 
and was finished in 2009. Meanwhile, in 2003 Valencia was selected as a venue for the America’s 
Cup sailing competition in 2007. A second edition was held in the city in 2010. Sociopolis was 
presented for the first time in the Valencia Bienal of 2003 and is still being executed.  Therefore the 
selected projects can provide a chronological perspective. In addition, the evolution of the 
regeneration strategies, the impact of different historical and economic moments in the processes and 
the influence of the perceived result of one project over the others can be studied through them. 
From an empirical perspective, I set out to study prestige mega-projects for different reasons. On the 
one hand, they are the meeting point of global, national, regional and local political and economic 
interests, that is to say, the transnational class, local hegemonies and ‘national’ political projects. On 
the other hand, they reflect the power struggles among different elite groups to influence and try to 
shape built environments and forms of governance to their convenience (Zukin, 1995; Hubbard, 1996; 
Swyngedouw et al., 2002, 2005b). Also, in their conception and development, processes at different 
scales interact and are condensed. Thus, through this interaction of scales, global trends are captured 
and incorporated in a localised setting, or as Moluaert has put it, through them ‘globalisation becomes 
urbanised’ (Moulaert et al., 2005:3). In this way, prestige mega-projects become the expression of the 
socio-spatial and scalar political restructuring of the city and the changes in the relationships between 
scales. Yet, these spatialised interventions are embedded in their geographical contexts and 
institutional frameworks (Swyngedouw et al., 2002, 2005b). They are also highly ‘localised’ since it 
is through the built environment – and particularly through them – that capital from different scales is 
geographically fixed and valorised (Brenner, 1999; Moulaert et al., 2005a:47).  
Finally, flagship projects are not only empirical manifestations of globalisation, but also motors of 
change. They can be considered conduits of globalisation and of changes in the form of governance. 
In this sense flagship developments and the decision-making and development processes related to 
them contribute to the spatial reorganisation and the shaping of a new way of doing. Therefore they 
constitute empirical instances where some processes are evidenced. Through them we can analyse 
processes of urban change such as urban restructuring, the interaction between the local and the 
global, socio-spatial transformation, regulatory framework reforms and changes in the ways of doing 
(Swyngedouw et al., 2005b; Moulaert et al., 2005).  
4.3 Research methodology and research methods 
The research methodology involves a mix of different qualitative methods. It comprises different 
phases, from the identification of the key issues to be studied to the drawing of final conclusions. 
Thus, I have followed different steps. First, I have identified the relevant issues and have situated the 
selected case study through an initial literature review.  Second, I have conducted a secondary 
literature review with the purpose of establishing initial theoretical and empirical frameworks with 
which to analyse the case studies. This secondary review has included two sets of literature, one 
purely theoretical on the issues identified in the first phase of research – covering theories of urban 
politics, political-economic theories, city competitiveness, globalisation and actors of globalisation - 
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and the other one empirical, aimed to contextualise the case study – which has included literature on 
Spanish and Valencian urbanism, and urban regeneration case studies. Third, I have conducted 
empirical research, which has entailed the collection and analysis of data about the Valencian context 
and the three flagship projects. Four main research methods have been used to obtain both contextual 
and specific data on the flagship projects studied, that is, elaboration and analysis of secondary data, 
document analysis, press coverage analysis and analysis of original data from semi-structured 
interviews. Lastly, I have reviewed literature in reference to relevant aspects for the interpretation of 
the findings identified during the conduction of the empirical phase of the research. Then I have 
evaluated the findings and, have drawn final conclusions. 
As previously stated I have used a variety of research methods during the empirical phase of the 
research. On the one hand, I have used secondary data - including contextual information and data 
about specific case studies - as background information for interviews and, later on, during the 
interviewing phase, I have used it to corroborate of interview and press records (Flyvbjerg, 1997). 
Data have been drawn from statistical material published by public and private sources, academic 
studies, governmental, public agencies and business reports, general and architectural press. 
The different types of documents that have been collected to be analysed include, for instance, 
strategic plans (e.g.: Plan estratégico de Valencia’, 1996; ‘Plan Estratégico de Valencia 2015’), city-
marketing documents ( e.g.: ‘Valencia en Marcha’, ‘Valencia, ciudad de oportunidades para la 
inversión’ and ‘Valencia modelo de ciudad’, ‘Valencia motor del Mediteráneo’), urban and territorial 
development documents (e.g.:  Plan de Desarrollo Urbanístico de la Comunidad Valenciana, 1993; 
Estrategias de Vertebración Territorial ,1995, Plan General de Ordenación Urbana de Valencia, 1988), 
marketing documents of the specific projects and masterplans. 
As the main research method, and in order to analyse decision-making and development processes, I 
have conducted sixty-two face to face semi-structured (elite) interviews, of an average duration of 60 
minutes each. Twenty-five of the interviews were mainly general about the use of prestige projects in 
Valencia or also covered more than one of the flagships, when the interviewees had first-hand 
information about them. The remainder of the interviews were specific of the projects – 14 for The 
City of Arts and Sciences, 12 for the America’s Cup and 11 for Sociopolis.  
Semi-structured interviews, particularly elite interviews, are considered to provide a richness of detail 
and complexity about certain phenomena which other approaches – such as surveys or statistical data 
– fail to offer (Schoenberger, 1991). For other researchers (Smith, 2006), however, the distinction 
between elite and non-elite interviews is based on inadequate conceptions of power since defining an 
individual as belonging to an elite is problematic. Anyway, in the case of Valencia’s urban policy 
based on mega-projects and events, the interviewees have been considered to belong to the ‘elite’ in 
reference to their access to specific knowledge, whether because they have been involved in the 
implementation of the policy or affected by it (as it is the case of civic groups). The interviewees have 
included a varied range of actors such as municipal and regional politicians, planning officials,  public 
agencies or institutes (e.g. the Valencian Institute of Housing or ‘Consorcio Valencia 2007’, which is 
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a partnership constituted by the central, regional and local governments and created for the 
organisation of the America’s Cup), academics, members of the city marketing organisation (i.e. 
CEyD), business groups (i.e. Chamber of Commerce), developers’ organisations, real estate agents, 
professional bodies, political parties, economic institutions, community representatives, journalists 
and editors, construction company representatives and developers, private professionals (architects, 
engineers, planners) and other interest groups.  
Last but not least, I have conducted a press coverage analysis of a main general information 
newspaper. The newspaper chosen has been El País because it is ‘Spain’s largest circulation daily 
newspaper’ and it is considered ‘a source of reference for the most influential sectors of society’ 
(Nexis UK). El País was established in 1976. The Valencian edition - which since 1995 contains a 
special regional supplement - started to be published in 1987, just before the first of the three projects 
studied in this thesis started (www.elpais.com). One main newspaper has been considered to be 
sufficient for the purpose of complementing, corroborating information from the interviews and 
establishing the sequence of events. 
I believe it is important to stress the importance for the validity and reliability of the research of 
having used multiple sources of evidence - interviews, press coverage and documents - and of having 
considered independent data sets about the same information in combination. In this way, data sources 
have been triangulated, allowing for the corroboration of information and augmentation of evidence 
(Yin, 2003). 
The documents have been used to corroborate information, although they present the downside of 
being of uneven coverage. This problem has been overcome with the use of a systematic analysis of 
press coverage. In addition to avoiding the excluding of important events that might not come out in 
the interviews I have also used the press to establish a chronology of events, which at the same time 
has helped maintain the chain of evidence. 
Finally, being a case study of a single city in a particular historical and geographic context this thesis’ 
aim is not to generalise results in a statistical manner but to contribute to the research already 
conducted for other cases. Thus, the case of Valencia covers generalisable theoretical issues in the 
study of urban politics - such as the role of the estate at different levels, the role of political projects 
and accumulation strategies and the importance of global and local actors, for instance – and therefore 
it allows for an analytical generalisation to broader theories. In Burawoy’s (1991:279) words, ‘it seeks 
generalisation through reconstructing existing generalisations, that is, the reconstruction of existing 
theory’. 
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4.4 Data collection 
The process of data collection has been systematic and closely related to the research questions and 
the theoretical framework established beforehand. It has involved the collection of documents and 
press, and the conduction of research interviews.  
The data to collect is intended to answer the research questions but, in order to make the process 
operational, intermediate steps are necessary. Thus, three types of questions can be distinguished in 
this research. First, at a more general level, there are the three research questions – which I have called 
the why, the how and the what question – then there are the questions of inquiry, that is to say 
questions to ask to the flagship projects as units of analysis – which are direct questions that as 
researcher I pose to myself – and finally the questions for the interviewees, which are indirect and are 
questions to use in the field (Foddy, 1993; Gillham, 2000; Yin, 2003). 
The procedure I have used to decide which data to collect has been to produce a table which links the 
data to be collected to the questions to be answered. In the table, the different levels of questions, the 
source and type of data to collect and the theoretical concepts which help formulate the questions of 
enquiry are linked in a chain; theoretical concept, research question, questions of enquiry, source of 
data (interviews, press or documents), type of data (direct or indirect). Thus, the table contains 
information about; the concepts or theories from the literature review which help me formulate the 
questions of enquiry and will guide me in the later analysis as well, the data necessary to answer the 
questions and, the sources from where it can be collected (interviews, press or documents). Finally, it 
says whether the data answers the question directly or it needs further interpretation to relate to the 
question.  
From there I have gone on to produce an interview schedule with the questions to ask in the field, 
which are not direct but are likely to produce the necessary information. The questions are divided by 
general or specific to projects and by topic (design, economic, delivery, communication and 
marketing, etc.). After the first interviews I refined the questionnaire. The resulting final research 
questionnaire can be found in Appendix A. 
However, being open-ended interviews the topics and issues covered have been the same and 
generally all of them have been covered in each of the interviews but the actual questions, the order of 
them and the emphasis on the different topics has varied depending on the knowledge of the 
interviewee and the development of the interview.  
Having produced a research questionnaire, the next issue is to decide who to interview, what Saunders 
(1979) has called the problem of identification in urban politics research since ‘before it can begin to 
analyse what the powerful do, it must first identify who the powerful are’ (Saunders, 1979:327). 
However, the aim of this research is not to identify who the powerful are but, within a pluralist 
tradition, it is more interested in how power is exercised and assumes that power lies in political 
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institutions but also outside of them. In trying to address the why question it looks for political 
projects and accumulation strategies considering that not only elected politicians have an influence on 
them. On the one hand politicians depend on votes, on the other there are other powerful groups with 
different interests also. Not least, beyond specific interests, politicians as well as other actors are part 
of a society and they share values, beliefs and perceptions, as it has been found in this research. For 
instance, ideas of modernity are a commonality found across different actors and form part of the 
Valencian imaginary. 
Therefore, the research needs to take into account as many points of views as possible, especially of  
people or groups that are in positions of influence due to their access to economic and political 
resources and people who have first-hand information because they have been directly involved in the 
projects. Clearly, this includes members of the local and regional governments and, those ‘who 
control local material resources, who enjoy strong numerical support, who occupy strategic locations 
in social-political networks, who have expert knowledge or are in a position to control the distribution 
of information’ (Saunders, 1979:333-334). 
The techniques used to select who the key actors to interview were have been to search in internet, 
business directories and published books about local themes, to ask informants and, last but not least, 
to ask other interviewees. Thus, apart from talking to academics which have acted as informants and 
provided me with important contacts, at the end of each one of the interviews I have checked the list 
of selected contacts and of the already conducted interviews with the interviewees, and have asked for 
suggestions. Generally, there has been a coincidence in who different people pointed to me as a 
relevant person to interview. 
All this has been done in a systematic manner by creating a table which was organised by type of 
actor –academic, politician, architect, business group, press, developer, citizen organisation, etc. - and 
type of interview - general or about each one of the projects - and periodically updated to always 
ensure that all types of actors for each type of interview where covered and that the quantity of each of 
them was balanced.  The sample is not ‘complete’ but it covers a wide range of actors and it is 
balanced in the number of each of the type of actors interviewed. The final list of interviews can be 
found in Appendix B. 
Indeed, not only deciding who to interview but accessing ‘elite interviewees’ has been another 
problem to overcome. Interviewees have been contacted by email, by cold calling, in book 
presentations and other events or through other interviewees and contacts. Many times a lot of 
insistence and patience has been necessary but when an interview has not been possible I have 
substituted it by other with the help of the contacts table. Although some actors have been reluctant to 
grant an interview, being an architect and coming from a prestigious foreign University – despite 
having been born in Valencia - has helped me gain access to relevant actors and allowed me to present 
myself as an insider or an outsider at my own advantage. According to Sabot (1999) local elites are 
more willing to give information to foreign than to local researchers because they feel less 
‘threatened’ by the use they can make of the knowledge acquired. On the other hand, it is often 
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assumed that ‘insiders’ are in a privileged position to understand the context of the research. This 
brings to mind reflections about the positionality of the researcher and the dichotomy insider-outsider. 
Given that the positionality of both interviewer and interviewee can change over time and in 
relationship to what identity attributes are stressed, Herod (1999) has proposed that the dualism 
insider-outsider should be substituted by the idea of ‘degrees of outsiderness’, which implies that the 
relationship between the researcher and the researched involves a ‘sliding scale of intimacy’ (Herod, 
1999:326). 
On the other hand, as Ward and Jones (1999) have argued, beyond the positionality of the researcher, 
the kind of knowledge acquired and responses obtained from semi-structured interviews depend on 
the political-temporal contingencies that affect research access. For them, the researcher not only 
needs to be reflexive regarding issues of  his or her own personality, class, gender, nationality and so 
on in relationship to the object of research and the interviewees, but also theoretically reflexive. 
Therefore, Ward and Jones (1999) argue, politics must be placed inside the research design for 
research access to elites ‘is conditioned by the politics of time and the geographical complexities of 
place’ (1999:304) and ‘the researchers need to be aware that they are unable to completely remove 
themselves from their context’ (1999:309). 
In that respect, it is important to mention that, the period of conducting the interviews has coincided 
with a moment when many democratically elected representatives and politicians were being 
prosecuted for corruption. Although I was afraid that this fact and the distrust atmosphere it might 
create would have a critical impact on empirical work, in reality, the response has been largely 
positive and it has been possible to interview enough – in range and number - key actors. Perhaps, 
being in an early stage of the judicial processes and a moment where momentum in popular discontent 
and opposition to the urban policy based on mega projects had not been reached, the sensitivity of the 
topic was not very high yet. Also, I believe, the ethos of an urban policy that aimed to market the city 
and make it known internationally has influenced the willingness of the actors involved in it to discuss 
the policy. Nevertheless, I have found that, generally, it has been easier to access politicians who are 
not currently in office although there have been exceptions. On the other hand, star architects, such as 
Santiago Calatrava, have not been possible to access. However they have been substituted by their 
trusted representatives. 
Having got access to the key actors, it is important to obtain as much as possible of the evidence 
needed rather than just the information that the interviewee wants to disclose or which is in his or her 
agenda.  To achieve that I have used different techniques for guiding the conversation but at the same 
time letting the interviewees express their point of view. First of all the style of questioning has been 
non-aggressive in order to make the interviewee feel at ease, but, I have pointed out inconsistencies. 
Secondly, I have left them talk with little interruption for, after a long conversation, interviewees 
dropped off their guard and were happy to discuss any topic in a relaxed way. Also, when it has been 
possible, I have waited for them to touch on controversial topics instead of introducing them myself. 
Otherwise, I have introduced them casually. Lastly, in the final part of the interview, when the 
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interviewee was comfortable I have gone back to important matters, to issues that had been identified 
during the interview as key or where the interviewee could have more to say. 
Usually, the interviewees have spoken quite freely. Sometimes I have been requested to stop recording 
for a while or to not use some of the information but, most of the interviewees have not shown 
concern about the use of the information after learning that it was for academic purposes. 
The interviews have been conducted in Spanish - mother tongue of both interviewer and interviewees 
– which has helped to avoid misunderstandings, to capture the subtleties of the spoken and non-
spoken language and to understand the cultural context. 
On the other hand, the collection of press articles has been done with the aid of the online electronic 
database Nexis UK, which allows downloading electronic versions of the articles selected with the use 
of filters.  For the selected newspaper – the Spanish newspaper El País - there are electronic records 
from 18th April 1996 and therefore for the search of articles from previous dates – which total 70 - it 
was necessary to go to the newspaper and periodicals section of the Public Library of Valencia, go 
through the paper edition of the newspaper and photocopy them. I also did a final selection of articles 
in order to rule out those which were not relevant because only mentioned the project laterally. 
The period covered for the search of articles of each project starts when each project was first made 
public and finishes on the date when I first started collecting the articles, which is 20 March 2010. 
Thus, for The City of Arts and Sciences the period covered has been from 1st January 1989 until 20th 
March 2010.  The filters applied have been a combination of the search terms ‘Ciudad de las artes y 
las ciencias’ or ‘Ciudad de las Ciencias’ or ‘Ciudad de la Ciencia’ or ‘CACSA’ and ‘Comunidad 
Valenciana’ anywhere in the article. 
For the America’s Cup the period of time covered has been from 19th April 1996 until 20th March 
2010. Four sets of search words anywhere in the article have been applied: first, ‘Copa del America’ 
and ‘32’ and ‘Comunidad Valenciana’, second,  ‘ACM’ and ‘Consorcio Valencia 2007’ and 
‘Comunidad Valenciana’, third,  ‘Valencia litoral’ or ‘Marina Real Juan Carlos I’ and ‘Comunidad 
Valenciana’ and, fourth, ‘Veles e Vents’ or ‘foredeck’ and ‘copa’ and ‘Comunidad Valenciana’.  
For Sociopolis the period of time covered has been from 1st January 2003 until 20th March 2010 and 
includes a combination of the articles found in two different searches, the first with the words 
‘Sociopolis’ and ‘Comunidad Valenciana’, and the second with the words ‘Plan especial’ and ‘la 
Torre’ and ‘Comunidad Valenciana’ anywhere in the article. 
After applying all the filters and checking manually, the total number of newspaper articles analysed 
is 1,298 (422 for the city of arts and Sciences, 793 for the America’s Cup and 74 for Sociopolis). A 
full list of the press articles analysed can be found in Appendix C. 
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Finally, the collection of documents has been less systematic. It has relied on internet searches for 
issues raised during the interviews and on documents provided or suggested by the interviewees. The 
documents include strategic plans, city-marketing documents, urban and territorial development 
documents, master plans, books and published papers in relation to Valencia and the specific projects, 
etc.  
4.5 Data analysis 
The analysis of data has involved several steps. The first preliminary analysis took place while data 
was being collected and interviews transcribed, in order to check what needed to be followed up, to 
understand which the main interpretative threads were and, to identify possible relevant issues that 
had not been considered during the design of the case study. Second, with all the data collected I 
looked for the most important issues that emerged from data and could develop into themes which 
related to theory, and started dividing them into the why, how and what questions. 
Finally, I did a more thorough analysis with the aid of computer software NVivo 8. Data needed to be 
put in format so it could be uploaded to the program so I transcribed all 62 interviews and 
chronologically organised and divided into different files the newspaper articles. In the case of 
photocopied articles, I have coded them manually and then typed the relevant extracts to be introduced 
in NVivo 8. The files have been organised by project and type of data, interview or press article. 
I established a structure of codes and divided them by question and by themes which derived from the 
preliminary analysis so a more detailed thematic analysis could be done. However, I improved the 
structure of codes as the coding process went along and some issues became obvious. All the data, 
except the documents, have been coded. The documents have been used to increase and contrast the 
evidence from press and interviews and have not been analysed with Nvivo 8. 
In order to complement and help establish causalities and the evolution of processes I conducted a 
chronological analysis, based mainly on press coverage and documents. It consisted in situating 
graphically the main events - such as changes of government, new urban plans, start of each of the 
projects and changes in them - and looking for temporal relationships. 
From there I could start the interpretation of the data based on the developed themes. I used theoretical 
propositions which guided the analysis by helping to focus on certain data (Grbich, 2007). Indeed, 
those propositions had already guided the data collection but in this stage they helped me ignore the 
data which were not relevant to the research questions, especially so for the why and how type 
questions. For the what type question, the procedure was to see if the outcomes of mega-projects 
observed in other case studies and found in the literature review – privatisation, lack of transparency, 
focus on image, etc. - also appeared here as expected. 
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All of these methods were used to build an explanation of the phenomenon which also takes into 
account the three studied projects. Particular care was given to examine not only evidence for why 
things happened in a certain way but also why they did not happen in a different way. 
From a more theoretical viewpoint, while collecting and interpreting the data, I realised that not only 
the ‘objective’ different political and economic interests were important for understanding the 
phenomenon under study but also how people think about them. In other words, not only the material 
but also the ideational plays a role in shaping strategic action. In addition, the motives expressed by 
the actors not always correspond with what can be interpreted from their actions. The relationship 
between the material and the ideational became one of the major concerns of the analysis. 
Political and economic discourses are not only a way of justifying one’s actions but a way of 
understanding and interpreting the world, which indeed also influences behaviour. Therefore, in my 
opinion it is analytically important, albeit problematic, to distinguish between ‘objective’ interests, 
acknowledged and unacknowledged interests and perceived interests, and also, how they shape and 
are shaped by discourse. 
Hay (2001) explains the relevance of discourse very clearly. According to him the strategies 
considered and deployed by actors are a reflection of how they understand the context in which they 
are.  As he goes on to elaborate 
Nonetheless, for particular ideas, narratives and paradigms to continue to provide cognitive 
templates through which actors interpret the world, they must retain a certain resonance with 
those actors' direct and mediated experiences. In this sense the discursive or ideational is only 
ever relatively autonomous of the material. . . . What the above discussion hopefully 
demonstrates, is the centrality of ideas to any adequate understanding of the relationship 
between agent and structure, conduct and context. It also suggests the power of those able to 
provide the cognitive filters, such as policy paradigms, through which actors interpret the 
strategic environment’ (Hay, 2001).  
However, behaviour and thought are linked but it is not a causal relationship in either way. They are 
interwoven in more complex ways and therefore difficult to analyse. In order to take into account the 
interactions between thought and behaviour, discourse analysis is not adequate since it says nothing 
about the relations between talk and action, and therefore is not useful to interpret the why of the 
phenomenon, which is one of my main research questions. I am interested in interests, values and 
beliefs and their relationship to behaviour. 
For those reasons I have drawn, on the one hand, on Cultural Political Economy (already discussed in 
Chapter three) for it highlights ‘the complex relations between meanings and practices’ and ‘is also 
interested in the variation, selection and retention of different discourses’ (Jessop, 2007:237). On the 
other hand, my understanding of behaviour and thought is based on Marvin Harris’ definition of 
culture as a socially learned mode of life which can be found in human societies and comprises every 
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aspect of social life, including behaviour and thought (Harris, 2001), which, at the same time, is 
consistent with Cultural Political Economy. Ideas are not simply a guide of behaviour and hence the 
why and how questions cannot be approached separately for behaviour and action are related in 
complex ways. Analytically, these perspectives and concepts have helped me to make sense of the 
different explanations at different levels that have emerged from the empirical data and to relate them 
to the theoretical framework. 
4.6 Writing up the case study  
The case study is divided in four empirical chapters, including a background chapter which has a 
chronological structure and three chapters which are organised by research question and have a 
thematic structure. The background chapter introduces chronologically the regeneration strategy used 
in Valencia explaining when it started and how it has evolved and, puts the story of the three flagship 
projects into this context. Also, it points out the key actors and their motivation, interpreting what the 
main interests and objectives behind each of the three flagship projects are. The other three chapters 
address each one of the research questions, drawing and bringing together evidence from the three 
flagship projects to discuss thematic issues linked to the theoretical framework. 
 When it has been possible I have told the story making use of quotes, not only in the background 
chapter but also, although they are more abstract, in the three thematic chapters.  In order to deal with 
confidentiality issues some quotes are not attributed to a specific person but more generally to a type 
of actor. For obvious practical reasons, the interviews, their transcription and analysis have been done 
in the original language – Spanish – and I have only translated into English the quotes to be used in 
the text. 
4.7 Conclusion 
As the next chapters will show, although the case of Valencia is less well-known than other Spanish 
cases, it is a strong example of the vibrancy of Spanish urban politics. Bigger and smaller cities in 
Spain have undergone processes of urban regeneration in the last decades, especially after the onset of 
democracy. However, despite at a first glance the processes might look similar and, particularly 
Bilbao and Barcelona, are often cited as the models which other cities have followed, the regeneration 
policies show many differences. For instance, Bilbao’s one-off Guggenheim operation was just 
another piece of a wider regeneration policy. Barcelona’s model has been very focused on urban 
design and on bringing to the city a wide and diverse range of global star architects to leave their 
stamp on the urban fabric. Chapter five will discuss the evolution of Valencia’s urban policy through 
the three main projects under study, showing an unprecedented and almost exclusive emphasis on 
mega-projects and events, spanning a long period of time. 
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5. VALENCIA: THE PROJECTS  
5.1 Introduction 
The first and most important urban transformation of twentieth century Valencia was indeed the Garden of 
the Turia, an eleven kilometre long lineal park built in the old bed of the Turia river. After the floods of 
1957 the old river bed had been dissecated to avoid future overflowing and the course of the river had 
been moved three kilometres south of the city. During the first years of democracy and after citizen 
contestation had overturned the Francoist administration’s plan to build a highway, the old river bed was 
converted into a park, that would provide the city with a green structuring spine to which the main urban 
cultural and leisure amenities would be connected (Olmos 2004; Interviews 19, 42 and 54).  
The urban design of the Turia’s Gardens project was commissioned by the city council to Catalan architect 
Ricardo Bofill. The brief consisted in the ‘design of an urban park with plantations, fountains and ponds, a 
botanical garden, and sports and cultural facilities’ (Ricardo Bofill Taller de Arquitectura, 
www.ricardobofill.com). Bofill’s unitary project could not be implemented in its entirety due to budgetary 
restrictions and only two sections of the river out of twelve were developed by the architect, based on the 
original idea. Figure 5.1 shows a current view of the Turia’s Park, crossed by several bridges. 
Figure 5.1 Turia’s Park.  
 
Source: Vivir Valencia (www.vivirvalencia.com) 
The General Urban Plan of 1989 captured and established the structuring function of the new park 
(Interview 42). According to Alejandro Escribano - director of the plan - the 1989 General plan, swaying 
away from the, at the time, current paradigm of the ‘urbanism of austerity’, defined a finished ‘balanced 
urban model’ which has been able to accommodate Valencia’s subsequent urban mega-projects. The 
architect explains it in his own words: 
 ‘Valencia’s originality comes from the fact that the birth of these projects coincided with a 
General Urban Plan which gave them a support base and made them understandable at the city 
level. [...] Keep in mind that Valencia’s great works are recovering the old riverbed [...], reusing 
the port or reusing all of the industrial and railway areas in the South. By doing so, we follow 
with what we could call the most recent European tendency, the most logical at the moment. But 
this has been done within a grid, within a holistic urban plan that offered a clearer reading’. 
(Interview 42) 
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Therefore, the General Urban Plan provided the legal framework which established the urban model to 
follow, which, according to the then Head of the Mayor’s Office (1983-89) (Interview 9) consisted 
roughly in a green old river bed and a regenerated maritime facade. 
The new regional urbanism law (LRAU), introduced in 1994 provided the management tool for the rapid 
implementation of the plan – until then still hardly effective - (Gaja, 2006b; Interviews 17 and 54), which 
allowed that, ten years after its introduction, nearly all the land in the urban border earmarked for 
development had been planned or already developed (El País, 9 May 2004). 
In the 1980s the urban planning policy had the objective of curbing the lack of amenities accumulated 
during decades of rural-urban migration and rapid growth, and urban development plans were initiated, 
directed and managed by the public sector. From the 1990s the economic recovery and the increased 
power of the real estate groups set the background for the wider introduction of the private sector in urban 
development. New public-private partnership formulas were experimented – particularly in the urban plan 
of the Avenida de Francia (Interview 54) – which culminated in the introduction of the figure of the 
‘urbanising agent’ in the 1994 Urbanism Act (LRAU). That meant, in essence, ‘the handing over of public 
responsibility to a private agent’ (Interview 54). According to senior lecturer in urbanism Ángel Martínez 
the thinking behind it was:  
‘let us give the prerogatives to develop the zone to a private investor with the ability to do so. 
This guarantees us the presence of funds that we do not possess, the capacity to manage which we 
do not have, and it allows us to do away with the difficulties that the property owners who are 
withholding the land are making’ (Interview 54). 
The projects during the 1980s and 1990s were part of the ‘rationalising process’ (Interview 13) which was 
reflected in the Urban General Plan of 1989. Local scholars (Gaja, 2006b; Interviews 13 and 19) agree that 
the projects were generally aimed to meeting the local population’s needs and demands rather than 
positioning the city ‘in this sort of ranking of cities that provoke exclamation’ (Interview 19). 
Valencia’s big projects of the 1980s and 1990s were the concert hall (Palau de la Música) – ‘the first hint 
of hope that the city can have other investments’ (Interview 42) and the ‘last large rationalising work’ 
(Interview  13) – the Valencian Institute of Modern Art (IVAM), the seafront promenade, the new 
underground system and, of course, the City of Sciences, which was the first project which was born with 
the clear intention of being a new icon for Valencia. 
From the mid 1990s there arose an interest in capturing international cultural and sporting events. For 
instance, in 1997 Valencia lost to Bari the holding of the Games of the Mediterranean and in 2001 
Valencia’s candidature to European Cultural Capital failed as it was awarded to Salamanca (Olmos, 2004). 
Finally, in 2003, the city was designated to hold the America’s Cup sailing competition. Consecutively, 
                                                                                                                                                     CHAPTER 5 
81 
 
the 2000s and 2010s saw an emphasis on the events, including two editions of the America’s Cup, the F1 
competition, Valencia open 500 tennis competition or the pope’s visit among other less relevant ones. 
Some of those events – particularly the America’s Cup - required the implementation of considerable 
infrastructural works. The projects not longer stemmed from a social demand but, instead, aimed to 
generate a demand, not necessarily local (Interview 19).  
At the same time that the city was immersed in the race to attract new events the City of Sciences was 
being extended and new buildings added to the complex, such as the Agora (the last one) which would 
host the Valencia Open 500 tennis competition.  
On the other hand, side-by-side to the spectacular mega-projects - and supported by the Valencian 
Urbanism Laws of 1994 (LRAU) and 2006 (LUV) and the National Land Law of 1998 - the city and the 
region had suffered a rapid real estate expansion, which has been called an ‘urbanising tsunami’ (Gaja, 
2008). It could be described as a real estate boom that was predatory upon Valencia’s rural environment, 
since the expansion of the city had to be at the expense of the fertile lands which surround it. Fernando 
Gaja, senior lecturer of urbanism at the UPV (Gaja, 2006b) has contended that Valencia’s Urban Planning 
model is characterised by two complementary phenomena; a disproportionate residential growth and the 
implementation of urban mega-projects by the public administrations. Sociopolis can be considered to 
embody both of them. On the one hand it is an example of residential urbanisation of croplands in the 
periphery of the city, and on the other, it is an emblematic project of the regional government, particularly 
the pet project of regional minister Rafael Blasco. 
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Figure 5.2 Timeline  
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On the same expansionist line a modification of the General Urban Plan of 1989 –under the figure of 
‘revision to the plan’- started to be elaborated in 2004. However, the burst of the real estate bubble in 2008 
spoilt many residential expansion projects. 
Thus, the old and new mega-projects overlap in time, as shown in figure 5.2. For instance, the City of 
Sciences continued to grow while the city embarked in other endeavours such as the America’s Cup or 
more modest ones such as Sociopolis. Considered altogether they constitute an urban policy based on 
mega-projects and events. The evolution of the urban policy is affected by (and affects) economic cycles, 
legislation changes and other economic, social and political processes (see figure 5.2). In the next 
subsections we will look at the three projects under study in more detail. 
5.2 The City of Arts and Sciences 
The City of Sciences was an initiative of the first regional government – particularly of president Joan 
Lerma - and launched in 1989 (Interviews 9, 17, 26, 31, 32, 42, 55 and 58), some years after a New State 
of the Autonomies was instated in Spain and, Valencia became capital city of the Valencian Autonomous 
Community. The initial project was called the City of Sciences and Technology and included a 
planetarium, a science museum and a telecommunications tower. The City of Sciences has been 
considered ‘the first urban mega-project’ (Interview 42) and, although the inception of the project had a 
governmental origin, ‘there was a general consensus in the business and political spheres that Valencia 
needed a mega project because the city was completely asleep’ (Interview 42).  
It was in Lerma’s presentation speech of the City of Sciences in the Generalitat Palace with Calatrava in 
attendance when the idea of an emblematic project to represent Valencia was very clearly spelt out for the 
first time (Interview 38). Thus, ‘it was clearly an initiative from the regional government and endorsed by 
the interest of the president at the time, Lerma, to position the city’ (Interview 26). There was a need for a 
boost in self-esteem and showing the capacity to build a new icon for the city was an opportunity to do so. 
In the words of the Director of the 1989 Urban Plan of Valencia: 
 [In] the 1980s, the sensation was one of general pessimism. That is, everything here was going 
badly, everything was awful. […] There was a total distrust of anything that meant new urban 
development. So, it was necessary to beat this feeling a bit. (Interview 42) 
Therefore, from the beginning, when the project was just an idea, there was the sense that it had to be ‘a 
striking project’ (Interview 42), ‘something important for Valencia’ (Interview 30) which would - in the 
words of the then president of the regional government - ‘make of the city an emblematic place’ (Beltrán, 
13 September 1991). 
As the Director of the 1989 Urban Plan of Valencia explains: 
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The program was generated as the project was being developed. In other words, the fundamental 
idea was to do something stunning and there was not even a museum layout plan or anything like 
it. […] In the beginning, the project was really just an idea. Not even one page about what it was 
they wanted there had been written. It is [Calatrava] who defines the project as it goes along’ 
(Interview 42). 
In addition, the project intended to give the city an image of modernity - linked to science and technology 
- in contrast to its, until then, rural one. ‘The idea was to create an emblem that could signify that Valencia 
was in the future too’, (Interview 26) according to the Director General for Budget of the Regional 
government (1982-95). The City of Sciences would re-image and internationalise the city, market 
Valencia and the Valencian Community in the world (Interviews 5, 11, 24, 26, 38 and 42). 
The Valencian governors had different images in mind as models for the future City of Sciences. For the 
communications tower the model was the CN tower in Toronto (Interview 7). From a content viewpoint 
the models for the City of Sciences were Futuroscope in Poitiers and the ‘Cité des Sciences et de 
l'Industrie’ in the Parc de la Villette in Paris, France. The president of the regional government had been 
seduced by the ‘City of Sciences and Industry’ during a visit to Paris and wanted to build a similar 
complex in Valencia (Interviews 5, 7, 26, 42 and 58). 
Figure 5.3 Location of the City of Sciences 
 
Source: Author 
                                                                                                                                                     CHAPTER 5 
85 
 
When looking for a location the regional government consulted the city council. In that period, the 
General Urban Plan was being elaborated and, after ruling out alternative locations in Campanar and La 
Coma, it was decided that the complex would be built in the old river bed, a more central setting although, 
at the time, it was still a heavily polluted and under-developed area (Interview 42) (see location map in 
figure 5.3). According to the director of the 1989 Urban Plan (Interview 42) choosing that location, which 
benefits the city over the metropolitan area as a whole, ‘clearly, it was a bet on the City of Valencia, its 
capital city status, and for the city’s image’ (Interview 42). 
The architect selected to design the City of Sciences was Valencia-born architect Santiago Calatrava. In 
1986, called by a former architecture school class-mate and then head of the local authority’s urban 
planning department, Calatrava had already built the ‘9 d’Octubre’ bridge in Valencia, which had made 
him known in the city outside the professional circles. Later on, the architect won an initial competition to 
build a communications tower, which would solve the problem of Valencia being a flat city and could also 
create an attraction pole (Interview 26). 
Figure 5.4 Model of the City of Sciences and Communications 
 
Source: Sharp, 1996 
Calatrava’s contract was extended – with no further competition and no questioning from any sector - to 
include the then known as City of Sciences and Communications (Ferrandis, 27 April 1993; Martínez, 17 
December 1995; Interviews 23 and 26). As seen in figure 5.4, the project included a planetarium and a 
science museum besides the communications tower. Being internationally prestigious and born in 
Valencia, Santiago Calatrava was seen as, not only an obvious choice (Interviews 1, 11, 12, 26, 27, 41, 42, 
55 and 59) but almost the only option for, as José Antonio Pérez condenses very well, he is ‘the only 
Valencian global architect we have’ (Interview 26). 
On the other hand, Calatrava’s spectacular architecture fitted with the objective of creating an icon 
‘because it could bring about the spectacular image that was intended’ (Interview 42) and, rather than the 
architectural quality what was important ‘was that it would have the ability to attract which Calatrava’s 
architecture has demonstrated to have’ (Interview 26). His architecture – often referred to as hideously 
monumental, megalomaniac, striking and spectacular (Interviews 26, 41, 55 and 59a) – has an undeniable 
visual impact that makes it very attractive. 
But, beyond the emblematic character and the visual impact, which were the specific objectives of the 
complex?  Located in the old river bed in an old industrial dilapidated and heavily polluted area, one of the 
stated objectives of the project was the regeneration of the area, creating a new pole of urban growth 
towards the sea, where a new neighbourhood development, the Urban Plan of the Avenida de Francia, was 
going to be implemented (Interviews 5, 7, 14, 42 and 54). 
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In the 1980s the Administration had launched in Valencia two big areas of residential growth, and 
negotiated with the small group of real estate investors (such as the old Cros industries and Prima 
Inmobiliaria) who after the industrial crisis concentrated in their hands most of the land and wanted to 
obtain a profit from it. As Ángel Martínez explains  
the intervention is the same, that is, two areas of prestige of the city will be developed. In those 
areas the private initiative will make the investment, but the city council, the regional 
government, that is the administration, say, will provide an extremely important symbolic 
element of public space, public dedication, in each one of them. In the case of the Avenida de 
Francia, it is the City of Arts and Sciences. In the case of the Avenida de las Cortes Valencianas, 
it is the Convention Centre, commissioned respectively to Calatrava and Foster. (Interview 54) 
Thus, the Project of the City of Sciences went hand in hand with the development of the Urban Plan 
Avenida de Francia (Interviews 42 and 54). For Clementina Ródenas, mayor of the city (1989-91), the 
City of Sciences was not ‘an isolated thing but, rather, one of the pieces which conformed a vision for the 
whole city’ (Interview 7). Figure 5.5 shows a model of the initial plan Avenida de Francia including some 
undetermined buildings on the City of Sciences site since, at that stage, the content of the project had not 
been completely decided yet.    
Figure 5.5 Model of the urban plan Avenida de Francia 
 
Source: Vetges Tu I Mediterrània, arquitectura i urbanisme 
In addition, the regional government’s investment to build the City of Sciences resolved one section of the 
Turia’s Garden for the city council lacked the necessary funds to completely urbanise the old river bed (El 
País, 16 December 1990; Interviews 23 and 30). Given the lack of funds to implement Bofill’s overall 
plan for the Turia’s Garden, the city council decided to divide the old river bed in sections and resolve 
their design and funding separately, the Regional Ministry of Agriculture intervened in one section, the 
Regional Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Tourism created a children’s park in another, and so on. 
The City of Sciences would occupy another section, next to the future Avenida de Francia neighbourhood. 
As a result of the urban transformation, the value of the land in the surroundings of the City of Sciences 
area increased up to threefold (Interviews 11 and 17), a ‘good deal’ according to Javier Quesadas, Director 
General for Economy of the Regional Government (1995-98) (Interview 17). However, as pointed out by 
most of the interviewees, the cost of the complex, even in its first version, was far too high to constitute a 
mere urban regeneration project.  
The other main stated objective of the project was to achieve a regular income from tourism throughout 
the year. The tourist industry was focused on summer season sun and sand tourism and the City of 
Sciences intended to create an attraction linked to scientific culture and technology (Interviews 43 and 44) 
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As José Antonio Pérez, Director General for Budget of the Regional government (1982-95), stated at the 
time, Calatrava’s Science Museum, thanks to its spectacular nature, aspired to ‘have the tourist 
guidebooks give them a star that means it is worth to check it out’ (Ferrandis, 27 April 1993). 
However, there has been some scepticism as to the real objectives of the project, particularly in terms of 
the tourist strategy. First, it was not linked to the regional ministry of Tourism but to the regional ministry 
of Economy and Treasury to facilitate its funding (Interviews 30 and 55). Second, according to Andrés 
García Reche, Regional Minister of Industry, Commerce and Tourism (1987-93), (Interview 30) there was 
not a clear tourism strategy behind the inception of the City of Sciences, it was rather the emblematic 
aspect of the project what clearly predominated in the minds of the decision-makers. In García Reche’s 
words: 
My opinion, which I gave at the time and which was in disagreement, was that if they did it and 
spent so much money, it should be not just to make good buildings and regenerate part of the city 
- which is always a good thing - but also to add some content that would attract tourists, and that 
could only be called a theme park. We are talking about three million tourists. We are not talking 
about just 800,000 that come to Valencia according to the data; that is ridiculous. We are talking 
about a real theme park, a normal one. […] That was not accepted. The model selected consisted 
of putting three things with three contents and because it is really pretty and is going to 
regenerate part of the city, hey, better to have this than nothing, and, effectively, it is better this 
than nothing, that’s it. There is nothing behind it. Don’t look for strategies or great minds behind 
this; there weren’t any. (Interview 30) 
The objectives in terms of program were not very clear either. For instance, in the case of the science 
museum, Santiago Calatrava was commissioned to design a ‘container’ while the content would be added 
consequently by the government (Interview 12). A member of staff of the Centre for Strategy and 
Development of Valencia expresses it very clearly 
In many of these other cases, the building has come up and then it was considered what content to 
give it. This is the case, for example of the Museum of Sciences which is very difficult to run and 
maintain. They made the icon. The spectacular building, you can like it or not. But, I remember 
that when it was necessary to give it a content it was very difficult and it was a never-ending 
effort because the dimensions are so big that the first year, when it was planned, the exhibitions 
that were there came from the V&A and the Museum of Sciences from the Caixa of Barcelona, 
they were exhibitions that you saw there and they made an impact, they were interesting but, all 
of a sudden, seeing them in the museum, they ended up like Pin and Pon toys. It was almost 
ridiculous and the people, obviously, were shocked. Obviously, because the content is the same 
but the setting is complicated. But I don’t know why politicians get into megalomania, an outside 
image, and sometimes don’t know how to stop at the right time. (Interview 6) 
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In fact, after the building was finished, with a different regional government already in office, a new 
director – Manuel Toharia (Interview 35) - was hired because ‘there was no concrete museum curation 
project.’ 
There was one at the beginning, very encyclopedia-like, very exhaustive, for a bigger museum, 
for a planetarium and nothing else. When everything then began to get bigger and that 
encyclopedia-like plan no longer looked too attractive, too interesting. Another model – which no 
one ever knew which model it was - was opted for. They started to hire things here and there, not 
much else, like someone going to a supermarket to buy a half-pound of this and a pound of that 
without any concrete order and that was when they called me to get things in order a little bit.  
(Interview 35) 
According to Toharia, from a scientific policy point of view, dispersing different facilities within the 
Autonomous Community of Valencia would have been more effective than concentrating all the 
investment in the capital city. Moreover, the content of the museum should have been decided before 
designing the building but, as he says, ‘then, it would not have been Calatrava, but a much less relevant 
architect, I don´t know. The only museum, one of the few museums in such an impressive building is this 
one’ (Interview 35). In short, the evidence shows that the emphasis was on the emblematic aspect of the 
project rather than on other objectives. The spectacular scale of the planetarium and science museum can 
be seen in figure 5.6. 
Figure 5.6 Planetarium and science museum  
 
Source: Author 
For the delivery of the project, a public corporation dependant on the regional ministry of Economy and 
Treasury, and directly funded by it, VACICO (Valencia Science and Communications) was created in 
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1991 with the mission of building and managing the complex once completed (Interview 26). On the other 
hand, when the City of Sciences was commissioned to Calatrava the architect had offices in Paris and 
Zurich and, as a condition of the contract, he was asked to open an office in Valencia to manage the 
project, which he did also in 1991 (Interview 41). 
Regarding the economic feasibility of the project, it was to be entirely paid for by the Regional 
Government and the financial risk was taken by the public debt of the regional government. The total cost 
of the complex was estimated in 20, 000 million pesetas (120 million Euro) in 1993, 25,000 million 
pesetas (150 million Euro) in 1994, and 28,000 (170 million Euro) million pesetas in 1995 just before 
opening the call for bids for its construction (Ferrandis, 10 May 1994; Ferrandis, 27 January 1995). The 
cost of each building was: telecommunications tower: 14,000 million pesetas (84 million Euros); museum: 
10,000 million pesetas (60 million Euros); planetarium: 3,000 million pesetas (18 million Euros). The 
project, according to the Director General for Budget of the Regional government (1982-95) (Interview 
26), was a ‘budgetary priority’ (in his own words) and could be assumed directly by the regional 
government without the need of bank credits. The finance plan was that the management of the 
communications tower would be funded by the revenue coming from the commercial running of the 
telecommunications installations and the offices it included, in addition to a European Union structural 
funds subsidy of 2,700 million pesetas. The planetarium would be partially self-sufficient by its 
commercial exploitation as an IMAX cinema, managed through an exploitation concession to a private 
company (Martínez, 17 December 1995; Interview 26). The science museum was considered a public 
cultural amenity and was to be entirely financed through the regional government budget. However, it was 
expected that most of the museum permanent exhibits would be paid for by the Ministry of Culture and 
through sponsorships. On the other hand, apart from the compulsory purchase order of the land where a 
portion of the museum and the telecommunications tower would sit, there was a previous purchase of land 
by Vacico before the project was launched. Some of this land was to be used to partially amortise the 
investment in the complex through the surplus value generated by it (Interview 26). 
In 1993, within a recessionist economic climate, the search for private investment had to be intensified 
while the regional administration budget had to be frozen, but the government persevered (Ferrandis, 13 
September 1993). 
From the beginning, although there were some minor critiques, the first project - the City of Sciences and 
Communications - found political support from all the parties in the opposition both in the council and the 
regional government (S.B., 20 May 1993; Martínez, 17 December 1995). For an economically drained city 
council an investment of that magnitude and symbolic impact in the city – paid for by the regional 
government - was certainly well received and the council’s urbanism department set out to ease the urban 
planning procedures. 
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There was also general social support to the project for, in the words of Clementina Ródenas Mayor of 
Valencia (1989-91), ‘the idea had been pretty well accepted by the public opinion’ (Interview 7). To that 
consensus contributed the fact that the site was at the time a heavily polluted area and a public amenity 
project could not other than be well received (Interview 2).Moreover, the land was obtained by 
compulsory purchase order and since the site was in the river bed and there were not any affected residents 
that was not a source of conflict. 
In this atmosphere, after the presentation of the definitive project in may 1993, there was a call for bids for 
the constructions works and 40% of the construction contracts were awarded in the first trimester of 1995. 
The contractors – Cubiertas, MZOV, Dragados y Construcciones, FCC, Entrecanales, Pacsa and Hochtief 
- started working just before the regional government election of 1995. 
In 1995, after the elections and with the tower and museum already in construction, the new conservative 
government stopped the project. This came in as a surprise because the conservative party went from 
supporting the project when in the opposition to stopping it when they arrived in office. As the Director 
General for Budget of the Regional government (1982-95) explains 
‘to me, it, honestly, came as quite a surprise. I had worked years on this project, from 1989 to 
1995, six years, and at several meetings that I had with representatives of the conservative party 
to explain the project to them and to inform them of its progress, I was met only with agreement. 
‘This is something very important for Valencia, we support it’, and so on. And, when the 
conservative party government arrived at the regional government they tried to stop it’ (Interview 
26).  
There were two main alleged reasons as to why the government sought to interrupt the implementation of 
the project, based on a couple of reports, one by Price Waterhouse and another, which was commissioned 
to a group of professors of the UPV after a previous one by the Universitary School of 
telecommunications of the UPV was favourable to the telecommunications tower (Ferrandis, 27 October 
1995). On the one hand, the tower and science museum were considered un-necessary and on the other 
hand too costly for the limited financial resources. José Luis Olivas, the new Regional Minister of 
Economy was always emphatic in his interventions in the Valencian parliament regarding the complex 
with statements such as ‘there is not technical or economic reason that justifies building the 
telecommunications tower’ or ‘we should ask those who are on the dole if they demand emblematic 
projects or, on the contrary, they demand work’ (Villena, 22 December 1995). However, none of the 
participants in the project – city council, architect, construction companies nor investors interested in the 
project - had been consulted before making the decision of stopping the project (Ferrandis, 1 October 
1995). 
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As compensation, in October 1995 the regional government announced that the project would be modified 
but the investments maintained (Agencias, 31 October 1995). A couple of months later, on 5 December 
1996, a first proposal for an alternative project was presented by Olivas, the regional minister of economy. 
The alternative project maintained the planetarium and added ‘a City of Justice, various thematic 
pavilions, a covered pool, hotels and restaurants, a farm school and even a geyser’ (García del Moral, 16 
April 1998). But the alternative to the City of Sciences was not well received, and was accused, in the ex-
mayor Clementina Ródenas’ words, of being ‘a rough sketch made by two architects from Vacico, 
compared to the project designed by a prestigious international figure such as Calatrava’ (Navarro, 23 
March 1996). Olivas, on his part, recognised that the alternative project had been elaborated in haste by 
civil servant architects but defended it. 
All the political parties in the opposition both in the council and in the regional parliament (PSOE, EU, 
UV) - not only the socialist party, responsible for its inception– opposed the interruption of the project and 
were not satisfied with the alternative projects proposed. Importantly, the regionalist party Unió 
Valenciana, which governed the region and the city in coalition with the conservative party, supported the 
project of the City of Sciences (especially the communications tower) and threatened with allying with the 
left parties to pressurise the conservatives. 
On its part, the city council, of the same political party as the regional government and in coalition with 
the regionalist party UV, had included the City of Sciences in the strategic plan of the city, highlighting 
the communications tower as a key element of the plan. However, the mayor had to defend her party’s 
decision in the plenary council meeting. The position of the central government, in socialist hands, was 
established by the declarations of the State Secretary for Universities and research, Enric Banda: 
‘The regional government, upon eliminating the Museum of Science, has made Valencia go back 
to the 19th century instead of moving towards the 21st century.’ […] ‘The regional government, 
with this decision, lives on with its back to the future. It is a worrying setback’. (Villena, 20 
December 1995) 
The architect defended his project using his public relation skills (Interviews 26, 28, 38 and 55). For the 
Director General for Budget of the Regional government (82-95), ‘one day, the city will have to recognise 
to Mr. Calatrava, [that] his determination and his capacity of influence in other spheres of the national and 
international economic structure was the reason why the project did not fall apart’ (Interview 26). 
Calatrava went as far as to declare in the local press that ‘it would be an affront to all Valencian people to 
not make the City of Sciences’ (Villena, 27 December 1995). His call seemed to have an effect for even a 
citizen organisation called Friends of the City of Sciences was created to support the project.  
On the other hand, the affected construction companies – although they would be beneficiaries of a 20% 
of the total contract in compensation (around 39 million Euro) - formed a united front to coerce the 
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government to continue with the project for, in the words of the president of the Commerce Chamber of 
the Valencian Community ‘the companies are not for charging compensation (because of the cancellation 
of contracts) and take off but rather to work’ (Ferrandis, 27 October 1995). 
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Figure 5.7 General view of the City of Arts and Sciences 
 
Source: Author  
After several months of continued pressure from construction companies, political opposition and 
government allies, finally, negotiations with Calatrava were resumed in March 1996. The government 
accepted to continue with Calatrava’s project but introducing some modifications. Thus, a modified 
project for the now called City of Arts and Sciences, which substituted the communications tower by an 
Opera palace was finally presented by Calatrava on 20th June 1996 at the Valencian Institute of Modern 
Art. Figure 5.7 shows a general view of the complex with the opera palace in the foreground and the 
science museum and planetarium in the background.  
The new complex also included an oceanography museum, planned by a local practice – Civis Project 
Management - integrating in the design some thin-shell structures by renowned architect Félix Candela 
(see figure 5.8). The origin of the oceanography museum - awarded to Civis Project management with no 
public competition two months after the company was registered in London - is unclear but the selection 
of the design company has been justified by alleging that the brief required a functionalist design which a 
formalist architect such as Santiago Calatrava would have not been able to deliver (Interviews 59a and 
59b). 
Calatrava, on the other hand, had been able to persuade the new government that he was able to modify 
the previous City of Sciences project designed by him to their needs. The Director General for Economy 
of the Regional Government (95-98) recognises that ‘apart from being from here, he is a person who has a 
huge capacity of persuasion, seduction, many things, power, social power’. There are people who reject 
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him but he is a man of genius, very bright and anyone he explains his project to falls for him’ (Interview 
11). 
Figure 5.8 Museum of oceanography 
 
Source: Author 
Although having almost been ‘compelled’ to return to Calatrava, the new government ensured that what 
Olivas – regional minister of economy and treasury - had described as ‘a hideously monumental structure 
for the greater glory of the previous government of Joan Lerma’ (El País, 20 December 1995) would not 
be identified with the socialist government. The substitution of the tower – the most iconic element of the 
project - by the opera palace was interpreted as a way for Eduardo Zaplana - the new president - to leave 
his own political footprint and erase that of the old one, Lerma, and not as a decision made on more 
rationally justified grounds (Interviews 12, 13, 14, 26, 31, 41 and 55). The opera palace was even more 
impressive than the tower, as shown by figure 5.9. It included a main hall and auditorium with capacity to 
seat 1,500 people each, and two more halls with capacity to seat 400 people each. 
Also Vacico, the public corporation created to build and manage the complex, changed name to CACSA 
(Ciudad de las Artes y las Ciencias, S.A.) and was adapted to the new corporate purpose in July 1996 
(Ciudad de las Artes y las Ciencias, S.A., www.cac.es/CACSA). Despite the changes, the Director General 
for Budget of the previous Regional government (1982-95) admits (Interview 26), the new project, 
‘respond[ed] to the same philosophy as the previous one’. The intention of creating a monumental area 
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which would become an icon of the city was maintained, as can be clearly understood when observing the 
result (Interviews 5, 14 and 54). Also, the alleged general objectives of urban and economic regeneration 
were similar, according to Business director of CACSA (Interview 43) because the objectives were ‘very 
generic, such as, for example, the generation of wealth, welfare, urban revitalisation of the area. In 
addition, they are goals that any government that comes to power would commit to as they are generally 
positive.’ However no socio-economic impact study was elaborated until the project was well under way 
(Interview 18). 
Figure 5.9 Model showing a cross section of the opera palace  
 
Source: Lefaivre and Tzonis, 2009  
Finally, the planetarium was opened to the public on 10th April 1998, the science museum on 13th 
November 2000, the museum of oceanography on 15th February 2003 and the opera palace in 2005, three 
years later than it was initially planned. By that time, both the opera palace and the oceanography museum 
accumulated cost overruns of 436% and 295% respectively. In addition, the fact that the opera palace is 
largely over-sized made the difficulties to pay for its construction and maintenance huge. The Director 
General for Economy of the Regional Government (1995-98) clearly admits it: 
[…] that was intended to function as a cultural area which would be connected to the river. The 
river was to be made into a walkway to go from the Music Auditorium to the Opera house, from 
the Opera house to the Museum of Sciences, like in Chicago, like in the world’s great cities. Just 
that in Chicago there are 10 million people nearby and there are extraordinary companies, they 
sponsor, there are people with a lot of money and it is full of millionaires and of the middle class 
[…] In short, the project is out of scale. (Interview 11) 
According to social scientist José Miguel Iribas (Interview 28), hired by the regional government to do a 
study of usage of the opera palace, the loss the opera palace generated yearly was calculated at around 54 
million euro and ‘they assumed it as good and, to me, that fact was mind-boggling.’ 
In 2005, the same year that the opera palace was inaugurated the project for a new building by Calatrava 
for the City of Sciences – the Agora - was presented. Now, since 2003, the regional government, still in 
conservative hands, had a new president, Francisco Camps, who, back in 1996 from his seat at the 
Valencia city council had declared that ‘to renounce the City of Sciences project has been an expression of 
reasonableness which characterizes the Conservative party, its ability to adapt to reality’ (Olivares, 21 
January 1996). 
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Figure 5.10 Agora 
 
Source: Author 
The Agora - a building with no specific brief or function - was considered to be Camps’ pet project 
(Interview 11). The building was 80 metres tall and could reach a maximum capacity of 6,000 people (see 
figure 5.10). The building, inaugurated in 2009, closed the complex of the City of Sciences, a project – 
according to Quesadas, Director General for Economy of the Regional Government (1995-98) (Interview 
11) – of the regional government and not necessarily of the bourgeoisie. 
The director of El Mundo in Valencia explains it very clearly: 
From there it comes the City of Arts and Science which initially had been projected by the 
socialist party in their last years in office and that has come with many changes, that is, the 
socialist party started it, Zaplana changed it and pushed for it, Olivas retouched and Camps ended 
up adding the last building in his last mandate. In short, the City of Arts and Sciences is an entity 
of one, two, three and four presidents of the regional government, of all of the presidents the 
regional government has had. (Interview 44) 
For the political opposition and other observers the Agora did not seem to have any other justification than 
doing something bigger and more impressive (Interviews 4 and 38) and was harshly criticized. 
Considering the huge cost overruns that the City of Sciences had already accumulated, the plan of adding 
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a new element to the complex was considered the last straw by the political opposition (EU and PSOE), 
who back in 1995 had passionately defended the project. 
The gigantic cost overruns can be explained, at least in part, by the fact that – as pointed out by the public 
auditing body’s reports and the construction companies (Ferrandis and Olivares, 23 December 2008, 
Interview 62) – the budgets are not closed, Calatrava’s initial projects are little detailed and need 
subsequent modifications and additions which obviously result in increased costs. Moreover, the political 
opposition accuses the government of not being able to keep the architect’s ‘creative greed’ at bay 
(Interview 55). According to the Director General for Economy of the Regional Government (1995-98) 
controlling Santiago Calatrava from a budgetary point of view  
‘is very difficult because often when he designs a project the companies, which are always eager 
to get work, make very low bids if they see a project that is not well defined because they know 
that detailing will come later, that many details are missing. This makes the politician say: “Wow, 
how cheap, of course we are going to do it”. This is a bit of a trap because the moment it is 
started, the company is waiting for the architect or someone to say: “How do we proceed?” and 
someone says: “Ah, well, it will have to be done…” And they start to add items that were not in 
the initial project. Then, the construction company tries to lower expenses, the architect fights 
because he says something, another says something different and the architect puts his foot down. 
However, it is the administration that has to pay. So, at best, the constructor says that it will be 
cheaper painting something grey but the architect says: “Hey, I thought you were going to paint it 
white for this price”. Then there is a three-sided struggle where everyone blames each other. The 
politician says: “I don’t want to funnel more of the budget to this”. The company owner says it 
was not in the project plan. The architect says: “it was but you don’t want to do it that way 
because you made a low bid to get the project and you promised me that we would do it this way 
and you’re not doing it”. It is really difficult to run it all, who really knows who is right’. 
(Interview 11) 
The maintenance costs of the existing buildings - the managers of the complex complain (Interviews 43 
and 59a) - are also very high due to their spectacular characteristics and formalism. Finally, the huge 
accumulation of costly architecture by Calatrava has been censored by many sections of the society such 
as politicians, architects, engineers, intellectuals, businessmen and even real estate agents (Interview 1), 
who consider that the City of Sciences complex has arrived to a saturation point in Calatrava artefacts 
which are not able to add any more economic value to the area.  
By the end of the century, the huge cost overruns and maintenance costs of the City of Sciences had 
greatly impacted CACSA’s profitability. The losses of the public corporation were so substantial that a 
desperate and indebted regional government was already trying by different means to curb them, such as 
injecting public capital or legally increasing the useful life of the buildings. With the objective of reducing 
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CACSA’s debt, the mayor and the regional president presented a project to build four skyscrapers in 2004 
- which in September 2005, when the final contract with the architect was signed, were reduced to three of 
308m, 266m and 220m – designed by Calatrava. The design development drawings for the skyscrapers, 
which included up-market housing units, offices and hotels, were commissioned and paid to Calatrava but 
the project was never implemented for no private developer or investor believed in its economic viability 
(Velert, 28 October 2008; El País, 8 March 2008). Figure 5.11 shows the powerful impact the skyscrapers 
would have had on Valencia’s skyline. 
Figure 5.11 Photomontage of the skyscrapers designed by Calatrava 
 
Source: Calatrava te la clava (www.calatravatelaclava.com) 
Despite the costs, the general public has been satisfied with the City of Sciences and, for a long time there 
has not been strong citizen contestation (Interviews 5, 17, 19, 26, 40, 44 and 55). In the beginning, most of 
the critiques arrived from groups of intellectuals worried by the huge cost overruns and negative 
cost/benefit relationship. It was not until the second decade of the 21st century, and already in full-blown 
economic recession that the discontent with the City of Sciences grew and became relatively widespread. 
5.3 The America’s Cup  
The America’s Cup sailing competition was unknown in Valencia to the general public until the Swiss 
team Alinghi won the competition in 2003 and needed to find a maritime venue to celebrate the 2007 
edition. The Valencia Sailing Club used to attend the different editions as spectator, and its president, 
Manuel Casanova, suggested the Swiss Valencia as a venue (Interviews 33 and 34).  Ernesto Bertarelli, 
Alinghi team’s principal, created the private company America’s Cup Management (ACM) to organise the 
33rd edition of the competition, which, as a first step, launched a competitive process to select a venue. 
Informed by the Valencia Sailing Club, the mayor and José Luís Olivas, the regional president at the time, 
officially expressed the city’s interest in participating in the process. The city council – through a small 
team directed by José Salinas and based in the city’s tourism office Valencia convention Bureau - took on 
the main weigh of the first phase of the candidature process (Interview 21). 
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Figure 5.12 Location of the America’s Cup 
 
Source: Author  
After the ruling out of 52 cities, in April 2003, Valencia was shortlisted as a candidate together with 
Marseille, Naples and Lisbon. In October 2003 the local, regional and national administrations created a 
consortium called Valencia 2007 – with José Salinas as its president - with the objective of achieving the 
designation of the city (Huet, 2005; El País, 30 September 2003) and, finally, on 26 November 2003 
Valencia was designated to hold the 33rd America’s Cup. The location of the area where the competition 
would take place, along with that of the area later on earmarked for the Development Plan el Grao can be 
seen in figure 5.12. 
The plan of hosting the America’s Cup (and the infrastructural works it implied) had always institutional 
support from the three levels of government, national – under the conservatives first and the socialists 
afterwards – regional, and local, materialised from the last phase of the candidature process in the 
Consortium Valencia 2007 (Interview  21). From the elections of 2004, the socialist central government 
and president Zapatero were always at pains to emphasise that they supported Valencia in hosting the 
America’s Cup competition in response to the accusations of the conservative local and regional 
governments. There was a general consensus that the America’s Cup was a good opportunity for Valencia 
and, both the main business associations of the city – such as CEV, AVE and business chamber –and the 
political opposition in the local and regional governments unanimously expressed their support of the 
event (Velert, 9 May 2004; García del Moral, 29 September 2005). 
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From the point of view of the Valencian decision-makers the main objectives of the celebration of the 
America’s Cup in Valencia were twofold, the opportunity to internationally market the city and, to 
transform the maritime waterfront area (Interviews 21, 33, 34 and 45). In the words of José Mª Gil Suay, 
Council Commissioner for the America’s Cup, the event provided ‘a platform to launch the city 
internationally and even nationally, to generate some citizen’s pride and also, to begin physical changes, in 
this case, located basically in the port’ (Interview 33). 
The marketing of the city intended to be directed mainly to the promotion of tourism, particularly to the 
attraction high-end tourism and luxury cruises (Interviews 9, 28, 34 and 52). Not in vain the pre-
candidature and candidature projects were born in Valencia Convention Bureau, the body responsible for 
establishing the city’s tourist strategy, and the first president of the consortium was José Salinas, also 
director of Valencia convention bureau. On the other hand, with the precedent of the transformations and 
investments from the central government in Barcelona and Seville for the 1992 Olympics and Expo, the 
America’s Cup was expected to be a lever to achieve the inner harbour –in hands of the port authority and 
used by the commercial port - for citizen use (Interview 42) and, substantial investments from the central 
government. Figure 5.13 shows a view of the inner harbour before the start of the construction works for 
the America’s Cup. 
Although the official discourse emphasised the transformation of the territory as one of the key objectives 
of hosting of the event in Valencia, the subsequent mismanagement of the inner harbour area and the 
destruction of the urban design works realized for the America’s Cup in order to accommodate the area for 
the celebration of the F1 competition has created doubts about the real initial objectives (Interview 51a). 
Figure 5.13 Inner harbour before being remodelled for the America’s Cup 
 
Source: Cruceros, 2013 
With regards to the general Valencian public, the event was broadly well received too. According to a 
survey commissioned by the socialist group in the city council opposition, 78.78% of the citizens were of 
the opinion that hosting the America’s Cup would have a positive impact on the city (Vázquez, 33 
November 2004). 
The opposition to the America’s Cup was very minoritary, only a few citizen, ecologist and intellectual 
groups – such as Iniciativa COPA-sos, Coordinadora Pel Litoral Que Volem, the Federation of Residents 
Associations of Valencia and Universitat en Bici (Morenilla, 30 October 2004) -  considered that the event 
was being used as an excuse for real estate speculation, the privatisation of the public realm and the 
destruction of the environment, and demanded citizen participation in the debate about the future of the 
city. 
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The enthusiastic reception of the majority of the population was due to the need for a boost in self-esteem 
and the optimistic economic expectations fueled by the different economic impact reports commissioned 
by the administrations and different business associations of the city – which fundamentally coincided in 
the previsions of growth - and disseminated by the local press. In short, the previsions were an economic 
direct impact of more than 1,500 million Euros, the creation of more than 10,000 jobs according to the 
Port Authority and Valencia convention Bureau (Zafra, 30 April 2004) and a 1.7% increase in the regional 
GDP according to AVE and KPMG (Olivares, 5 June 2004). The real estate and tourism sectors were 
considered to be the most likely to benefit from the event. Also, the local press insisted in the opportunity 
offered by the America’s Cup for the urban transformation of the city. An extract of the local edition of El 
País in April 2006 read like this: 
‘[…] the America’s Cup and its reception in this land is understood by virtue of the opportunity 
that it represents to the improvement of the city of Valencia because its main reason for existence 
is that any event organization of this magnitude brings investments with it that improve 
communications and provide infrastructure that contributes to modernization and, frequently, 
elevates the standard of living of the citizens of the city in question. If not, just look at the 
changes experienced by capital cities such as Barcelona and Seville after the Olympic 
celebrations and the Expo, respectively’. (El País, 13 April 2006) 
From September 2003 to the designation of the city in November 2003, the city council entrusted a small 
team directed by tourism and city marketing expert José Salinas - head of Valencia Convention Bureau - 
with the task of producing a candidature project. The time, less than three months, was very limited and, 
as expressed by Salinas (Interview 21), ‘logically, having limited time, you rely on your own team, on 
outside consultants for whatever you end up needing. For example, if it is something to do with 
engineering, an engineering consultant… but really fast, you know?’ Thus, ‘to speed up the processes’ 
(Interview  21)  the urban planning project was commissioned to Áreas - the architectural and engineering 
practice of José María Tomás, who had already worked in the project Balcón al mar in the area.  
Once Valencia was the only Spanish candidate in the selection process, the central government was 
incorporated to the project through the creation of the consortium Valencia 2007, formed by the three 
levels of government and chaired by Rita Barberá, mayor of Valencia. The involvement of the national 
scale was essential since the central government has competences related to the needs of the event - such 
as national security, air navigation, maritime navigation and radio space– and the space where the 
competition would take place belonged to the central state (a total of 330,000 square metres of land and 
565,000 square metres of water) (Vázquez, 27 March 2007). The process of constitution of the consortium 
and initial negotiations with ACM was very speedy as José Salinas, first director of the Consortium 
explains; 
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‘And of course, [the Consortium] has to be constituted. Well…This whole process is completed 
in three weeks and at the beginning of October in an official act in Valencia with the vice-
president of the economy at the time, Rodrigo Rato, in attendance. The document is signed; we 
have a consortium. But, well, we have to continue working because, at the same time, the four 
finalist cities are negotiating with ACM the contract of host city. Because what they intelligently 
do to maintain the tension and the competition, between the cities is to say: ‘no, no, no, what we 
are going to do is sign a contract with the four cities, with a suspension clause that says that this 
contract will be valid and in force if this city is designated as the host and, if not, it will not be 
valid.’ So, during this time it is necessary, say, to go on negotiating the contract with the 
organisers and, at the same time, keep on coordinating the legal processes with the public 
administration because there is a series of agreements that must be made. And, breaking 
bureaucratic records, in some twenty days, there is a document to be signed on the Council of 
Ministers desk. Twenty-odd days is a world record, which is the agreement of the Council of 
Ministers of 31st of October for which a series of things that were absolutely necessary for the 
contract were approved: fiscal issues, for example, that were demanded by the organisers to 
favour the teams and their participants, tax reductions, etc. etc’. (Interview 21) 
Figure 5.14 View of the new canal 
 
Source: Megaconstrucciones (www.megaconstrucciones.net) 
After the designation of Valencia in November 2003 the main objectives of the consortium were to build 
the necessary infrastructures for the sailing competition and to be the visible head of the Spanish public 
administration for ACM (Interview 47). The contract with ACM included the payment of a canon of 90 
million euros, of which 40% was contributed by the central government, 40% by the regional government 
and 20% by the city council. Also, the realization of a series of infrastructure works - including the 
construction of a new canal that would communicate the inner harbour with the open sea, in preparation of 
the event and initially budgeted in 500 million euro - formed part of the contract (see a view of the canal 
in figure 5.14). 
The definitive infrastructure project of the inner harbour was soon approved but the consortium had not 
agreed on how to finance the works. In view of the lack of agreement about the financing of the 
infrastructures and to speed up the process the invite for tender was done by the port authority and 
construction works in the inner harbour started in 2003. The mayor had suggested that an urban 
development operation which would include a marina and about 4,000 dwellings in the Eastern and 
Western Quays, the landowner of which was the Port Authority, could be the formula to fund the 
necessary infrastructures for the competition (El País, 8 June 2005). But the change of central government 
in March 2004 - in which the socialists substituted the conservatives – ruined her plans.  
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Finally, after the local and regional governments recognised that they did not have the financial capacity 
to carry out the project and putting an end to several months of disagreements, in October 2004 - 
following Fernando Huet’s designation as new director of the Consortium - there was a definitive 
agreement regarding the financing of the infrastructure works. The central government would provide a 
bank guarantee for a credit of 500 million euro given by the Official Institute of Credit (ICO), 70% of 
which the government expected to recover through the exploitation of the inner harbour area after the 
sailing competition had taken place. This formula was chosen, according to the Director of the Valencia 
Port Foundation for two main reasons. The first is ‘to avoid making a budgetary allocation. A loan is a 
different type of financial asset and does not accrue as public debt while a budgetary allocation is active in 
the budget and is debt, it is accrued as debt. So, it is very common in this type of project to depend on this 
type of financial instrument’ (Interview 45). The second 
is what we call the finance project. This has to do with you expecting the business that is 
underway to generate a certain income in the future with which to pay back the loan. It is like a 
toll motorway […] But, in a project like this, the toll is not clear, that is, it is not clear when you 
do the risk analysis of the project because the political and institutional components of the project 
are large and depending on how things are implemented it will be more or less clear. So, to do 
this, if the Consortium had tried to issue a bond or go into debt with a banking institution, etc. the 
bank analysts would have denied it and required a guarantee from the State to give the credit. 
And if you need a bank guarantee from the state the existing formula is the governmental agency 
that we call ICO (Institute of Official Credit). So, the ICO provides the funds but, because they 
know that the payback can be complicated and they have to defend their profit and loss account 
balance, what they do is say to the Council of Ministers, that is, the Government: Very well, I 
will lend what the Ministry of Public Administrations tells me to lend, I have no problem with it, 
but I need a state guarantee. In such a way that if the Consortium cannot pay because they do not 
have the money, because the marinas are not generating income, well, the result is that the state 
would have to pay the ICO back.  (Interview 45) 
Therefore, in November 2004, the Consortium took over the construction works started by the Port 
Authority and the construction of the rest of the necessary infrastructures. In June 2006, after the 
completion of the works, Fernando Huet returned to his previous position in a construction company and, 
Jorge Gisbert took over the presidency of the consortium. As Huet explains: 
In that year and a half, obviously, all of the works were completed. I believe that the management 
was doubly successful. First, for having complied with everything that was to be done in two and 
a half years because one year had been lost and, second, which I believe to be the most important 
achievement of the Consortium, because infrastructural works budgeted in  500 million were 
completed for 450 and not for 2,000 as is usually the case, right? This is, I think, the most 
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successful part; everything was completed on time and for less money than budgeted. (Interview 
57) 
Besides the financing of the infrastructure works, the other issue of contention was land ownership. The 
Port Authority, dependent of the central government, was the landowner of the inner harbour - except for 
the old Art Deco port warehouses which had been ceded to the city council in 2003. There was an 
agreement from 1997 between the Ministry of Public Works, the regional government, the local council 
and the Port Authority according to which in exchange of other privileges – mainly the construction of an 
access to the port through the North - the Port Authority would cede the inner harbour for citizen use but 
the transfer had not taken place. (Interview 34) On occasion of the America’s Cup the port Authority 
signed a concession for the exploitation of the area in favour of the consortium, who at the same time sub-
contracted it with ACM (Interviews 34 and 47). However, there were tensions between the Port Authority 
and the Consortium because the port’s expansion plans were hindered by the America’s Cup, as expressed 
by the president of the port authority Rafael del Moral  
The port is making a tremendous effort because the America’s Cup is another piece of land taken 
from the extension through the north, which is just a project but is supposed to be done for sure, 
but which is worth for the Valencian Community only if the interests be compatible. (Ferrandis, 1 
April 2004) 
Rafael del Moral resigned in May 2004 and was substituted by Rafael Aznar – the mayor’ right-hand man. 
Some commentators pointed out that the controversies that had confronted him with the central 
government and the mayor of Valencia regarding the America’s Cup and the second enlargement of the 
Port of Valencia had an important role in del Moral’s decision to resign (Vázquez, 9 September 2004). 
The new president started his term in office announcing that in his strategy ‘the America’s Cup [was] a 
priority’ (Olivares, 5 November 2004) because it was a launching platform and an opportunity to 
consolidate the brand of Valencia’s Port. 
Regarding the contents of the project to carry out, the candidature project already included a master plan 
for the America’s Cup area – elaborated by Tomás - and the necessary infrastructure works, which took 
the lion’s share of the investment (Interview 47). The Consortium, with little further work and a dose of 
improvisation (Interview 57), implemented it by dividing the global project in individual projects - the 
canal, the docking of mega yachts, the team bases, etc. -  and calling for tenders separately for each of 
them (Interview 47). The only original addition of the Consortium to the initial project was the iconic 
building Veles e Vents. The contract with ACM stipulated the obligation of providing a VIP centre for 
ACM’s guests, but as Manuela Gras, Project and Conservation Manager of America’s Cup Consortium, 
explains ‘it was intended to be an emblematic element in memory of the celebration […] to be emblem of 
memory for the citizens because, later, this building would always remind one that the America’s Cup was 
held here’ (Interview 47). With that aim, the consortium launched an international architectural 
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competition, which was won by British renowned architect David Chipperfield and FermínVázquez (see 
figure 5.15). 
Figure 5.15 Building Veles e Vents 
 
Source: Author 
With all the necessary works finished, pre-regattas of the America’s Cup were held in Valencia in June 
2005 and on 2nd July 2007 the Swiss team Alinghi won the 32nd edition of the America’s Cup. Soon 
afterwards, on 25th July 2007, Alinghi announced that the 33rd America’s Cup competition would be held 
in Valencia in 2009. The Valencian decision-makers’ expectations for this second edition were more 
modest as José Mª Gil Suay, Council Commissioner for the America’s Cup, explains: 
‘Theoretically, we knew what was happening and we were totally sure that a second edition of 
the Cup was much less powerful than a first edition […] the Cup had generated this impact in the 
first edition; the additional impact of a second edition was much less and, in terms of cost and 
effect, at least arguable. But, well, according to how it was considered in 2007, another edition 
was to be celebrated in 2009. That was two years. Meanwhile, they could put all of the 
international competition rules together for the exploitation of the inner harbor […] In short, it 
meant to delay two years the completion of the transformation of the harbour into a multi-use 
space and not just for the Cup and, of course, two years in the history of the city wasn’t much’. 
(Interview 33) 
The three administrations expressed their support to holding a second edition of the America’s Cup in 
Valencia. In an interview with Bertarelli, the president Rodríguez Zapatero guaranteed the central 
government’s support to the agreement (Velert, 25 July 2007). Also the president of the Port Authority 
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expressed his support, ‘compromise’ and ‘eagerness to cooperate’ in the organisation of the America’s 
Cup (El País, 25 July 2007). 
In October 2007 a contract for the 33rd America’s cup competition was signed. However, on 22 November 
2007 ACM announced that the 33rd America’s Cup would be postponed due to a sporting dispute between 
the winning team Alinghi and its main rival Oracle, which had to be resolved by a New York legal court. 
In June 2008 ACM handed over the Inner harbour to the Consortium for its management due to the 
uncertainties about a possible new edition of the America’s Cup in Valencia. 
After many months of uncertainties and changes of mind about the dates and location of the next edition 
of the America’s Cup, ACM decided that there would be a second edition of the America’s Cup in 
Valencia. In November 2009 the regional president and the mayor of Valencia announced that the 33rd 
edition of the America’s Cup would be held in Valencia in February 2010; and it did. By that time, the 
consortium had already great difficulties returning the credit for the inner harbour had been in ACM’s 
hands for a long time and, in addition, the economic crisis had heavily impacted the profitability of its 
exploitation when it returned to the Consortium. 
Apart from the infrastructural works necessary for the hosting of the sailing competition, the America’s 
Cup generated further development and transformation of the maritime area. In 1995 there had been a 
competition to redesign the inner harbour and coastal area called Balcón al Mar, which was won by José 
María Tomás, but which had never been implemented (Interview 23). The selection of the city to host the 
America’s Cup in 2003 meant that the maritime area would be ‘in the limelight or centre of the media 
attention of the city’ (Interview 20) and, real estate consultant Ignacio Jiménez de Laiglesia – motivated 
by the council’s lack of overall planning for the area - presented a private initiative to develop the 
maritime area next to the inner harbour. Jiménez de Laiglesia explains his motivation: 
‘The initiative comes up in an almost spontaneous way, without any premeditation or institutional 
support, nothing, that is, it comes up as a concern for me as a professional and as a Valencian. 
[…] With the America’s cup, here there was going to be I don’t know what number of things, all 
the television channels, all of the wealthy elites, all the I don’t know what. And this is a bit as in 
the house of the farmer who is going to marry his son or his daughter and says to himself, well, 
the guests are going to come. And there is a sort of need to paint over the flaking paint that had 
been there forever, to repair this piece of furniture or, in the end, give an image of modernity to 
the city and so forth. And given that all this circus was to be precisely in the most conflictive and 
degraded urban environment of the city, the debate about what to do with that area arose’. 
(Interview 20) 
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Figure 5.16 Infography of Nouvel’s Valencia Litoral project 
 
Source: Valencia Litoral 
Jiménez de Laiglesia had a personal relationship of friendship with French star architect Jean Nouvel, who 
visited Valencia and got enthusiastic about developing a strategic project for the maritime waterfront and 
coastal area of the city (for which Jiménez would pay him only the incurred expenses). The project – 
which achieved the blessing of the mayor and deputy mayor to get started (Velert, 12 November 2004) - 
had the intention of opening the debate about what to do in the area and was baptised with the name 
Valencia Litoral (Interview 20).  
Valencia Litoral –which delivered a ‘holistic proposal about dealing with all this, with uses, with what 
type of amenities, how to approach the environment design, to which kind of people is it directed’ 
(Interview 20) for an area that spanned nearly the whole waterfront of the city (see figure 5.16) - was 
presented by Nouvel in November 2004 to the general public, and local and national authorities. The star 
architect had the express support of the crème de la crème of the architectural profession, including names 
such as Norman Foster, Alberto Campo Baeza, Richard Rogers, Salvador Perez Arroyo, Renzo Piano, 
Frank O. Gehry, Ben van Berkel and Peter Cook (Velert, 12 November 2004). The project sparked off 
huge media interest and was broadly received received by the general public. 
Mayor Barberá and deputy mayor Jorge Bellver liked the proposal and promised to study its viability, 
although Valencia Litoral promoter Jimenez de Laiglesia was sceptical about their understanding of the 
project. According to him; 
‘The mayor still likes and loves the project, however her way of interpreting the project is frankly 
in need of revision. That is, because she believes to be following the spirit of the project but every 
time there is a proposal or something it is crazy; it has nothing to do with what we were 
proposing. Why? Well, because she only has the most superficial understanding of the project, 
the most visual part’. (Interview 20) 
The city council picked up the relay and, in November 2004, through the municipal public corporation 
responsible for urban planning AUMSA organised an international competition for the master plan of the 
residential sector of El Grao. The area - of 370,372 square metres by the last section of the Turia’s Garden 
and the port - approximately coincided with Nouvel’s Valencia Litoral. 
Prestigious international architects such as Ieoh Ming Pei (who designed the Louvre pyramids), Meinhard 
von Gerkan and VolkwinMarg (designers of the remodeling of Berlin’s Olympic Stadium), Zaera (author 
of Yokohama airport terminal), Koolhaas, (Pritzker Prize in 2000), or famous Spanish architects Emilio 
Tuñón and Luis Mansilla submitted their entries to the competition. 
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However, in September 2005, although four architectural practices had already been shortlisted and GMP 
International had taken the lead, the mayor Rita Barberá – using the sailing competition as a justification - 
decided to leave the resolution of the competition in stand-by with the intention of extending the area to be 
planned in order to include the inner harbour (Velert, 20 September 2005). 
In September 2006, a new international competition was convened, this time by the Consortium, which, 
apart from the area of the Development Plan El Grao, included the design of a new marina in the inner 
harbour area. The final area delimited for the competition covered approximately 1.35 million square 
metres and included a water surface area of approximately 565,000 square metres (Consorcio Valencia 
2007). The objectives of the marine were related to the America’s Cup for the intention was to create a 
marine for mega-yatches which could attracthigh-end tourism too (Interview 46). In the Urban Plan El 
Grao the council, differently to the usual procedure in other urban plans, divided the design from the 
implementation of the plan, thus introducing an intermediate phase –the design – for which a competition 
was convened (Interview 54).  
In March 2007, the winners of the Competition Marina Juan Carlos I were announced. The first prize ex-
aequo was awarded to Jean Nouvel and to Volkwin Marg (GPM), but local architect José María Tomás 
(author of the previous project Balcón al Mar) was commissioned to coordinate a final proposal which 
would combine the proposals of the two winners. 
Figure 5.17 View of the Marina Real Juan Carlos I 
 
Source: Author  
The competition was considered a way to approve, from an administrative perspective, a proposal – 
Valencia Litoral – which the mayor thought was interesting (Interviews 20 and 54). However, according 
to de Laiglesia, in the end,  
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‘the competition is to justify doing then what [the mayor] likes because really, at the end of it, the 
competition and all of this boring talk, the City Council has commissioned an architect through a 
municipal company, or stuck him in, let’s say, almost using a shoehorn to ram him in, in the 
proposal with Jean’ (Interview 20). 
The marine project – a view of which can be seen in figure 5.17 - was implemented but the economic 
crisis has left the Urban Plan El Grao awaiting for investment from private developers to be carried out. 
5.4 Sociopolis 
The project of Sociopolis was an initiative of a group of architects called Metapolis, appeared in 1998 and 
lead by Valencian architect based in Barcelona Vicent Guallart. This group of architects, which included 
among others Manel Gausa, Willy Mueller, Enric Ruiz-Geli and Ramon Prat, was also involved in the 
creation of the ‘Institute for Advanced Architecture of Catalonia’ (IAAC) in 2001, funded mainly by the 
Catalan Regional government (Serra, 13 June 2004; Interview 25). The IAAC - which describes itself as a 
‘a cutting edge education and research centre dedicated to the development of an architecture capable of 
meeting the worldwide challenges in the construction of habitability in the early 21st century’ (Institute 
for Advanced Architectures of Catalonia, www.iaac.net/institute/vision-objectives) – was created, 
according to one of the members, with the intention of ‘getting commissions from the public 
administrations through the institute, to do things that we thought had to be done’(Interview 25). 
In this context, Sociopolis was born as a theoretical project in which a group of architects proposed their 
idea of how a city should be organised (Interview 25). Here it was not the client – in this case the regional 
government - who contacted the architect but the other way round. In fact, the project was proposed by the 
architects –with Guallart at the head – to the public administration. Vicent Guallart had a personal 
friendship relationship with Consuelo Císcar (then responsible for the Valencia arts Bienal) and her 
husband Rafael Blasco (then regional minister of Social Welfare) and proposed a project – Sociopolis - 
which, according to him, would step away from the dominant paradigm of the architectural icon and 
would work on the construction of neighbourhoods and housing (Interview 60). Guallart explains how the 
project was initiated: 
Well, in fact, the initiative came about in a conversation with Rafael Blasco, Consuelo Císcar and 
me. At that time, Consuelo Císcar was starting up or was leading the Biennial of Arts of Valencia 
and Rafael Blasco was, at the time, the Minister of Social Welfare. That was 2001, a time of great 
euphoria for architecture, mega events and so on and I thought that it was important to work 
again on the idea of constructing neighborhoods and designing good architecture for social 
housing programs [...] So, I said to them: Well, if Consuelo is going to do a Biennial of Arts and 
Rafael is responsible for Social Welfare, why don’t we look at that idea of doing an exhibition at 
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the Biennial of Arts, invite some architects and we draw up a project for designing a 
neighborhood and then it can be developed, right? And, actually, that is why it is called 
Sociopolis, because it was pushed forward by the Department of Social Welfare, initially. 
(Interview 60) 
Therefore, as a result of the conversation a first theoretical project called Sociopolis was commissioned by 
the regional Ministry of Welfare. Guallart gathered a group of well-known architects - Guallart, Abalos & 
Herreros, Duncan Lewis, Zaera, Greg Lynn, Torres Nadal, Gausa, Vinymas, Eduardo Arroyo, François 
Roche, Lourdes Garcia Sogo and Toyo Ito - who elaborated a project of an ideal neighbourhood that 
proposed new types of housing for young people that live alone or share flats, older people in homes, 
immigrants or single-parent families. Sociopolis was presented in the Valencia Arts Bienal –the topic of 
which was ‘the ideal city’ – hosted in 2003 at the old monastery of San Miguel de los Reyes. The model 
exhibited in the Bienal can be seen in figure 5.18. 
Figure 5.18 Model of the initial Sociopolis project 
 
Source: Guallart Architects (www.guallart.com) 
The opportunity for Sociopolis to become a real urban design project arrived when Rafael Blasco was 
appointed Regional Minister for Housing, Territory, Urbanism and Environment, in 2003 (Interviews 50 
and 60).  
Immediately after Blasco arrived in office the Valencian Institute of Housing (IVVSA) was made 
responsible for the development of Sociopolis, to ‘make it real’ (Interview 56), that is, find a site and the 
funding to formalise what until then had been a ‘mere theoretical speculation’ (Interview 50). The 
Institute’s remit is to develop publicly subsidised housing, on urban land provided by the local councils in 
the beginning and, since the onset of the Valencian urbanism law in 1994, also on land generated through 
the planning process by them acting as ‘urbanising agent’. This last option was the one used in this case.  
Sociopolis was a regional government project managed through the IVVSA but the city council, since it 
was subsidised housing and an emblematic project, took interest in it and collaborated from the beginning. 
In Guallart’s words ‘the City Council, at its highest level, has supported us since the beginning and I 
believe that this is very important because otherwise, the project would have gone nowhere’ (Interview 
60). There was an agreement between the regional and local authorities to build Sociopolis. Together they 
defined the site for the project and the council modified the urban plan - reclassifying 35 Ha - to allow the 
development of previously protected cropland. The local authority also ceded land which was earmarked 
for amenities to the IVVSA to build social housing (Interviews 50 and 56).  
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Figure 5.19 Location of Sociopolis.  
 
Source: Author 
The location, in a dependant village within the Valencia city territory called La Torre, was selected in 
collaboration with the Valencia city council and, as shown in figure 5.19, was in the periphery of the city. 
The selected site was on historical croplands and therefore the planning figure selected was a ‘special 
plan’, which was called ‘La Torre special plan’ and included approximately 3,000 dwellings. The decision 
to build on protected croplands was very controversial but justified by the author of the environmental 
impact study in this way 
The problem in Valencia is that any urban development has to be made at the expense of the 
croplands or the Albufera nature park. [...] if urban growth was absolutely necessary and had to 
be located somewhere, well that is where it had the least impact (Interview 22). 
Regarding the objectives of the project the architects speak about architectural experimentation and 
innovation. According to Guallart (Interview 60), the fact that the council offered rural land as a location, 
arguing that there was no land available within the urban core of the city, was perceived by him as an 
opportunity to look into the creation of a new rural-urban development typology and the integration of the 
croplands and urban life. Also the collaborators of the project describe Sociopolis as innovative, 
vanguardist and experimental (Interviews 8 and 22). It is considered so from several points of views. First, 
it explores an urban design typology which combines a rural environment with an urban one. Second, it 
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investigates about new ways of dwelling and creates a laboratory of social housing. Third, the architecture 
of the individual buildings is not only typologically but also formally singular. 
Figure 5.20 View of the Sociopolis construction site 
 
Source: Guallart Architects (www.guallart.com) 
When Sociopolis became a real project under the direction of the IVVSA, according to Mª Jesús 
Rodríguez, Director General of Housing of the Regional Ministry of Environment, Water, Urbanism and 
Housing (Interview 56), it kept the intention of being a pioneering project from an architectural and urban 
design perspective, where the buildings were commissioned to prestigious architects. The officially stated 
objectives were to propose a new type of neighbourhood which would integrate urban living with 
traditional croplands and provide new types of dwellings for the new types of families. The other 
important raison d’être of the project, according to Rodríguez (Interview 56) was to provide an important 
proportion of the amount of subsidised affordable housing needed. This objective was also interpreted as a 
way of satisfying regional president Camps’ electoral promise of building 100,000 subsidised affordable 
dwellings (Interview 9) in a very visible way since Sociopolis was the Valencian Institute of Housing 
flagship project.  
Despite the official rhetoric of Sociopolis intending to be a sustainable neighbourhood with social aims, 
which provided the project with popular support, urbanists, ecologist and intellectual citizen groups – such 
as Per l’Horta and Terra Crítica (Diago et al., 2008) – and the local socialist party in the opposition 
opposed the project on the grounds that it would destroy Valencia’s valuable rural environment. As 
explained by Senior lecturer of Urbanism at Valencia’s Polytechnic University and member of the 
grassroots group Terra Crítica Fernando Gaja that destroying ‘one of [Valencia’s] best rural lands to make 
an ecological neighborhood’ is absurd and contradictory: ‘You cannot destroy the croplands saying that 
you are going to save the croplands’ (Interview 2). Figure 5.20 shows the rural land being prepared for the 
construction of Sociopolis, and the more fertile layer of soil removed in the process. 
The residents of La Torre – the hamlet dependent on Valencia where Sociopolis is located – however, 
thought that the new development would be an improvement for them because, in Miguel Moreno’s – 
farmer and resident – own words ‘La Torre has always been a very small neighbourhood and this will 
provide more volume of housing. This will make it livelier’ (Interview 61). Representative of Per l’Horta, 
Josep Gavaldá, describes it in a less positive way: ‘they think that it is good for the village, they have an 
idea of progress that, for us, is from the 19th century’ (Interview 15). Also those farmers whose farming 
land had been object of compulsory purchase were happy to sell ‘because they are old people (the 
youngest being 60-65 years old) and they are happy to quit farming’ (Interview 22), as the author of the 
environmental impact study explains. 
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In any case, several facts pointed out by the critics contradicts the stated sustainability objectives and 
questions the urban design quality of the development. First, Sociopolis is a neighbourhood of affordable 
housing segregated from the urban area, whose deficient public transport links makes it car dependent. 
Moreover, its segregation means that it does not solve the metropolitan area’s structural problems 
(Interviews 2, 9, 15 and 54). 
Second, building new dwellings in a peripheral location instead of refurbishing the estimated 40,000 
empty dwellings existing within the urban core or developing available more central land, questions its 
social justification (Interviews 2 and 15). In addition, since they intend to be ‘remarkable architecture’ the 
construction of the new dwelling results too expensive for being affordable housing (Interview 2). The 
project by Dutch architects MVRDV – in figure 5.21 – is an example of how imagination has been given 
full rein and construction costs not taken into account. 
 
Figure 5.21 Infography of experimental housing project in Sociopolis 
 
Source: MVRDV 
Third, the neighbourhood is badly integrated with the environment (it could have been anywhere), lacks 
conviviability spaces (Interview 54) and its buildings are ‘banal architecture’ (Interview 15). In short, 
‘Sociopolis, as a concept, is a common and vulgar new town’ (Interview 9).   
Urban planner and author of the Valencia Urban Plan of 1989, Alejandro Escribano summarizes the 
critiques very well. 
Well, it is a contradiction, a contradicto in terminis, it makes no sense. If you are going to make a 
sustainable neighborhood, you are going to bet on vanguard architecture what you cannot do is 
start by trampling the territory, and locate a neighborhood like by a high-use motorway, with 
noise levels above the permitted, without public transport, with bad accessibility and all this just 
to get some press headlines. I see it plainly like this. Sociopolis doesn’t look like a model 
operation to me at all. And then, in addition, the vanguard architecture is not going to be 
implemented. So, if in the end you said, hey, here we’re going to have a mix of 10 or 12 
architects, we are going to have such and such name but it ends up that they are private promoters 
that probably will have to use a type of architecture that generates at least a minimum level of 
income or else it won’t sell. And, on the other hand, the project has many issues; from how the 
public spaces are designed, the maintenance of the croplands that have been left there, within the 
urban fabric in an artificial way and with no guarantees that it can be maintained. (Interview 42) 
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On the other hand, including, as Sociopolis did, an 80% of subsidised affordable dwellings was also 
considered a way of justifying the occupation of protected croplands by appealing to its ‘strong social 
interest’ (Interview 8). Guallart is very clear about the ‘social value’ of the project: 
The truth is that Sociopolis, when the General Urban Plan was created in 1989 it was decided that 
all of the land that was not urban would be considered specially protected rural land. Then, in our 
case, the Valencian law itself allowed that in this type of land if you were going to use 70% of 
the edification rate for subsidised housing, the state could do it, but, despite this, it was a 
transformation of specially protected croplands to build subsidised housing, which required, in 
Rafael Blasco’s words, its sale as something social, or creating links with people, with agents that 
would add value to the project. [...] In short, despite it being an urban development to make 
subsidised housing, I have wanted to surround it with people who could contribute a different 
kind of values and knowledge (Interview 60). 
Moreover, concentrating subsidised affordable housing in peripheral and badly communicated areas of the 
city or metropolitan area left more central and appealing areas for more profitable uses, such as tertiary or 
free-market housing, and did not interfere in the housing market of the core city by lowering prices.  
Yet, the project received the approval of the international architectural professional and cultural worlds 
when in 2004 - being still a theoretical project - it was exhibited in the Architekturzentrum of Viena – a 
prestigious centre for architecture. Dietmar Steiner – director of the centre – commented that Sociopolis 
was ‘very connected to the architecture with a social purpose and even experimental’ and ‘for the first 
time in the new millennium, the Sociopolis project is designing a really integrative and hybrid vision for 
the new European city of the future’ (El País, 1 November 2004). Later on, Sociopolis was one of the 
projects represented in the exhibition about contemporary Spanish architecture ‘Onsite: New Architecture 
in Spain’ held at MoMA, New York, in 2005 (El País, 5 February 2006). 
According to Guallart (Interview 60), this external recognition helped to find support for the project at 
home. 
I believe that there was a key moment in Sociopolis which is when it was also acknowledged 
abroad, because here there was a lot of criticism from the opposition. Recently, for example, I 
have understood that the opposition supported the project, to have it completed. Sometimes, I 
have felt that they help more than the government itself. And, basically I believe that foreign 
acknowledgement is always fundamental to ease the people, to make them understand that it is 
supported by someone, you know? (Interview 60) 
The project although not without difficulties started to be implemented. Having been born as a 
neighbourhood of experimental architecture to finally become a ‘neighbourhood with social aims,’ 
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compromised the feasibility of the project since the cost of experimental ‘emblematic architecture’ is 
incompatible with the necessary budgetary contention of publicly subsidised housing. To make the plan 
economically viable a higher floor area ratio than that established by the General Urban Plan was allowed. 
Also 20% of the dwellings would be sold at market prices instead of being affordable subsidised dwellings 
as it was initially planned. Moreover, due to the quality and singularity of the dwellings most of those 
which were subsidised belonged to the higher price end of the rank. 
Figure 5.22 Virtual model of Special Plan La Torre (Sociopolis) 
 
Source: IVVSA  
When the project turned from being a theoretical into a ‘real’ project it also became less of an artistic and 
intellectual endeavour and was more linked to the urban development sphere (Interview 60). For the 
theoretical project all the participant architects had been selected by Guallart. In his words, they were 
‘friends of mine, let’s say [...] We didn’t contact anyone we didn´t know but rather only people that we 
had worked with on past projects, in conferences, etc. in past years’ (Interview 60). When the Valencian 
institute of Housing commissioned the architect the master plan for the ‘La Torre special plan’, each one 
of the architects of the initial group were assigned a plot of land to develop a housing project and given a 
new brief and, in addition, other plots were assigned by public competition to teams formed by an 
architect and a developer (Interview 25).  Moreover, the size of the site for the special plan grew seven-
fold in comparison to the theoretical one (Interview 60). From a design point of view, the initial master 
plan elaborated by Guallart was modified in collaboration with the architects of the Valencian Housing 
Institute to arrive to a more feasible final design (Interviews 25 and 56). In figure 5.22 a virtual model of 
the modified Sociopolis project (‘La Torre Special plan’), including high-rise residential buildings in the 
middle of the croplands, can be seen. It can also be observed the difference of scale between the new 
buildings and the existing urban fabric of La Torre (behind). 
The connection to urban utilities was difficult and therefore the investment in infrastructures was 
considerable (Interview 22). An agreement to retain the irrigation canal of Favara - one of the main 
historical water supplies for agriculture still in use – in good functional use was signed by the community 
of users and the Valencian Institute of Housing. However, although the original intention was to maintain 
the irrigation and paths infrastructure of the croplands as unchanged as possible, in the end as architect 
García Sogo (Interview 25) complains this feature of the project has been lost and the urbanisation of the 
land has become more standardised (see general view of Sociopolis in figure 5.23). 
The implementation of the project, which is still going on, has encountered many difficulties. According 
to Guallart, building a neighbourhood is more difficult than building a building-icon for many more agents 
are involved – landscape architects, botanists, ecologists, architects, engineers and so on – and in the 
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process ‘many hands intervene and, this, well, provokes that easily 20-25% of the quality is lost on the 
way, for various and even justified reasons, we could say’ (Interview 60).  
Figure 5.23 General view of Sociopolis 
 
Source: author 
On the other hand, coordinating a group of star architects spread around the world and which have little 
knowledge or interest in the local building regulations and planning system has been complicated, 
especially given the fact that each of them is involved just in a small housing project with a limited budget 
rather than in the design of an iconic mega-project (Interviews 56 and 60). 
Also, when the projects of the star architects were submitted to a call for bids for their construction, there 
was little response to some of them from the developers due to their technical and structural difficulty 
considering that it is social housing. On top of it all, from 2007, the economic recession and burst of the 
real estate bubble impacted the project due to a lack of buyers for the dwellings and of financing for the 
developers. 
In the end Sociopolis is an emblematic project with a political justification. It was intended to be the 
flagship project of the IVVSA (Interview 48). It allowed the Regional government to make visible its 
special focus on subsidised housing and even counteract the negative publicity that Valencian Urbanism 
has in the EU due to the 1994 Urbanism Act (LRAU) (Interview 9, 42 and 54). The project has been 
mainly driven first by architect Guallart and -when it became more than a theoretical endeavour - by the 
IVVSA, but it was also regional minister Blasco’s pet project. 
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5.5 Conclusion 
The analysed projects are different in size and scale of money involved. While the America’s Cup, in a 
relatively short period of time, had spectacular international media impact, Sociopolis – of a more modest 
scale - has had less media coverage and relevance. On the other hand, although the budget for the 
infrastructural work implemented in the harbour for the America’s Cup was considerable – 500 million 
euro - a project of the magnitude and economic cost of the City of Sciences – estimated in more than 
1,200 million euro – exceeds it in an overwhelming way. 
Despite the differences, the three projects show similarities in their objectives and approach. In all of 
them, the use of emblematic architecture to achieve urban revitalisation and economic growth occupies 
central stage and the construction and real estate sectors play an important role. On the other hand, the 
actors involved in the projects are of the same type. Particularly, the understanding between elected 
politicians and star architects providing them with sought-after symbols stands out. 
Having understood better the context of Valencia’s mega-projects, how they came about and their 
objectives, the processes of design and implementation as well as the support and the obstacles to their 
delivery, in the next chapters the actors and coalitions of interests involved in the projects, the motives 
behind the urban policy and its economic, social and planning outcomes will be examined more in depth. 
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6. INDEBTEDNESS AND AUTHORITARIANISM: THE OUTCOMES OF 
VALENCIA’S URBAN POLICY 
6.1 Introduction: Urban change and the image of the new Valencia 
It is undeniable that Valencia has undergone a profound urban transformation in the last 15-20 years. 
As it is always the case with architecture, the physical transformation is the most tangible effect of 
Valencia’s urban policy. In the words of one of the interviewees: 
 […] Valencia was pretty much a transit city even before the bypass was built. It was called 
the traffic light of Europe. In other words you could come from Germany to Alicante and 
only pass through Valencia as a traffic light. […] I’d say that as a city it was ugly. Nowadays 
the change for the better is obvious. Casting my memory way back I can even remember a 
roadsign at the entrance to Valencia, painted brown to make it even uglier still, if that were 
possible: Valencia historical centre 2 hours. This could be taken two ways. Firstly it might 
mean that as we know you’re only passing through here you can do the historical centre on 
only a two-hour visit; alternatively it might be interpreted as don’t bother spending more than 
two hours on the visit because by then you will have seen it all (Interview 1). 
Figure 6.1 Aerial view of the Sociopolis site 
 
Source: Guallart Architects (www.guallart.com) 
Indeed, both the City of Sciences and the transformation of the harbour and waterfront area are of 
spectacular scale and have completely changed the face of the city. Sociopolis, situated in the 
periphery of the city and still being built, is less visible but represents an example of the residential 
urban growth that has clearly extended the footprint of Valencia and its metropolitan area, as can be 
seen in figure 6.1. In fact there is consensus not only around the convenience of urban transformation 
but also, and more specifically, pro-growth. And these projects have indeed generated growth in the 
sense of new urbanisation, colonising new areas of the city. Sociopolis is a clear case of urban growth 
but, similarly, the City of Sciences started the expansion of the city by the river towards the sea and 
the America’s Cup was the driving force for the development of the waterfront area.  
The general consensus is that the transformation has been positive, the city has acquired new heritage 
– Calatrava’s spectacular architecture or the Veles e Vents building by David Chipperfield for instance 
– which, on the other hand, provides new tourist attractions for the city, regardless of the ‘architectural 
quality’ of the buildings. Thus, everybody agrees that the City of Sciences is spectacular. For 
CACSA’s representatives the concentration of elements makes the complex ‘unique worldwide’ 
(Interview 43), for many, it is beautiful and an example of quality architecture (Interviews 17 and 25). 
The critics, however, attack the City of Sciences’ lack of real content (Gaja, 2006a; Interviews 3, 6, 7, 
17, 30 and 58) and its urban design, which has left it as an isolated element that could have been 
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anywhere and which has no impact in the urban structure of the city (Interviews 19 and 53). An aerial 
view of the complex – as seen in figure 6.2 – clearly shows both its spectacular nature and its isolation 
from the city’s urban fabric. 
Figure 6.2 Aerial view of the City of Sciences.  
 
Source: Patricia Gómez de la Casa 
Besides growth, urban transformation regarded as modernisation is the other issue that has created 
consensus. The construction of new infrastructure such as the extension of the port and the airport on 
occasion of the America’s Cup are seen as conducive to growth and modernisation (Interview 21). 
Also, the City of Sciences is successful urban modernisation (Interviews 12 and 41). The physical 
transformation from a highly polluted industrial brownfield into a ‘visually attractive’ (Interview 26) 
‘very modern and very beautiful’ (Interview 58) new urban area has been considered successful and 
positive by the decision-makers but also generally by the population. Business director of CACSA 
explains: 
I have a photograph of what the City of Arts and Sciences looked like 10 years ago and the 
difference between what it was then and what it is now is vast. [...] Beforehand there was 
nothing and the change now leaps to the eye. So it’s what you see with your own eyes; you 
can tick off the list of buildings made, for example, over 5,000 houses, supermarkets, leisure 
centres, whopping green areas and 16 hotels in the area and you get some idea of what the 
City of Arts and Sciences has meant. That’s really the difference; it’s tremendous; you only 
have to look about you and you can see that, yes, it’s changed (Interview 43).  
For some, however, the development has been excessive and ‘disproportionate to the long term needs 
of the city’ (Interview 24). The city has transformed itself in order to host the America’s Cup rather 
than the city using the event to transform itself according to its needs (Interview 54). On the one hand, 
according to expert in urban economy Sorribes (Interview 9) the transformation has been focused on 
concrete parts of the city – around the City of Sciences and in the port areas – and has not produced a 
positive impact on neighbouring impoverished areas of the city (such as la Malvarrosa, el Cabañal and 
Nazaret). But, more importantly, the environmental negative impacts have been significant. In the 
case of Sociopolis, historical croplands which cannot be recovered have been destroyed. The group 
Per L’horta has claimed that the irreversibility of the project is its main flaw (Interview 15), and alerts 
of the importance of being cautious when making decisions that will affect future generations. In fact, 
as engineer Javier Obartí (Interview 22) - author of the environmental impact study – explains, 
Sociopolis is from a time when conservation of landscape issues were not considered important. The 
new infrastructures built for the America’s Cup also have negative environmental effects. The 
transformation of the inner harbour has caused problems of erosion of the coast line but also opened 
the doors to real estate speculation, according to ecologist groups. The benefits that the America’s 
Cup would bring to Valencia were used to justify the negative environmental impacts that the 
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infrastructural works would have. Both the America’s Cup and Sociopolis affect environmentally 
fragile spaces of the city but the ‘economic regeneration’ relevance of the projects has seemed to 
weight more for decision makers than the irreversible environmental impacts they imply. 
A less tangible but, indeed, very clear effect of Valencia’s urban policy has been the general 
impression that as a result of physical change the city has improved; it is more beautiful than before.  
It has changed for the better, an impression widely held in Valencia but also shared by other places in 
Spain (Interviews 1, 6, 30, 32, 39 and 46). The expressions ‘how much Valencia has changed’ or ‘how 
pretty Valencia is now’ are common among visitors from other regions (Interviews 5, 16, 32, 39 and 
46). The citizens can be proud of their city and perceive their urban environment under a better light. 
Seeing the perception of others has made them revaluate their urban space. For instance the America’s 
Cup definitely changed the vision of the port and the maritime area, making it become a new area of 
centrality and prestige of the city (Interviews 27 and 54). 
This positive image has also been projected to the exterior. Valencia, in relationship with the 
megaprojects and events, is described as dynamic and vital by many of the interviewees (Interviews 5, 
16, 24 and 34). All the interviewees agree that more people know Valencia thanks to the City of 
Sciences and events such as the America’s Cup and F1 (Interviews 1, 6, 18, 19, 31, 34, 44, 54, 55 and 
58). Decision-makers insist that the objectives have been achieved: Thanks to mega-projects and 
events ‘Valencia is on the map now’, and this could be the most repeated phrase by decision-makers 
and population alike, the one that sums it all. Therefore, the City of Sciences has provided Valencia 
with an icon while the America’s Cup has provided it with publicity; many hours of television around 
the world that have made Valencia known internationally. In the words of the person responsible for 
tourism promotion in the city: 
What’s obvious is Valencia’s huge media splash thanks to the America's Cup. We’ve made 
headlines in papers of the five continents; we’ve been reported on CNN, in the New York 
Times, we’ve had half-hour slots on the BBC or CNBC. But for this massive media event, it 
would be very hard to gain such an international projection for more than a couple of 
minutes. Why? Because in such a globalised world there’s so much news to fit in. (Interview 
21) 
Figure 6.3 Tourists during the America’s Cup competition 
 
Source: La Marina Real Juan Carlos I 
This positive perception of the city has had an effect on tourism too, for more people consider 
Valencia as a tourist destination. As an interviewee comments: ‘I had never seen tourists in the city 
before and now one sees them’ (Interview 1) (see the crowds generated by the America’s cup 
competition in figure 6.3). This has been remarked by both people who agree and people who disagree 
with the urban policy based on mega-projects and events, thanks to the City of Sciences and events 
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such as the America’s Cup Valencia is in the tour circuits.  The director of Commercial Strategy and 
Corporative Development of the Port Authority of Valencia explains regarding the America’s Cup: 
Valencia’s citizens saw that the city was suddenly filling up with a flood of tourists from all 
round the world. This effect of people from all parts each waving the flag of their country 
lasted for nearly two years and, this really livened up the city. And the truth is that the more 
these visitors saw of Valencia the more they were impressed by the city and I think this effect 
lingers on over the years. Valencia was the vogue not only in Spain but also in Europe and 
the whole word. Just as everyone visited Barcelona or Seville in the nineties, well in the 
noughties everyone wanted to come to Valencia and there is a knock-on trickle of visitors 
even today. (Interview 34) 
On the other hand, the importance of global architecture and architects in attracting media attention 
must be stressed. Architects of Santiago Calatrava’s reputation not only have high ‘social and media 
impact’ (Interview 28) but their architecture, described as iconic, is expected to work particularly in 
terms of image. Thus, with the City of Sciences Valencia has attained an emblem with which to be 
identified. The complex is described as a new urban landmark for the city (Interviews 29 and 30), ‘a 
scenography’ (Interviews 16 and 39), ‘a cinema set’ (Interview 38), ‘an urban image’ (Interviews 17 
and 36), ‘an icon’ (Interview 14), ‘a tourist attraction’ (Interview 17), a ‘background landmark’ where 
you can take pictures (Interview 16). In a synthetic way and either as a compliment or a critique, it is 
considered ‘a postcard’ (Interviews 5 and 31), something that makes Valencia recognisable. As the ex-
director of the Calatrava office in Valencia admits, mega-projects such as this:  
They are projects that are very ambitious in general because there’s no easily recognisable 
payback (...) they can’t be set against ticket sales. They are projects with other sorts of 
payback. It’s like Bilbao’s Guggenheim museum; the construction cost is not met by ticket 
sales but in terms of Bilbao’s image, the snapshot […] How much does a city postcard cost? 
A recognisable city postcard. How much does it cost? How much do you have to pay? No 
one really knows. (Interview 5) 
Likewise, the building Veles e Vents, designed by British architect David Chipperfield and built on 
occasion of the America’s Cup celebration also attracted the international press attention and, in 2006, 
was awarded the Leading European Architects Forum (LEAF) prize to the best building. Even in the 
case of Sociopolis, although its impact has been bigger in professional circles, there is the perception 
that the fact that there are well known architects in the project has contributed to Valencia being better 
known abroad. As expressed by the director general of housing of the regional government: 
I reckon that the importance lies precisely in the participation of international architects, 
bringing Valencia and its project to outside notice so that people can see the sort of 
architecture we’re capable of. But for me even more important is the fact that IVVSA’s 
working policy for some time now has been the search for building quality (Interview 56). 
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The emphasis on the benefits in terms of image has caused to emerge questions about the 
correspondence of this image of success with the reality, with the real benefits for the city in economic 
or social terms. The Regional Minister of Public Works and Transport (1990-95) summarises very 
well a common appraisal of the City of Sciences: 
Most people see the buildings and say ‘How lovely!’ snap a few shots and move on. Few 
actually enter the museum and it has no cultural or scientific life, that’s for sure. It’s become 
a sort of upmarket funfair; how pretty is Valencia! Let’s pull in the tourists, make this new 
area so eye-catching and spectacular (Interview 17). 
Similarly, the America’s Cup is described as ‘a minute of glory’ (Interview 51a) or ‘fireworks’ 
(Interviews 33 and 51a). Gil Suay, Council Commissioner for the America’s Cup, complains: 
What I mean is that the immediate results, more immediate anyway, were spectacular. What 
I’m much less satisfied and sure about is the long term input. Truth is that the falla afterwards 
was fabulous, a beautiful monument seen all over the world and the cremá was quite 
spectacular too, with impressive fireworks. People were stunned, but after the last flame 
flickered, darkness came down and here we are today. That’s what I miss; I mean the ground 
had been prepared for a really huge long-term boost for the city rather than just letting it all 
drop afterwards (Interview 33). 
In any case, the new Valencia and its improved image have been very profitable electorally for the 
party in office. The people are generally happy of the visible results and that pays off in the ballot. 
Although initiated by the socialist party, the political and electoral benefits of Calatrava’s project –
although with initial hesitation – were understood by the conservative party, which strived to 
appropriate it, deleting the former president’s stamp. Subsequently both socialist and conservative 
parties have tried to capitalise the merit of the City of Sciences but the project has become the ‘trade 
mark’ of the conservative party (Interview 9) and has often been used in its electoral publicity. The 
America’s Cup was one of the key points of the mayor’s electoral message and has been considered 
the key of her success. Finally, Sociopolis has been the flagship housing project of the regional 
government, the one that demonstrates that the promise of building a certain number of subsidised 
dwellings was being kept. 
6.2 Profitability and economic impact 
In terms of direct economic returns Valencia’s mega-projects – particularly the City of Sciences and 
the America’s Cup – have been non-profitable, even ruinous, for the public administration. In that 
sense, it is generally accepted that this kind of projects do not make any profit but - in the words of the 
Director General for Economy of the Regional Government (1995-98) (Interview 11) - generate 
wealth for the ‘society as a whole’. A Member of staff of the Centre for Strategy and Development of 
Valencia expresses the notion very clearly: 
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The city has benefited in terms of its image and job creation from all the building and 
development and the new areas. All this has generated knock-on wealth but the projects 
themselves have not yet broken even (Interview 6). 
From the beginning the project of the City of Sciences and CACSA, the public corporation which 
manages it, have been loss making. Already in 1999, the only building functioning at that time, the 
planetarium, despite the high number of visitors could not balance its accounts and CACSA got a set 
of loans from different banks for a total of 345 million euro for which all its shares had to be pledged 
as a guarantee. (That meant that if CACSA could not return the loan, to secure repayment, the 
possessory titles of the buildings would be conveyed to the creditor; the banks, in this case). Only 
during the year 2002 the losses amounted to 36 million euro, giving an accumulated debt of 713 
million euro in 2005. Again, CACSA’s losses were 45 million Euros in 2006 and 62 million euros in 
2007. As the complex grew also the expenses did and, for instance, in 2007 the expenses of more than 
192 million euro could not be balanced by the 34.5 million euros of turnover, creating a continuous 
dynamic of accumulated economic loss.  
To balance CACSA’s accounts and avoid its compulsory liquidation due to bankruptcy, the regional 
government injected public capital to the public corporation several times. According to an agreement 
signed by CACSA and the Regional government in 1999, the latter 
makes the commitment to defray operating costs that the company cannot cover with its own 
income and to carry out capital increases to keep the company’s financial structure balanced. 
(Olivares, 28 August 2008) 
Thus, between 1996 and 2009 there were no less than eleven injections of public capital, the last of 
115 million euro in 2006, 113.3 million euro in 2008 and 72.7 million euro in 2009. According to a 
report of the Sindicatura de Comptes (public auditing body), of the public capital injected to CACSA 
314 million euro have been used to offset the depreciation of the entity (El País, 23 December 2008). 
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Table 6.1 Cost overruns of the city of Sciences  
 
Initial budget              
(million euro) 
Final cost 
(million euro) 
Cost overrun 
Planetarium 18 32 178% 
Museum of sciences 62 149.8 242% 
Parking building 14 33 236% 
Opera palace 109 382.5 351% 
Museum of oceanography 39 172 440% 
Agora 46.2 89.3 193% 
Elaborated from data obtained from the local press 
In addition, CACSA’s economic losses have gone hand in hand with the cost overruns (see chapter 5). 
Thus, if the budget for the initial project of the City of Sciences was the equivalent to approximately 
210.3 million euro in 1996, in 2006, the unfinished City of Sciences had already cost the regional 
government 1,065 million euro and in 2011 nearly 1,300. According to the reports of the Sindicatura 
de Comptes the total cost overruns of the City of Sciences were over 300% in 2003 and over 400% in 
2011. The approximate cost overruns of each of the buildings as to 2012 are reflected on table 6.1. 
But it was not only the City of Sciences which was accumulating losses but the rest of the nine 
regional public corporations linked to mega-projects were in similar economic situation too. Indeed, 
as the Director General for Economy of the Regional Government (1995-98) admits the regional 
estate runs with the financial risks of the City of Sciences and other megaprojects and that is why, 
according to him, it is the most indebted in Spain (Interview 11).  
The case of the infrastructure created for the America’s Cup is another example of difficult economic 
returns. The inner harbour area - which was supposed to pay for the loan given to the Consortium by 
the ICO to do the infrastructure works - remained deserted after the sailing competition finished in 
2007 and failed to generate any income. After the celebration of the America’s Cup in 2007 the pubs 
and restaurants gradually had to close due to the lack of clients. Also, the marina has 311 moorings for 
mega-yachts of which, in 2009, only 6% were occupied (Zafra, 13 September 2009). 
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The main problem was that ACM (America’s Cup Management) had exclusive rights to exploit the 
inner harbour during the period of time in which the sailing competition was being held, which, 
including the pre-regattas, was between 2004 and 2007. The uncertainties about the possibility of 
holding a second edition of the competition in Valencia extended the period of time during which the 
Consortium could not exploit the area to generate income and pay the loan for the infrastructure 
works. This fact put the Consortium in a very difficult financial situation.  
The loan, guaranteed by the ICO, had to be reimbursed in 2010 but the Consortium had been 
accumulating losses since 2006 because the income from the exploitation of the inner harbour was 
lower than the ordinary expenses. In 2006, the balance sheet showed negative equity capital of 15 
million, which would have forced the Consortium to dissolve had it had to abide by the regular trading 
corporations rules. In 2008, the total loss was 30.6 million euro. The three administrations represented 
in the consortium agreed to inject capital for a total of 40 million euro in 2006 but only the central 
government contributed its part, 16 million euros. In 2011 the losses were 18 million euro and the 
Consortium had not reimbursed any of the capital credited for the infrastructure works. 
All these cost overruns, management loses of the public corporations and investments with no 
economic return have contributed to the high indebtedness of the local and particularly the regional 
government, leading the last one to be technically bankrupt. The huge cost of maintenance of the new 
infrastructures created – particularly the city of Sciences - left the regional government lacking in 
funds for it. 
Also the local government was heavily indebted, according to them mainly due to the investment for 
the America’s Cup. In 2006, the local government, for the first time ever, had to ask for permission 
from the central government to contract new loans because the (admitted) indebtedness was over 
110% (Velert, 24 February 2006).  
However, the case of the regional government has been paradigmatic within Spain. Already in 2001, 
Moody’s report alerted about the high financial risks that CACSA represented for the regional 
government (El País, 12 October 2001). In fact, all the budgetary increments of the regional ministries 
in 2001 were absorbed by the payment of debt interests. In 2004 the Regional Government had a debt 
of 10,098 million Euros, 11% of its GDP, which placed it as the most indebted in Spain (before 
Galicia with 7.8%). To this we must add the debt supported by the public corporations, which are not 
included in the public debt but –as explained for the case of CACSA– depend on the regional budget 
too. 
The report of the Sindicatura de Comptes of 2006 confirmed that, as to 2005, if the rules for private 
corporations had applied, the regional government would have had to be dissolved (García del Moral, 
27 December 2006). In 2007 the Valencian Community, with 11,500 million euros of total debt, 
representing 11.4 of the GDP, was still the more indebted in Spain according to the Bank of Spain (El 
País, 27 March 2008). Moody’s report of 2008 stated that most of the debt increase was due to the 
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indebtedness of the public corporations and the bank guarantees given to them (Ferrandis, 20 March 
2008). 
With the economic crisis the problem of indebtedness and the difficulties to maintain the mega-
projects built during the economic boom were made more evident. Finally, in 2012, the Valencian 
regional government – which had been put by president Rajoy as the example for the rest of Spain – 
was the first one to ask for a bail-out from the central government.  
As the regional minister of economy affirmed in 2007 referring to the City of Sciences, ‘projects of 
this kind do not necessarily have to be financially profitable short term’ (García del Moral, 8 August 
2007). According to the regional government, the objective of mega-projects and events is not their 
economic profitability but their positive impact on the regional economy (Interviews 11 and 18). The 
Director General for Economy of the Regional Government (1995-98) expresses the governments 
view: 
 […] the accounts of the City of Sciences have always been in the red, for various reasons. 
But the thing is that as a public initiative it cannot charge market prices, neither in the 
museum, the planetarium and not even in the opera palace, which is intrinsically loss making. 
But these are book losses; if you take into account all the knock-on benefits in terms of jobs, 
activity, hotel- and restaurant-trade, etc., the returns are very positive (Interview 11). 
Therefore, despite their financial situation being problematic, the regional government has claimed 
that the benefits from the mega projects and events have been received by the society as a whole. This 
argument has been sustained based on several economic impact reports of both the City of Sciences 
and the America’s Cup commissioned to the Valencian Institute of Economic Research (IVIE), a 
research centre founded by the regional government in 1990. According to the (on the other hand 
contested) economic impact study the proportion of wealth generated has been around 1 to 2, that is, 
for each euro of public investment approximately 2 euros have been generated for the benefit of the 
private sector.  
In the case of the City of Sciences and according to the reports elaborated by the IVIE, the calculated 
internal rate of return, which includes the social returns, has consistently been over 5%, which is the 
value of reference according to the European Commission (Interview 18). With these positive results 
the regional government was able to obtain funding from the European Investment Bank (BEI) 
(Interviews 11 and 18). Joaquín Maudos, author of the IVIE economic impact reports, explains how 
the economic impact and social profitability were calculated: 
What we did in that study was: firstly to estimate the museum’s economic impact on 
Valencia’s employment and income figures, taking into account two sources, namely the 
construction itself, a sizeable sum, and the ongoing operation. The operation itself can then 
be broken down into two impacts, one deriving from the operating account, i.e. people 
working there, procurements here, security services bought there, publicity etc. All this 
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generates economic impacts. Secondly, and very important from the social point of view of 
Valencia’s economy, is the impact associated with the tourism expenditure of museum 
visitors. We also took into account two additional social benefits of the museum, firstly the 
intellectual enrichment of the visit, which has a value in terms of human capital. We 
economists try to turn this human capital into monetary terms. In other words if you visit the 
museum and get some personal enrichment out of it this has an economic value, which we 
reflect in the report. Secondly the price per square metre of the housing in the hinterland has 
soared since the event was approved. We therefore tapped into the cadastres and other 
information sources and calculated from a plan just how much the housing price per square 
metre had risen by districts and how much it is likely to rise in the future. This factor brought 
it from last place in the rankings to first. Then there was a tremendous town-planning impact 
and this also represented an appreciation of value. It was as though the owners were 
shareholders and suddenly their capital is worth more, you’ve become richer. So what we do 
in the report is to calculate economic impacts in income and employment and then we factor 
in social costs and benefits and private costs and benefits. Then we calculate what is known 
as the internal rate of return (Interview 18). 
Although the reports have not been made accessible to the public, the regional government presents a 
summary every year to justify the profitability of their urban policy. Thus, Maudos goes on 
explaining: 
 […] what the regional ministry of economy does, and this is used greatly by the economics 
regional minister and first vice president, what we do is to begin adding together the whole 
impact in terms of income and employment, not social profitability note, income and 
employment impacts for the whole set of activities, and this can obviously be added up. Then 
the cumulative GDP percentage of the Valencian Community is set in a yearly scenario. They 
annualise the impact and say: Look, thanks to the whole set of activities throughout the year 
the major events generate such and such a percentage of Valencia’s regional GDP. But, I 
repeat, note that this does not take into account the social profitability, only the economic 
impact, which is by no means the same (Interview 18). 
In the case of the America’s Cup, before the celebration of the first edition in Valencia there were five 
economic impact reports commissioned by different institutions. The Regional Ministry of Economy 
commissioned one to the IVIE and the national Ministry of Public Administrations commissioned 
another to the ‘Fundación Tomillo’. The Valencian Chambers of Commerce did their own study, the 
Valencian Association of Entrepreneurs (AVE) commissioned a study to the consultancy KPMG and 
the local newspaper Levante EMV commissioned another to the Instituto de Economía Internacional 
de la Universidad de Valencia. 
The five studies used the same methodology, an input-output analysis, but differed slightly in their 
results because they disagreed on the public investments that were attributable to the America’s Cup 
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(Interview 18). As Maudos (Interview 18) advises, it is very difficult to consider the induced private 
investment because it is complicated to know what to attribute it to. Thus, for instance, according to 
the IVIE’s report, the America’s Cup would increase the regional GDP in 1% and the creation of jobs 
in 1.2%. The most benefited economic sectors would be the service sector - mainly commerce, 
hospitality industry, real estate agencies and business services – and the construction sector. 
According to ‘Fundación Tomillo’ 40,770 jobs would be created, and the economic impact on the 
Valencian economy would be 3,663 million euro – 1,300 million Euros of direct impact and 1,435 of 
indirect impact. The most benefited sectors would be the service sector, industry and construction. 
According to KPMG the economic impact would be 3,150 million euro and 111,000 jobs would be 
generated in Spain in four years. According to the Chamber of Commerce the construction sector 
would be the more benefited due to the construction of infrastructures (Cámara Oficial de Comercio, 
Industria y Navegación de Valencia, 2010). Despite some differences, all of them agreed that the 
America’s Cup would have a huge positive economic impact on the Valencian economy, create 
thousands of jobs and bring about an increase in tourism.  
In 2008, after the sailing competition had taken place, the regional government presented the 
definitive report of the America’s Cup’s economic impact (Maudos et al., 2007), which confirmed the 
positive forecast of the former report in terms of GDP and employment and quantified the total 
income in 7,724 million euro. The report analysed both the direct and indirect economic impacts 
generated by the current expenditure (26% of the total) and the investments in infrastructures (74% of 
the total) produced from 2004 to 2007 and linked to the America’s Cup. According to the report, 75% 
of the total expenditure corresponded to the Spanish administrations, 16 % to teams and organisers 
and the rest to visitors, media and others. 
The 440 million euro invested by the Consortium in the remodeling of the inner harbor to adapt it to 
the needs of the competition, represented according to the report only 16% of the total expenditure 
while the higher expenditure 1,250 million euro, representing 45.05% of the total, corresponded to the 
Regional government’s ‘Action Plan for the America’s Cup 2004-2007’. 
The expenditure of the regional government attributable to the America’s Cup has been a bone of 
contention and has generated many critiques to the IVIE report. In 2004 the regional government had 
presented an investment plan of 500 million euro but in 2005 decided to present a new plan of 2,102 
million euro that included a list of 150 actions, of which several were old projects already initiated. 
The action plan included not only the improvement of the public transport network and road 
accessibility to the city but also projects such as the new La Fé hospital already under construction 
(the author of the IVIE report decided to exclude this expense from the report (Interview 18)).  
As the author of the impact report admits the economic impact of mega-projects and events is 
proportional to the expense ‘if you spend more you always generate a bigger impact’ (Interview 18) 
and, given that the investment is substantial, the impact on the GDP is considerable too. However, 
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considering that most of the economic impact calculated corresponded to infrastructure and most of 
the expenditure was public expenditure, the study of alternative investments to holding the America’s 
Cup would have been highly advisable, even more if we take into account the profitability of the 
investments in infrastructure in the inner harbour and the difficult financial situation of the 
Consortium.  
6.3 Distribution of benefits and the effect on the Valencian Economy 
As suggested by the hefty costs of construction and indicated by the economic impact reports of both 
the City of Sciences and the America’s Cup, the main economic sectors which have reaped the 
benefits of an urban policy based on mega-projects and events are construction and real estate on the 
one hand and, tourism and the hospitality industry on the other. The huge investments have generated 
substantial capital gains which have been left entirely in private hands. 
Indeed, the most important direct beneficiaries of the investments have been the big construction 
companies which have signed succulent contracts, but real estate capital gains induced by an urban 
policy that has incentivased urban development (of which Sociopolis is an example too) must not be 
overlooked as it has resulted in huge economic returns for some (Interviews 4, 7, 28, 32 and 51a). 
The land around the harbour area, where the America’s cup and F1 competitions took place generated 
considerable capital gains but the case of the area surrounding the city of Sciences is very clear 
(Interview 18) as the Director General for Economy of the Regional Government (1995-98) explains: 
What we have seen in the surroundings, therefore, has been something of a bonanza. The 
initial town-planning gains have been appropriated by all the private sectors that have built, 
promoted or purchased housing in the area, who have seen prices triple in a few years as a 
result of the town-planning improvements (Interview 11). 
Certainly, the financial risks of projects such as the City of Sciences have been taken by the state but 
the bulk of the benefits have been reaped by the private sector. According to the conservative regional 
government, and in the words of the Director General for Economy of the Regional Government 
(1995-98) (Interview 11) by ‘the society as a whole’ although considering the equity of the 
distribution –mostly in hands of big construction and real estate companies – it would be better 
characterised as a transfer of public money to private hands. 
The other benefited sectors have been tourism and the service sector. From the late 1990s Valencia 
started to present a more characteristic urban tourism profile type (Universidad Valencia, 2007), at the 
same time as the number of visitors grew substantially (see table 6.2).  
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Table 6.2 Number of visitors to the city of Valencia 
 1992 1999 2003 2007 2011 
VISITORS 372,205 743,859 1,074,203 1,921,197 1,825,358 
National Institute of Statistics and Valencia Tourism 
This growth has been attributed partly to exogenous causes – such as the increase of low cost air travel 
for instance - but also significantly to the administration’s effort to equip the city with leisure and 
cultural attractions and the emphasis on the organisation of mega-events (Universidad de Valencia, 
2007). While, in 2003, the main reason to travel of over 60% of the visitors was work related, in 2011, 
60% of the visitors mentioned leisure as their primary motivation of travel (Departament Economia 
Aplicada. Universitat València, 2007; Turismo Valencia, 2011). The City of Sciences first and the 
America’s Cup later on have been crucial elements of a tourism policy focused on the attraction of 
urban tourists (Rausell, 2004; Rausell and Marco, 2005; Carrasco and Rausell, 2006). 
There has been however some scepticism about the figures of number of visitors to the City of 
Sciences complex given by the regional government. While the director of the complex (Interview 35) 
boasts of an annual number of 5 million visitors, from other sectors (Interviews 13, 28 and 51) there 
are more pessimistic views, not least because the visitor counting system of the complex does not 
allow to differentiate visitors from members of staff and does not take into account that some visitors 
are counted more than once (Departament Economia Aplicada. Universitat València, 2007). On the 
other hand, a crowding out effect of the City of Sciences on other cultural attractions of the city has 
been observed, which indicates that many of the visitors of the City of Sciences do not count towards 
the total growth of visitors to the city (Departament Economia Aplicada. Universitat València, 2007). 
An important boost to the Valencian tourist sector was the celebration of the America’s Cup. The 
Director of Valencian Convention Bureau (Interview 21), responsible of Valencia’s tourist promotion, 
explains the impact that the America’s Cup had in terms of tourism: 
Valencia, which was already growing a lot in tourism terms, has in fact been Spain and 
Europe’s quickest growing tourism city in the last five years. But we have not only grown 
quantitatively but also qualitatively in two different directions. Firstly the geographic 
demand-side direction – i.e. we have internationalised Valencia’s tourism; beforehand we 
had a seventy-thirty international-national split and now a fifty-fifty split. Secondly, from a 
series of firms and sponsors, we have nurtured a much freer-spending client type than the 
normal weekend visitors (Interview 21). 
But, again, this optimistic analysis is contested (Interviews 7, 9, 13, 28, 30 and 51). Although 
Valencia, between 1990 and 2004, was in effect the European city with a bigger increase in hotel stays 
(Nácher and Sancho, 2007) the success in tourism terms needs to be put in context. According to 
tourism expert Iribas (Interview 28), Valencia’s number of visitors was so low in relationship to the 
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city’s possibilities that it could only increase. In the words of Rausell, Senior lecturer of Economics at 
the University of Valencia: 
Effectively, Valencia from the tourism point of view has been a success story since the late 
nineties. The moot point now, however, is: why was Valencia not a tourism city before the 
late nineties? Here the most important point is perhaps the failure of the tourism model when 
it boasted the entire wherewithal for becoming a tourism city. Valencia since 2000 has grown 
vastly in terms of number of visitors; it is one of the quickest growing European cities in fact. 
This growth rate started from a very low base, however, but of course I believe it is a success 
story. But if we cancel out the one-off effect of opening various events and equipping them, 
the negative growth rate is higher than in other European cities. We are wringing out the last 
drops of this inauguration effect in a city with no previous references to go on, and so the 
people are coming for the first time. Most visitors in the early noughties were first-time 
visitors and this effect is now dying out. But this is because, surprisingly, Valencia’s main 
competitive strengths, mostly involving in my opinion its lifestyle, were not previously 
conceptualised or exploited properly. The setting up and equipping of the major events 
therefore served as an excuse, an attraction drawing in trippers. Since there were so many 
people who had not visited Valencia before as sight-seeing or weekend tourism, this 
obviously acts as an attraction and draws in visitors. But there lies the rub. What we are 
doing now is living off the lack of tourists from ten years ago and this effect will inevitably 
die out. When this inauguration effect flags, the City of arts and Sciences… it will all become 
trickier. In other words, success is unquestionable in tourism terms but due account has to be 
given here to the one-off boost of setting up and equipping these major events. (Interview 13) 
The data about the America’s Cup are in line with Rausell’s analysis. In 2007, the number of visitors 
increased in 8.1% and the number of night stays increased in 15.2%. In 2009, the number of visitors 
decreased in 7% and the number of night stays in 6% (Zafra, 8 February 2010). The experts explain 
the contrast attributing it to the so-called ‘champaign effect’, an increase in the demand due to a 
novelty in the supply which after a period of time goes back to normal levels of demand. For many 
commentators, this is a proof of the inefficacy of mega events to sustain and boost the tourist sector 
(Interview 28). 
The benefits of the hospitality sector during the competition – with some reserves - were substantial 
but, in the aftermath the scenario changed completely. The America’s Cup’s generation of wealth has 
been defined as ‘immediate and punctual’ (Interview 52). 
Although in 2007 the hotel occupancy in the Valencia province increased in nearly 1.8 points, in 2008 
the figures went back to pre America’s Cup levels (Biot and Castillo, 27 January 2008). In addition, in 
2008 the hospitality industry entrepreneurs complained that the huge increase in the supply - in part 
due to the optimistic expectations that the America’s Cup had generated - had left the sector in a 
flagrant situation of crisis. After all, between 1999 and 2005 the hotel supply in the city had increased 
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in 60% (Nácher and Sancho, 2007). Thus, the returns in tourism terms were not as expected in the 
long term. For the hoteliers, as expressed by the president of the Hotel union of Valencia Province 
‘the America’s Cup impact has been excellent but so far it has not been able to compensate the 
increase in supply’ (Biot, 19 February 2005). 
Emiliano García, representative for tourism in the Confederation of Businesses recalls: 
There was an initial reaction of scepticism from many people, I included, but the truth is that 
even I more or less got caught up in the wave of euphoria. Being so close to the America’s 
Cup site and also being highly publicised in many good-food guides, the truth is that I had a 
considerable boost in sales, not in profit but yes in sales. But the America’s Cup had little 
overspill in hotel and tourism terms because the port facilities mopped up most of it. And 
then there were people, me included, who wondered: What’s going to happen tomorrow? 
Then tomorrow comes and we see that, in effect, it was not catered for; not only that but the 
stock of establishments has increased appreciably and though we are given a very high 
tourism score in surveys, I mistrust this because we had to find new personnel overnight. I 
had to resort to unskilled people by offering high pay and this is not good for the sector in the 
long term. Now this unskilled personnel is back on the dole. (Interview 52) 
In contrast, ACM, the corporation responsible for the organisation of the America’s Cup, obtained 
direct economic benefits of 30 million euros according to the official version, apart from the canon of 
90 million euros (Ros, 6 July 2007). The Council Commissioner for the America’s Cup explains very 
clearly what can only be considered a net transfer of public money to private hands, in this case to the 
Swiss company: 
 […] ACM is so to speak the rights-holding body. All the dock, its whole transformation is 
placed by the consortium in ACM’s hands for holding the Cup and ACM then manages all 
this infrastructure, organises the races, and lays down the rules. In other words, it’s as though 
we built the house and then handed it over to the tenant, only instead of being paid a rent we 
pay him to come. We made the house, we hand it over to the tenant and pay him a rent and it 
is he the tenant who manages all the races and what we might call connected factors such as 
publicity. (Interview 33) 
On the other hand, at a more structural level the urban policy has not resulted in important changes in 
the productive structure of the city, where the service sector continues to predominate (Banyuls and 
Sánchez, 2007; Interview 13 and 28). The main economic sectors of the Valencian Autonomous 
Community are commerce, hospitality sector and consumer goods industry. In the last decades the 
construction sector has increased its weight and there has been a progressive terciarisation of the 
economy. In 2009 the service sector represented 70% of the jobs in the region and 66% of the regional 
GDP (Cámara Oficial de Comercio, Industria y Navegación de Valencia, 2010). Similarly, in 2008, in 
the Metropolitan area of Valencia commerce and the hospitality sector represented 26% of the total 
employment, construction 9% and, real estate and business services 15%. Only 12% of the working 
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population was employed in the industrial sector and 3% in agriculture and farming (Oficina 
d’Estadistica Ajuntament de Valencia, 2008). 
Albeit, according to the economic impact reports, the America’s Cup would generate a 1% increase in 
the regional GDP, in 2007, the total increase of the Valencian regional GDP was 5.9% while the total 
increase in Spain was 7%. In 2009 the variation of the GDP was -3.1% in Spain and -3.8% in the 
Valencian Autonomous Community, according to the National Institute of Statistics (Instituto 
Nacional Estadística, www.ine.es). 
Moreover, a model based on tourism and construction has generated precarious jobs. In 2008, in the 
Valencian Autonomous Community the temporary employment rate was 32.3% whereas the Spanish 
average was 29.3% (Cámara Oficial de Comercio, Industria y Navegación de Valencia, 2010). Also, 
the qualification rate of the Valencian labour force – 29.8% of the workforce has a university degree - 
was below the Spanish average (Cámara Oficial de Comercio, Industria y Navegación de Valencia, 
2010). This is due to having a productive structure based on labour intensive sectors - construction, 
commerce, tourism, transport, etc. – which do not require a highly qualified labour force – and 
therefore attract unqualified migrants - and where precarious contracts – short term contracts, part 
time contracts, etc. – predominate.  
According to the National institute of Statistics, the average annual salary in construction, commerce, 
hospitality sector and businesses services was lower than the Spanish average in 2002, 2006 and 2010, 
the average salary in the hospitality sector being between 30% and 40% lower than the Spanish 
average. Therefore, the average salary in the Valencian Autonomous Community was 10%, 8% and 
9% below the national average respectively in those years (Instituto Nacional Estadística, 
www.ine.es). Certainly, neither the City of Sciences nor the America’s Cup economic impact studies 
consider in their analysis the type of jobs generated (Interview 18). 
Despite the official discourse about the ‘city of knowledge’ the structural impact on knowledge, 
innovation, etc. of the urban policy based on megaprojects and events has been inexistent (Interview 
13). In fact, the global investment in R+D has been consistently below the national and European 
averages. For instance, in 2008, the global investment in R+D in the Valencian Autonomous 
Community was only 1% of the GDP, below the Spanish average of 1.35% and the 1.99% average of 
the 15 richest European countries (Cámara Oficial de Comercio, Industria y Navegación de Valencia, 
2010; Instituto Nacional Estadística, www.ine.es).  
Therefore, investments such as the City of Sciences or the America’s Cup seemed good more as an 
effect of institutional publicity than the reality shown by the data. As expressed by an ex-candidate to 
the Presidency of the Regional Government of Valencia: 
With all the advertising hype it seemed as though the America’s Cup was going to be the 
golden bullet that solved all our problems. Then the America’s Cup is gone and you wonder 
am I worse or better off? Well I didn’t notice much effect (Interview 4). 
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6.4 The social outcomes 
Despite the economic results of the urban policy, the regional government insist that projects such as 
the City of Sciences must be measured in terms of social profitability. They have commissioned a 
report to the IVIE – which is updated every year and put forward in their public appearances - to 
defend the social profitability of the City of Sciences (El País, 10 November 2004, García del Moral, 
8 August 2007). Social profitability, for the government, means that through the contracts and the 
functioning of the complex the investment has reverted in the Valencian society. In addition, the IVIE 
report monetarises what can be considered more intangible benefits. Thus, the author of the report 
explains: 
How do you value in monetary terms the increase in your intellectual capacity, in your 
human capital? So what we do is, well, a person values his or her visit at least in terms of 
what he or she is willing to pay; if you have paid for the entrance ticket it’s because you 
reckon the visit is at least worth the entrance fee. Then, since a considerable part of the 
entrance fee is subsidised, school groups, groups of elderly people, private groups, then there 
is a real difference between what they pay and what they would be prepared to pay. This is an 
important profit to be taken into account. So what we do in the report is work from the 
entrance price, which reflects what you are prepared to pay and hence the value you receive. 
Then we correct it in terms of the mean age of the visitor, because it is not the same thing to 
be visited by a thirteen-year old, with all the possible enrichment to be tapped into over the 
next sixty years, as a sixty year old with no likely return. So a correction is made for the 
mean age of the visitor. So in the end I take into account visitors, type of visitor, mean ages, 
ticket price and thus obtain an estimate of human capital. This is a mere bagatelle in the 
whole picture, adding up, I believe, to about eight million euros. (Interview 18) 
Even from that viewpoint, the expenditure has been so substantial that the government’s argument 
about the social profitability of the projects does not hold when the cost/benefit ratio is considered. 
Analysing the social outcomes more generally, the Valencian Community economic model has 
resulted not only in precarious interim jobs but also in a high rate of abandonment of studies, a trend 
which has been exacerbated by the economic crisis. In fact, the data of abandonment of compulsory 
secondary education in the Valencian Autonomous Community has consistently been one of the worst 
in Spain. For instance in 2009 while the percentage in Spain was 25.9% in Valencia it was 36.9% 
(Colectivo Lorenzo Luzuriaga, 2010). This can be in part attributed to an economy based on tourism 
and the construction, which provides jobs which require low qualification levels. 
Figure 6.4 School in temporary sheds in Valencia 
 
Source: Santiago Carreguí in El País, 13 September 2009 
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On top of that, social services (health, education and culture) have suffered from a lack of investment 
since the funds have gone to ‘economic regeneration’ expenditure (i.e. mega-projects and events). 
Figure 6.4 shows the effects of this lack of investment. Mega-projects and events as a means to urban 
regeneration have become almost the only public policy. The critiques have started to be heard: 
Now, this is the moment for taking stock, for saying, now listen, we’ve got kids living in 
slums and prefab schools and yet you’re hosting a Formula One race spending god knows 
how many billions. Look at the huge healthcare waiting lists and then we put on Formula 
One, the America’s Cup and what not. This is the flak it has come in for since. (Interview 44) 
In the words of regional PM Camarasa ‘with 105 million Euros [the capital transferred to CACSA in 
2005] it is possible to pay half of the new La Fé hospital or six old people’s homes for 1,400 people 
each’ (Olivares, 27 February 2005). 
In fact, between the years 2000 and 2008, per capita public expenditure in education, health and social 
protection in the Valencian Autonomous Community gradually and substantially decreased in 
relationship with the Spanish average, as table 6.3 shows. 
Table 6.3 Per capita social public expenditure 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Education 
Valencian   
Community 
798 829 751 725 768 785 791 838 884 
Spain 666 698 769 813 871 901 965 1.033 1.107 
Differential 132 131 -18 -87 -103 -116 -174 -196 -223 
Health 
Valencian 
Community 
864 895 883 963 1.058 1.128 1.118 1.189 1.252 
Spain 821 861 918 976 1.085 1.193 1.267 1.344 1.453 
Differential 43 34 -35 -13 -26 -65 -149 -154 -201 
Social 
protection 
Valencian 
Community 
1.866 1.943 2.020 2.081 2.207 2.325 2.407 2.565 2.740 
Spain 2.058 2.161 2.294 2.420 2.567 2.711 2.883 3.069 3.345 
Differential -192 -218 -274 -340 -360 -386 -476 -503 -605 
Total  
Valencian 
Community 
5.951 6.141 6.231 6.290 6.632 6.937 7.163 7.636 8.041 
Spain 6.108 6.337 6.851 7.143 7.650 8.079 8.602 9.227 9.884 
Differential -157 -196 -620 -853 -1.018 -1.143 -1.439 -1.591 -1.843 
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Data: Observatorio Social de España 
Even within the Valencian government there have been complaints that mega-projects and events 
have been prioritised at the expense of the budget of other regional ministries (Interview 3). For 
instance, according to the DOCV (Diari Oficial de la Comunitat Valenciana), the official budget of the 
Regional Ministry of Agriculture, Fishing and Food was modified in 1.051.739 euros to assign them 
to the America’s Cup and promotion of the region (El País, 4 May 2009).  
Dissociation between the local and the global can be perceived. The effort to situate Valencia globally 
has contrasted with how day-to-day investment in the neighbourhoods has been neglected. According 
to the President of the Federation of Residents’ Associations of Valencia: 
So from our point of view, until we have hard profit figures, then we have not benefited. We 
might have benefited by putting Valencia on the map; Valencia (Spain), Formula one, 
America’s Cup, but as I’ve already said – have we got a cutting-edge education, have we got 
a cutting-edge healthcare, better hospitals than anyone else, incredible services for the 
elderly? Well the answer is clearly no. (Interview 49) 
The case of Nazaret – a deprived maritime neighbourhood next to the America’s Cup area – is 
paradigmatic. Just some hundreds of meters away from the sailing boats and mega-yachts lies 
Natzaret – at the other side of a security bubble– a rundown neighbourhood plagued by drug-
trafficking and poverty. According to the vice-president of Natzaret’s residents’ association ‘the only 
benefit most residents have noticed from the holding of the Cup is that the prostitutes are swept off the 
streets before the high-ups arrive’ (Velert, 14 October 2004). 
Although in the city of Valencia, the strategic plan placed great emphasis on livability and quality of 
life, contradictorily, the focus on an urban economy has not only resulted in an economy that produces 
precarious jobs and high rates of abandonment of studies but has increased the cost of life for many, in 
particular for those who have seen their salaries go down and prices –especially real estate and 
everything related to it; retail, leisure, restaurants, etc. - go up. 
On the other hand, competitiveness driven by amenities has not been a source of social cohesion. For 
some local commentators, although the city might have improved its international image its social 
cohesion has deteriorated (Azagra and Romero, 2012).  Between 1973 and 2005 most autonomous 
communities in Spain improved the equality of income distribution, and the poorer 5% improved their 
situation. The Valencian Autonomous Community was one of the exceptions. In addition, the richer 
5% was richer in 2005 than in 1973 (Aldás, Goerlich and Mas, 2007). Between 1996 and 2007, a 
period of economic growth, the Gini coefficient of income distribution showed no improvement in 
equality while the percentage of relative poverty increased from 13.3% to 15.2% (Azagra and 
Romero, 2007). In 2010, the effects of the economic crisis were patent with a clear increase in the 
inequality of income distribution and an index of moderate poverty of 19.6% (higher than in 1981 
which was 16.5%) (Azagra and Romero, 2007). Therefore, the years of economic expansion did not 
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mean an improvement in equality and, moreover, the economic crisis brought inequality and poverty 
to levels higher than in the beginning of the 1980s. 
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6.5 Governance: privatisation, transparency and democratic control 
Beyond the image, physical, social and economic outcomes, Valencia’s urban policy can be 
considered a conduit of profound governance changes, as expressed by a local commentator mega-
projects and events are ‘veritable ideological engine rooms based not so much on what is said as on 
ways of being and doing that are established’ (Sánchez, 16 May 2007). 
First of all, although in the main the population has not shown discontent until very late, there has 
been a general complaint in the city about the lack of debate about the important decisions (Boira, 
2003b). The regional economic model has not been widely debated and the urban policy based on 
mega projects and events either. Whoever has disagreed with it has been called ‘anti-Valencian’. As 
the regional minister of public administration (85-87) complains,  
There is no public debate because the conservative party has pulled off an important feat by 
stigmatising anyone who questions the model as anti Valencia. [...] They turned a deaf ear to 
anyone else. They closed ranks and stigmatised any critical voices. (Interview 14) 
At local level there has been no involvement of the social agents in the debate about city strategy, or 
about mega-projects.  In the words of the secretary of studies and programmes of the socialist party in 
the city of Valencia ‘mega projects are not previously agreed with the city or its residents’ (Interview 
24). 
Some citizen groups – such as Iniciativa COPA-sos, Pel Litoral Que Volem, the Federation of 
Neighbourhood Associations of Valencia and Universitat en Bici - have demanded more public 
participation and citizen debate on the city’s important projects (Morenilla, 30 October 2004; 
Interview 49). As the manifesto of the ecologist group Pel Litoral stated, their claim was  
Rather than a city managed on a seat-of-the-pants basis in the interests of the favoured few 
and their vested interests, we are advocating a city run in the interests of all with across-the-
board participation. (Zafra, 28 May 2004) 
Considering the individual projects, none of them has involved and extensive consultation or 
participatory process. For instance, when the first democratic regional government came up with the 
project for the City of Sciences no alternatives for the ‘economic regeneration’ of the area or the city 
were discussed. From the beginning, the style of decision was top-down. When the first conservative 
regional government arrived in office and decided to change the communications tower for an opera 
house little explanation was given. This way of doing continued until the project was completed. Also 
the convenience of hosting the America’s Cup in Valencia was taken for granted. The infrastructure 
and urban transformation projects linked to the America’s Cup did not generate any citizen debate 
either. 
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Although the lack of citizen involvement in urban projects decision-making can be considered a 
general trend of Spanish society after the first years of participatory euphoria which came with the 
onset of democracy, megaprojects and events and the mechanisms used to implement them have 
played an important role in the process. 
First, for the majority of mega projects and events exceptionality measures have been applied with the 
justification of efficiency, the speeding-up of procedures and the social interest of the projects. Thus, 
urban planning has been adjusted to allow for the projects. For instance Sociopolis did not abide with 
the general urban plan of Valencia, and, therefore, the general plan was modified by the public 
administration as allowed by the Valencian Urbanism Act. Protected land was reclassified so it was 
possible to build Sociopolis. The planning figure used was a ‘special plan’, which as explained by an 
architect involved in the planning of the project ‘it is called special because it has a very important 
social interest, which, in this case was the substantial quantity of subsidised housing to be built there’ 
(Interview 8). Guallart explains the importance of the social interest of a project such as Sociopolis to 
achieve the modification of the urban plan: 
Sociopolis, when the General Urban Plan of Valencia was drawn up back in 1986, decided 
that all land which was not urban should be listed as specially protected croplands (limited 
development with only typical farming and market-garden constructions allowed). In our 
case this means that under Valencia law the government was entitled to construct on land of 
this type if 70% of the buildings were to be state-subsidised housing. Despite this, however, 
there was a clear transformation of specially protected croplands into land for the 
construction of subsidised housing. In the words of Rafael Blasco this called for its social 
sale, that is, the collaboration of agents that gave an added value to the project was needed. 
(Interview 60) 
Once the General Plan was modified and the project approved there were more adjustments. The 
initial project established that all the dwellings would be publicly subsidised but the final project 
includes 2,614 subsidised dwellings and 462 free market dwellings. In addition, the allowed 
residential density was allowed to be increased on the grounds that Sociopolis was a singular project. 
Also the City of Sciences was a direct intervention of the regional government to do a project which 
was not contemplated in the General Plan but which was considered of exceptional importance. As 
early on as 1994, for the first project which included a communications tower, the local authority was 
open to modify the urban plan if necessary so the tower could also house private activities (S.B, 18 
January 1994). Later on, in 2004, the project of four skyscrapers commissioned to Calatrava within 
the complex of the City of Sciences needed modifications of uses and volumetry of the General Urban 
Plan of Valencia to adapt it to the star architect’s design. 
Therefore, while in Sociopolis – a peripheral location - protected crop land was reclassified to build 
subsidised housing; in the City of Sciences –a prime location – land earmarked for subsidised housing 
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was reclassified to allow for more economically profitable uses. Urban planning was being changed to 
suit the government’s interests. 
However, the project for the skyscrapers, which did not respect the use for which the land had been 
obtained, arouse suspicions about the legality of the compulsory land purchase order and made the 
previous land owners resort to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court decided that the ‘social 
interest’ which was the justification for the compulsory purchase order did not apply anymore and 
therefore it was revoked. The Regional Government was sentenced to revise the price of the land 
(which had hugely increased in price since the compulsory purchase order) or to return it (El País, 8 
March 2008). 
Also, time pressures and the government’s declaration of the ‘special interest’ of the America’s Cup 
was used to speed-up hiring processes or compulsory purchase orders and, to skip procedures. The 
case is paradigmatic of how decisions had to be made in a rush. Since the candidature project needed 
to be done in a short period of time there was no time for proper democratic controls. For instance the 
architect for the master plan was hired directly, without competition, as explained by Salinas, the first 
director of the Consortium. 
This master plan is contracted by the Consortium, well firstly by us and then by the 
Consortium, from the architecture firm of José María Tomas to speed up the process, because 
it was they who had carried out the Balcón al Mar project. So of course they had everything 
in train and there was no time for any other option. There was no question of saying, ‘let’s 
see how the project pans out’, but rather ‘I need this in 15 days’. So the overriding aspect, as 
we’ve already pointed out, was the fact that it was a project already underway, you know, 
already under consideration. (Interview 21) 
Once the city was designated and the candidature project became the definitive one, the infrastructure 
works were contracted by direct hiring because there was no time to call for bids. Also other decisions 
- such as the constitution of a consortium or tax reductions for the participants in the competition– had 
to be made in a rush (see chapter 5). Thus, a sponsorship decree - which gave special fiscal privileges 
to organisers, sponsors and participants in the America’s Cup - was passed by first the conservative 
and then the socialist central government. For instance, donations to the Consortium or the 
participants in the America’s Cup had a tax deduction of between 25% and 35%, the owners of the 
boats and owners of the sailing teams would be exempt from social security taxes and, both 
Consortium and teams would have special tax deductions. The regional government, in turn, also 
granted fiscal exemptions  to people related to the sailing competition and their families. For instance, 
an exemption of 99.99% in the property tax was offered to those who bought property in the 
Valencian Community due to the sailing competition. All these privileges can be considered an actual 
transfer of public money to private hands, aggravated by the fact that, in 2009, the Consortium had 
accumulated losses of around 60 million euro. 
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The second main mechanism to take decision-making out of the citizens’ control has been the transfer 
of management to public-private organisms. The 1990s was the moment when, in Spain, many public 
administrations resorted to the creation of public corporations, which were considered to provide agile 
management. On the one hand the administrations were undergoing a process of modernisation and on 
the other hand substantial European funds needed to be managed rapidly. Therefore, the mix of public 
ownership and private management that public corporations offered was seen as the most convenient 
formula. 
Since then, also in Valencia, many public corporations have been created to manage mega-projects 
and events, but also to deal with urban planning and urban design at different scales – AUMSA, 
CEyD, CIEGSA, IVVSA, etc. For instance, the Valencian institute of Housing (IVVSA) is the 
regional public corporation responsible for social and affordable housing, and therefore managed the 
Sociopolis project. Actually, public private partnerships with IVVSA as the public partner were 
introduced in 2003 with the stated aim of solving the lack of subsidised housing. Most of these 
corporations are loss-making and have been used to increase the level of indebtedness of the regional 
government. They have also provided positions for the clientele network of the local and regional 
governments. This can be seen as a process of structural and spatial selectivity of the state. On the one 
hand, public corporations are used as a way of privileging certain groups of interest – those which are 
part of the urban regime – through their inclusion in the increasingly large number of semi-public 
bodies created, many times seemingly with that only purpose. On the other hand, the state reorganises 
itself – becomes ‘glocalised’ (Swyngedouw, 1997, 2005b; Brenner, 1999) in order to promote 
competitiveness by externalising its functions through privatisation, de-regulation and 
decentralisation. 
VACICO, which then changed name to CACSA, was created for the construction and management of 
the City of Sciences, to speed up processes and to skip bureaucratic procedures – for instance to have 
more freedom to hire staff, etc. CACSA is a corporation with public capital whose president is the 
regional minister of economy. It has an administration board of ten people. It is managed as a private 
company but its capital is public. Being a public corporation its obligations of transparency are less 
numerous and strict than the public administration’s. The information about CACSA’s accountability 
- expenses, profits and losses – is not in the public budget. The Sindicatura de Comptes – the regional 
public auditing body - is the organism which audits its accounts. The ex-director of the Calatrava 
office in Valencia explains the functioning very graphically: 
What you do is, you receive public money, pay it into cash and work from then on as a 
private firm: you manage it and come up with a more professional approach or you try to 
ensure a more professional money-management approach from this firm. That is the aim. 
(Interview 5) 
In this way, despite the continuous demands of the press and political opposition, the regional 
government has avoided giving information about CACSA’s contracts - for instance Calatrava’s fees - 
on the grounds that that information is ‘professional secret’ between the two parties and it is only for 
                                                                                                                                         CHAPTER 6 
145 
 
‘internal use’ of CACSA (Ferrandis, 12 December 2009). According to Gerardo Camps, regional 
minister of economy, ‘CACSA passes on this information only to the Sindicatura de la Comunitat 
Valenciana (the Public Audit Office for Valencia) and working auditors inspecting this company’s 
annual accounts’ (Ferrandis, 12 December 2009). 
The same has happened with academics, who have found very difficult to obtain information about 
mega-projects and events for research purposes. For instance, out of the IVIE economic impact report 
of the City of Sciences only a summary of the results has been made available to the public, or to 
researchers. According to an academic of the University of Valencia: 
I’ve been trying for five years to get the study. Now, it is presented in a press conference by 
the regional minister in charge, who says: “The profitability rate of the City of Sciences is 
9%”, and that’s it. This never appears anywhere and it’s impossible to pull it off. It’s done by 
colleagues of mine from upstairs, who keep it on their desktop. I’ve been trying to get it for 
eight or nine years but there’s a complete lack of transparency. (Interview 13) 
In turn, the different yearly reports of the public auditing body - Sindicatura de Comptes - have 
questioned CACSA’s contract awarding system and have even advised about a possible 
misappropriation of public funds. For instance, in 2006 the report pointed out the ‘scandalous amount 
of shoo-in contracting without abiding by any principle of publicity or even-handedness’ (García del 
Moral, 27 December 2006). 
Moreover, in 2001, with the excuse of a more efficient management and the fact that ‘legally and 
operationally it is easier to set up contractual relations’ (Olivares, 16 August 2001), CACSA was 
divided into four limited companies. The new formula is closer to having four unipersonal enterprises, 
where the directors do not have to respond before a governing body and a shareholders board, and 
their liability is only that invested or guaranteed to the company. Also, the quantity of information 
they must make public is further reduced. 
On the other hand, a new foundation was created for the management of the opera house; the 
Foundation of the Arts, which depends on the regional ministry of culture. As Senior lecturer of 
Economics at University of Valencia complains, the creation of foundations adds another step in 
management opacity: 
Then there’s another process, which is ‘foundationalisation’. Here there is another argument, 
i.e. the incorporation of private agents, but most of them are foundations, precisely those 
closest linked to culture. The inputs of private agents are minimal. This means that 90% of 
the budget goes to foundations, foundation of the City of Arts, CACSA, City of Arts and 
Sciences, 90% is publicly funded, likewise the foundation of the Luz de las Imágenes, the 
foundation of the Teatro de Sagunto… which are mainly the contributions of public boards, 
but these are part of a completely opaque circuit. Then there’s the transfer of money from the 
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government to the foundation, whereupon all trace is lost, you don’t know what they do with 
this money, why or when they spend it or who or what they spend it on …(Interview 13) 
Also, with the aim of promoting Valencia as a tourist place and a place to invest in occasion of the 
America’s Cup many obscure public companies such as VEPI, VCI and SGIEPCV were created, 
sometimes with an overlapping of functions. Therefore, although Valencia Turismo Convention 
Bureau was the municipal body for the tourism promotion of the city, a new foundation to promote 
Valencia’s tourism on occasion of the America’s Cup, VEPI (Valencia Estrategia, Promoción e 
Imagen) was created with 50% of its capital coming from the local government (through Valencia 
Turismo Convention Bureau) and the other 50% coming from the regional government (through 
SGIEPCVSA). In addition, a regional public corporation SGIEPCVSA (Sociedad Gestora para la 
Imagen Estratégica y Promocional de la Comunitat Valenciana) was created to promote the 
autonomous community in occasion of the America’s Cup. Finally, VCI (Valencian community 
Investment) was created in 2004 to attract investment on occasion of the America’s Cup. Such 
proliferation of bodies with the same functions – some of which with little activity - suggests that they 
were being used by both local and regional governments to provide rewards for the participants in the 
governing coalition, to create a clientele network which helped structure the existing urban regime 
and, to act as mediators between the government and private interests. 
Referring to VEPI, socialist party city councilor Botella complains 
Then, all the money that has been managed through this America’s Cup promotion firm is 
opaque. There’s no way of knowing and millions of euros have been set aside for 
management – we’re not talking two figures here but maybe three or four judging from the 
last accounts we’ve seen because the latest accounts have not yet been deposited. But the 
crucial factor here is that an instrumental company has been set up that is unaccountable to 
anyone from the opposition or the public at large who might like to know that is being done 
with public money. No account is rendered of the reports and it has been used for contracting 
companies or hiring personnel at will, even in the current crisis, for organising the event. So 
this is also how the event is managed, how public resources are handled through instrumental 
companies of a legal nature set up to shirk any accountability by the Sindicatura de Comptes 
or the opposition party. (E51a) 
Not surprisingly, with this premises, Valencia’s events  - F1, America’s Cup, visit of the Pope, etc. - 
have been linked to cases of corruption; particularly to the infamous Gürtel case, a political corruption 
scandal which consisted in the alleged illegal financing of the conservative party in exchange of the 
illicit awarding of contracts to several companies by different conservative regional governments. The 
company linked to the Gürtel corruption network in the Valencian Autonomous Community was 
Orange Market - an enterprise specialised in the organisation of events.   
With only five employees in the payroll, SGIEPCV needed to source out and hire companies 
specialised in the management of events and marketing and, thus, Orange Market was the beneficiary 
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of several contracts. Orange Market was hired also by the Consortium to organise opening ceremonies 
and events for the America’s Cup. Many times the contracts were divided into smaller contracts to 
avoid a call for bids.  
Therefore, mega-projects and events have been prone to corruption, not least because the opacity of 
public corporations and foundations allows for it. One of the interviewees (who wishes to remain 
anonymous) summarises it very well: 
Mega events or the major operations of the CACSA type are a staggering nest of corruption. 
Why is that? Firstly because parallel, uncontrollable companies are set up to circumvent red 
tape and speed up the management process. Here’s where the strange contracts start, the 
contracting of people that are not really necessary but money is coughed up because they are 
said to be vital. The rectifications, the price revisions, the ... everything’s OK, you’ve 
deviated 300 percent, everything’s fine. You really believe in all this deviation and there have 
already been so many complaints without anyone being caught with their hands in the till, a 
very large till. And isn’t it likely that there are many dipping into this till? And isn’t it equally 
likely that there is no end of connivance to bring friends and chronies into the firms because 
they are outside the pale of state contracting procedures? In the interests of urgency, because 
there is always urgency in these cases, then all the bureaucratic controls are blown wide 
open.  
Both exceptionality measures and privatisation of management - through the creation of semi-public 
foundations and public corporations - have resulted in a lack of transparency and a lack of democratic 
control which, many times have derived in corruption. In this way, urban mega projects and events 
have constituted patent conduits for the establishment and normalisation of new neoliberal 
technologies of power (Keil, 2002). 
The other process which has led to privatisation - not only of management but of public assets and 
even public space - has been the need to balance the cost overruns and the budgetary problems that a 
loss-making complex such as City of Sciences creates. For instance, the museum of oceanography is 
managed by the corporation ‘Parques Reunidos’ – owner, among others, of the zoo and the 
amusement park of Madrid – of which Bancaixa is a partner at 12.5% (Vázquez, 19 December 2002). 
According to Iribas (Interview 28), the regional government decided to give it to private management 
to minimise loses. More importantly, in 2002 a new regional property law was passed to allow the 
transfer of the property rights of the buildings of the City of Sciences from the regional government to 
CACSA without paying the tax of property transfer. The aim, according to the regional government 
was to ‘make better use of resources’ and introduce ‘more flexible managerial procedures’ in publicly 
owned property (El País, 16 October 2002). 
The struggle to maintain the expensive complex of the City of Sciences has pushed their managers to 
find new ways of funding, even at the expense of privatising part of what in the master plan was 
considered public open space. An example of this is the Umbracle, an open public space, half the 
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surface of which was rented to be exploited as an outdoors private club. In fact, according to 
CACSA’s business director (Interview 43), 25% of the City of Sciences’ revenue comes from renting 
its spaces for private events. The financial difficulties encountered in the management of public mega-
projects have provoked not only a process of privatisation but also the ‘naturalisation’ of such a 
process. Once indebtedness shows its face politicians are able to justify anything, even privatisation of 
public space, in order to find new financing. 
6.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the outcomes of Valencia’s urban policy based on mega-projects and 
events. Although the benefits of the urban policy in terms of physical change, perceived image and the 
population’s self-esteem are obvious to the eye, they do not correspond with the social and economic 
reality. The substantial expenditure in urban regeneration projects, often subjected to huge cost 
overruns has left the local and regional administrations highly indebted. The allegedly intended 
creation of wealth for all has instead resulted in a precarious regional labour market, under-financed 
social services - health, education and social protection - and a more unequal society. However, some 
sectors of the society – particularly the big construction companies and real estate agents –have been 
economically benefited by the urban policy. On the other hand, the mechanisms used to implement 
megaprojects and events – such as the application of exceptionality measures and the transfer of 
management to semi-private delivery bodies - have played an important role in a process leading 
towards more authoritative and privatised decision-making. 
Keeping in mind the social, economic and democratic implications and the real beneficiaries of an 
urban policy based on mega-projects and events in Valencia, the empirical findings regarding the 
reasons behind the formulation of such urban policy will be discussed in the next chapter. 
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7. SELF-ESTEEM AND THE NEW REGIONAL ESTATE: THE MOTIVES 
OF URBAN REGENERATION IN VALENCIA 
7.1 Introduction: Valencia’s entrepreneurialism 
Valencia’s strategic commitment to architectural icons and international events in the attempt to 
increase the city’s competitive advantages represents a weak form of competition identified by Harvey 
(1989), the attraction of tourism. As many local commentators have agreed, Valencia has gone for ‘the 
easy option’ (Interview 9). According to the Secretary-General of FECOVAL, 
We’re right at the rear of the R&D rankings. As yet the city has not been capable of attracting 
the intellectual elite, snobs, European bon vivant, even with a fantastic climate. We have not 
managed to become the European California or Florida neither with the elderly nor the 
young. We have not managed to pull this off even starting out with all the advantages, so 
we’ve lost too in this model. Which model do we have? In the end it will be a process of 
elimination, like shedding Russian dolls, not this, not this . . . and what will we end up with? 
What no one else wants, that’s for sure. (Interview 62) 
Also in the physical upgrading of the environment to increase its competitive edge Valencia has opted, 
as several interviewees have agreed (Interviews 13, 14 and 50), for an easy –if not inexpensive – 
choice, that is to build new heritage instead of restoring the existing. Indeed, it is easier to build from 
scratch than to manage the existing. 
Presented as urban regeneration projects to market the city and attract tourism - particularly cultural 
and upmarket tourism in opposition to the traditional sun and sand tourism – both the City of Sciences 
and the America’s Cup show enough contradictions to make us wonder about ulterior motives behind 
urban regeneration. To mention just a few of the contradictions, the City of Sciences is not designed 
thinking about the content or a scientific strategy. The opera palace is over-sized for the purpose of 
fomenting musical culture in the population and, such a big building as the Agora was designed and 
built with no specific use in mind. A common critique to the complex is that image has been given 
priority over content. The director of the science museum’s complaints seems to confirm it; 
I’m as big as La Villette and instead of one thousand people I’ve got two hundred, and 
instead of a budget... well, to give you an idea, my operational budget is less than fifteen 
percent of theirs and yet I’ve got the same number of visitors. (Interview 35) 
Perhaps those objectives were overlooked for the sake of a higher level objective, the attraction of 
tourism to the city and the economic impact it could have. However, no cost/benefit studies of the 
project have been elaborated and the economic impact study that exists was commissioned while City 
of Sciences was already being built (Interview 18). As the author of the study states, 
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Here is a project I’m asked to evaluate and I do so but they don’t tell me to assess it against 
another, no, this is different. I’ve had to do it a posteriori rather than a priori. In other words, 
there is no ranking of projects to choose from, funding the highest earning one, nothing of the 
sort. Here there is no ranking of projects, the City of arts and Sciences is paramount and I’m 
asked to weigh up its social profitability but not vis-à-vis other projects. (Interview 18) 
On the other hand, the City of Sciences was not linked to any sectorial policy, it depended on the 
Regional Ministry of Economy and Treasure and not, for instance, on the Regional Ministry of 
Tourism.  
The America’s Cup project – initiated by tourism expert and director of the local body for tourist 
promotion José Salinas – came out from the very centre of the city’s tourism policy. The focus of the 
strategy was very clearly on upmarket tourism while a key tourist asset of the city, such as the 
beaches, which were the reason of 78% of the foreign tourism flows (El País, 30 May 2004), was 
being overlooked. For many, the America’s Cup has been a lost opportunity for a well-thought-out 
urban transformation of the maritime area. It seems, as shown by the management of the post-event, 
that the event in itself was more important than using it to generate an urban transformation.  
Sociopolis’ objectives were allegedly closer to objectives of social reproduction. However, as already 
discussed, neither the social nor sustainability justifications of Sociopolis hold up in that location. The 
project –although modest in comparison to the City of Sciences and America’s Cup – had also 
internationalisation aspirations linked to the use of global architecture and prestigious architects as a 
marketing tool. Tourism - beyond tourism of architects visiting the work of the stars of the profession 
publicised in architectural journals- was not an objective of Sociopolis but similarly to the City of 
Sciences and America’s Cup it is closely related to the construction and real estate sectors. 
An urban policy based on mega-projects and events is a policy of times of growth when there is no 
strict order of expenditure priorities for it seems there is budget for everything (Interviews 13 and 14). 
Definitely, the very costly City of Sciences ‘is a project of an era of economic boom’ (Interview 5). 
However, as late as 2009 and despite the economic crisis, the regional government insisted on the 
virtues of a policy based on mega-projects and events. Francisco Camps, the regional president, 
affirmed referring the hosting of mega-events ‘this is one of our ways to employment and prosperity’ 
(Alberola and Biot, 5 March 2009). 
In short, all these facts show that Valencia’s urban policy is due to more than a mere entrepreneurially 
devised economic strategy. Therefore, the conceptualisation of Valencia as an entrepreneurial city to 
explain the motives behind the urban policy adopted needs to be problematised, as McNeill (1998, 
1999) pointed out for the case of Barcelona too. 
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7.2 Groups of interest 
The interests of different groups meet in the development of flagship projects, and therefore, their 
analysis offers a first approach to the motives behind urban regeneration. Although different groups 
may have conflicting accumulation strategies, if one of those strategies achieves general acceptance 
from powerful elements of society it becomes hegemonic (Jones, 1997; Collinge, 1999; MacLeod and 
Goodwin, 1999). The analysis of the interests that have been privileged provides information about 
the ruling coalition or hegemonic bloc. The main groups of interest benefited by Valencia’s emphasis 
on mega-projects and events have been construction companies, developers, elected politicians and 
architects. They have been able to exercise political influence and, their interests have been privileged 
and reflected in the urban policy. 
The group which, in economic terms, benefits more directly from the mega-projects is the 
construction companies. Only the cost of the City of Sciences represents more than 1,200 million 
euros, a big cut of which corresponds to construction works. At the time when the first project for the 
City of Sciences the communications tower was the most important construction project in the city, 
apart from infrastructural works in the underground system and the port (Interview 29). The socialist 
regional government awarded the construction contracts trying to distribute them equally among all 
the important companies (Interview 12) and, when the new government interrupted the works, all the 
companies pulled together to pressurise the government to go on with the project. Their preference of 
doing the works rather than receiving the 20% compensation, resulted wise in the long term for the 
over costs of the City of Sciences have been gigantic (see chapter 6).  
On the other hand, outstanding architectural mega-projects, such as Calatrava’s, are considered to 
increase considerably the prestige of a construction company (Interviews 5, 29 and 41). In the words 
of architect Carmona, who worked in the city of Sciences project for both Calatrava and a 
construction company,  
 [Construction companies] diversify their business activity, they don’t only make roads and 
junctions, you know. And then they can also bid for other works of Santiago, which always 
end up running over budget but the construction company doesn’t foot the bill, right? We do, 
the general public, because the politicians succumb to blackmail and ‘cough up’ in the end 
with our money. So the construction company wins out, never loses any money with a work 
of Santiago, it might happen sometimes but this is certainly not the rule. [...] also it’s a 
fantastic shop window for the construction company, isn’t it? To be able to brag of this 
construction in all their books, their website and records gives them loads of kudos, doesn’t 
it? No end of clout among construction companies. (Interview 41) 
However, although architects and construction companies benefit from mega-projects, the architect’s 
and the construction companies’ interests do not coincide completely. As Carmona explains, 
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Santiago wants the most perfect construction, doesn’t he? What the construction company 
wants is to make as much money as possible because that’s its raison d’être as a company. 
Indeed you might think that any construction company wants to do the work well and they do 
but they’re even keener to make money, they want to earn even more. So if at any given 
moment they can earn a bit more by skimping here and there they do so. […] So this small 
clash of objectives is always on the cards. Santiago couldn’t care less and he’s quite right; he 
couldn’t give a damn about how much the construction company earns, it’s not his problem. 
His concern is to carry out the project as he wants, in the best way possible as an architect. 
(Interview 41) 
Also the infrastructure works for the America’s Cup represented a big flow of public money which 
increased the big construction companies’ business volume. Again, almost all the construction 
companies at local and national levels were involved in the America’s Cup works (Interview 47). 
Actually, in 2005, Eloy Durá, president of the Valencian Federation of construction (Fevec) after 
complaining about the central government’s insufficient investment in the Valencian Community and 
lamenting the end of the European structural funds in 2006, affirmed that ‘the only thing that might 
bail us out a bit is the investments in the America’s Cup’ (Vázquez, 10 February 2005). Therefore, in 
the words of Eduardo Beut, Secretary-General of FECOVAL (Federation of Companies of the 
Valencian Community which are Building Contractors for the Public Administration),  
 […] if your approach was one of public works, of construction […] I would have told you 
quite the opposite. We’re delighted because we’ve won a tremendous amount of public 
construction, flagship buildings. […] Public works is delighted with everything done in the 
city and if we’re told to take out this bridge and communicate with the aquarium 
underground, we’ll do it without batting an eyelid. Anything to do with public works seems 
fantastic, that’s the official version of this federation. (Interview 62) 
Linked to the construction of mega-projects, the other sectors in expansion have been the development 
and real estate sectors.  The Integral Development plan of Grao – next to America’s Cup’s harbour- 
and the Integral Development plan of Avenida Francia –next to City of Sciences –are clear examples, 
and interviewees from both a censuring and a non-critical perspective agree (Interviews 1, 2, 4, 7 and 
19). Not for nothing, as discussed in Chapter five, the regional government had come to the agreement 
with the developers that the development plan of avenida Francia would be backed by a singular 
element, i.e. the City of Sciences, in the same way that the council would provide a Convention 
Centre by Norman Foster in the Development Plan Ademuz (West of the city). Figure 7.1 shows some 
of the residential buildings developed right in front of the City of Sciences. 
There has been some scepticism about the effect of the City of Sciences in the real estate value 
increase in the area, as Benjamín Muñoz, Secretary-General of the Federation of Property Developers 
and Urbanising Agents on the Valencian Community (FPIAUCV) explains: 
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Now, I’m convinced that the existence of the City of Arts and Sciences hasn’t impinged in 
any way whatsoever on prices and construction activity roundabout. Construction work 
would have been the same anyway, in an upmarket zone of Valencia, a zone well defined by 
the Avenida de Baleares, the Avenida al Mar, Avenida whatsitsname, Avenida de Francia, 
with sufficient heights, because the building work in a new Valencia site, the first Integral 
Development Plan to join up Valencia with the sea, with free space and the river running 
right through the middle, would have filled up anyway with a football pitch, a municipal 
swimming pool or a millennium wheel like the one in London. (Interview 58) 
However, be it City of Sciences or a more modest project, without the support and investment of the 
public administrations in the urban regeneration of a heavily polluted industrial brownfield on the old 
river bed the Development Plan Avenida de Francia would have not been possible. 
Figure 7.1 Residential buildings next to the City of Sciences 
 
Source: Author  
The Integral development Plan of Grao, directly linked to the America’s Cup (see chapter five), 
provided a lucrative speculative business for CLH (Compañía Logística de Hidrocarburos), owner of 
land in the area. CLH moved their premises, where they had fuel tanks, and demolished the old ones 
at a total cost of 70 million euro, to later – in November 2006 - sell the land at auction to a real estate 
group formed by Bancaixa, Lubasa and Sacyr Vallehermoso for 320 million euro (El País, 9 
November 2006; Interview 9). The expectations of the buyers were that, after the land was urbanised, 
the price of the land would increase from 3,200 euro per square metre to at least 7,000 euro per square 
metre (El País, 9 November 2006) but the burst of the real estate bubble in 2007 ruined their plans. 
The virtual model in figure 7.2 shows the substantial volume of new development foreseen by the 
plan. 
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Figure 7.2 Virtual model of the Integral development Plan of Grao 
 
Source: Tomás Llavador arquitectos+ingenieros (www.tomasllavador.com) 
On the other hand, the fact that the construction of hotels started before Valencia’s designation to host 
the America’s Cup (although it intensified after it) can only be fully explained considering the real 
estate interests behind it. Sociopolis, in turn, directly represented for developers the colonisation of 
further formerly protected agricultural land.  
Therefore, mega projects and events, contend critical groups and architects (García del Moral, 7 
September; Interviews 2, 9, 15 and 19), have been an excuse for more development and real estate 
accumulation, which have increased the already considerable number of existing empty dwellings, 
while development companies have increased in size and economic power. 
State actors - beyond more general political and strategic objectives- also have their own specific 
distinct interests, which can be summarised in to main objectives, on the one hand the financial 
maintenance of the public administrations and on the other hand their own electoral self-reproduction. 
Due to the unresolved problem of the funding of the local authorities, urban development taxes have 
been used to alleviate the council’s economic situation. The figure of the urbanising agent introduced 
by the regional urbanism law of 1994 (LRAU) has also been used by several institutions of the 
regional government such as the Valencian Institute of Housing – responsible for the implementation 
of the Sociopolis master plan –  to get hold of land for development and for their social and subsidised 
housing schemes. 
But, more importantly, mega-projects designed by star architects and events provide politicians with a 
very effective tool for self-promotion and political legitimation. They can be at the same time a visible 
proof of the governors’ work – things are being done - and an element of glamour. For a political 
leader, being identified with a mega project is a way of improving his or her personal political image. 
Not surprisingly, all the Valencian regional presidents have strived to leave their stamp in the City of 
Sciences. In a populist politics of the photograph, inaugurating prestigious projects such as the City of 
Sciences and events such as the America’s Cup is valuable media publicity, even more prized when 
supported by the presence of star architects - many times more media celebrated than elected 
politicians. This explains too why Jean Nouvel was so well received by the local authorities. 
Santiago Calatrava has used the Valencian governors’ interest in linking their names to his. Also, 
Vicente Guallart is fully aware of the added value that prestigious architects can provide. In his own 
words, 
So for them [politicians] this is like a present really, right? To have... I’ve worked my socks 
off to bring architects here charging the same rates as a local architect. (Interview 60) 
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And in fact, as other of the architects involved in the project explains, elected politicians have made 
the most of this aspect of Sociopolis since celebrity architects provided an added value to the project 
(Interview 25). In figure 7.3 Guallart explains the project to local and regional politicians. 
Figure 7.3 Guallart explaining the Sociopolis project to Camps, Barberá and Blasco (left to right) 
 
Source: EFE 
Megaprojects and events are so visible and have proved so popular in Valencia that even the 
politicians in the opposition have realised that it is electorally more profitable to support them than not 
(Interviews 2 and 44). As the Director of the editorial office of El Mundo in Valencia explains, 
At one point there was some political opposition from the socialist party, which I believe was 
mistaken and was in fact rectified later, an opposition to the mega events, with some of the 
media inevitably tagging along in their editorial line. Like the socialist party I reckon that 
most cottoned on in the end to the fact that this was not an electoral ploy because the 
conservative party is going from strength to strength while the socialist party is losing 
election after election and has hit rock bottom. The new leader of this socialist party, Jorge 
Alarte, has now changed tack and supports mega events. (Interview 44) 
Architects, or more accurately a tight group of prestigious architects, are another powerful interest 
group in relationship to urban mega-projects. Their interests are not only economic – increase 
business volume and maintain their practices - but career-wise (even personal) as well. Indeed, iconic 
projects provide them with the opportunity to raise their professional profile. Both in the City of 
Sciences and the America’s Cup or Sociopolis we find architects – higher or lower in the global 
prestige ranking – trying to realize their creative ideas, further their careers and satisfy their egos.  
Moreover, (star) architects generally prefer to work for the public sector because the control of the 
budget is less strict and they are granted with more freedom to experiment. As architect Rodriguez 
explains,  
For architects of this type there is very little private capital; it’s mostly public capital. Let’s 
just say that most of the star architects’ projects are publicly funded. (Interview 5) 
For Santiago Calatrava, as he affirmed in 1993, the City of Sciences represented his project of ‘greater 
urban planning significance’ ever (Ferrandis, 1 June 1993). Whether he was trying to please the 
Valencian people or not, his closest collaborators in the project (Interviews 5 and 12) have agreed that 
the City of Sciences has been a good showroom to get more work, ‘a fine worldwide calling card for 
Santiago’  (Interview 5). 
In Valencia, Calatrava in particular has built a considerable body of work. According to Javier 
Quesadas, Director General for Economy of the Regional Government (1995-98) (Interview 11), that 
is so because the architect ‘is very ambitious, has 50 projects on the go and would like to carry them 
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all out and has to defend himself a bit. […] Any right-minded architect wants to build everything he or 
she has in his or her head and turn them into viable business plans’. (Interview 11) Thus, working for 
the public sector has indeed proved favourable and, Calatrava’s prestige has allowed him to be hired 
by the public sector. As the director of Calatrava’s office in Valencia has stated 
Now let’s get this straight, private entrepreneurs look out for their own money and politicians 
for public money. Or that’s how I see it, so the private entrepreneur is keen above all to have 
clear targets, hone prices; they keep a closer control of the economic side and contract you 
with a specific idea in mind. It’s like a single-family dwelling; they have to have 3 bedrooms 
and 2 bathrooms because that’s what they want. The politician tells you I want a 20,000-
metre square container to make a museum and then lets Santiago do whatever he wants. 
(Interview 12) 
The America’s Cup also brought opportunities in the city for members of the select group of 
internationally renowned architects other than ubiquitous Calatrava. David Chipperfield designed the 
architectural icon of the sailing competition, the building Veles e Vents. The international architectural 
competitions to design the marina and the master plan of the inner harbour area attracted the interest 
of many star architects from over the world, such as, to mention a few, Norman Foster, Ieoh Ming Pei, 
Meinhard von Gerkan and Volkwin Marg, Alejandro Zaera, Rem Koolhaas or SOM.  
But, as discussed in Chapter five, the most publicised intervention was that of French star architect 
Jean Nouvel, who, by arriving in 2004 by the hand of a local real estate agent Ignacio Jiménez de 
Laiglesia to present the project Valencia Litoral had made the mayor aware of the interest of la crème 
de la crème of the architectural profession in the area. Nouvel’s cicerone and friend Jiménez de 
Laiglesia explains the architect’s enthusiasm about the project; 
Jean did it because it gave him a buzz, because he still has an artist’s heart, he is not moved 
by... OK, if with time this spawns further work for him, well not for him exactly but for a 
factory with over 100 architects on the payroll, all well and good, obviously. But we soon 
came to an agreement, I told him I’d pay for all travelling costs, god knows how many hotels 
and comings and goings and collaborators and I’ll make sure it’s all carried through 
successfully and you take on responsibility for your own study and Bob’s your uncle. Then 
he soon proved to be, well, a person who is not moved by selfish motives but still believes in 
his vocation and is keen to take on projects that make some sense for him. We got on like a 
house on fire . . . it was a time of permanent intellectual ecstasy because we never ceased to 
come up with new ideas, modifying and debating them, mooting things, revamping 
everything, and all this was great fun and very rewarding because the result was completely 
satisfying and the grassroots reception was tremendous. (Interview 20) 
In fact, Nouvel was one of the winners - ex-aequo with GMP - of the competition which was 
subsequently organised by the Consortium Valencia 2007 to design part of the area covered by 
Valencia Litoral. However, when local architect Tomás was asked to combine the proposals of both 
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winners in a definitive master plan, Nouvel’s professional prestige (or personal pride maybe) proved 
more important for him so he resigned and refused to sign a project which was not his original 
(Interview 20). 
Sociopolis is another example of how a group of architects, led by Vicent Guallart, managed to 
achieve the commission of a project they had been working on their own initiative. One of the 
participants in the project, Lourdes García Sogo, (Interview 25) claims the advantage of this 
procedure; 
Here we worked backwards, i.e., we got together and then sounded each other out. This was 
crucial and very interesting, architects from all over the world continually meeting up here 
and there. They were also here in Valencia twice, two weekends, we talked it all over and 
there was an American, a Chinese and god knows what else. All this was fine and no one 
really planned any of it, we organised ourselves. From there we managed to get them to 
continue hiring us because without money you can’t do anything and it would never have had 
the impact it had, but it wasn’t the other way around, in other words it wasn’t a question of a 
politician deciding to reintegrate the market-garden land and holding a tender to find out how 
best to do so; that would have been a disaster because then each architect would have gone 
his or her own way with all sorts of overlapping and redundancy. I reckon that this is the 
most important lesson to be learnt from the Sociopolis, the way of organising the architects, 
letting them and the town planners organise themselves and then we to go to the university, 
the politicians and say, ‘listen, if you’re interested in this project we’re prepared to carry it 
out’. Then they’re much likelier to take it on. (Interview 25) 
But in this case, the interest of the architects is again not only economic. As García Sogo continues to 
explain, for her the project has not been profitable economically but it has been profitable 
intellectually (Interview 25). Here, the ‘investment’ consists on being able to realize one’s creative 
and experimental ideas as well as raising one’s profile as an architect from an intellectual viewpoint. 
Also Vicent Guallart - main promoter of the project - emphasises the relevance of the project for him 
as an architect, which meant that he was granted the opportunity to develop one of his architectural 
ideas (Interview 60). Indeed, encouraged by the fact that they are working for the public sector the 
architects want to take the chance to stand out (Interview 56).  
However and although the interests of several groups converge in Valencia’s urban policy, all the 
mega-projects and events have been paid for with public money (Interview 4, Interview 24, Interview 
38, Interview 40) for, in the words of an ex-candidate to the Presidency of the Regional Government 
of Valencia, ‘private initiative jumps on the bandwagon only when the business is already up and 
running’ (Interview 4). In this way the risks have been supported by the public sector and, therefore, 
by the citizens. Local commentators (Interviews 7 and 38) have portrayed the Valencian business and 
entrepreneurial sector as weak and highly dependent on public investment. 
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Regarding iconic architecture, all the projects by internationally prestigious architects in Valencia 
have been public projects. As the Secretary-General of FPIAUCV complains; 
But great architects here have been used – how can I put it? – only for government initiatives 
either at national, regional or local level. The great architects, well Calatrava has done this, 
Foster has made a palace, Chipperfield has built Veles e Vents but here Valencia’s middle 
class or private promotion has been very timid. No Valencian promoter, even during the 
recent boom years, has said, “well look, my building I’m going to put up in Plaza de América 
will be done by so and so”. No, they’ve just kept on working with their longstanding 
architects, taking no risks. (Interview 58) 
Even when prompted by the government, for instance for the project of the Calatrava towers in the 
City of Sciences, the private sector have been cautious about getting involved in risky projects. 
Certainly, projects such as City of Sciences - with architects such as Calatrava - are only possible in 
times of economic boom and when they are paid for with public money – since, in that case, 
budgetary control is not as strict as when the investment is private. 
Moreover, although many times the projects initially came from a private initiative - Sociopolis, 
Valencia Litoral ore even the America’s Cup – there was the need for state support in order for the 
projects to come to term. Certainly, the state has the funding, institutional and the organisational 
capacity, but also the necessary legitimacy. 
Financially, the fact that the main Valencian building societies (Bancaixa and CAM) are semi-public 
and dependant on the political power has meant that they have invested in projects which by strictly 
profitability and financial risk criteria they would not have invested in (Interviews 19, 30, 14 and 28). 
In fact, their bankruptcy in 2012 was mainly caused by having had to back up political investment 
decisions in mega-projects (for instance the City of Sciences but also Terra Mítica and others) made 
by the regional government (Interviews 14 and 28). In the words of city councilor Gonzalez, 
Bancaixa, regrettably, jumps to the orders of the powers that be. It is not an autonomous bank 
acting on its own profit motive. These savings banks are organisations of a social character; 
rather than seeking economic or social profitability they act to political dictates. So if 
Bancaixa receives an instruction from Calle Caballeros, the street where the regional 
president is headquartered, telling it to buy such and such or support the Integral 
development plan of Grao, well of course it does so and all the others fall into line. 
(Interview 19) 
In the case of the infrastructure for the America’s Cup the council and regional government needed 
the financial capacity of the central government. The works for America’s Cup were funded with an 
ICO’s bank guarantee. 
Therefore, investment capacity is crucial, but also organizational capacity and legitimacy. For 
instance, although the idea of bringing the America’s Cup to Valencia was of the president of the 
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sailing club, a private entity, the candidature project was taken over by the city council, the legitimate 
representative of the city. Moreover, although the council was the initial driving force of the 
America’s Cup candidature, the infrastructure of the port belongs to the Ministry of Public Works and 
therefore central government needed to be involved too. 
On the other hand, many competencies of the central government – such as security, radio-electric 
space, air navigation, maritime navigation, etc. – are involved in an event of this type. 
Sociopolis, as discussed, was possible thanks to the complicity of regional minister Blasco and his 
support. The state – at its various scales – not only provided funding but also organisational capacity 
through a public corporation, the Valencian Institute of Housing (IVVSA). Unlike other residential 
development projects of the Valencian Housing Institute, Sociopolis, being their flagship project, is 
not managed by a public private partnership but is completely public, although the resulting plots of 
land were left to the private initiative which had to follow the design of the architects assigned by 
IVVSA (Velert, 3 May 2009; Interviews 48 and 50). This has been considered the reason why it is 
also the only project which, despite despite encountering many difficulties, was still going on after the 
start of the economic recession (Interview 50). 
Valencia Litoral, although widely publicised and backed-up by the cream of the architectural 
profession needed the support of the public sector, as admitted by Jiménez de Laiglesia (Interview 
20), father of the initiative; 
Anyway, these types of major projects, which are those that motivate me personally, move 
me even to pie-in-the-sky proposals like this one. Because unfortunately in the end you need 
the public input, that is as debate, because each person can set things up his or her own way 
and they see you as quixotic, giving you many slaps on the back and congratulations but even 
so . . . If you don’t have the backing of the powers that be . . . and this is very difficult if 
you’re really an independent spirit in your judgments and proposals. (Interview 20) 
Thus, it was the mayor who took over and converted the proposal into a competition for the 
development of the area, after adapting it to her political interests. The competition was duly won by 
Jean Nouvel’s team, although ex-aequo with German team GMP. A third party, José María Tomás -
Barberás’s ‘house architect’ - was commissioned to combine both winning projects, infuriating star 
architect Nouvel. 
7.3 Strategy and the state: the construction of the Valencian regional state 
Mega-projects and particularly mega-events have ranked high in the Spanish political agenda, not only 
in Valencia but elsewhere. As vice-president de la Vega pointed out 
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‘If we already put on a good show in the Barcelona Olympic Games and the Seville Expo in 
1992, we’re going to do even better in 2007’, ‘Spain is a country with all the specialist skills 
for organising events of this nature’. (Ferrandis, 12 December 2004) 
The central government – both when in socialist or conservative hands - has supported the celebration 
of mega-events in different Spanish cities, from Barcelona Olympics and Sevilla Expo in 1992 to the 
more recent Expo 2008 in Zaragoza, for instance. As the central state has ‘glocalised’ (Swyngedouw, 
1997), through – among other processes - restructuring downwards to the regional and urban scale, it 
has also privileged competitive strategies –such as inter-city competition for mega events – which are 
more compatible with those scales. This can be interpreted – resorting to the concept of spatial 
selectivity (Jones, 1997) – as a shift of political emphasis to individual cities’ capacity to successfully 
compete and promote themselves (Jones and Ward, 2002). 
Thus, despite the difficulties of coordinating different levels of government and their policies, big 
events have always created consensus. Architect Escribano explains it very clearly referring to the 
America’s Cup, 
Well I believe that precisely because they are events that bring together hefty investments 
and concerted effort by government authorities. At the end of the day the key to success in 
these large-scale projects is blending the wills of the central, regional and local government, 
because in a country like Spain, with a quasi federal government since 78, there is always a 
risk of overlapping and conflicting competencies at these three levels and even at the residual 
provincial level. So what does the America’s Cup achieve? What does an Olympic Games 
achieve? The joining of wills because they know that political loggerheads have to be set 
aside when the America’s Cup is at stake because we can’t afford to become a laughing stock 
and no one would glean any political kudos from a badly organised Olympics or America’s 
Cup. Everyone puts their shoulder to the wheel and buries the axe, therefore, with only minor 
skirmishes in the worst case. They know how crucial it is to do well and this concentrates 
minds and wills wonderfully and above all raises investments that would otherwise be 
unavailable. In other words Valencia is going to receive 300 million euros for reform of the 
inner dock and also in a very short period of time. (Interview 42) 
Hence, the America’s Cup was presented, in the words of president Zapatero as, ‘a project of all the 
Spanish people’ (Vázquez, 6 February 2005), ‘a project of state’ for which the president offered ‘as 
many investment efforts as be necessary’ (Vázquez, 15 July 2005). A project for which the three tiers 
of government would work together, as representatives of the three administrations insisted in public 
declarations (Ferrandis, 27 May 2004, El País, 9 June 2004). Consensus was reached not only among 
the different tiers of government but also with the political opposition, which unanimously gave their 
support to the event. 
However, for the Valencian regional government urban mega projects and the hosting of events has 
become the core of their policy. It was started by the first socialist regional government with the 
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project of the City of Sciences and, it achieved its hayday with the subsequent conservative 
governments, while also politically supported by Rita Barberá, mayor of Valencia since 1991. 
Certainly, when trying to understand the emphasis placed on global architectural icons in Spain, and 
particularly in Valencia, it must be stressed the importance of the regional states, each one with a 
distinct political project and economic strategy.  
The so-called self government after the Valencian Autonomous Community was created in 1982 was 
the framework where a new cultural and identity context could be generated. The discourse of Joan 
Lerma, the first elected regional president (1982-1995), revolved around the ‘modernisation’ of 
Valencian society and the creation of a new administration, both intimately related to democratisation 
too. Therefore, the era of the first democratically elected regional president was that of the 
modernisation of the institutions and the start of the creation of the Valencian public sector. On the 
other hand, also Valencia needed to consolidate its role as capital city of the autonomous community. 
According to Escribano (Interview 42) with the City of Sciences Valencia wanted to become not just 
the economic and demographic capital city but the moral capital also. In the words of the Director of 
the 1989 Urban Plan of Valencia; 
Bear in mind here that Valencia needed to shore up its status as capital city. It is 
unquestionably the historical capital, clearly outweighing Alicante in terms of economic clout 
and population. Against the 300,000 inhabitants of Alicante or the 200,000 poorly counted of 
Castellón, Valencia’s demographic weight is clear. But the moral weight needed underlining 
because Alicante harboured misgivings about the regional self government and Castellón also 
had its qualms with all the controversy about language and all the rest, seen as an artifice of 
the city of Valencia. (Interview 42) 
The project of the City of Sciences has to be understood in that context of modernisation but also as 
the symbol of the ‘self-government’. It is the architecture of a new power, which is the regional 
government. 
The second president – Eduardo Zaplana (1995-2002) – under the epithet ‘Valencian power’ took the 
mission of creating a – not only politically but economically - powerful regional space (taking 
Catalonia as a model) with its own Valencian building societies, utility companies and construction 
companies. 
From 1995, when the local and regional governments were conservative, both tiers of governments 
shared ‘a vision for Valencia’ (Interview 27) and ‘joined their efforts in the same direction’ (Interview 
19). This joining of efforts was especially patent after the regional government recovered the project 
of the City of Sciences initially put in doubt. The mayor and city council (also in conservative hands) 
had included the project in the strategic plan of the city and listed it as one of Valencia’s assets to bid 
for being European cultural Capital but, due to party politics, they had to support the regional 
government decision of stopping the project. 
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The two icons of the Zaplana government were the theme park Terra Mítica and the modified project 
for the City of Sciences, including the opera palace and the oceanography museum (Interviews 44 and 
55). The City of Sciences, Lerma’s emblematic project, was therefore turned into an icon of Zaplana’s 
political project of structuring the Valencian Community and making it globally known.  
Thus, in a first period, with Eduardo Zaplana (1995-2002) and Jose Luis Olivas (2002-2003) in the 
presidency of the regional government, regional politics were directed to turn Valencia into a ‘strong 
region’, influential in Spain but also in Europe. Moreover, with the conservatives in office the 
discourse acquired a more populist vein and turned to issues of self-esteem and identity. The 
Secretary-General of FECOVAL explains; 
In this Autonomous Community there was a change that we should not forget to take into 
account: a change in self-esteem. Zaplana […] managed to rebuild the Valencians’ self 
esteem. Suddenly we were no longer the people who crept shame-facedly into Madrid on 
tiptoe; no longer did we feel unimportant, incompetent, the people who only did things 
disastrously and late. This was suddenly a thing of the past; we did things well, on time and 
to brilliant effect. (Interview 62) 
After Olivas’ short term in office (2002-2003), the discourse of the fourth regional president, 
Francisco Camps (2003-2011), insisted on the importance of the Valencian Community territorial 
project and, for instance, claimed that the America’s Cup could be useful to structure the territory 
through the new infrastructures. The event was considered important for the image of the region as 
well as the city. 
Between 2003 and 2011, not only the regional and local governments were of the same political party 
but Rita Barberá - the mayor - and Francisco Camps –the regional president – had a perfect political 
and personal understanding (Interviews 5 and 54). During this period, big events started to 
complement megaprojects. Thus, to regional mega-projects such as the Agora, Calatrava’s 
skyscrapers, the City of Languages, the city of Light, Mundo Ilusión and so on, there was the addition 
of events such as the America’s Cup, the Volvo Ocean Race, the Formula 1 competition, the European 
Athletics championship, etc.  
In fact Camps’ presidency was characterised by the emphasis on megaprojects and events and Rita’s 
mayoral election campaign of 2007 was based on two lines; a city focused on the citizens’ quality of 
life and the commitment to attract mega-events, among which she highlighted the F1, America’s Cup 
and possibly the final of the Champion’s league (Velert, 13 February 2007). This was so much so that 
Bernie Ecclestone, owner of the F1 competition rights, conditioned the celebration of the race in 
Valencia to the electoral victory of Francisco Camps in the regional government and Rita Barberá in 
the city council (Ferrandis, 11 May 2007) (see figure 7.4). 
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Figure 7.4 Mayor and regional president presenting Valencia F1 circuit with Ecclestone 
 
Source: As, 12 May 2007 
The hosting of events became the core of the regional government’s political project (Interviews 4, 40 
and 60), almost the only policy; ‘an obsession’ (Interview 36). A journalist of El País in Valencia’s 
editorial office expresses it very graphically, 
The concept would be that of a totem. I really like the comparison because mega events and 
projects are a sort of totem on which we Valencians staked our all. Industry and our 
traditional sectors might go to the wall; there might be no end of problems with the education 
system and the environment but this totem becomes an overriding concern. (Interview 38) 
In 2004, when the socialist party won the general elections, they found in Rodriguez Zapatero the 
perfect outside enemy of the Valencians and their ‘prosperity’ - represented by the urban policy based 
on mega-projects and events.  The central government was at pains to ensure their support to the 
America’s Cup. 
Therefore, both local and regional governments have focused their political project on the emphasis 
on mega-projects and events. As commented by American architectural critic Terence Riley 
(2005:17), the big investments in architecture in Spain have been by the regional governments. Since 
the onset of the autonomy in 1982, the regional government has been the state tier which has invested 
more substantially in Valencia’s urban mega-projects. The council has always played an important 
political role but it is the regional government who has paid for important projects not least because of 
its bigger economic capacity.  
Indeed, an investment of the magnitude of the City of Sciences would have not been possible without 
the regional government for the council was financially too weak. As the Regional Minister of 
Industry, Commerce and Tourism (1987-93) recalls; 
The city council is penniless, the river bed still has to be made; something needs to be done 
with the river. There is no money for doing anything significant with the river. So what do 
we do with the river? We chop it up for a piecemeal approach. Then Bofill makes a garden 
part, we make a music auditorium paid for by god knows who, we do a Gulliver, which was 
an invention of mine. [It’s small things] but all these piecemeal solutions taken together are 
solving the problem of the river bed. A Mediterranean woodland made by the Regional 
Culture Ministry, up there hard by the zoo, OK. This breaks it all down into sections and hey 
presto the problem of the river is solved. But there was one last section. The council wonders: 
What can I do here? Here’s where the regional government comes in and says: We’re going 
to invest in a City of Sciences and god knows what else. Fine. They build it and that’s that. 
(Interview 30) 
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The regional government, through the development of Sociopolis, also benefited the local authority by 
providing affordable housing within the city territory. 
However, Rita Barberá’s – mayor of Valencia since 1991 – mayoral politics have played an important 
role in the implementation of the urban policy, if not from a financial, from a discursive point of view. 
According to Camps, when he was a city councilor before being regional president, 
The city council has a limited budget but a lot of ideas and is more aware than anyone else of 
what the city lacks. It should be a party to all important decisions affecting the city and in 
fact it is. But it cannot single-handedly take on the large-scale city projects. (Olivares, 21 
January 1996) 
The city council is financially weak but, from the moment mayor Barberá was economically backed 
up by a regional government of the same political party, she was able to fully pursue her political 
project. Projects such as the City of Sciences and the location of Sociopolis in Valencia (Interview 60) 
had the blessing of the council but, the focus of Barberá’s mayoral politics and populist discourse was 
the America’s Cup. In order to capitalise on the America’s Cup the mayor’s manoeuvres have been 
manifold, from presenting projects for Valencia on occasion of the America’s Cup and repeatedly 
pressurising the central government to invest in them to arranging meetings – outside the framework 
of the Consortium – with the main central state actors about the America’s Cup project. 
The construction of the Valencian regional state – in itself a hegemonic project which gave direction 
to the activities of the regional government - had also several political and institutional implications. 
First, as already mentioned, the creation of a new government meant the creation of a capital city as 
well, and Valencia - its historical main city – acquired renovated strength. The City of Sciences was a 
project of the regional government which contributed to reinforce Valencia’s nature as capital city. In 
the words of the Director of the 1989 Urban Plan of Valencia; 
The regional government footed the whole bill; it was the regional government’s baby and 
more in the interests of the capital than the city. It should not be forgotten here that Valencia 
needed to shore up its role as capital. It is unquestionably the historical capital, clearly 
outweighing Alicante in terms of economic clout and population. Against the 300,000 
inhabitants of Alicante or the 200,000 poorly counted of Castellón, Valencia’s demographic 
weight is clear. But the moral weight needed underlining because Alicante harboured 
misgivings about the regional self government and Castellón also had its qualms with all the 
controversy about language and all the rest, seen as an artifice of the city of Valencia. So 
there was a need to create a city with a powerful image to strengthen its capital status. 
(Interview 42) 
Indeed, the fact that Valencia is not only the most populated city in the Valencian Community but its 
capital city too, has conferred it added political, economic, institutional and representative relevance 
(Boira, 2003a). Other investments of the regional government concentrated in the capital city as well. 
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Thus, in 2005, the mayor commented that the regional government’s investment in Valencia 
confirmed their ‘firm bid for the capital of the Valencian Community as the main city, the site of 
large-scale projects’ (Velert, 25 November 2005). Not surprisingly, the regional government has 
invested where the political power is, in the capital city, which due to its higher demographic weigh is 
also seen as more profitable electorally (Interviews 3, 9 and 31). Guallart’s explanation of why 
Sociopolis was located in Valencia and not, for instance, in its metropolitan area exemplifies this 
preference for the city very well. For him, although Sociopolis could have been anywhere, regional 
minister Blasco wanted it to be in Valencia ‘because relevant projects occur in relevant places’ 
(Interview 60). 
Second, the devolution of competencies to the Autonomous Communities generated a Valencian 
public sector which, starting from scratch, became the ‘first Valencian enterprise’ (Antuñano and 
Fuentes, 2007) with a GDP of around 12% of the regional. The process involved the creation of the 
necessary institutions to manage the newly acquired competencies and, therefore of a corps of 
bureaucrats of different levels dependant directly on the regional government. The creation of such an 
important state apparatus needed to be legitimised by the visible products of the so-called self-
government. However, the construction of the Valencian regional state was political and institutional 
but also economic, in terms of identity and even semiotic, as will be discuss in subsequent sections. 
7.4 The importance of the national scale 
In Valencia’s case, the regional and local governments can be considered to have been the main 
generators of strategy but, the central government’s supporting and facilitating role has been crucial. 
In Spain, the onset of the state of the autonomies partially decentralised economic state capacity and 
decision-making. However, investment which is crucial for the regions - for instance in infrastructure 
- remained in the central state hands and, furthermore, the regional governments need the central 
government’s permission to increase their level of indebtedness. The regional states have got involved 
in a competition to achieve the best central state funding possible. For instance, the decision to build 
an opera house (or the City of Sciences) was the regional government’s but in order to run it they 
needed– likewise the opera palace of Barcelona and Madrid - a subsidy from the central government. 
In this way, producing a coordinated policy on culture was left out of the reach of the central 
government. The Director General for Economy of the Regional Government (1995-98) explains it: 
Battle lines were drawn up there because it is the same government telling Madrid it needs 
money for the City of Sciences and it wants the same per capita as given to La Rioja. But 
now the figures have come out and Valencia is at the moment the worst financed per capita. 
The regional minister claims that no money is sent, I have no choice, I’m not going to deny 
[medical] treatment to a single person. Meanwhile they revise the regional financing model 
for the umpteenth time because the regional government is running up a bigger debt. The 
alternative is not to run up any debt, behave yourself, and then you’ll get no City of Sciences, 
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or America’s Cup or Formula One or anything else. But this wasn’t the style of the regional 
government, which says it’s going to blow in your hands because I’m going to do the same as 
Barcelona, as other places, right? Well I don’t intend to stop until the funds are forthcoming. 
(Interview 11) 
In this scenario mega projects have become a way of competing for central government funds 
leverage, too. The America’s Cup is a textbook example of this. On the one hand, the America’s Cup 
would have not been possible without the central government’s financial aid, but more importantly, 
the sailing competition was considered a perfect pretext to receive investment in infrastructure from 
the central government (Interviews 7, 21 and 38). In the words of Clementina Ródenas, Mayor of 
Valencia 1989-91 and representative of the central government in the Consortium Valencia 2007: 
What good is the America’s Cup to me, city of Valencia?  Well a lot of good to me because 
the central government is going to foot the bill for some phenomenal constructions worth a 
mint and the port will be a gold mine. That’s stupendous. Projects of this type are fantastic; 
with my meagre input and the regional government’s the net result is a bonanza project and 
I’ll fill my boots; it’s going to be wonderful. (Interview 7) 
Therefore, the requests to the central government were several; from infrastructures such as the high-
speed train and improvements of the three airports of the region - demanded by the regional president 
– to embellishment works for the city – demanded by the mayor. Thus, in 2005, the mayor presented a 
request of 1,600 million euro to the Minister of Public Administrations to pay for the necessary works 
for the America’s Cup and to embellish the city (Velert, 10 June 2004). In the list of proposed works 
presented to the central government later on, in January 2005, she included the remodeling of public 
gardens, the construction of new old people’s homes, sport centres, upgrading of the city centre and 
maritime quarters and the elimination of architectural barriers. Also the head of the opposition in the 
council, of the socialist party, presented the socialist minister of Public Administrations a list of 
demands and supported the request to allow an increase in the city’s level of indebtedness (El País, 12 
November 2004). 
In addition, the conservative local and regional governments’ discourse of the socialist central 
government’s economic discrimination against them was used electorally but also as a way to 
pressurise the central government for funds. As the Regional minister of public administration (1985-
87) explains 
Everything changed when Rodríguez Zapatero came to power. Why? Because then that 
Cinderella conscience could be channelled through political ire. This was perfect, manna 
from heaven for local and regional governments of the conservative party. For it should be 
remembered here that a sense of being hard done by is hard-wired into Valencia’s psyche. 
And historical memory being so short, no one remembers that during the Aznar 
administration only one high-speed train link was made. But from the very next day the high-
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speed train, AVE, was asked for instantly as though it could be brought in overnight. 
(Interview 14) 
The strategy was not completely unsuccessful. The central government allowed the council 50.8 
million euros of further indebtedness to embellish the city in occasion of the America’s Cup, which 
was less than 240 million euro requested but still a substantial quantity. Also the project of extension 
of the local airport, Manises, was expedited thanks to the America’s Cup. 
All in all, despite the rhetoric of global competitiveness, Spain is still an important framework of 
competition. One of the aims of Valencia’s urban policy was to increase the city and the region’s 
economic and geopolitical influence within Spain. A project such as the City of Sciences was 
expected to help consolidate Valencia’s position as the third most important city in Spain and 
counteract Barcelona and Madrid’s power (Interviews 3, 5, 7, 11 and 31). Politicians from the two 
main parties – socialists and conservatives – clearly recognise it. Therefore, socialist mayor (1989-
1991) Ródenas admits 
The first question is this: as a result of this policy of mega projects do we want Valencia to be 
a great city or a provincial city? Are we really the country’s third most important city and do 
we really want to keep up with Madrid and Barcelona or do we only want to remain there in a 
sort of limbo? (Interview 7) 
Similarly, conservative Director General for Economy of the Regional Government (1995-98) says 
But of course Valencia was always looking on while Barcelona won the Olympics, Madrid as 
the state capital and with chances now of also getting the Olympics, well just imagine, 
without anything with similar clout the third-ranked Spanish capital lags well behind the two 
front-runners. (Interview 11) 
Also the America’s Cup was interpreted in geopolitical key as an opportunity for Valencia to 
consolidate its position and political and economic weigh in Spain. This understanding of the interests 
of the region in relationship with the rest of regions in Spain, as well as the shared interests in 
leveraging money from the central government  can be seen as part of the political project of creating 
a strong region. It is also an element which, as we will see in chapter eight, has created cohesion 
within the urban regime and, general consensus. Both the party in the government and the main 
opposition party agree on that point. 
A personal wish of historical relevance can be glimpsed in the mayor’s promotion of the America’s 
Cup, Blasco’s support of Sociopolis or the different regional presidents’ footprint in the City of 
Sciences. But, beyond that, Valencian governors sought to improve their own political relevance 
within their parties and in Spanish national politics while enhancing the weight of the Valencian 
Community within Spain. Both Lerma and Zaplana are considered to have used the regional 
government as a stepping-stone to Madrid (Interviews 31 and 44). For the director of the editorial 
office of El Mundo in Valencia it is very clear. In his own words; 
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Here we need to look for a different economic model so a great part of this tourist vision 
focuses on the mega events that have this double or even triple aspect, seeking a regional 
image, seeking an economic alternative and seeking political projection. Zaplana used it for 
this end without any doubt, [...] at national level, for he ended up as minister [...] and was 
even once on the point of running for president. (Interview 44) 
Moreover, apart from competing for government funds and influence at national level, there is also a 
competition for prestige. Therefore, Spain remains an important arena of imitation and comparison in 
the Valencian imaginary. As architect Martínez puts it, Valencia does not want to 'remain at the rear 
of all Spanish cities’ (Interview 46). 
After the Barcelona Olympics and Sevilla Expo’92 Valencia’s governors felt that the city needed to 
do something not to be left behind (Interviews 3, 14, 33 and 38), to overcome a ‘Cinderella complex’ 
(Interview 14) with respect to Barcelona, Madrid and even Seville. The City of Sciences was in a 
sense Valencia’s response to that frustration feeling for - unlike Madrid, Barcelona and Sevilla - not 
achieving anything for 1992 (Interviews 5, 26, 38 and 41). According to the Director General for 
Budget of the Regional government (1982-95) 
All this stemmed from the fact that the Expo was held in 92, right? Because, of course, I can 
perfectly understand the presidents and politicians of other Autonomous Communities than 
Andalusia thinking ‘we’ve got to something similar here as well’. And the Olympic Games in 
Barcelona likewise. Then came Valencia. The Basque Country, Bilbao made the 
Guggenheim museum... (Interview 26) 
On the other hand post-Olympic Barcelona and Bilbao’s Guggenheim had been constructed as 
successful models to imitate (Interviews 1, 2 and 3). However, within the Valencian imaginary, 
although the ‘Guggenheim effect’ had certain influence in the decision-makers’ minds, Barcelona had 
always been the city to imitate (Interviews 3, 4, 9, 16, 28 and 31). As local academic Piqueras 
explains; 
They try to stand out from the pack, not so much in terms of a model but trying to match 
Barcelona’s international projection, tourism development and development of urban services 
with the Olympics; so here they said, ‘this is the way to go’. Always at loggerheads with 
Barcelona, always squabbling, but at the end of the day they emulate it. And what they have 
done with the port, converting the old dock into a leisure site, is what Barcelona did with the 
Port Vell much earlier. (Interview 3) 
 7.5 Tourism, construction, and real estate  
In the 1920-30s, Valencian fruit and vegetable exports were the main source of foreign currency in 
Spain, a trend which continued during the post-war (1940-50s) (Boira, 2012). During the 1960-70s a 
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process of de-agrarianisation and industrialisation started in the Valencian region, and continued until 
the 1990s.  
In 1960 the number of agriculture jobs was higher (by 127,000) than industrial jobs in the province of 
Valencia. Nine years later, the agriculture sector had lost 64,500 jobs and between 1970 and 1971, 
51,470 agriculture jobs were lost. At the same time, between 1962 and 1973, the industry sector grew 
in 11.5%. (Boira, 2012:115). In the mid-1970s agriculture jobs had gone down to 15% and industrial 
jobs were 44% of the total (Boira, 2012:115). 
In the 1980s, with Spain’s entry in the EEC, the traditional industrial sectors started to decline. But it 
was not until the late 1990s when deindustrialisation gave pass to a service economy. As the 
Valencian economy - affected by globalisation and the flooding of the market with Chinese industrial 
products – deindustrialised, the weight of the tourism and construction sectors - both intimately linked 
- grew.  
From 1982, the Valencian region was known as the Valencian Autonomous Community and had a 
democratic regional government. The first regional government, of the socialist party, was rather 
supportive of the industrial sector but already started to see that the existent economic model was 
becoming obsolete. In fact, one of the stated objectives of the first project for the City of Sciences was 
to promote city tourism in Valencia (see chapter 5). 
With Zaplana (1995-2002) in office the decline of the traditional industry could be clearly seen. As 
Director of the editorial office of El Mundo in Valencia explains, 
When we stopped being competitive back in the eighties and especially in the nineties and 
fierce competition started up, here they had to look for a different economic model. Then a 
great part of this tourist vision focuses on mega events that have this double or even triple 
aspect, seeking a regional image, seeking an economic alternative and seeking political 
projection. Zaplana used it for this end without any doubt. (Interview 44) 
The Valencian Community had a tradition of sun and sand tourism and tourism seemed to be a logical 
and easy option (Interviews 3, 32 and E51a), a solution to deindustrialisation, although maybe it 
showed a lack of imagination (Interview 2). Mega-projects, and later on events, seemed a good way to 
support the tourist sector. The Secretary of studies and programs of the socialist party in the city of 
Valencia describes Zaplana’s vision of tourism, 
Let’s just say that Eduardo Zaplana’s model consisted in making of the Valencian 
Community a large-scale Benidorm. He had been mayor of Benidorm, he was familiar with 
that model; the knew its strengths, which it undoubtedly had, and tried to export them to the 
region as a whole and then anything he saw, whether a future technology park, a water park 
or whatever, what he saw there was tourism potential, he saw coaches, cameras; he saw what 
he had learned there. (Interview 24) 
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However, there seemed to be wide consensus. The secretary-general of the Valencian socialist party 
(1997-99) at the time coincided in the analysis. In his own words, 
A productive structure like Valencia’s, taking the case in point, has to specialise in 
something, diversify into something outside its two mainstays, a traditional, long-standing 
tourism sector. He had to revamp this to improve it and then look for an alternative to an 
industrial sector that was fine back in the fifties, sixties, seventies and eighties but was now 
showing signs of fatigue. This I see as logical. Which was the most logical path to take? 
Reinforce some sector of the service economy. And what are the strong points of the 
Valencian Community? Its climate, geographical situation, good communications, an 
attractive site, strong demand from Europe. And this was a fairly logical line; I wouldn’t have 
done otherwise. (Interview 40) 
The other economic sector to grow while deindustrialisation advanced was construction, as many 
industrialists decided to relocate their industries and use the land left vacant to enter the construction 
sector. In this way, whereas in 1994, the construction sector was 7.4% of the GDP and 8.1% of the 
total employment, in 2000, the construction sector was 10% of the GDP and 12% of the employment 
in the Valencian Community (Boira, 2012:117). In 2009, after the burst of the real estate bubble, the 
construction sector was 11% of the GDP and 14.8% of the total employment (Boira, 2012:117). 
This was an option which was supported by the regional government and, which has a lot to do with 
Valencia’s mega-projects and events (Pedro and Sorribes, 2007). Thus, the conservative governments 
have insisted in tourism and construction being the economic motors of the region. As the Regional 
Minister of Industry, Commerce and Tourism (1987-93) explains, ‘to their minds tourism, events are 
now productive fabric and the events generate economic activity in their own right’ (Interview 30). 
President Camps, in his public interventions has been very clear about it and has described projects 
such as the City of Sciences, Terra Mítica, the City of Light, the America’s Cup or the Formula 1 
Competition as the ‘tourism factories of the 21st century’ (Pérez, 11 February 2007). 
Also the construction sector was clearly favoured in the official discourse of the regional government. 
After the burst of the real estate bubble not only the construction sector but also the majority of the 
industry, which was linked to it - glass, ceramic for construction, furniture, etc. – was affected and 
many commentators said that a change of economic model was necessary. However, in 2009, 
president Camps still insisted that the construction sector had ‘to continue being the main driving 
force of the economy, job creation and welfare’ (Ferrandis, 24 March 2009). Also business 
associations, such as CEV, expressed the need to involve the construction sector businessmen in 
innovation to create a new Valencian economic model. 
The regional capital city was to be the main focus of this accumulation strategy, which was however 
of regional level. Valencia was not a tourist city until the end of the 1990s. It was in fact considered an 
‘anti-tourist city’ until very recently (Interview 9; see chapter 5). From the 1990s, with Rita Barberá in 
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the city council, urban tourism acquired relevance in the council policies (although, as seen in Chapter 
six, there are some discrepancies about the success of the urban tourist sector). In any case, urban 
tourism intended to be an alternative to sun and sand tourism, which would attract upmarket and year-
round tourism, in opposition to seasonal tourism. The construction of mega-projects, such as the City 
of Sciences, and hosting of events, such as the America’s Cup or F1, would drive the transition 
(Interviews 1, 2 and 6). Therefore, the tourism strategy promoted by both local and regional 
governments, especially in the city of Valencia, was mainly based on mega-projects and events 
(Interview 51a). 
Figure 7.5 View of a regatta during the America’s Cup competition 2007 
 
Source: La Marina Real Juan Carlos I  
Thus, one of the stated objectives of the City of Sciences – according to both socialist and 
conservative governments - was to promote urban tourism internationally, to diversify the sector. In 
the words of the Director General for Economy of the Regional Government (1995-98), 
I want the same, I don’t say 10 planes from London every day because that would be over-
ambitious but a daily flight from the main European cities and then the tourists visit the 
museum, the opera palace, going to a concert, going to the oceanography museum, going out 
to have a paella, in two days, seeing the Albufera, visiting the old part of the city, seeing the 
painting galleries, which are all fine. In short you arrange a two-day schedule for them for a 
reasonable hotel price, because now there is a wide range of hotels: the richest at Westin, the 
less well-off at the four-star establishments. And in this sense I’d say that internationally 
we’ve been successful. Because the fact they know about us in Castellón, Albacete or 
Madrid, that’s already done and dusted, but what we’re interested in now is the people in 
London, with about 200 coming every week; and all 200 of them saying this isn’t at all bad. 
(Interview 11) 
It was the first project with this aim and Valencia is considered to have become a tourist city with the 
City of Sciences. However, the most direct economic effect of the City of Sciences has been absorbed 
by the construction and real estate sectors (see chapter 6). 
For the Director of Valencian Convention Bureau, responsible for tourism in Valencia, the City of 
Sciences represented one of the main structural tourist assets of Valencia and the America’s Cup was 
the circumstantial opportunity to make the assets visible and therefore could be easily integrated in the 
tourism policy of the city (Interview 21). The America’s Cup was considered an important step 
towards a high-end urban tourism, focused in attracting cruise operators. Figure 7.5 shows a moment 
of the America’s Cup competition where the new tourist assets – new urban spaces, buildings and 
marina - generated in the maritime area can be seen. 
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But again, America’s Cup and tourism were also an excuse for more urban development and growth. 
First, the America’s Cup opened up business for the big construction companies because of the 
necessary infrastructures to be implemented not only in the harbour area but also in the airport, etc. 
Second, the sailing competition brought about urban development projects in the maritime area. It was 
also a good occasion for real estate speculation in the harbour area as Sorribes, specialist in urban 
economy explains, 
Now, the Integral development Plan of Grao, this land that is a fantastic speculative 
operation, because the firm that was there left. The move to the industrial estate called 
Polígono del Mediterráneo and demolition cost the firm about 70 million Euros, I believe. A 
year later they sold the land to a consortium formed by Sacyr, Bancaixa and Vallehermoso 
for 320 million euros and the city didn’t see one peseta of this capital gain, adding up to 250 
million euros. (Interview 9) 
Therefore, besides tourism, the other prioritised sectors were construction and real estate. Although 
mega-projects are justified on the grounds of tourism, the really benefited sectors are construction and 
real estate, which have capitalised the benefits (Interviews 2, 7, 13 and 14). For instance, as the 
president of the FEHPV (Valencian Federation of Hotelier Businesses) complained in 2004, the lion’s 
share of the capital invested in new hotels came from real estate companies rather than the hotel sector 
(Olivares, 1 April 2004). Similarly, Rausell, local academic expert in tourism analysis explains, 
For example, why are more hotels built here, which is one of the prerequisites? Well because 
of the real estate boom, but this was before the America’s Cup. There are studies by Exceltur 
showing that by 2002 it was impossible for Valencia to meet its hotel building plans. Even 
here, the hoteliers, the hoteliers themselves asked the city council not to grant more hotel 
licences because there madness lay. The hotels were built for the sheer logic of the real-estate 
sector, because it turned out to be profitable to build hotels. Not to meet the needs of the 
tourism sector. (Interview 13) 
The evolution of the Valencian construction sector sheds light on the matter. At the end of the 1980s 
and 1990s, when many entrepreneurs got into real estate development and left other industrial sectors, 
Valencian real estate and urban development companies were small and could not compete with 
nation-wide powerful companies. 
By adding new spectacular heritage instead of restoring the historical centre, the City of Sciences 
along with other megaprojects provided the opportunity to the Valencian construction companies to 
grow and acquire know-how. The Secretary-General of FECOVAL recalls, 
For 12 years we have carried out so many public works here that there was no need for 
innovation... You know, that this business of innovation, effectiveness, exportation or 
winning business abroad is like a muscle: if you don’t exercise it goes flabby. Here there was 
so much construction that there was work for everyone and profit for all and there wasn’t that 
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need. Suddenly the downturn hits and all comes tumbling down like a house of cards, not 
only in the residential sector but the whole caboodle. (Interview 62) 
The construction of the first buildings of the City of Sciences – the telecommunications tower, the 
museum of science and the planetarium - were awarded to the main nation-wide construction 
companies although, to facilitate the bid of Valencian companies for the preparation of land works the 
size requirements of the companies were lowered (Ferrandis, 17 August 1994; Interview 29). 
Some years later and for the first time ever for a project of such size and relevance, the Agora was 
awarded to a partnership of Valencian construction companies, which had already the technical and 
economic capacity to opt for a work of such size. Figure 7.6 shows the scale of the work and the 
complexity involved in the construction of the Agora. As an Engineer of Necso at the Museum of 
Sciences working site recalls, when the works for the first project of the City of Sciences started, some 
of the Valencian companies which have worked in the Agora were ‘not much more than the owner 
and three employees’ (Interview 29).  
In the meantime, the Valencian construction companies had got organised, as the Secretary-General of 
FECOVAL explains, 
This federation is exclusively of public works, contractors of public work. […] Suddenly, 25 
years ago, especially those of us that were always public work contractors, small 
subcontractors, thought that we’d had enough of carrying out the work ourselves and that the 
important people of Madrid, SEOPAN, Fomento, Acciona, the big boys took on the 
construction, subcontracted us and they earned a commission for doing absolutely nothing. A 
federation was therefore set up to defend vested interests; then it became crystal clear that we 
are not promoters, residential constructors, no; this federation is solely made up by public 
works contractors. (Interview 62) 
Also, there was a will to support the Valencian companies, as CACSA architect explains ‘in this 
project the guiding idea is always to promote Valencia’s interests, whether Valencian architects, 
Valencian businessmen or even Valencian construction firms’ (Interview 59b). 
Figure 7.6 Construction works of Agora 
 
Source: PERI (www.peri.com.mx) 
Looking at it from a different angle, some commentators (Interview 2) have seen in the discourse 
about entrepreneurialism an excuse to hide that the real objective of mega-projects is to feed the 
construction sector. Certainly, many construction companies live almost exclusively on public 
construction works. Academic and member of the grassroots group ‘Terra Crítica’ Gaja explains, 
This discourse is the official line: Valencia has to take its rightful place in the worldwide 
concert of cities; it has to promote its image; the city’s image sells and draws in tourists and 
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ipso facto wealth and economic activity. This is the official line. I personally am very critical 
of this official line; it might have a kernel of truth but it cloaks many other things. What does 
it hide? It hides the fact that these major works are completely unnecessary; in many cases 
they are a shocking waste of money and are justified only by the desire to boost a private 
sector living off the public budget. Many major construction firms would close in six months 
if they didn’t receive government commissions and in fact they have admitted publicly that 
they live off the government. It is a sector that can be dubbed semi-public or semi-private. 
(Interview 2) 
In any case, the regional government has taken into account whether the construction company was 
Valencian when awarding important contracts. In the words of the Secretary-General of FECOVAL, 
If you bid for public work you must have economic and technical solvency. That said, the 
Regional Government has supported us. The president that kicked off the boom was Zaplana; 
with Lerma there was little construction. When the socialist president was in office, it wasn’t 
a lack of will, there was little construction around at the time, the boom took off with 
Zaplana, who apparently threw himself in the deep end; for much of the work there wasn’t 
even any funding but somehow the bloke got it all done anyway. Now there was a 
tremendous boom and this was the first era. In the first legislature of President Camps, there 
was also construction work, right? ― So now of course Valencia’s interests became 
paramount; they were nurtured tacitly, never explicitly but tacitly; the so-called UTEs (joint 
ventures) were fomented, which are nothing else than consortia as they are called elsewhere. 
They are usually made up by a national firm and Valencia firm 50%, 60% 40% depending on 
the technical procedure, so, of course, in all the projects you mention there are firms from 
here. [You say this was done tacitly; how does this work?] Yes, the mechanism is obvious. 
You make bids as a national firm single handedly and you don’t win any tenders, and then 
you see a UTE with a national and Valencia firm and they win the tender. One case might be 
a coincidence but three....  You know the trick is to bid jointly, at least try to … In other parts 
of Spain this process is even more extreme; in Catalonia, for example, the biggest Catalan 
firms bid single handedly, not in a UTE with the bigger Madrid firms or national firms, they 
go alone. In the latest era in Andalusia there are also important firms, Sandro and the rest, 
with a lot of clout and they bid solo and they tell me – I don’t know, I’m not really in touch 
with regional trends – that this is also happening in Galicia; since the minister Blanco came 
to office some of them are going it alone. (Interview 62) 
The regional government’s support of the Valencian companies to create a strong Valencian 
construction sector can be seen as part of the creation of a new regional estate. 
To conclude, mega-projects can be considered the expression of a new power, the regional 
government. The accumulation strategy fauvored by the different Valencian regionals governments, 
when the economy was affected by globalisation and de-industrialisation, was based on tourism and 
construction. Those economic sectors were selected to the detriment of other sectors such as 
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traditional industry - which was formed by small and medium size enterprises – or agriculture. 
Particularly Zaplana, and later on Camps, focused the regional economic model on tourism ‘Benidorm 
style’, based on the construction of mega-projects and, later on, the celebration of mega-events. For 
them, this matched well with the construction of a strong regional space not only economically but 
also institutionally and symbolically. 
7.6 Imaginaries and discourses  
The ideational component has been a crucial aspect to understand the consistency of Valencia’s urban 
policy. On the one hand decision-makers have taken advantage of the population’s need for self-
esteem, wish for modernisation and glamour. On the other hand, they – as part of the same society – 
have had the same aspirations themselves.  
After the dictatorship and particularly with the onset of the first democratically elected local and 
regional governments there was a need in Valencia for recovering self-esteem (Interviews 31 and 38), 
to feel that the city was able to do ‘important things’. Other Spanish cities were organising 
international events; Barcelona the 1992 Olympics, Sevilla the 1992 Expo, Madrid had been elected 
European Cultural City and Bilbao had initiated the Guggenheim operation. Valencia’s initial 
response was the socialist regional government initiative to build the City of Sciences. In the words of 
the Council Commissioner for the America’s Cup; 
The idea is to shove everything into the shop window and then anything that comes along is 
welcome, right? Valencia had been hugely frustrated in 92, when, as everybody remembers 
Barcelona hosted the Olympics and Seville the Expo. Valencia bid to be the European 
Capital of Culture, tried to clamber onto the bandwagon of some big event; I believe it was at 
this moment that Valencia and many other cities cottoned onto the importance of events. 
Both Barcelona and Seville won worldwide fame, especially Barcelona and then everyone 
wanted to climb on this bandwagon and Valencia got left by the wayside and felt enormously 
frustrated. [...] In 93, 94 the city was more or less saying: ‘all we get is the ugliest and worst 
stuff; we’re no good for anything, no one wants us and we’re condemned to eternal 
mediocrity’. (Interview 33) 
He goes on to explain the change in attitude represented in first place by the project of the City of 
Sciences; 
This defeatism changed normally into a sense of: ‘we can do things’; ‘yes we can’ was 
invented some time ago, it was said in Valencian but it comes to the same thing, and this was 
the start of a couple of important milestones. (Interview 33) 
Later on, the subsequent conservative regional governments would capitalise on the Valencian 
people’s need for self-esteem and would construct their discourse around it, making of the City of 
Sciences one of their symbols of local pride. President Camps would describe it, for instance, as ‘the 
                                                                                                                                         CHAPTER 7 
176 
 
most ambitious project in our history’ (Ferrandis, 7 April 2006). The ‘politics of self-esteem’ were 
instituted. This shows the way in which regional, and also local, politicians provided a strong vision of 
a new Valencia, which would be key to their leadership in the construction of the hegemonic project, 
or also the formation of an urban regime, as will be discussed in Chapter eight.  
With the ‘politics of self-esteem’ already ongoing the America’s Cup reinforced the feeling of 
achievement. Finally, after several failures (see chapter 5) the city’s entrepreneurial efforts had been 
rewarded with the awarding of an event of international relevance. Mega-events such as the Formula 1 
or the America’s Cup were also understood as a way of showing off to the world how much the city 
had already improved and the City of Sciences was a proof of it (Interviews 11, 31 and 42). As the 
Council Commissioner for the America’s Cup explains; 
This is a city that has changed a lot, a huge amount in the last 20 years. It was in a situation 
of profound change and also hopeful of doing something important some day. The idea was 
to dress up smart and sooner or later we would find a fiancé and get married. (Interview 33) 
Certainly, the urban policy and the discourse that has accompanied it have been extremely successful 
in terms of increasing the Valencian citizens’ self-esteem. The overcoming of a complex of inferiority 
which was initiated with the onset of the democracy and the so-called self-government was also linked 
to the project of modernisation of the city, the region and their institutions. The city, seat of the 
regional government, was to be converted into a worthy capital city and a European cosmopolitan 
city. The City of Sciences was seen as a key element of such modernisation and when the conservative 
party stopped the project there was a reaction against what it was seen as a hinder to modernisation. 
The idea of modernity was later on integrated also to the discourse of the conservative governments 
(and the architect) not only for the City of Sciences but also for the America’s Cup. Thus, Valencia’s 
maritime facade was to be modern, cosmopolitan and international as a result of the remodeling works 
implemented on occasion of the America’s Cup. Discourse and the strategic use of symbols were key 
to the achievement of consensus around a program of action. In that regard, the architects’ role in 
providing the symbols of the politician’s vision was crucial. 
In this breeding ground, ideas of competitiveness and city marketing – a global trend started during 
the 1980s - easily permeated through the Valencian decision-makers’ minds. Policy discourses about 
city marketing seemed to justify the benefits of mega-projects and events. The understanding went 
like this; many other cities are doing it and therefore not only must it be effective but Valencia must 
not be left behind in the competition. Thus, Valencia followed the trend of having buildings by media 
relevant architects initiated in the 1980s and of competing for mega-events (Interview 36). The 
Director General for Budget of the Regional government (1982-95) is very clear about it; 
But it was not only Valencia that did this; Madrid did it, Barcelona did it, Rome did it; all 
cities on the map or that wanted to be on the map did likewise. But the thing is that some 
could draw on past goodwill; Paris, Barcelona, New York, Chicago. These are world-ranking 
cities, aren’t they? And Valencia isn’t. Will it be one day? I don’t know. We’ll probably have 
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to invest a lot to make it so. Obviously an Olympic games brings you into the world 
limelight. (Interview 26) 
In this way, the search for self-esteem and local pride translated into an aspiration to be part of the 
first tier of cities when global ideas of competitiveness penetrated the Valencian imaginary of both 
decision-makers and population. It resulted in what can be described as a parochial globalism whereby 
‘globalising’ or becoming global means to do bigger things, ‘be on the map’ and rub shoulders with 
the ‘global elite of the glamour’. In local editor Lagardera’s words, 
The city desperately sought a mirror and has found it at last, whether we like it or not, the 
city has found it. Now we’re being seen. Beforehand we weren’t but now we are. […] Of 
course the city aims to break into the first division of cities or become a bustling second-
division city, which is what I believe we have achieved. (Interview 31) 
This connects well with the Valencian idiosyncrasy.  The idea of ‘doing things’ to ‘put Valencia on 
the map’ – the most repeated phrase – seems ubiquitous. Mega-projects and events are an opportunity 
to show the world what the city is capable of doing, of putting it on the map. Thus, the City of 
Sciences is described as ‘unique in the world’ (Interviews 43 and 59a), something to be proud of and 
through which Valencia can be compared with cities such as New York, London, Paris or Berlin 
(Interviews 5, 11 and 35). Even those who are in charge of managing the Valencian economy boast 
about having spent and done things bigger than the size of the city would allow for. The words of the 
Director General for Economy of the Regional Government (1995-98) show it very clearly; 
‘The fact of placing Valencia on the map, the perception is that things are being done here. I 
hear it on the radio and see it on the written press. And, I say: ‘but, if we are poor as church 
mice’. And everybody says: ‘what things they are doing!’ (…) I can affirm that we have a 
project, the city of Arts and Sciences, which corresponds to a city of ten million inhabitants 
and not one million’ [...] That was designed to work as a cultural riverside area with the river 
acting as a walkway from the music auditorium to the opera palace, from the opera palace to 
the science museum, as in Chicago, as in the world’s biggest cities. But the thing is that 
Chicago has a population of 10 million in its hinterland and there are extraordinary sponsor-
friendly firms, wealthy people; it is full of pocket-book millionaires and middle class and 
lower class and the like. Here there is a mismatch between the size of the city and its middle 
class, upper class and working class, in other words the city as compared with its project. The 
project is out of scale. (Interview 11) 
For him, Valencia’s aim must be to ‘show up, be noticed; feature in the league of those who get things 
done’ (Interview 11). 
In turn, the America’s Cup was seen as the perfect opportunity to make Valencia known around the 
world (see chapter 5). Apart from this craving for visibility, the other element of Valencia’s parochial 
globalism has been the search for ‘glamour’, represented on the one hand by global architects and on 
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the other hand by high-end tourism. Certainly, during the America’s Cup the crème de la crème of the 
world rich and famous passed through Valencia and provided the sought after glamour in excess. 
In this respect, for some, the fact that Valencia now has more high-end shops, restaurants and hotels is 
a marker of the ‘success’ of the city’s urban policy (Interviews 5, 27 and 31). Local editor Lagardera 
explains it; 
The results for the city are marvellous, and I’m saying this as a book and magazine publisher 
in the city, okey? I’ve seen how this has changed radically in recent years; the one hundred 
restaurants of yesteryear have now become three hundred. The fact is that a new restaurant 
opens up every week; each one prettier, cooler, more stupendous and more god knows what 
than the last. And shops and luxury boutiques, none of which existed before. Here there was 
no Vuitton or other fashion houses. None of that. Now there’s Vuitton and Bulgari and the 
like. In other words, this is a city-measuring scale; for example I wrote an article called: ‘The 
Prada Shop is missing’. And this was a sort of metaphor standing for all this. A university 
philosophy professor wrote to me saying: ‘what a load of trivia’. But this bloke is an idiot 
because the existence of luxury shops is in fact a gauge of the city’s success. (Interview 31) 
Sociopolis - although its marketing has been mainly directed to the professional public - partook of 
the same ideology of the other projects. On the one hand it was presented as innovative, a modern way 
of urbanising but rooted in the past. On the other hand, the fact that it brought together a group of 
renowned architects in Valencia and that two of its residential buildings where exhibited at the 
MOMA in New York, provided glamour and sense of achievement. 
This latent yearning of the Valencian people was translated to a discourse based on the visibility and 
spectularisation of mega-projects, iconic character of architecture and, events (Interviews 13, 
Interview 14 and 38). The discourse exploited the Valencian people’s inferiority complex by 
appealing to feelings of self-esteem at the same time that the visibility of the mega-projects and events 
actually nurtured the citizen’s self-esteem (Interviews 1, 38 and 54).  
The populist discourse of both the regional president and the mayor makes reference to ‘dreams that 
come true’ (Interview 38) and to Valencia’s historical importance. According to Sorribes (2007), who 
has analysed the mayor’s discourse, the message is deeply populist. It makes reference to 15th century 
Valencia – the city’s golden age – and compares it to the new Valencia, which – according to the 
mayor’s discourse – is again in the European avant-garde. 
Therefore, as it was to be expected, all the mentioned ideational components are present in the 
(populist) official discourse about Valencia’s urban policy; modernisation, self-esteem, local pride and 
glamour. Certainly, they are in the imaginary of the Valencian people – to which the political class 
and local commentators also belong. The ideational is, in part, how decision-makers and population 
understand the world, their own and other people’s actions and strategy, but they are also how they 
choose to justify them and therefore are contained in the discourse.  
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However, the content of the discourse rather than decided strategically in advance was formed through 
a process of semiotic selection (Jessop, 2007) and therefore constructed at the same time as the urban 
policy was being ‘improvised’. In this way, modernisation, europeisation and self-esteem were linked 
to globalisation and city marketing and competitiveness. According to local academic Rausell 
(Interview 13), the Valencian urban policy responds to ‘fancy’ decisions rather than to before-hand 
planning, a ‘casual’ model generated by improvisation. The discourse is generated a posteriori. In his 
own words; 
It is action that shapes the discourse. A discourse finally cropped up I’d say in the mid 
nineties until the America’s Cup arrived. They are seat-of-the-pants decisions. And as from 
the America’s Cup attempts were made to bring the planning discourse into line as though 
everything had been thought out beforehand; this is a very Valencian model of after-the-
event thinking. (Interview 13) 
In fact, the construction of the discourse was a parallel process to the construction of the regional 
state, evidencing the importance of both materiality and the dialectic of discursivity in the production 
of hegemony (Jessop, 2007; Jessop and Oosterlynck, 2008; Sum, 2009). The self-government, as 
explained by journalist Beltrán, ‘represented the end of a period of subsidiarity, of parochialism’ and 
the chance to ‘create a new ideological context, identity-building and cultural’ (Interview 38). 
Whereas in a first era the main tasks were the modernisation and democratisation of society and, the 
creation of the new institutions, the first conservative government realized that a powerful discourse to 
accompany it was needed (Interviews 13 and 38). Gradually, using fragments of discourses and 
elements taken both from local and global sources, the discourse continued to be constructed. 
7.7 Conclusion 
As we have seen, the interests of various groups – mainly construction companies and developers, 
elected politicians and star architects - meet in the development of mega-projects and events. 
However, in the case of Valencia, it is the state in its different tiers the major investor, as well as the 
chief instigator and facilitator of the emphasis on the use of mega-projects and events as a 
regeneration strategy. 
In the analysis of why an urban policy based on mega-projects and events has been instituted in 
Valencia, two particularities stand out. First, the relevance of the construction of a new regional state 
after the onset of the of the autonomy in post-francoist Spain and, second, what I have called the 
politics of self-esteem as an underlying factor to the various motives behind the formulation and 
lastingness of Valencia’s urban policy. Certainly, Valencia’s mega-projects can be considered the 
expression of a new power but also signify the city’s newly acquired status of regional capital city and 
the need of the Valencian people for reinforcing their identity and recovering their self-esteem, as well 
as their wish for modernisation. Therefore, for Valencian regional presidents, mega-projects and 
                                                                                                                                         CHAPTER 7 
180 
 
events have matched well with the construction of a strong regional space not only economically but 
also institutionally and symbolically.  
Having discussed the motives of urban regeneration in Valencia, the next chapter will focus on the 
processes at different scales and on how different local and global actors have been involved in the 
formulation and enactment of the urban policy based on mega-projects and events. 
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8. STAR ARCHITECTS, POLITICIANS, CONSTRUCTORS AND 
MAGNATES: THE POLITICS OF REGENERATION IN VALENCIA 
8.1 Introduction 
Although, as seen in the previous chapter, the role of government is important in the institution of an 
urban policy based on mega-projects and events, for all the projects are mainly publicly funded and 
led - collaboration of other relevant groups to implement them is needed. Governments need to build 
the capacity to govern seeking collaboration outside their boundaries (Collinge and Hall, 1997; 
Mossberger, 2001). In Valencia, as already discussed, there are several groups whose interests 
converge in the institution of the urban policy, and which are part of what in Valencia can be 
characterised as a ‘boosterist’ urban regime. Indeed, the long-standing emphasis on ‘using architecture 
to boost culture, leisure and business’ (Torres, 2005:143) seen in Valencia and which has been seen 
over time across different political colours in both the regional and local governments, points out to 
urban regime theory, as other elements which will be discussed in this also chapter do. 
However, Valencia’s case study offers insights into the role of other actors who are not included in the 
regime, and how their interests have been transferred to the local scale, too. For instance, the role of 
owners of mega-events such as the America’s Cup or the Formula one competition and of global 
architects will be considered. 
Finally, the creation of popular consent through different mechanisms has been crucial for the 
durability of the regime. 
8.2 Local coalitions of interest and decision-making 
In Valencia, coalitions of interest have formed and pursued specific policy outcomes. Thus, we can 
find business lobbies which have ‘circles of intimacy’ (Interview 24) with the political power. The 
business lobbies include, apart from the Business Chamber and the CEV (Confederación de 
Empresarios de Valencia), business associations, such as AVE (Asociación Valenciana de 
Empresarios), considered the non-official employers’ organisation (Interview 44). The industrial port 
is certainly another powerful actor. In the different organizations, the same entrepreneurial figures and 
surnames are found –Virosque, Mompó, Boluda, Soler, Noguera, Casanova, Serratosa (Navarro, 
2005). In order to realize their political project local and regional governments needed the 
collaboration of business, while business needed the government’s legitimacy, but also, their 
leadership. As we will see, there are more factors which allow us to characterise this collaboration as 
an urban regime. 
Regarding projects such as the America’s Cup the Valencian entrepreneurs got specifically organised 
to channel their initiatives. In December 2003, CEV set up the America’s Cup Entrepreneurial 
Council with the aim of coordinating the proposals and being the interlocutor of the Valencian 
entrepreneurs in front of the public administrations in order to achieve the participation of the higher 
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possible number of companies in the America’s Cup’s project (Velert, 19 June 2004). Both AVE and 
the council created by CEV held different meetings with the Minister of Public Administrations  - 
representative of the central government for the America’s Cup – and the Valencian authorities to 
maintain ‘the collaboration spirit’ – in the words of Rafael Ferrando, president of CEV (Velert, 22 
June 2004) – and give the entrepreneurs’ point of view. According to Taberner (Interview 4) the 
construction and real estate lobbies which pressurised the government were a tight group of powerful 
actors in front of the little and medium industries of the Valencian Community and were able to 
influence the government agenda. Although some fortunes were made during the rise of the Valencian 
bourgeoisie in the 19th century, most of them have interests in the construction and urban 
development sectors, some of them from as early as the 1950s during ‘developmentalism’ (Navarro, 
2005; Sanchis Guarner, 2007).   
But, the demand for collaboration has been both ways, and many times through informal networks as 
well as through formal institutions, as it is characteristic of urban regimes. For instance, in 2007, the 
Regional government accompanied by several entrepreneurs of the tourism, construction and housing 
development sectors travelled to Brussels to defend the Valencian urbanism Act (R. M. de R., 12 
April 2007). When the president of regional government was being charged with corruption the 
support of the business sector was recruited too, during different institutional events. Looking at how 
the projects under study were started it is possible to find evidence of such informal ‘networking’. 
Sociopolis has its origin Blasco and Guallart’s personal friendship while Valencia Litoral, although 
coming from a private initiative, had extra-officially received the blessing of the mayor and deputy 
mayor before starting (see chapter 5). Also, as it will be discussed in this chapter, Calatrava’s 
relationship with regional president Camps went beyond the strictly professional relationship. 
At a different level and using art and culture as an attraction factor, groups of architects tried to 
network their way into the influential group of people involved in the construction and development 
sectors, for instance organising informal dinners and art previews to which prominent members of the 
those sectors were invited (interview 25). The complicity between the public and private sectors - 
especially construction and development sectors but also the port authority – can be seen in many 
projects (Mundo Ilusión, Terra Mítica, Marina d’Or...) where we find a mix of the public and the 
private with no clear boundaries between them.  
Some commentators have argued (Interviews 7, 14 and 40) that in the city the priorities have been 
established by the private sector – the participants in the regime - and thus, the public sector decisions 
have been in favour of private interests. A Member of the grassroots group ‘Per l'Horta’, referring to 
the elaboration of the strategic plan of Valencia, explains this prioritising of interests very clearly; 
They say: We’re going to see what the people of Valencia think. But for them the people are 
the port of Valencia, the Chamber of Commerce, maybe the Professional Architects’ 
Association if they were playing ball that day, and few else. And you say, what about the 
social associations? And they say; what do they know about urban development? So of 
course, that’s how it’s done and the master lines are more port, more motorways, more 
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airport and more constructions because, of course, the constructors swing into line with the 
whole plan. But you say: This is a Christmas wish-list for your firms to continue making 
profits but it isn’t sustainable and doesn’t fit in at all with what we really need here. So we 
have little respect for this strategic plan because it’s a Christmas wish-list for corporations 
with vested interests in the project. They tell us: We need the high-speed train. But what for? 
These are things I don’t understand. If you have a 220 km/h line to Barcelona which has not 
yet been brought on line and a one-track section running from Castellón to Tarragona, well 
finish it. And when we are running chock-a-block at 220 let’s ask ourselves whether to make 
a high-speed train or an airline. (Interview 15) 
However, the entrepreneurial groups have followed the initiative of the local and - especially – the 
regional government. As derived from the literature, in Europe it is often the state who takes up the 
role of coordinating urban regimes (Harding, 1997; Hubbard and Hall, 1998; Mossberger, 2001), and 
the case of Valencia confirms it. The Regional Minister of Public Administration (1987-89) explains; 
So there was overwhelming support from the public sector, of course, but this doesn’t mean 
that the private sector wasn’t involved, but on many occasions it was sucked in. Look, you’re 
either with me or against me and if I’ve got a project that also benefits you then it only stands 
to reason that I ask you for support. And so they ask for support in the privatisation of 
hospitals, for example, to build Terra Mítica. Huge fortunes are also present in board 
meetings. (Interview 32) 
For instance, the government lead initiatives such as the towers by Calatrava to close the complex of 
the City of Sciences and tried to involve the developers, although this time with little success.  
The consensus generated within an urban regime is on policy and not necessarily over values as it 
derives from the motivation of the participants (Stoker and Mossberger, 1993). However, although the 
interests of many groups converge in the development of mega-projects and events, such interests are 
not exactly the same and emphasis is put in different aspects and there is place for politics and 
negotiation in decision-making. Politicians need star architects who provide them with their needed 
icons and architects prefer to work for public clients because the control of the budget is less strict. In 
this way, for example, Calatrava’s creative interests and the regional government’s wish for 
emblematic architecture meet in the City of Sciences. Also construction companies benefit from 
emblematic mega-projects but their emphasis is more on making money than on the architectural 
quality of the work wished for by architects.  Thus, as Director General for Economy of the Regional 
Government (1995-98) very well summarizes, it is  
‘a three-way ploy with everyone at fault. […] The government would want it to be cheap and 
showy, the construction firm very dear and quick and the architect very showy and if possible 
slightly under budget’. (Interview 11) 
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In Sociopolis it is possible to see again the conflicts between producing architecture that stands out, 
making money and managing to deliver an urban plan. 
Regarding an event such as the 32nd edition of the America’s Cup, ACM (America’s Cup 
management) – owner of the race rights – arrived in Valencia in search to pursuit their interests, both 
sporting and economic. This raised the suspicions of the local entrepreneurs who, on the one hand saw 
the America’s Cup as an opportunity but on the other were wary of the Swiss monopolising the 
benefits of the competition. As the Council Commissioner for the America’s Cup, Gil-Suay, 
complains ‘it was a veritable dictatorship of ACM, spectacular, a bonanza for them (Interview 33). 
For the Valencian governors the America’s Cup meant publicity, not just for the city within the inter-
city competition race, but also for themselves before their constituency. On the other hand, an 
international event creates the consensus necessary to undertake – and speed up - important urban 
transformations which involve many actors and need the coordination of different levels of 
government. 
In the same way, accumulation strategies based on tourism and on construction can be considered 
complementary. Even the remaining industrial activity in the Valencian Community is linked to the 
construction sector. However, in Valencia there is a point of conflict which the America’s Cup 
brought to light. The fact that ValenciaPort is mainly an industrial port and not a passenger port 
although it is situated adjoining to the urban area, has caused territorial and land use compatibility 
conflicts. These conflicts were intensified by the America’s Cup because the port activity and the 
sailing competition overlapped geographically. 
The Port Authority of Valencia (APV) is a public body dependent of the Ministry of Public Works. It 
is responsible for the management of ValenciaPort, name used to designate the state owned ports of 
Valencia, Sagunto and Gandia, all of them located on the Eastern Mediterranean coast of the 
Valencian Autonomous Community (Port Authority of Valencia, www.valenciaport.com). According 
to data provided by the ministry of Public Works (Port Authority of Valencia, 
www.valenciaport.com), Valenciaport handled over 64 million tons during 2010 and is considered 
leader on the western Mediterranean coast in terms of container traffic. It also provides direct or 
indirect employment to approximately 15,000 people and generates a volume of business of over 1.1 
billion Euros. Therefore, the Port Authority is a very important economic actor in Valencia. Figure 8.1 
shows the colossal size of the port. 
Valenciaport’s economic interests, as expressed in its Strategic Plan 2015 gravitate around the growth 
of the port space in order to increase its competitiveness by consolidating it as the ‘main deep sea 
gateway on the Iberian peninsula’ and converting it into the ‘leading intermodal logistics platform in 
the Mediterranean’ (Port Authority of Valencia, www.valenciaport.com). 
The designation of Valencia as the venue for the 2007 America’s Cup moved the focus of the city to 
the maritime and harbour area, territory mostly in hands of the Port Authority. Apart from the land use 
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disputes over the inner harbour, the sailing event put in danger ValenciaPort’s longest standing 
strategic project, the so-called Northern access, a road access through the North. The project had been 
proposed by the Chamber of Commerce in the beginning of the 1990s but had never received 
government funding for its planning and implementation (Velert, 4 July 2004; Interviews 3 and 37). 
The Northern access seemed incompatible with a new tertiary and leisure area linked to the America’s 
Cup harbour, an obstacle which was added to the already existing ones.  
Figure 8.1 Mega-port of Valencia 
 
Source: Prácticos de Valencia (www.valenciapilots.com) 
The America’s Cup presented several inconveniences for the port’s interests. First, the old port project 
of opening an access through the North became more difficult, as a Professor of Geography at 
University of Valencia explains; 
The America’s Cup put paid in theory to one of their projects, i.e. the northern connection 
because there were now more port-access difficulties. […] They wanted to run it 
underground and enter the port but it was now even trickier because the northern part of the 
port had been picked as a leisure site so how could you run a motorway through it to reach 
the port, as they intended to do? It could reach the commercial port but now it would come to 
a leisure and show site and this is no zone for container lorries, which is what they wanted it 
for. And this raised objections and a certain opposition. (Interview 3) 
Second, there was a conflict with the council’s intention of building housing on port territory to 
finance the America’s Cup. This conflict was, however, promptly resolved by the socialist central 
government, which did not allow it. 
Finally, and more importantly, there was the question of whether a big industrial port within the urban 
fabric was compatible with a citizen leisure area linked to cruise tourism which the America’s Cup 
would promote. The geographical proximity of both the leisure and industrial port are evidenced in 
figure 8.2. As tourism representative in the CEV explains; 
If it was decided to make it a completely tertiary-sector port, solely tourism, we might forfeit 
our hegemony as a strategic merchandise port and this possibility needed to be factored in. I 
believe that the two might live together but only in a very well designed project and we 
certainly couldn’t stage events of this type, could we, because they run counter to the other 
aspect. (Interview 52) 
In short, in Valencia’s inner harbour area two accumulation strategies which seemed compatible a 
priori – production and its logistics and a consumption-based urban economy - clashed as they were 
spatialised. The prioritisation of one over the other presented no little dilemma to the local and 
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regional tiers of government, not least because global interests represented by the owner of the 
America’s Cup rights, Ernesto Bertarelli, and the F1, Bernie Ecclestone, were involved in the dispute.  
Figure 8.2 Tertiary port and industrial port 
 
Source: Planenge LTDA (http://www.planenge-ltda.com) 
Although Valencia port is central-state owned, the president of the port authority is appointed by the 
president of the regional government. The regional government has always supported the port, which, 
on the other hand, is very close to the city’s main business associations (Commerce Chamber, CEV 
and AVE). The local government, as would have been expected, favoured a strategy based on the 
urban development of the area with residential and leisure uses linked to services and tourism. 
However, both local and regional governments, with the support of the central government, marked 
the America’s Cup as a priority of their political project and the port authority’s demands put the 
regional government in a difficult position. Already in 2004 (see chapter 5) Rafael del Moral had 
resigned and been substituted in the presidency the port authority, probably in part caused by the 
tensions regarding the disputes created by the America’s Cup.  
In view of the situation, the port authority’s policy was to advocate for the compatibility of the hosting 
of the America’s Cup with their industrial activity and, particularly, their plans of creating a northern 
extension and access. The Director of Commercial Strategy and Corporative Development of the Port 
Authority of Valencia explains the port’s position; 
Well, the truth is that we are not really a tourism-oriented institution. That said, there is a 
central thrust within our strategy, which is integration between port and city because we are 
an urban port, due to city sprawl, and in the end we have to blend our commercial uses with 
public uses. […] But for the Port, for the Harbour Authority, the cruise sector is not very 
profitable because they take up very expensive infrastructure; port infrastructure is costly and 
passenger and cruise ships generate less income than container ships. Nonetheless, as part 
and parcel of this strategy of harmonising port and city we consider it very important to 
endow the port with the necessary infrastructure for a cruise stopover port. […] In other 
words it was also good for Valencia, for the Port of Valencia, to nurture the idea of Valencia 
as a cruise port, but as strategy geared more towards making port and city compatible than 
the port activity itself. (Interview 34) 
The conflict tourism versus industrial port intensified after the celebration of the America’s Cup in 
2007, when a new edition of the America’s Cup in Valencia was being negotiated. The enlargement of 
the port was seen by ACM (and Ernesto Bertarelli) as a problem for the celebration of a 2nd edition of 
the sailing competition and the consolidation of the America’s Cup harbour area as a leisure and 
tourist area.  
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Bertarelli pressurised the Valencian authorities saying that a second edition of the America’s Cup and 
the enlargement of the port were incompatible. The port authority – supported by the local and 
regional business associations (i.e. Cierval) - on the other hand, insisted on the compatibility of a 
mega-port and tourism and compromised to ‘phase in’ the construction work to ‘make it compatible’ 
with the regattas ‘as far as possible’ (Ros, 6 July 2007). In the words of the Director of Valencia Port 
Foundation, 
We generate twenty-odd thousand jobs, taking in direct and indirect employment, and help to 
make importing and exporting more competitive on the strength of an inter-ocean port that is 
currently the leading port in the Mediterranean and the world’s only port clocking up over 
two and a half million TEUs, which has continued to grow until the last month despite the 
downturn. So mister Bertarelli has his own point of view, which is just as valid as anyone 
else’s, but obviously our action does not go in the same direction; it aims at making the 
activities compatible. And we have already shown that the city has hosted the America's Cup 
and Formula One races and this port has continued growing and providing a service for the 
productive economy, which is our overriding aim. (Interview 45) 
The local and regional governments, although trying to avoid a conflict with the port and business 
associations, clearly prioritised the America’s Cup (which, on the other hand, had been so profitable in 
electoral terms). However, the Northern enlargement of the port was finally approved by the 
government. The uncertainties about a second edition of the America’s Cup created by the judicial 
case cooled down the expectations and plans to turn the harbour into a sporting and leisure area which 
could attract high-end tourism and cruises. 
In the end, the America’s Cup helped the Port Authority find support for another long-ambitioned 
project, the northern extension. As the Director of Commercial Strategy and Corporative Development 
of the Port Authority of Valencia explains; 
As I see it, the America’s Cup represents two important indirect advantages for the port of 
Valencia and maybe they were thought of at first but brought out later. Firstly there is the 
northern extension. […] The northern extension, here the construction work started, well this 
yearbook is a little out of date, but the northern extension is a port expansion in this zone that 
had aroused a certain public objection due to the environmental impact, because they claimed 
that the new sea wall might alter the sea-land sand flows. So no one objected to holding the 
America’s Cup, everyone was in favour, weren’t they, the whole society including the 
political parties. And since the holding of the America’s Cup meant building this new canal, 
the creation of this canal, and this sea wall set the limits of the extension, so the whole 
negative environmental impact basically boiled down to the build up of sand here and the 
loss of sand there. […] The America’s Cup is a project supported by one and all and since it 
had received overall support nothing negative could be said against the northern extension, 
which doesn’t grow at all and adds no other impact. So it is a great advantage because it 
saved us a lot of media debate. (Interview 34) 
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On the other hand, as port representatives have stated (Interviews 34 and 45); the America’s Cup has 
given ValenciaPort the opportunity to demonstrate that their activities are compatible with the 
citizen’s use of the inner harbour for leisure and to improve the image that the population had of the 
port. 
This conflict regarding the uses and specialisation of the port highlights the role of the state – in its 
different tiers - as mediator between different groups of interest trough a process of structural 
selectivity. Although the America’s Cup was prioritary for the government, in the end, the durability 
of the regime was not compromised, which, otherwise, would have also diminished the government’s 
capacity to govern. The government in its role of mediator was able to distribute rewards – such as in 
this case support to the northern extension of the port – and ensure the cohesion of the governing 
coalition. 
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8.3 Global actors and translation of interests 
Local coalitions of interest, guided as we have seen by the local and regional governments are just a 
part of the story. In a globalised (glocalised) era, a new set of actors – global actors to simplify – have 
made their appearance and acquired paramount importance. On the one hand there are the global 
architects who find work opportunities all over the world and, on the other hand, the owners of events 
such as the F1 and the America’s Cup. However, global and local interests are not completely 
autonomous from each other and cannot be studied in a simplistic excluding way, for they are 
interrelated. 
The America’s Cup was not only seen as an opportunity by the Valencian governors but, for the 
Swiss, Valencia offered extraordinary business opportunities. However, there was a clash of interest 
between the Swiss entrepreneurs - who arrived with ACM - and the local economic lobbies, who 
wanted to have their share of the business. In the end all the parties strived to benefit from the event. 
The groups of interest included public works construction companies who would get substantial 
contracts for the infrastructures, those who manage the publicity campaigns and the local urban 
development sector (because the America’s Cup and the new public sector investments would turn the 
maritime area into a profitable field for housing development and revitalise the real estate market). On 
the other hand, AVE and Port Authority lobbied for the extension of the port in Valencia while 
Bertarelli and Eclestone pressurised the Valencian authorities to prioritise tourism and leisure in the 
area. 
The Valencia Litoral project can be seen as one of the urban development opportunities brought by the 
America’s Cup. Nouvel was perceived by the local lobbies as an intruding agent but, at the same time, 
he needed to be integrated in the process somehow, given the local council’s good acceptance of the 
publicity and prestige he brought to Valencia with the Valencia Litoral project. A restricted 
architectural competition was organised. But, when the competition was given to both Nouvel and 
GMP exaequo, local architect Tomas was commissioned to coordinate a joint project. For the 
promoter of Valencia Litoral, the purpose of the competition was to justify a direct commission to 
José María Tomás, who is considered Rita Barberá’s ‘official’ architect (Interviews 16, 19, 31 and 
41), the one the mayor trusts to get things done. When there was a need for the design of a master plan 
for the candidature of the America’s Cup and very little time, Tomás was assigned the task. Thus, 
global architects – Jean Nouvel in this case - provide the prestige and publicity and local architects –
Tomás - provide politicians with local knowledge and the confidence of the well-known. The case of 
Calatrava is particular because he is at the same time global and local (Tzonis, 2005), and therefore 
ideal to be made the ‘house architect’ by the regional government.  
On the other hand, the involvement of global actors has generally come about through the mediation 
of local actors. Moreover, global actors’ interests have been transferred to the local scale through a 
process of translation. As one interviewee pointed out, the city has been transformed to suit the needs 
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of the events (Interview 54). According to the Secretary of studies and programs of the socialist party 
in the city of Valencia; 
The model has been to trail what the will of the owners of the mega events was, completely 
submit to that will, develop point by point their requirements and little else, I believe. 
(Interview 24) 
This transforming the city as a translation of foreign actors’ interests is very clear in the case of the 
America’s Cup. Indeed, once the city had been appointed, the mayor did not hesitate to affirm that the 
city would transform itself to offer the best America’s Cup (Velert, 8 December 2003). Valencia and 
its maritime area were put to the service of the Swiss company ACM. The Swiss did not have the 
necessary infrastructure to hold their sailing competition - the sea. Valencia not only provided it but 
also adapted it to their specific needs.  
Thus, Valencia offered Bertarelli an excellent regatta field because of the wind regimes but also, as 
book editor Lagardera explains; 
At that moment the national government was in the hands of the conservative party and also 
the regional and local government. So everything is hunky dory and the answer is always 
‘whatever you want’ and so there is a great communion of interests between the Swiss and 
the vested interests of the local political class at the moment. (Interview 31) 
Salinas (Interview 21), Director of Valencian Convention Bureau and responsible for the pre-
candidature phase of the event explains that the three main factors that made the Swiss choose 
Valencia (as explained by the Swiss themselves) were threefold. First, the city, its ongoing 
transformation process and the expectations on its further transformation. Second, the existence of 
institutional support at the different tiers of government. Third, a good professional team ‘who 
understood what the challenge was and how to tackle it in the best way in a very tight time schedule’ 
(Interview 21). 
For Valencia the America’s Cup was an opportunity, for ACM it was a business, and Valencia an 
opportunity to make money too. Thus, for ACM everything was benefits. Starting from the fact that 
Valencia had to pay a canon (90 million euro), to ‘buy’ the rights to hold the America’s Cup 
(Interviews 14 and 17). The owners of the event offered it to the best bidder and Valencia bid higher 
than the other cities (Interviews 51a, 51b and 52). 
Second, Valencia’s inner harbour area was redesigned according to ACM’s requirements. The master 
plan of the inner harbour area was designed for the purpose of the America’s Cup, in Gil Suay’s 
words the project ‘was functionally conceived with the Cup in mind’ (Interview 33). 
In the negotiation with ACM the infrastructural, technical, legal and security conditions that the city 
needed to fulfil were established, as Salinas, first director of the Consortium explains  
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So of course the ground rules are set. Who sets them? The organiser, who says, listen, if you 
really want to be candidate as host city you have to present a whole series of things, you have 
to submit a project, a candidature. […] In the end there is a contract between the organisation 
supporting the host city and the event organiser, laying down the rights and obligations of the 
parties. (Interview 21) 
The master plan for the candidature project – elaborated by José María Tomás architectural practice at 
the request of the city council - followed the brief given by ACM and was strictly limited to the area 
required for the America’s Cup (Interview 23). 
When the city was selected and the consortium was constituted to carry out the infrastructure works 
agreed with ACM, the candidature project was implemented directly with little further design or 
architectural competition. According to the Project and Conservation Manager of America’s Cup 
Consortium 
The projects put out for tender were really fairly well defined because the organising body 
laid down guidelines in the contract plus some basic requisites for each item. Certain 
dimensions had to be met, there had to be a berth for mega yachts of so many metres with so 
many berthing points, the area of the guest zone had to be such and such. […] The building 
had to have so many square metres, there had to be parking places. So in the end the bid had 
to be made with all these factors in mind. (Interview 47) 
In fact, the only original addition to the candidature project – and therefore to ACM’s brief - was the 
building Veles e Vents, which was meant to be a vestige to remind the city of the America’s Cup 
(Interview 57). 
Third, although the infrastructures were built by the Consortium with public money, for the duration 
of the regattas (until December 2007), ACM had the exclusive rights to exploit the inner harbour area 
– under the name ‘Port America’s Cup’. The Council Commissioner for the America’s Cup 
complains; 
ACM is so to speak the rights-holding body. The entire dock, its whole transformation is 
placed by the consortium in ACM’s hands for holding the Cup and ACM then manages all 
this infrastructure, organises the races, and lays down the rules. In other words, it’s as though 
we built the house and then handed it over to the tenant, only instead of being paid a rent we 
pay him to come. We made the house, handed it over to the tenant and paid him a rent and it 
is he the tenant who managed all the races and what we might call connected factors such as 
publicity, who managed all aspects such as the banning of publicity in the Avenida del Puerto 
unless authorised by ACM, in the whole inner dock, and a whole host of other things. For 
example Damm was the only beer on sale simply because Estrella Damm was one of the 
sponsors … Well, this was a true dictatorship by ACM, mind-blowing. Here it really filled its 
boots. (Interview 33) 
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Everything in the city seemed to be conditioned to the celebration of the America’s Cup. The most 
obvious thing was that the expansion plans of the port had to adapt to the America’s Cup, a fact which 
caused no little friction with the port’s authority. Also, the old regional airport terminal had to be 
modified to convert it into a terminal for the private aircrafts which arrived for the America’s Cup 
(Interview 21). But even other projects such as the approval of the Plan of Albufera (Plan Rector de 
Uso y Gestión (PRUG) de L'Albufera) were postponed until the needs for America’s Cup were known 
(El País, 29 February 2004). 
The America’s Cup seemed to be such a priority that the aftermath planning was overlooked. The 
bases of the teams, which were designed especially for the America’s Cup, were to be knocked down 
after the competition instead of re-used (Interview 57). Figure 8.3 shows a view of the bases, which 
have not been demolished yet. 
Figure 8.3 Bases of the America’s Cup teams  
 
Source: Author  
Even what to do after the America’s Cup depended on the investment already done with the purpose 
of the event. After holding the first edition of the America’s Cup in Valencia, the conditions for a 
second edition went further, not only a higher canon for the competition but also Bertarelli pressurised 
the administrations to plan the maritime area to his own interest. Finally, an agreement was reached. 
The central government assured that the organiser’s needs for a second America’s Cup would be met.  
Regarding global architects there is a process of translation, too. There is the idea that architecture is a 
highly globalised profession and architects – particularly star architects - work anywhere in the world. 
However, there is always a need for translation for, as shown in Sociopolis, global architects often 
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need the collaboration of local architects who know the workings of the local construction industry 
and building legislation. Thus, global architects got in touch with local architects to collaborate with 
them in projects in Valencia. For instance, Greg Lynn contacted Tomás for a project in Sociopolis 
(Interview 23). But, the call for collaboration happens also in the opposite direction. Local architects 
call foreign star architects to achieve more credibility in front of the administrations. On their side, 
foreign star architects increase their volume of business and visibility. Sociopolis includes a group of 
well-known architects which provide this credibility. In order to participate in an architectural 
competition for the America’s Cup Juan Añón – director of a well-known local architectural practice - 
got in touch with global architect Alejandro Zaera. 
In whichever direction the first contact happens, there seems to be a mediation of local agents to 
introduce global architects in the Valencian scene. The case of the Valencia Litoral project is 
paradigmatic. French star architect Jean Nouvel arrived in Valencia through a local real estate 
consultant who has a friendship relationship with him. Nouvel created a team with local people - for 
instance Iribas, Lozano - who provided the local knowledge. 
In the case of Calatrava, being a global-local (glocal) architect this translation occurs within his own 
architectural practice. Thus, although Calatrava is specifically asked to open an office in Valencia 
when he is commissioned the City of Sciences as a condition in the contract and needs to hire local 
architects - who know the local regulations and speak the language - he is conscious of the importance 
of his brand as a global architect and requires them to adapt to Calatrava’s office ideology. For that 
reason ‘Santiago’s interest was to employ young architects who could be easily freed from prejudices, 
without a very solid basis which would prevent them from doing what he told them to do, who 
followed his orders without question and without saying a word’ (Interview 41) explains a former 
employee. 
8.4 The importance of individual actors  
Not only politics matter but there is also some place for the agency of individual actors. Certainly, in 
the Valencia case, the influence of different individual personalities and their preferences can be 
traced. Apart from considering the state as an actor, individual politicians have put their personal 
stamp in Valencia’s politics. The importance of the figures of regional presidents such as Lerma, 
Zaplana or Camps, and of Rita Barberá, mayor since 1991 must not be underestimated. Besides the 
importance of the main political figures there are other secondary but very powerful political actors 
who highly influence policies. Thus, even when the initiative comes from someone else, as in the case 
of the America’s Cup which was the initiative of the former president of the sailing club, the mayor 
wants to be the protagonist and stamp her mark. 
According to Pau Rausell (Interview 13), a ‘casual model’ such as this of Valencia and the Valencian 
Community is dependent on which particular person is there at a particular time. Political projects 
heavily carry the stamp of particular persons. Blasco, married to Consuelo Císcar, is a politician who 
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has been in all the regional governments with different parties. He has been very powerful within the 
regional governments of each of the parties. Sociopolis was possible through the personal relationship 
of Guallart with Blasco and Císcar, and a series of coincidences (Interviews 28 and 60). Consuelo was 
the director of the Valencia Bienal and Blasco Regional Minister of Welfare. Then Blasco was 
appointed Regional Minister of Housing just when the regional governments were starting to say that 
it was necessary to build affordable subsidised housing (Interview 60). Subsequent regional ministers 
have not supported the project as much as he did (Interview 60; see chapter 5). 
Along with politicians and governors, as already discussed, architects are an influential group. Not 
only do they have especial influence in the creation of the legal planning network for the development 
of the city (for in Spain architects are also spatial planners) but they also provide politicians with the 
emblem they need. Their role in the generation of vision in which much of the government’s 
leadership of the ruling coalition or urban regime rests cannot be overestimated. The relationship 
between architecture and power has been thoroughly studied (Glendinning, 2010; Sudjic, 2005). 
Architecture and power have always been intimately linked but in a world where the media are so 
important and public image a crucial asset of power, the balances of power between an elected 
politician and a star architect seem to be somehow nearly reversed. Thus, within the architectural 
world it is assumed that it is true that star architects choose their clients and not the other way round. 
In Valencia, the figure of architect Santiago Calatrava has been particularly relevant, and his 
architecture can be found everywhere despite the fact that many people (Interviews 1, 4, 6, 16, 23, 28, 
29, 36 and 55) complain about the saturation of his works that the city has. His work is ubiquitous and 
politicians seem to be dependent on him. In the words of a Member of the Valencian Regional 
Parliament,  
They wanted to go ahead with this spectacular image of Valencia and this almost 
psychological dependence on Calatrava. Because the question no one posed here was 
whether a city should be practically an urban development complex and architectural theme 
park of Santiago Calatrava or whether a city should input a certain cosmopolitanism and in 
certain parts of the city there is room for commissions, so to speak, from Calatrava, Foster 
already has something, from the Iraqi, Zaha Hadid, from Nouvel, from Renzo Piano, from 
Rogers, in short, do something, right? But here there is a knee-jerk dependence on Santiago 
Calatrava. (Interview 55) 
There is almost a direct identification of Valencia with Calatrava (Interview 55). Each regional 
president has had his Calatrava building in the City of Sciences. Calatrava is considered to have what 
is necessary to become an architect of icons. From the 1980s, the architectural world followed the 
same trends of privatisation and economic liberalism as other social and professional spheres, 
gradually embracing the values of individualism and creative freedom (Glendinning, 2010). Individual 
personality – which is also reflected in an architect’s work – became paramount to professional 
success, not least because some of that artistic personality aura could be shared with the clients 
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through the process of commissioning and ‘owning’ a signature building (Sklair, 2006a; Sklair, 
2006b).  
Calatrava is said to be an ambassador of the city (Interview 6) and president Camps’ architectural guru 
because he’s a ‘bag full of personality, of blarney; he has an international image…’ (Interview 62). He 
would be an excellent representative of how: ‘right from the beginning of the Modern Movement, 
sprang a new kind of individualistic ‘hero architect’, concerned both with exalted prophesying and 
with promotion of his own reputation, as well as being highly sensitive to the visual ‘image’ of his 
work’ (Glendinning, 2010:33). See the architect presenting a new project for the City of Sciences to 
politicians, developers and other members of the Valencian business sphere in figure 8.4. 
Figure 8.4 Calatrava with Barberá and Camps in the presentation of the skyscrapers project 
 
Source: Jordi Vicent, in Ferrandis, 8 November 2011 
Calatrava’s skill to sell his work, particularly to sell Valencian regional presidents more pieces for the 
City of Sciences, is undisputed (Interviews 5, 11, 54, 55 and 62). As the Secretary-General of 
FECOVAL explains; 
Bear in mind that construction work is being given out to him against the opinion of all and 
sundry; there were raging rows with him in the economics department, raging rows with him 
in the infrastructure department, none of the companies want to work with him. The president 
said – bah! – I don’t mind. (Interview 62) 
From the very beginning and particularly when the project of the City of Sciences was threatened due 
to the change in regional government, Calatrava’s role was essential. Also Vicent Guallart plays the 
role of the ‘hero architect’, coordinating a group of international architects, finding a client – through 
his relationship with Blasco – and promoting Sociopolis within the cultural sphere of architecture. 
Guallart justifies his projects recurring to eloquent theorisations. In Sociopolis he mixes ideas of the 
garden city with the fashionable leitmotiv of sustainability and talks about the creation of a rur-urban 
environment (Guallart, 2004). This proves to be an effective way of achieving commissions and 
raising his work’s profile. His personality, persistence (Interviews 25 and 31) and ‘a good capacity of 
social and political relation’ (Interview 54) ensured the project to go on despite the difficulties. 
Valencia Litoral is the private initiative of a real estate consultant (although with the blessing of the 
local council) who hires French architect Jean Nouvel to propose an ambitious urban design project 
for Valencia. Jean Nouvel’s status of star architect also grants him the legitimacy to present a grand 
proposal for Valencia’s maritime front. Although the Valencian urbanism law allows the private 
sector to propose urban plans, a proposal by a corporate actor without an intellectual-artistic backing, 
would most probably have not been received as well (by representatives not only of the council but 
also of the central government such as minister Sevilla). Nouvel’s professional prestige and support 
by the existing handful of global star architects was played in favour of the proposal. 
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But star architects such as French architect Jean Nouvel are not the only foreign private actors who 
have been involved in Valencia’s fortune. Valencian governors’ reliance on sporting events as a 
marketing tool has brought to the arena the relevant figures of the owners of the events, Ecclestone in 
the case of the F1 and Bertarelli in the case of the America’s Cup. Both of them have wanted to shape 
Valencia in their interest. Once Valencia was selected to hold the America’s Cup, the planning 
machine was put to service the needs of the competition, as discussed in the previous section. In the 
same way, Ecclestone decided that, although there was a circuit in Cheste, 27 km from Valencia, he 
would prefer an urban F1 circuit in the harbour area and Valencia’s governors granted his desire 
(Interviews 2, 4, 30, 51a, 58 and 62).  
After the holding the sailing competition in Valencia 2007, Bertarelli, the patron of the America’s 
Cup, pressurised the Valencian public administrations to have the planning of the harbour area suit his 
needs. The eventual celebration of a second edition of the America’s Cup in Valencia was conditioned 
to the project of extending the commercial port. The two economic models, tourism and the industrial 
port competed for the same space and the Swiss tycoon put in crisis the alleged compatibility of both. 
The interests of the Swiss went further than the celebration of a sailing competition for Bertarelli was 
interested in the long term economic vision for the area and several Swiss entrepreneurs were 
interested in investing in Valencia if the port changed course to focus on high-end nautical tourism. 
Also Ecclestone’s interests coincide with those of Bertarelli in having a harbour specialised in tourism 
and leisure, which would be more profitable both for the America’s Cup and F1 competitions. As 
commented in a local newspaper ‘one and the other seem to want to design the future of the city, when 
what they are really pledged to is the future of their businesses’ (El País, 26 June 2007). 
Although some local businessmen representatives complained about the intromission in local politics 
– certainly defending their own economic interests - the local authorities yielded to the pressures of 
the owners of the events and tried to please them. On the one hand the sporting competitions seemed 
to them an important asset, on the other the economic feasibility of the maritime area depended on the 
patrons of the sporting competitions for without the crowds brought by them bars and restaurants in 
the America’s Cup’s harbour had already started to close. 
To add further complication to the equation, internal sporting disputes between the teams which had 
to be resolved by the New York superior court conditioned the celebration of the 33rd edition of the 
America’s Cup in Valencia. In the meanwhile the America’s Cup’s harbour area had no activity. 
Finally, on 2nd April 2009, the court pronounced sentence resolving a lawsuit that had started on 20th 
July 2007 by invalidating the Club Náutico Español de Vela (CNEV) as 'Challenger of Record'. As a 
result, the 33rd edition of the America’s Cup would be a one-on-one competition between BMW 
Oracle and Alinghi. On 20th November 2009 it was decided that the competition would be held in 
Valencia in February 2010. During all the period of uncertainty the America’s Cup’s area was in 
economic decline. 
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In sum, the whole process got out the hands of the Valencian authorities, who entrusted their 
economic model to a third party (ACM), making it highly vulnerable to contingency. 
8.5 Politics versus planning and tactics versus strategy 
Although the emphasis on mega-projects and events has been consistent in Valencia over time, it is 
perceived to respond more to an accumulation of individual decisions than to a thought-out strategy. 
For most of the interviewees Valencia’s particularity is actually the lack of a clear strategy, of a 
predetermined plan (Interviews 2, 4, 13, 26, 30, 31, 36, 45, 51, 52, 58 and 62). The projects are 
considered to respond to a permanent improvisation (Interviews 2, 31 and 51), to ‘fancy ideas’ 
(Interview 36) and instead of following a strategy are done ‘as opportunity arises’ (Interviews 2 and 
58), and therefore are ‘propaganda- and election-driven seat-of-the-pants jobs’ (Interview 58).  
The fact of specialising in mega-events was not a planned decision but an accumulation of events by 
chance which, in the end, formed what seems to be a strategy, the model was ‘constructed on the go’ 
(Rausell, 2006; Interview 36), what Rausell, senior lecturer of Economics at University of Valencia, 
has called ‘a fancy ideas model’ (Interview 13) which responds to decisions linked to the interests of 
different pressure groups (Rausell, 2006; Gaja, 2007).  For Rausell, unrelated and fortuitous decisions 
have converged on an emphasis on mega-projects and events, which have been later on been presented 
as a thought-out strategy. In the words of the Secretary-General of FECOVAL; 
it’s like catching anything that moves. For me, quite sincerely . . . I mean have you got a city 
strategy or not? […] What doesn’t seem on to me is to swallow anything just to feature in the 
photo, whatever it costs. It’s a cost-benefit issue and I believe this wasn’t done; instead it was 
dressed up afterwards. (Interview 62) 
There is a sense of path dependency (Interviews 58 and 62). It is a chain of decisions in which one 
leads to the other. Therefore, Valencia is perceived as ‘an empty container to host events’ (Interview 
30), a container which transforms itself in order to accommodate the different events (Interview 54). 
As the Director General for Economy of the Regional Government (1995-98) admits 
But in my view one of the knock-on benefits of the City of Sciences might be the America’s 
Cup. None of us could have imagined that when designing and promoting a city project this 
would give birth to other projects but success breeds success. (Interview 11) 
The city, however, had a strategic plan which was published in 1995 and was called Valencia 2015, 
but it reflects the characteristic improvisation as it has been repetitively changed to introduce and 
adapt to the new events (Interviews 13 and 19). Rausell (Interview 13) uses the term permanent re-
programming to describe it. He explains 
There is, for example, the city planning office, which is the Strategy and Development Centre 
(CEyD); here they draw up ostensibly strategic city plans that incorporate the mega events in 
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a very imprecise way. They invent a concept such as permanent reprogramming; 
conceptually it runs counter to the planning processes because what has to be brought into 
line with each new occurrence is the official discourse. And the occurrence might . . .  I 
mean, why the America’s Cup? Previously they had bid for many other events and if it had 
been a world-ranking athletics meet or whatever it would have been held in another part of 
the city or the outcome would have been completely different. There was no sense of ‘let’s 
reorganise the city with the sea in mind and therefore bid for the America’s Cup’, no, lets’ 
just try out options and see what we get. (Interview 13) 
On the other hand, the strategic plan is considered more of a ‘marketing device’ or ‘shop-window 
policy’ (Interview 9) than a real policy guiding document (Interview 17). 
According to architect Llopis (Interview 53), in Valencia there is little consensus to achieve a kind of 
integrated holistic planning which could have integrated the mega-projects and events into a wider 
strategic project. First, urban planning is territorially fragmented. A territorial plan has never been 
elaborated and there has not been an overall planning coordination of the Valencia city council with 
other councils in the metropolitan area (with the exception of some services such as water and rubbish 
management) (Interviews 19, 36, 42 and 51a). This fragmentation has resulted in the existence of 
contradictions between different plans at different scales, for instance the General Urban Plan of 
Valencia and the PAT (Plan de Acción territorial). Moreover, the General Urban Plan, which should 
have guided the future development of the city, has been modified at convenience. The case of 
Sociopolis is a clear example (see chapter 5). 
Without a coordinated planning framework which takes into account the whole metropolitan area it is 
much easier to do isolated mega-projects than to plan integratedly. It is also more rewarding from the 
public visibility point of view and therefore more beneficial electorally. 
Furthermore, the cost opportunity of the investments has not been studied (Pedro and Sorribes, 2007; 
Interviews 14, 30 and 55). Commentators and economists’ analysis emphasise the huge cost 
opportunity of these projects (especially the City of Sciences) (Interviews 13, 14, 17, 28, 30 and 55) 
and the bad relationship cost benefit (Interviews 1, 13, 14, 17, 28, 30, 51 and 55). Pau Rausell 
(Interview 13), Senior lecturer of Economics at University of Valencia explains it very clearly: 
Here everything is overkill. Here, to grow a sapling we flood three thousand hectares and so 
of course the sapling grows but the opportunity-cost of wasting so much water is vast. 
Indeed, everything here is overkill and naturally restructuring and repositioning the city has 
an impact and puts the city on the map. I believe that this is a very inefficient way of working 
but the impact in terms of citizen satisfaction is positive; the local people are happy and the 
city’s share of world tourism grows too. The results have been spectacular. No exaggeration 
but they have been notable. (Interview 13) 
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Looking at specific projects and events it is possible to trace Valencia’s ‘unplanned strategy’. The 
initial project for the City of Sciences, responded to the idea that Valencia needed an emblem, an icon 
but the objectives were not very specific (see chapter 5). The Director of the Science Museum 
explains it very clearly 
I believe that it’s a strategy designed by no one. There was no one with a light-bulb idea of 
‘within the next fifty years Valencia has got to change and to that end we’ve got to do such 
and such ‘. No, I believe that this was trumped up by the successive governments, but like all 
governments sometimes they are successful and sometimes not. (Interview 35) 
There was a lack of specific planning for economic regeneration. There was just an intuition that it 
would happen. In fact, decisions were taken without considering neither any alternative options nor 
doing a cost-benefit analysis (Interview 18). There was not an established planning of the area either. 
As a Member of staff of CeyD explains; 
But things were done slightly off the cuff. I can tell you that I lived through the City of 
Sciences project from scratch. We set out to sell it abroad when only the planetarium was up; 
the rest was only an information graphic. There was no more than an information graphic and 
lots of construction sites. The people who came here were disappointed and said ‘what’s all 
this?’ Because they’d seen the pictures and thought everything was finished already. There 
were no bus routes. All these questions were gradually cleared up on the go, whereas if it had 
been planned properly beforehand it would all have been perfectly thought out from the start. 
(Interview 6) 
Then, the project was modified and the communications tower substituted by an opera palace, without 
much debate or feasibility study. And from there the project grew and grew. Even the buildings were 
built before there was a detailed brief for their use. In 2001, when the opening of the opera was 
planned for 2003, the director general of CACSA stated that it was not possible to estimate the 
maintenance cost of the building or the cost of running the opera house (El País, 6 June 2001). A 
study of the possible uses of the building was commissioned to sociologist Iribas when it was already 
in use (Interview 28). 
On the other hand, the Agora was built with no clear purpose, as described in CACSA webpage it was 
‘conceived as a very versatile multifunctional space for holding different types of events’ (Ciudad de 
las Artes y las Ciencias, S.A., www.cac.es/agora/) and, since its opening in 2009 has been underused. 
As the Director General for Economy of the Regional Government (1995-98) has admitted ‘Valencia, 
‘pensat i fet’. That’s a saying from around here, you know? ‘Pensat i fet’ means planning little and 
trusting on instinct...’ (Interview 11) 
The story of the America’s Cup is also one of chances and accumulation of decisions. The sailing 
competition went to Valencia by chance, because the winners of the former edition, the Swiss team, 
needed a city by the sea. The America’s Cup was seen as a good opportunity by the Valencian 
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governors, mainly the mayor, and with no further economic analysis of cost-benefit and no alternative 
investment study (Interview 18) the city prepared to contend to bring it to Valencia. 
The project seemed more of a tactic - to get money from central government - than strategic 
(Interview 38). In fact, before the appearance of the America’s Cup the clear priority was the 
industrial port, which was being planned as a trading mega-port which would be referential in the 
Mediterranean (Interview 4) and it needed to be extended. Afterwards, with the America’s Cup, the 
priorities changed and the development of the port could be sacrificed in benefit of the tourist and 
sporting uses (Interview 4). Therefore, the America’s Cup did not respond to a strategic plan of the 
city and was not integrated into any overall strategy afterwards. Regarding urban planning, the event 
was not incorporated into a spatial plan of the city either. Although in 2004 the America’s Cup was 
perceived as an opportunity for the holistic spatial planning of the maritime area by architects and 
urban planners (El País, 28 January 2004) the urban project of the infrastructures to carry out was 
hastily established during the candidature process. No further design work was done. What to do with 
the maritime area was not clear and an overall master plan was not elaborated. Therefore, the 
America’s Cup was not used to plan the maritime area of the city which remained without an overall 
spatial plan. It was within this scenario that the Valencia Litoral initiative appeared. An individual 
developer perceived that the maritime area lacked overall planning, it was fragmented and forgotten 
(Interview 20). 
The economic opportunities linked to developing the area were grasped and realized but as a set of 
fragmented plans, as explained by architect Peñín (Zafra, 17 November 2007) Valencia’s waterfront 
area has had fourteen strategic plans, none of them implemented in its entirety, which has resulted in a 
seemingly unplanned design. The most profitable pieces within the waterfront area (due to the 
America’s Cup and F1) were designed and implemented first regardless of other considerations. 
Moreover, after the America’s Cup, the inner harbour area was re-designed for the F1 competition. 
The poor results in terms of public realm of the improvised redesign can be seen in figure 8.5. The 
author of the interior urban design of the harbour for the America’s Cup explains; 
Then they ran a tender for what they called the East Park, which closed off the port. We won 
the contract and it was carried out. It was a sort of linear park running along the new canal 
and closed off the port, you know? Then it had to be extended towards what was part of the 
new mooring berths that were being constructed. This park was built and as well as the tender 
specs it also had to meet some soundproofing conditions; a separation barrier had to be 
installed between the port activity area and the leisure-based area and since it was also a 
mooring area for yachts paying huge mooring fees blah, blah, these had to be protected from 
lorry noise. All this was designed and this park, as soon as the America’s Cup was over, well 
the Formula One circuit started and the circuit was plotted out above the park so the whole 
thing was dismantled. It was a hefty outlay, I think it cost about ten or twelve million Euros 
and then it was all dismantled almost as soon as it was built. Now that was built as a short-
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lived project because if it had been they would have... you know how it is . . . one day they 
think of one thing and the next month something else occurs to them. (Interview 36) 
Figure 8.5 Public realm in harbour designed for Formula 1 competition 
 
Source: Author  
On the other hand, not only was there a lack of holistic spatial planning  there was also a lack of 
integrated long term tourism planning despite the fact that the boost of tourism was one of the alleged 
objectives of the America’s Cup. The optimistic expectations of the administrations, transmitted to the 
population to build up support for the sailing competition, and the lack of an adequate forecasting 
resulted in an oversupply of hotels and restaurants (Interview 52). 
The lack of long term planning for the aftermath of the America’s Cup was generalised. Thus, once 
the sailing competition finished the inner harbour remained deserted, in the words of one of the 
interviewees it looked like ‘a ghost town’ (Interview 52). 
The critiques to this lack of long-term planning came from very different sectors of society, the 
Federation of Residents Associations, retailers and hoteliers associations, the political opposition, 
intellectuals and even from within the responsible for the organisation of the America’s Cup (Maseres, 
7 August 2009; Maseres, 7 September 2009; El País, 1 March 2010; Interview 33). It was not until the 
end of October 2010 that the local and regional governments presented a usage plan for the inner 
harbour, which was linked to the arrival of the high speed train to Valencia (Levante, 27 October 
2010). Short term planning but not agreed long term planning and strategy restricted the choices a 
posteriori. A path dependency was created for, without a long term strategy, finding other events to 
bring to the area seemed to be the easiest solution. 
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The idea of a lack of a clear strategy is reinforced by the fact that the projects have been politically 
used in a tactic way. Many of the discussions around the mega projects have been approached from a 
partisan viewpoint. The City of Sciences was very clearly the project of one president and it needed to 
be appropriated by the next government (see chapter 5). Politicians of different parties have strived to 
be identified with the City of Sciences. As discussed in chapter 5, all the presidents of the regional 
government have wanted to leave their print in the megalomaniac complex. The City of Sciences is 
used as political propaganda; it gives an image of modernity. It appears in architectural journals too. It 
is an element of political prestige (Interviews 9 and 55). 
Along the same line, the mayor of the city, Rita Barberá, strived to be identified with the America’s 
Cup and put the event in the centre of her populist politics. The America’s Cup and the alleged 
political and budgetary involvement of governments of different political parties has been a veritable 
bone of contention. This has been clearly staged in the Consortium. The disagreements started when, 
after the 2004 general elections, the conservative central government was substituted by a socialist 
party one. Fundamentally the discussion was an attack of the local and regional conservative 
governments, accusing the socialist central government of not pulling its weight and hindering 
strategic projects such as the celebration the America’s Cup.  In Ricardo Costa’s words; ‘Zapatero’s 
government now doesn’t know what to invent to damage the Valencian Community’ (Ricardo Costa 
in Velert, 3 June 2004). Every public appearance was an excuse to accuse the central government of 
not supporting the America’s Cup enough and was reflected in the newspapers (García del Moral, 12 
May 2004; Ferrandis, 14 May 2004; Vázquez and Velert, 4 June 2004). First, the central government 
had not appointed their representatives in the consortium (April to June 2004), then the delay of the 
environmental impact report, and so on.  
Meanwhile the central government tried to counteract the accusations. Later on, when the Consortium 
was given a credit for the infrastructural works with the bank guarantee of the ICO both local and 
regional governments complained that the central government was not investing (although the only 
capital came from the credit guaranteed by the ICO). Again they repeated it endlessly on every 
possible occasion. Also the comparison with the central government support of Sevilla Expo ’92 and 
Barcelona Olympics was a constant. The central government, on its side, counteracted by demanding 
investment from local and regional governments (which never occurred), accusing them of not 
investing, and threatening with managing the event directly on its own if they did not contribute 
economically (Vázquez, 10 June 2004; Velert, 14 June 2004). Political representatives in different 
tiers of government of both the conservative and socialist parties participated in the discussions. 
Finally, after ACM’s complaints, seven months of disagreements between the three administrations 
represented in the consortium came to a close and the works could be finished. However, even after 
the successful celebration of the America’s Cup the political row continued between the local and 
central governments over the property of the port’s land and the investments. 
Despite its described unplanned character, the urban policy has been consistent over time because the 
components – and therefore the interests - of the regime have been stable, not because a coherent 
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‘strategy’ had been devised in advance. However, an emphasis – for instance - on the construction 
sector could have been achieved with a different type of megaprojects, not necessarily emblematic 
projects such as the City of Sciences, which, as already discussed, has the footprint of each regional 
president. In that sense, the idea of a political project which guides the activities of the state and 
includes concerns that are wider than mere economic interest - such as the construction of a strong 
regional state within Spain - is crucial. Prestige mega-projects and events benefit certain interest 
groups – as already discussed – but they have been prioritised because they are consistent with the 
state’s hegemonic project. 
8.6 Issues of dissent 
In the 1980s, during the first local and regional democratically elected governments, the conservative 
political opposition criticised the socialist party in power for what they considered an over expenditure 
in big structural projects such as the underground or the Turia’s Garden (Interview 7). The City of 
Sciences was one of those criticised hideously monumental structures. However, the conservatives 
soon changed their minds when in government and made of the City of Sciences one of their flagships 
(see chapter 5). 
When the urban policy based on mega-projects and events was being pursued in full, there were some 
opposition groups to mega-projects and events on the grounds that there was a lack of social 
expenditure as a result. Some neighbourhood associations complained about the over-expenditure in 
mega-projects and events and got organised to demand more amenities for their neighbourhoods. 
However, the general public was satisfied with the urban policy, as shown by the electoral results. 
General opposition was not strong, nor had a real social effect (Interviews 2, 24, 38 and 44). 
Later on (from around 2009 on), as the country entered economic recession the critical voices became 
louder and more numerous (see figure 8.6). In any case, until very recently, it has always been very 
specific groups - architects and planners, intellectuals, ecologists, etc – which have been critical with 
the urban policy.  Political opposition has not been strong. Critical citizen groups have only had – on 
some occasions - the support of minority political parties, such as IU and the Green party (Interview 
2). 
Figure 8.6 Protests against the urban policy based on mega-projects and events 
 
Source: EFE, 11 February 2012 
The critiques have been on the one hand to the short-sightedness of an urban policy which has been 
called a policy of the spectacle. On the other hand, mega-projects and events have been, according to 
anti-growth ecologist groups, intimately linked to excessive urban development and, have provoked 
huge environmental impacts. Therefore, for opposition groups, mega projects, events and iconic 
architecture have been an excuse for urban growth and unsustainable urbanism. The collective Terra 
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Crítica published critical articles in the local press and published a book compiling them (Diago et al., 
2008; Interview 2). There was also an oppositional platform to the F1 competition called Fórmula 
Verda or one to the America’s Cup called Copa SOS tenible (Interview 2). But, it was not a wide 
oppositional movement. In addition, citizen oppositional groups had little support, money and access 
to information. Thus, only some minority groups opposed the America’s Cup, while the critiques from 
the main opposition political party were not to the fact that Valencia would hold the America’s Cup 
but to the way the organisation of the event was being dealt with. 
In the same way, the City of Sciences, having been incepted by the socialist party when in power, 
could not be directly dismissed by them when in the opposition. Moreover, there was an electoral risk 
in being completely opposed to such a popular project. Therefore, not surprisingly, the socialist party 
was never openly contrary to the use of iconic megaprojects since they had started this tendency with 
the inception of the City of Sciences. As the Regional Minister of Public Administration (1987-89) 
admits, 
It is effectively the idea of mega projects; that’s why I said earlier that it wasn’t simply 
another rejectable model; the socialist government itself also initiated it. The trouble is that it 
was only one more part of the whole at first, whereas after 94, still with the Zaplana 
administrations, it was conceived as a political ploy […] This is what usually happens in the 
last governments; the change consists in converting what was simply one facet of a tourism 
policy into the central thrust of the whole economic policy. (Interview 32) 
Or, as very simply put by the Director of the CBRE Valencia and Palma Offices Marín, 
I reckon this strategy has been very similar. The river [referring to the City of Sciences 
project] was started by the socialist party many years ago and all the conservative party did 
was to up the stakes. (Interview 1) 
Thus, the critiques from the socialist party – the main political opposition party – were directed, again, 
more than to the strategic relevance of the City of Sciences to the enormous cost overruns. They also 
focused in the figure of Calatrava.  
Moreover, many interviewees, including architects, business groups, developers and real estate agents 
among others, agreed that the city needs buildings by star architects but disagreed with Calatrava 
doing everything (Interviews 1, 6, 33, 43 and 55). In the words of real estate agent Marín, 
Maybe the most criticisable aspect is the setting up of Calatrava on a pedestal … and the fact 
they turned to no one else and the concentration of elements. Now I hear many critical voices 
wondering whether it was really necessary to build the bridge of the Azud d’Or, a really 
expensive bridge to span a river that didn’t carry water anywhere and then the construction of 
the Agora. All these features were the brainchild of Calatrava, of the same architect, with a 
specific style and all concentrated together. OK, let’s put a series of elements in other parts of 
the city to bring out its value. In the end, within a 1 km stretch, they pack in so many things 
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you begin to wonder if they’re really adding anything. The marginal utility of putting in the 
bridge of Azud d’Or or the Agora is really doubtful and they probably add very little in the 
end. (Interview 1) 
The emphasis on mega events was introduced with the conservative party in office both in the local 
and regional governments. However, both conservative and socialist parties roughly agreed that events 
were beneficial for the city. In the specific case of the America’s Cup, all the political parties included 
in the local assembly –PP, PSOE and EU – agreed in 2004 that the sailing competition was a great 
opportunity for the city (Velert, 9 may 2004; Interviews 51a and 51b). Therefore, they disagreed in the 
form rather than in the substance of the policy. That is, about how the strategy is carried out - for 
instance prioritising short term objectives instead of long term objectives - rather than on the strategy 
itself (Interviews 24, 32, 40, 51a and 51b). In the words of the Secretary of studies and programs of 
the socialist party in the city of Valencia, 
I reckon that the mega projects have been one of the foremost strategies of the regional and 
local government because they are in some way elements organising the modern economy; 
they help to project cities further afield and are probably one of the smartest and most 
productive city and development options, aren’t they? The trouble arises when their only 
target is political kudos and there is no attempt to tap into the major assets that might derive 
from these major events when they are planned properly with participation and anticipation, 
with a medium- and long-term outlook and strategic approach. This is what was lacking in 
this case. (Interview 24) 
But the consensus was much wider. In fact when it was announced that the sailing competition would 
be held in Valencia it was received as a great opportunity by different groups; an opportunity to shape 
the city in different ways, an opportunity to finish the maritime facade of the city, to recuperate the 
maritime area for citizen and leisure uses, to boost central government investment in infrastructures 
such as the high speed train, the extension of the airport (new terminal) or the extension of the port, to 
consolidate the tourist sector and focus on high-end tourists. The residents associations foresaw or 
hoped that it would also serve to complete Valencia’s neighbourhoods with much needed new schools 
and medical centres and regenerate the impoverished maritime neighbourhoods (Biot and Velert, 30 
November 2003).  
Thus, the general agreement about the goodness of the America’s Cup was qualified with references 
to the need for the competition to be ‘sustainable’ – particularly regarding real estate speculation and 
environmental impacts to the coast – and references for the need to plan for the redistribution of the 
benefits and for the aftermath of the competition. In that sense, the debate turned mainly around the 
infrastructure project for the inner harbour and how to minimise its inevitable environmental impact. 
As architect Añón puts it, ‘who is not going to agree about bringing in an event of this type? No, but 
the problem is how it is carried out’ (Interview 36). 
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After the first America’s Cup competition some divergences among the decision-makers started to 
appear, particularly between consultants and elected politicians. A policy based on mega events 
started to seem too weak to generate sustained economic growth. Too much emphasis had been put on 
the America’s Cup forgetting the wider strategy. Thus, Gil Suay, commissioner for the America’s Cup 
by the local authority explains,  
I was quite clear about this from the start. Before the end of 2007, i.e., before the end of the 
races, at the end of the Cup, I began to draw up documents for the authorities saying: ‘if there 
is another Cup we’ll have to negotiate with these people anew so they don’t take the mickey 
again’, pointing out which things could be exploited, how to tackle the overseas launch to 
reinforce issues that are really worth reinforcing, which complementary plans we could start 
to implement. In other words let’s work seriously on some of these things, quite a few things 
and it was already obvious that the next Cup was not going to be a pushover. But anyway a 
contract was quickly signed and it seemed to be a case of ‘having been overly pessimistic’ 
but unfortunately it was not so. So we have lost some precious time and now we’ve hooked 
up with another big event, Formula One, but in my opinion we can’t afford to pin all our 
hopes on these big events. Events are fine as a springboard but if you concentrate solely on 
events, well firstly its very expensive, very people-intensive and each particular event calls 
for no end of knowledge and expertise, different every time, etc. And from my point of view 
it’s like a plot of land where they set up the Christmas circus. When the circus has gone off 
this plot is no longer such and such square, it’s now the place where they set up circuses and 
it’s forfeited its own personality, it’s lost its rightful individuality. (Interview 33) 
In the same way, other economic sectors – the hospitality sector for instance – demanded further 
integrated planning to make the most of the city marketing benefits achieved due to the sailing 
competition (Aliaga, 31 January 2009; Interview 52). 
In sum, there are two main issues of general consensus, the necessity of growth – in economic and 
physical terms – and the need to market Valencia, and events and iconic projects are considered an 
excellent way to do so. But, for some, as previously discussed, events such as the America’s Cup have 
proved to be too ephemeral to be a sustainable growth strategy and the regional government’s 
insistence on Calatrava’s architecture excessive. Therefore, the main issues of disagreement have been 
on how the urban policy has been implemented rather than the policy itself. In this way, durability – 
an essential characteristic of urban regimes – is pinpointed in Valencia by the fact different 
individuals and parties did not fundamentally question the programme of activities. Although 
government participation is considered in the literature (Harding, 1997; Hubbard and Hall, 1998; 
Mossberger, 2001) to be one of the causes of less stability of regimes in Europe, it has not been the 
case in Valencia. Apart from the shared interests, it has been the strong leadership of the government 
which has provided the glue to keep the regime stable. Global architecture as a symbol of growth and 
competition has been successfully used by the government, not only within the ruling coalition but 
also, as discussed in the next section, to gain popular consensus. 
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8.7 The creation of popular consent 
Valencia’s urban policy – despite some issues of divergence - achieved for many years wide popular 
consensus. Popular agreement is highly relevant for the durability of the urban regime for - in addition 
to being electorally beneficial to the government in place – a lack of it can lead to strong citizen 
mobilisation and the disruption of the regime. The reasons of such consensus were mainly of two 
kinds; economic and ideational. Perception of economic success and social imaginaries were both 
fabricated and mobilised to recruit consent for the urban policy. Apart from relying on a lack of 
transparency about the real expenditure and decision-making processes, the press and institutional 
marketing campaigns played a crucial role in creating consent. 
On the one hand, notions of ‘growth for all’ generated consensus based on economic gain. Therefore, 
the idea that tourism would bring about the creation of wealth created consensus. In fact, the number 
of tourists visibly increased and that gave people the impression of success. In addition, the real estate 
model was widely accepted because it coincided with a moment of boom, of growth of the real estate 
bubble. It generated jobs and ‘easy’ money for ‘all’ (Interviews 7, 24, 28 and 32). Indeed, the 
expectations that any rural land could be urbanised and generate income for its land owner created 
social consensus about an economic model based in construction and real estate (see figure 8.7). From 
this perspective it is easy to understand why local farmers did not oppose to Sociopolis being built. 
For them urban development is more profitable than agriculture. As the Solicitor of the Irrigation 
Canal of Favara explains, 
No, the farmers put up no opposition. I’ll tell you something, and no doubt you’ll already 
have heard it elsewhere, what the farmers want is to plant mainstays. You know what I mean 
by that, don’t you? Market gardening is down on its uppers, the game is up and there had 
been many buoyant years when the farmers had reaped the best harvests of their lives, right? 
So there was no opposition because the people . . . no youngsters are going into farming and 
the producers are in such a bad state that there is no profit in it anymore. (Interview 10) 
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Figure 8.7 Sociopolis building site 
 
Source: Author 
On the other hand, there is a strong ideational component that contributed to the achievement of 
consensus for the new urban policy. The ideational not only plays a role in explaining why decision 
makers favoured a certain urban policy, as discussed in chapter 7, but it is also important to 
understand how the public was persuaded of the policy’s appropriateness.  Valencia’s ‘boosterist’ 
urban regime strongly relied on populist symbolic politics. First, local pride and nationalist feelings 
have been cunningly used by politicians (particularly of the conservative government), for instance 
appealing to Valencian people’s imaginary of discrimination by the Madrid government (used to keep 
cohesion within the regime too). 
For many local commentators, the Valencian idiosyncrasy plays an important role, and the political 
class has usefully grasped it. It has been argued that the character of the Valencians is little critical, 
little interested in public money accountability, there is not the awareness that public money comes 
from tax-payers’ purses (Cucó, 2007; Interviews 4, 17, 24, 28, 30 and 55). It also tends to an 
exaggerated local pride (Interviews 16 and 30) and to spend money in the ephemeral (Interviews 17, 
30 and 40). However relevant the existence of a specific ‘Valencian character’, the social psychology 
of the self-esteem has certainly been played to the advantage of the urban policy. Mega-projects are 
certainly something to show off to visitors and to be proud of (Interviews 14, 38 and 55). Thus, a type 
of discourse that is directed to the emotional intelligence and not to the rational one has been 
predominant in Valencia (Interviews 2, 4 and 30). For Gaja (Interview 2) only in this way the 
following question can be answered: 
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Why does a society beset by so many dearths, such grave lacks of school and healthcare 
equipment of all type look on so happily as public money is squandered on useless, short-
lived feasts and festivals? (Interview 2) 
It has been described as bread and circuses. This emotional response of the people has been very well 
used by the political party in power with outstanding electoral success. 
The other emotional component which was added to the discourse is the appeal to feelings of 
belonging and identity, of which spectacular architecture can be a representation (Vale, 1999). Those 
who criticised the model were called bad Valencians (Interviews 14 and 38). As Quilley (1999:191) 
has discussed for the case of Manchester, the assumption is that ‘to compete successfully requires the 
subordination of divisive class-based loyalties in the interests of the local ‘team effort’. For journalist 
Beltrán (Interview 38), in Valencia, this type of discourse has become central to local politics, the 
entirety of the political discourse is around the sublimation of mega-projects and events such as the 
City of Sciences, the America’s Cup or the F1. 
Architecture, or more exactly architecture by prestigious architects, is also a way of legitimising 
certain operations (Gaja, 2007). Calatrava is the most paradigmatic instance of this. As already 
discussed, his prestige as a star architect is incontestable. In Valencia Litoral, not only was Jean 
Nouvel a central element of the legitimation but the project was also backed-up by a long list of star 
architects of high media impact - Richard Rogers, Frank O. Gehry, Renzo Piano, Ben Van Berkel, 
Norman Foster and Peter Cook among others – who went to Valencia and who recorded videos 
praising the project (Interview 20). At a smaller scale, Sociopolis is, in great measure, valorised on the 
grounds of its architectural quality (Interviews 9, 15, 16 and 22). Gavaldá (Interview 15) goes as far as 
to say that star architects serve as an alibi. In Sociopolis, apart from the participation of prestigious 
architects there is the added value of it being presented as a project of social interest – because it is 
mainly protected housing. Alberto Sanchís, Head of the Professional Support Service of the Regional 
Ministry of Territory and Housing (Interview 50), explains it: 
Because at that moment, back in 2003 the real estate bubble was swelling and state-
subsidised housing was not being built. There was some awareness of a problem with 
affordable housing, of a lack of affordable housing. Then Sociopolis makes with practically 
100% of state subsidised housing, okey?, affordable housing, since about 2,900 or so I 
believe are subsidised and it is put forward as an operation of state-subsidised and affordable 
housing  at  a moment when there was no subsidised housing in the city of Valencia or in 
surrounding municipalities. So that’s what it’s all about; it’s a showcase deal to generate a 
wide range of subsidised housing at a time when there wasn’t any, right? So it was a question 
of selling the story not only in terms of social housing because more or less international 
teams were also chosen, people from the world of architecture with some profile. So let’s say 
it was an attractive project; it was a question of selling a project with these components: 
social housing, quality projects, public intervention. (Interview 50) 
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Global architects not only provide ‘certified’ expertise but also glamour. In the same way, Calatrava´s 
opera palace was presented as a cultural amenity (which made it difficult to contest) but also provided 
the newspapers with a long list of high cult musical celebrities to present to the Valencian public. This 
sort of populism - which in Valencia is taken for granted - can be applied to the America’s Cup too 
(Interviews 34 and 62). It translates as: Who is going to be against a beautiful and glamorous 
competition such as the America’s Cup? 
The main instruments to gain consensus for a policy based in mega projects and events have been the 
local television and the written press. Intellectuals and commentators complain that generally the press 
is not critical, and its role has been ‘to applaud and join the general consensus’ (Interview 2). El País 
journalist Adolf Beltran explains the role of the press very clearly: 
In this city there is a certain tendency to present a project to the press and it’s sure to hit the 
headlines next day. Look through past newspapers and you’ll see a host of examples of front-
page projects and mock-ups which then disappeared into oblivion, you know? You thrust a 
mock-up before them and . . . bwah!, the tallest skyscraper in Christ knows where, now one 
more building is to be put up... There is a more grotesque example involving some promoters 
who had presented twice a mid-ocean island, making quite a splash in the Valencia press; 
they were going to make a great big artificial island out there and, well, it was utter madness 
because this is not the United Arab Emirates or Dubai or Kuwait or any of those places. And 
the latest is a cable car from Bioparc to the port, presented by the same promoters, which also 
hit the headlines and then fell into oblivion. This is just playing with people. They’re playing 
on the populist gullibility of ‘great! We’re going to have the biggest...’ Words like ‘bigger,’ 
always play a very obfuscating role in these types of things, in my opinion. As I say a part of 
the press are fairly critical, we’ve often criticised this situation, maybe as a reaction to so 
much vacuous euphoria and grandiloquent words, and another part has been an enthusiastic 
propagandist of the matter, you know? It’s always difficult to strike the right balance, you 
know? And the grandiloquence tends to drown out any possible debate of the rational 
elements like what is good and bad about the project, above all because it’s fissureless; it 
leaves no space or gaps for any sensible discussion. ‘Either you’re with me or against me; 
either you’re in favour of Valencia becoming something important or you’re a traitor to this 
idea’. (Interview 38) 
Anyway, the written press does not have as much widespread diffusion or impact as the public 
regional television (Canal 9), which has been the main formulator of the public opinion (Interviews 4, 
32, and 55). It is controlled by the regional government and it has been instrumental in the 
conservative party’s consecutive re-elections as well as the consolidation of social support for their 
urban policies (Piqueras et al., 2011). Furthermore, it is important to remember that, on the other hand 
independent information and democratic control have been made very difficult by the lack of 
transparency that characterised the whole process (see chapter 6). 
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Figure 8.8 Photomontage of Sociopolis 
 
Source: Guallart Architects (www.guallart.com) 
Figure 8.9 Photomontage of Sociopolis 
 
Source: Guallart Architects (www.guallart.com) 
Thus, the local written press has presented the mega projects to the Valencian public in a positive and 
praising tone. Analysing the press coverage, Sociopolis is presented as innovative, sustainable, 
socially mixed, a project of exceptional importance, etc. See photomontages of Sociopolis published 
in the press in figures 8.8 and 8.9. As a Member of the grassroots group ‘Per l'Horta’ complains; 
The problem is that the bottleneck is very wide for them and very narrow for us, and we 
don’t believe in the media. Out of every five press releases you send in, one might be 
published from time to time. It’s different for them; they send out photos taken by an 
architects’ studio and say: this is going to be Hollywood. (Interview 15)  
The City of Sciences – despite the losses and cost overruns being published – has been described by 
the written press using words such as spectacular, ambitious, the leader, magnificent, or, the biggest 
cultural, educative and leisure complex in Spain and one of the biggest in the world. Everything is 
superlative: biggest, best, tallest... Figure 8.10, for example, shows a diagram of the first project for 
the City of Sciences where the telecommunications tower is described as the third biggest in the 
world. Also the figures of visitors have been periodically published, giving the public the impression 
of great success (despite the fact that the figures of the economic loss are also impressive). 
In relation to the holding of the America’s Cup in Valencia, from the beginning, the local press 
stressed how beneficial for the economy it would be. Since the selection of the city in 2003 until the 
celebration of the competition in 2007, numerous press articlesemphasised how important, 
economically beneficial, powerful in terms of marketing and boosting tourism the sailing competition 
would be or was being. In them it is possible to sense a feel of local pride. Different economic impact 
reports, importantly that commissioned to the IVIE by the regional government, were disseminated 
through the press. 
Figure 8.10 Diagram of communications tower 
 
Source: El País, 31 January 1995 
Regarding the urban transformation, as ex-candidate to the Presidency of the Regional Government of 
Valencia Taberner (Interview 4) puts it, there was not any citizen debate about the America’s Cup 
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because the press immediately showed artist’s impressions of how beautiful the harbour area would be 
after the development and, the public was impressed. In his own words, 
There’s been no opposition; there was some debate about this, focusing more I believe on the 
specialist sectors and the political sectors of the city council itself, but no social debate. 
Why? Because next day’s papers print pictures of the future development of that whole area 
and the reaction is: ‘how lovely! I like that!’ They show you the other project whatever and 
you go: ‘how lovely! I like that!’ (Interview 4) 
On the other hand, the economic impact reports of both the City of Sciences and the America’s Cup 
elaborated by the IVIE have been used by the regional government to justify them, and to justify 
almost anything. 
Apart from the use of the press, different kinds of marketing campaigns have also been important. For 
instance, in the case of Sociopolis, the first theoretical project was exhibited in the Valencia Bienal, 
Sao Paulo Bienal and Architektur Zentrum of Viena. Guallart gave talks about it internationally. The 
Sociopolis exhibition in the Valencia bienal had 7,523 visitors (Bono, 15 October 2003) and cost - 
according to the regional minister of culture – 606,601 Euros (Bono, 4 March 2004). In addition, 
regional minister Blasco organised an international landscape conference where Sociopolis was 
presented and the IVAM held an exhibition about Guallart’s architectural work. However, marketing, 
information and reality rarely seem to coincide. Whether Sociopolis will be what it has been hailed to 
be – a super-modern, green and intellectual project (Interview 17) - is still to be seen. 
In the case of Sociopolis the marketing strategy was more limited than that of the City of Sciences and 
America’s Cup. Not only were the City of Sciences project, and Calatrava’s body of work exhibited in 
local museums and presented to the public but there was a marketing campaign to promote the 
complex abroad. The City of Sciences was presented in National and international tourism fairs 
(World Travel Market, Fitur), and other events as a key tourist asset of the Valencian Community. 
Even regional president Camps participated actively in the promotion of Valencia’s mega-projects and 
events. He travelled to the United States several times to present the America’s Cup, the City of 
Sciences and other mega-projects as part of the international promotion of the Valencian Community.  
Also the America’s Cup had an institutional marketing campaign to mobilise social support for the 
competition. As the Council Commissioner for the America’s Cup explains; 
The selling of the sports element was basically in the hands of ACM but we want not only 
America’s Cup to be sold but also Valencia. And anyway setting up our own complementary 
campaign and mobilising the city ran the risk of a counterproductive reaction, a very good 
turnout, and that’s what we had been working on for those two years. (Interview 33) 
Thus, both the economic expectations and ideational components were mobilised by the press and 
marketing campaigns to achieve popular consensus. 
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8.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed how different local and global actors have been involved in the formulation 
and enactment of Valencia’s urban policy. Certainly, the interests of many groups –politicians, global 
architects, construction companies, business lobbies, etc. - converge in the development of mega-
projects and events. In Valencia, coalitions of interest have formed and pursued specific policy 
outcomes. To build the capacity to govern, local and regional governments have built alliances with 
the elite, which on their part needed the government’s legitimacy and economic and organisational 
capacity. As a result, a durable ‘boosterist’ urban regime has emerged. Thus, the public sector 
decisions have been in favour of private interests, as was to be expected given their participation in the 
governing coalition. However, it is the government which has put in place and guided the formation of 
coalitions, as it often is in the European case. Global actors – such as architects and the owners of 
mega-events - and their interests have also intervened and influenced Valencia’s urban policy. The 
involvement of global actors has generally come about through the mediation of local actors and their 
interests have been transferred to the local scale through a process of translation.  
Although the emphasis on mega-projects and events has been pervasive in Valencia over time, it is 
perceived to respond more to an accumulation of individual decisions than to a thought-out strategy as 
shown by the lack of holistic spatial planning and the lack of integrated long term economic planning. 
The consistency of the urban policy is due to the stability in the composition of the regime and to the 
leadership of the local and regional governments, guided in their actions by a marked hegemonic 
project of constructing a strong regional space within Spain. 
Valencia’s urban policy, despite some issues of disagreement, has enjoyed wide political consensus 
within the main political parties and influential local economic groups. Opposition to the urban policy 
has come from a limited number of very specific groups – local architects and planners, intellectuals, 
ecologists, etc – and has not generated a wide impact on the population. On the contrary, as shown by 
the electoral results, the general public has been in favour of the urban policy. The reasons for the 
wide popular consensus achieved by Valencia’s urban policy have been mainly of two kinds; 
economic and ideational. On the one hand, there was a perception of economic success brought about 
by the growth in tourism and the real estate bubble. On the other hand, the use of the emotional 
response of people mobilised by the official discourse and focused on local pride, identity issues and 
the need for self-esteem, have been crucial to understand popular support to the urban policy. 
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9. CONCLUSIONS 
9.1 Introduction 
This research has examined the use of spatially targeted emblematic projects as the key strategy for 
addressing urban economic and social decline. More specifically, the object of the research has been 
the urban policy that, in the last decades, has put emphasis on urban regeneration based on urban 
renewal, particularly through the use of mega projects by global star architects and events. 
The study was set out to examine the different economic, political, social and cultural factors that have 
led to the use of such regeneration strategy, to understand the actual processes and actors involved in 
it and the implications for the built environment and for planning practices. 
The specific research questions of the study were three. First, the research has sought to find out the 
implications of the urban policy for planning practices and for the shaping of the city’s physical form. 
Second, it has sought to conceptualise and identify the causes of the formulation of an urban policy 
that uses flagship projects as a means to achieve urban revitalisation and economic regeneration. 
Third, it has aimed to identify and analyse economic and political actors and processes at different 
scales and, their interplay involved in the formulation and enactment of the urban policy.  
9.2 The empirical findings  
The empirical findings discussed in chapters five, six, seven and eight have helped find answers to the 
research questions. First, they have shed light on what the implications of an urban policy based on 
mega-projects and events have been. The outcomes of the urban policy are physical, in terms of 
image, social, economic and in terms of governance. 
Certainly, as discussed in chapter 6, Valencia’s spectacular physical transformation has confirmed 
Hall’s (1989) statement that place marketing actually shapes cities in the sense that it guides their 
development in order to achieve a desired environment. In our case, this physical transformation has 
produced a new Valencia with an improved image which has attracted international media attention, 
improved the population’s self-esteem, attracted tourism, and been electorally valuable for the party in 
office.  
However, the benefits in terms of image do not correspond with the social and economic reality, 
corroborating existing research (Barnekov, Boyle and Roch, 1988; Hubbard and Hall, 1998; Holcomb, 
1993; Leitner and Sheppard, 1998). Not only have mega projects and events and their incurred cost 
overruns left the local and regional administrations highly indebted but the alleged generation of 
wealth for the ‘society as a whole’ has not been materialised either. A regional economy based on 
tourism and construction - promoted by the urban policy - has generated a regional labour market 
where precarious jobs and salaries below the national average dominate. Moreover, a focus on 
regeneration based on mega-projects and events has drained funds off social services - health, 
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education and social protection - in a turn from welfarism to entrepreneurialism. As a result, and 
despite the years of economic expansion before the onset of the crisis in 2008, an improvement in 
equality has not taken place, as previous research on the topic in other localities also suggested 
(Hubbard and Hall, 1998; Agnew, 2000; Harvey, 1989; Leitner, 1998). Meanwhile, the construction 
and real estate sectors have reaped the bulk of the economic benefits in a clear transfer of public 
money to private hands.  
But, an urban policy based on mega-projects and events has proved to be a clear conduit of profound 
governance changes. Not only are projects such as the City of Sciences considered big and important 
enough to justify legislative changes (see chapter 6) but they are also used as models and laboratories 
of urban management and development. A paradigmatic case of the last is the use of the Integrated 
Development Plan of avenida Francia – linked to the City of Sciences – as a pilot for the development 
of the Valencian Urbanism Act (see chapter 5). 
The mechanisms used to implement megaprojects and events have played an important role in a 
process leading towards more authoritative and privatised decision-making. Also, in the advancement 
of ‘hollowing out’ of the state processes as described by Jessop (1997a: 18 in MacLeod and Goodwin, 
1999). 
On the one hand, with the justification of efficiency, the speeding-up of procedures and the social 
interest of the projects, exceptionality measures were applied for the majority of mega projects and 
events. On the other hand, decision-making and democratic control was taken out of the citizens’ 
hands as management was transferred to public corporations and foundations, which, in addition, have 
been used to increase the level of indebtedness of the regional government over the legal limits and 
provided positions for the clientele network of the local and regional governments. Both 
exceptionality measures and privatisation of management - through the creation of semi-public 
foundations and public corporations - have resulted in a lack of transparency and a lack of democratic 
control which, many times have derived in corruption.  
Last but not least, financial difficulties brought about by the typical cost overruns of mega-projects 
have contributed to the public acceptance of privatisation processes. 
Second, the empirical findings further the understanding of the reasons why an urban policy based on 
mega-projects and events has been formulated. 
The interests of different groups – mainly construction companies and developers, elected politicians 
and star architects - meet in the development of mega-projects and events. Thus, linked to the 
construction of mega-projects, the economic sectors in expansion have been the construction, 
development and real estate sectors. For star architects, iconic projects provide the opportunity to 
increase their business volume and raise their professional profile. Elected politicians, beyond more 
general political and strategic objectives, see mega-projects and events as a source of personal glory, 
political promotion and electoral success. 
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However and although the interests of several groups converge in Valencia’s urban policy, all the 
mega-projects and events have been paid for with public money. The private sector has been benefited 
but needed the state’s support too. The state has the funding, institutional and the organisational 
capacity, but also the necessary legitimacy. 
The central government –both when in socialist or conservative hands - supported the celebration of 
mega-events in different Spanish cities but for the Valencian regional government the urban mega 
projects and the hosting of events became the core of their policy. In Valencia, both local and regional 
governments focused their political project on the emphasis on mega-projects and events.  
Since the onset of the autonomy in 1982, the Valencian regional government has been the state tier 
which has invested more substantially in Valencia’s urban mega-projects. The council has always 
played an important political role but it is the regional government who has paid for important 
projects such as the City of Sciences, not least because of its bigger economic capacity. In Valencia’s 
case, the regional and local governments can be considered to have been the main generators of 
strategy.  
Nevertheless, the central government’s supporting and facilitating role has been crucial since 
important investment for the regions, such as transport infrastructure, remain centralised and mega-
projects and events are seen as a way of competing for central government funds leverage. Therefore, 
despite the rhetoric of global competitiveness, Spain is still an important framework of competition 
for government funds and economic and geopolitical influence at national level, but also for prestige.  
From a strategic point of view, the construction of the Valencian regional state and its political and 
institutional implications are crucial to understand why an urban policy based on mega-projects and 
events, focused in the city of Valencia, came into being.  
The creation of a new government meant converting Valencia from a provincial capital to the worthy 
capital of the new regional state. In addition, it involved the creation of the necessary institutions and 
of a corps of bureaucrats to manage the newly acquired competencies. The establishment of such an 
important state apparatus implied the need for legitimation through the visible products of the so-
called self-government. Certainly, mega-projects can be considered the expression of a new power, 
the regional government. 
From an economic point of view, the accumulation strategy fauvored by the different Valencian 
regional governments to counteract de-industrialisation was based on tourism and construction. Those 
economic sectors were selected to the detriment of other sectors such as the existing traditional 
industry or agriculture. Particularly, the regional government’s support of the Valencian companies to 
create a strong regional construction sector was an important component of the creation of a new 
regional estate. 
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For the Valencian regional presidents, mega-projects and events matched well with the construction of 
a strong regional space not only economically but also institutionally and symbolically. The 
construction of the Valencian regional state was also in terms of identity and even semiotic.  
The ideational component has been a crucial aspect to understand the consistency of Valencia’s urban 
policy. On the one hand decision-makers have taken advantage of the population’s need for self-
esteem, wish for modernisation and glamour. On the other hand, they – as part of the same society – 
have had the same aspirations themselves. The search for self-esteem and local pride translated into an 
aspiration to be part of the first tier of cities when global ideas of competitiveness penetrated the 
Valencian imaginary of both decision-makers and population. Thus, at the same time, an official 
discourse about Valencia’s urban policy which included all the ideational components in the social 
imaginaries - modernisation, self-esteem, local pride, glamour, “Valencianess”, etc. - was being 
constructed. 
Third, the empirical findings offer an analysis of the processes at different scales and how different 
local and global actors have been involved in the formulation and enactment of the urban policy based 
on mega-projects and events.  
Valencia’s urban policy, despite some issues of disagreement has enjoyed wide political consensus 
within the main political parties and influential local economic groups. The main issues which 
generated general consensus were twofold; the necessity of growth – in economic and physical terms 
– and the need to market Valencia through the use of mega-events and iconic architecture. The 
disagreements have focused on how the urban policy has been carried out - for instance prioritising 
short term objectives instead of long term objectives - rather than on the policy itself. Thus, for some, 
events such as the America’s Cup have proved to be too ephemeral to be a sustainable growth strategy 
and the regional government’s insistence on Calatrava’s architecture excessive. However, the 
disagreements have generally been of form rather than of substance. 
Opposition to the urban policy has come from a limited number of very specific groups - architects 
and planners, intellectuals, ecologists, etc – and has not generated a wide impact on the population. On 
the contrary, as shown by the electoral results, the general public has been in favour of the urban 
policy. 
The reasons for the wide popular consensus achieved by Valencia’s urban policy have been mainly of 
two kinds; economic and ideational. On the one hand, there was a perception of economic success 
brought about by the growth in tourism and the real estate bubble. On the other hand, the use of the 
emotional response of the people mobilised by the official discourse and focused on local pride, 
identity issues and the need for self-esteem, have been crucial to understand popular support to the 
urban policy. It could be aptly summarizsed as ‘bread and circuses’. The instruments used to 
crystallise consensus have been the local media, different kinds of marketing campaigns and last but 
not least the prestige of star architects. 
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Although the emphasis on mega-projects and events has been consistent in Valencia over time, it is 
perceived to respond more to an accumulation of individual decisions than to a thought-out strategy as 
shown by the lack of holistic spatial planning and the lack of integrated long term economic planning. 
Furthermore, not any serious studies of cost opportunity of the investments in mega-projects and 
events have been elaborated to guide decision-making. 
Certainly, despite the lack of a deliberate planned strategy, the interests of many groups – politicians, 
global architects, construction companies, business lobbies, etc. - converge in the development of 
mega-projects and events. Coalitions of interest have formed and pursued specific policy outcomes. 
To build the capacity to govern, local and regional governments have built alliances with the elite, 
which on their part needed the government’s legitimacy and economic and organisational capacity. 
Thus, clearly, the public sector’s decisions have been in favour of private interests, as was to be 
expected given their participation in the governing coalition. However, it is the government which has 
put in place and guided the formation of coalitions, as it often is in the European case (Goodwin and 
Painter, 1996; MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999). 
Despite the convergence of interests, they do not coincide exactly, and emphasis is placed in different 
aspects, leaving space for negotiation and urban politics. For instance the America’s Cup brought to 
light a conflict between two different accumulation strategies – one based on production and the other 
on consumption – when the valorisation of capital was expected to take place in the same space, the 
harbour area. The prioritisation of one strategy over the other presented no little dilemma to the local 
and regional tiers of government. 
In addition, the case of the America’s Cup shows very clearly how global actors – such as star 
architects and the owners of events like the F1 and the America’s Cup – and their interests, intervene 
and effect urban policies. However, the empirical research has demonstrated that the involvement of 
global actors has generally come about through the mediation of local actors. Moreover, global actors’ 
interests have been transferred to the local scale through a process of translation. 
In the case of architects, global architects often need the collaboration of local architects who know 
the workings of the local construction industry and building legislation, while local architects call 
foreign star architects to achieve more credibility in front of the administrations. 
The owners of mega-events are seen by decision-makers as representing an opportunity for the city 
while the former need their interests to be translated to the local scale. Thus, although local business 
groups complained about the intromission in local politics of the owners of mega-events – certainly 
defending their own economic interests - the local authorities yielded to the pressures of the owners of 
the events and tried to transform the city to adapt it to their specific needs.  
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9.3 Theoretical implications 
This research has adopted a theoretical framework which combines different theories and concepts, 
such as, on the one hand the strategic-relational approach, cultural political economy and the literature 
on the politics of scale - with the aim to consider globalisation and its scalar and spatial effects - and, 
on the other hand, urban regime theory combined with notions of translation of interests between 
geographical scales in order to consider globalisation and overcome localism. 
The use of such framework to the Valencia case study has had several implications regarding theory. 
First, it has entailed the application of the strategic relational approach to the regional level. In the 
analysis of why an urban policy based on mega-projects and events has been instituted in Valencia, 
the relevance of the construction of a new regional state after the onset of the autonomy in post-
francoist Spain has come to the fore.  
Certainly, Valencia’s mega-projects can be considered the expression of a new power but also signify 
the city’s newly acquired status of regional capital city and the need of the Valencian people for 
reinforcing their identity and recovering their self-esteem, as well as their wish for modernisation. For 
Valencian regional presidents, mega-projects and events have matched well with the construction of a 
strong regional space not only economically but also institutionally and symbolically. The 
construction of the Valencian regional state can be considered in itself a hegemonic project which 
gave direction to the activities of the regional government. The accumulation strategy favoured by the 
different Valencian regional governments, when the economy was affected by de-industrialisation, 
was based on tourism and construction. Mayoral politics have played an important role in the 
implementation of the urban policy, if not from a financial, from a discursive point of view, since the 
importance of Valencia as capital city was enhanced by the creation of a new regional state. 
But, the analysis would not be complete without considering processes of globalisation (and 
localisation). The literature on the politics of scale has proved useful to overcome the relational 
strategic approach’s insensitivity to space. In Valencia, the regional and local governments can be 
considered to have been the main generators of strategy but, the central government’s supporting and 
facilitating role has been crucial. In this scenario mega projects have become also a way of competing 
for central government funds leverage, and - interpreted in geopolitical key - an opportunity for 
Valencia to consolidate its position and political and economic weight in Spain. This is also an 
element of the political project of creating a strong region. All in all, despite the rhetoric of global 
competitiveness, Spain is still an important framework of competition.  
Thus, as the central state has ‘glocalised’, through – among other processes - restructuring downwards 
to the regional and urban scale, it has also privileged competitive strategies – such as inter-city 
competition for mega events – which are more compatible with those scales. This can be interpreted – 
resorting to the concept of spatial selectivity – as a shift of political emphasis to individual cities’ 
capacity to successfully compete and promote themselves. Other observed processes of glocalisation 
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in the Valencia case have included the hollowing out of the state apparatus – particularly at local and 
regional levels - through the creation of public enterprises privatised management. 
In short, by allowing us to look through the lens of specific political projects - pursued by national or 
regional governments - that privilege certain social groups, spatial fixes and policy paradigms, 
including urban policy paradigms, the strategic-relational approach combined with the insights 
provided by the analysis of the politics of scale has shown its ability to be a powerful structural 
framework to understand urban governance from a perspective that adequately situates the state in a 
globalising era. However, this approach has empirical limitations as it tends to downplay the 
importance of political process, particularly how to build the capacity to govern effectively. On the 
other hand, it can neglect empirical investigation on how the relationship between hegemonic projects 
and accumulation strategies is articulated by hegemonic groups. In order to overcome such limitations 
and to avoid reading local change off from global change, this research has shown how the strategic 
relational approach can be combined with urban regime theory.  
Both theoretical approaches are philosophically and methodologically compatible. Although they 
place emphasis on different aspects, both of them recognise the importance of structure and agency, 
and take into consideration the role of the state. While the strategic-relational approach emphasises the 
importance of the state as site of strategy and mediator between different interests, urban regime 
theory – when it has been applied in Europe – has shown that in many cases the local authorities take 
up the role of coordinating the regimes.  Thus, by combining both approaches it is possible to build on 
the empirical strengths of regime theory while providing a firmer theoretical grounding. 
In Valencia, to build the capacity to govern, local and regional governments have built alliances with 
the elite, which on their part needed the government’s legitimacy and economic and organisational 
capacity. As a result, a durable “boosterist” urban regime has emerged. Thus, the public sector’s 
decisions have been in favour of private interests, as was to be expected given their participation in the 
governing coalition. However, it is the government which has put in place and guided the formation of 
coalitions, as it often is in the European case. In conflicts such as that regarding the uses and 
specialization of the port, the role of the state – in its different tiers - as mediator between different 
groups of interest through a process of structural selectivity has been highlighted. Although the 
regional government prioritised the America’s Cup over the port’s interests, in the end, the durability 
of the regime was not compromised. The regional government in its role of mediator was able to 
distribute rewards – such as in this case support to the northern extension of the port – and ensure the 
cohesion of the governing coalition. In this way the durability of the regime was preserved and with it 
the government’s capacity to govern. 
Therefore, from a conceptual viewpoint, leadership provides a link between both approaches. In 
Valencia’s case, it is clearly local and regional governors who provide leadership. Empirically, the 
pervasive emphasis on mega-projects and events in Valencia over time, it is perceived to respond 
more to an accumulation of individual decisions than to a thought-out strategy, as shown by the lack 
of holistic spatial planning and the lack of integrated long term economic planning. Resorting to 
theory, the consistency of the urban policy can be explained by the stability in the composition of the 
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regime and to the leadership of the local and regional governments, guided in their actions by a 
marked hegemonic project of constructing a strong regional space, and capital city, within Spain. 
Furthermore, the Valencia case study has also shown to what degree the ideational – semiosis and 
discourse - is intimately related to the construction of hegemonic projects but, also, to urban regime 
formation. Discourse and the strategic use of symbols, language and symbolic rewards, can motivate 
participation in regimes and help to build ‘a common sense of purpose’ or contribute – alongside the 
material – to the achievement of consensus around a program of action, resulting in the generation of a 
hegemonic project. In fact, in Valencia’s case the construction of the discourse was a parallel process 
to the construction of the regional state, evidencing the importance of both materiality and the 
dialectic of discursivity in the production of hegemony. 
The ideational can be key to keeping the cohesion of an urban regime, and avoiding popular 
contestation, which could disrupt it. Therefore, it is another link between the strategic relational 
approach and urban regime theory. Both of them, the first – through cultural political economy – and 
the second – particularly in the case of symbolic regimes – emphasise the significance of semiosis and 
discourse. In Valencia, politicians, besides providing leadership, have provided vision. Therefore, 
apart from the shared interests, it has been the strong leadership of the government which has 
provided the glue to keep the regime stable. Global architecture as a symbol of growth and 
competition was successfully used by the local and regional governments, not only within the ruling 
coalition but also to gain popular consensus. Global architects’ role in providing the symbols of the 
politician’s vision was crucial. 
Finally, the use of cultural political economy in the consideration of semiosis has helped avoid the risk 
of reading off policy outcomes directly to the different interests of the participants in the urban regime 
– apart from through the use of the concept of hegemonic project – by considering both the conditions 
of action which go unacknowledged by actors and the struggles to transform those conditions of 
action. 
9.4 Future areas of research 
This research is an in-depth study of urban politics in Valencia and, therefore it has provided detailed 
insights into the causes, processes and actors involved in the institution of an urban policy based on 
mega-projects and events. The case of Valencia covers generalisable theoretical issues in the study of 
urban politics - such as the role of the estate at different levels, the role of political projects and 
accumulation strategies and the importance of global and local actors. However, to further the 
understanding of such questions it would be useful to apply the used theoretical framework to other 
contexts, such as other cities in Spain where many of the processes are similar but where social, 
political and economic differences can be found, or in other countries, particularly in Europe. 
As made evident in the case of Valencia – which is a paradigmatic case in Spain - but is also 
suggested in other Spanish regions - for instance by the emphasis in global architecture - the onset of 
the new regional governments – each of them with individual political projects and, competing for 
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central government investment – is crucial to understand Spanish urban politics. The trend towards 
regionalisation is wide-spread in Europe and therefore its influence in urban politics – not only in 
Spain - would deserve further attention. Analytically, the theoretical framework used in this research 
could offer a useful tool. 
On the other hand, this research has highlighted the importance of the ideational - semiosis and 
discourse - in the creation of a hegemonic project, the cohesion of urban regimes and, the generation 
of popular consent. It would be interesting to compare in that regard Valencia with cities of other 
cultural contexts with different idiosyncrasies, or cities of different tiers, where the ‘politics of self-
esteem’ could have a different character.  
In Valencia the urban policy based on mega-projects and events became practically the only policy, 
but in a first tier city, for instance, the conditions would be different. As commented by one of the 
interviewees, many cities use global architecture to be ‘on the map’ but there are world cities such as 
‘Paris, Barcelona, New York and Chicago’ which have a lot of accumulated heritage whereas 
Valencia, to become a world city, will need to invest very heavily (Interview 26). Also the balance of 
power between local governors and global actors such as global architects or owners of mega events 
are likely to be different in other kind of cities. For instance, Calatrava in Valencia is a local-global 
actor, but, what differences would we find if we studied Calatrava working abroad instead of at home? 
Valencia’s empirical research is strong on the interests of different types of actors. However, more 
research on the motives of global actors such as the owners of mega-events or architects would be 
useful, not only to understand better their interests but also to study more in-depth processes of 
mediation and translation of interests, which have appeared as an important theme in the present 
research. Particularly, further research on mediation within the architectural world would offer a way 
into the relationship between processes of localisation and globalisation and their influence in 
urbanisation. This would also provide insights into how ideas travel. 
Regarding the travelling of ideas, some questions arise. Are global architects travelling elsewhere - for 
instance newly developing countries - and the urban policy which puts emphasis on global 
architecture and events experimented there instead of in crisis-ridden Europe? Examples such as 
Olympic Rio or the race among Asian cities to build the highest skyscraper in the world come to 
mind. Therefore, is the urban policy based on mega-projects still in full force or are we seeing the 
decline of it?  
Global architects seem to be taking on board the new economic situation and changing strategy. Their 
discourse is now more focused on austerity and ecology. In this sense, Sociopolis has provided an 
example of a different kind of architectural icon which claims to be sustainable. It remains to be seen 
whether this is only an adaptation to the new situation with the aim of maintaining the status quo.  
The last developments in Valencia – with a bankrupt regional government and cuts in public services - 
have shown a change in the reaction of the population to the urban policy, which has been put in the 
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limelight by the press and social movements as the visible cause of the region’s economic problems. 
Indeed, it was an urban policy of times of growth but, what will the evolution be in a different 
economic climate? One of the first measures Fabra – the new regional president after Camps resigned 
in 2011 - took was to dismantle many of the regional public corporations. 
Moreover, in the last months, the disastrous results of Valencia’s urban policy have drawn huge 
attention from the international press. Thus, a negative example in contrast to successful models such 
as “the Barcelona model” or the “Guggenheim effect” is being constructed, although it is still early to 
analyse the effect it will have in other places. 
In short, the study of a similar phenomenon in different contexts - political, cultural or in terms of 
structural position of the city – and different economic times, would advance the understanding of the 
actors and processes involved in it – such as state restructuring, travelling of ideas, introduction of 
new technologies of power and so on - from an empirical viewpoint. It would also test the usefulness 
of the application of the conceptual framework and would contribute to its further development. 
9.5 Conclusion 
Although emblematic projects are expected to generate economic activity and employment, this 
research has shown that – given their very limited effectiveness for economic and social regeneration 
and their inequality in the distribution of benefits – the main reasons for the implementation of these 
projects are related to the economic, political and professional interests of different groups and, to 
ideational reasons, such as the ‘politics of self-esteem’. The case of Valencia has particularly shown 
the importance of the creation of a new regional state from an institutional, political, economic and 
identity viewpoints. 
It has also highlighted the crucial role in the implementation of the urban policy played by a 
“boosterist” urban regime brought together and kept in place by the local and regional governments. 
Also, the involvement of local and global actors and the relationship between them, particularly in 
processes of mediation and translation of interests. 
Finally, it has provided evidence of how mega projects and events have become a conduit of state 
restructuring and neoliberal globalisation by fostering privatisation of assets and decision making and 
a lack of transparency and democratic control. 
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APPENDIX A. SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
General questions about Valencia’s urban policy: 
Why has there been so much emphasis on prestige mega projects in Valencia? Is it part of a 
general strategy/ urban policy? What are the objectives?  
What has been the prevalence of the strategy/urban policy over time? Have there been any 
differences? Why? Depending on the political party in office?  
Has the strategy/urban policy been inspired by other experiences? Has it been justified on the 
grounds of the success or failure of previous experiences here or elsewhere?  
What kind of support (political and civic) has the strategy/ urban policy had?  
Has there been any opposition? From which groups?  
Questions specific to a project: 
1. Initiative and objectives (why) 
Who initiates the project? Why? 
a. Inspired from other experiences? Are they justified on the grounds of the 
success or failure of previous experiences? Have they learnt from previous 
experiences in Valencia or in other places?  
Is the project part of a wider strategy? What strategy? 
a. Is it part of a political project of construction of Valencian identity? 
b. Is it part of an internasionalisation strategy?  How? 
c. Competition in tourism? Why?  
d. Relationship of the project with the strategic plan 
e. Other components of the strategy.  
Prevalence of strategy over time?  Have there been differences? In what sense? Why? 
Differences depending on the political party in power 
What are the specific objectives of the project?  
a. Have the objectives been aided by other measures?  
Have the objectives changed of over time? 
a. Have there been differences depending on the political party in power? 
Who supports the project 
a. State support to the projects?  Why or why not? What kind of support?  
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b. Have there been differences depending on the political party in power? Why or 
why not? 
c. Collaboration local/regional governments: how has it been over time? 
d. What has been the response of civic/ residents groups? 
Opposition to the project.  
a. groups in the city against and for development 
b. Opposition groups? Who they represent, composition? 
c. What was done to overcome opposition? How was it handled? What were the 
positions taken by the different levels of government? 
d. Other proposed alternatives 
e. Reasons for the opposition. Issues of disagreement 
2. Economic feasibility (why-how) 
Selection of the site.  
a. How and why was that site selected?  
b. Land ownership?  
c. Was there anything there?  
d. Was there opposition? Why? 
Finance  
a. Where does the capital come from? How much capital? 
b. What is the proportion of the general public budget invested in the project? Has 
it changed over time? 
Who carries financial risk?  
a. Financial risks for the state? 
Who benefits economically from the projects? Public sector? Private sector? 
a. Increase in value of the adjacent land and buildings? Was it an objective (for 
instance to secure the viability of the project)? Who reaps the benefits? 
b. Does it open up new land and opportunities for development? Relationship with 
real estate market. 
3. Delivery (institutional and planning) (how) 
What institutions and levels of government have participated in the project. Relationship and 
interdependence 
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Institutional arrangements.  
a. Have new bodies and partnerships been created? When? By who? 
b. With what objectives?  Why have these bodies been created? More efficient 
delivery? 
c. With what composition? Representativity of those bodies. 
d. Have there been changes in them? 
e. What are the competencies of these bodies? What power do these bodies have? 
consultory?  
f. Who are those bodies accountable to?  
g. How are decisions made?  
Relationship of the project with the strategic plan and relationship with the general plan. 
a. Have exceptionality measures for the design and implementation of the project 
been taken? 
• Who are the planners? Public officials?  
• Has there been public participation in the project? How? 
4. Design (Architecture and urban design) (how) 
Procedure to select architect.  
a. Public competition? What kind of competition? What were the requirements to 
participate? 
b. Who was the jury? 
c. Why was this project selected? Style? Symbolic capital of the architect and/or 
the building? 
d. Importance of networking?  
Interests of the actors 
a. Incentives to participate. Why was it interesting to participate in this project 
from the point of view of the architect? 
Models used for the design 
Design, symbolism and identity from the point of view of production  
a. Were there requirements for the design?  
b. Design mechanisms  
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c. Were identity issues taken into consideration for the design? How is the project 
different because it is in Valencia? 
d. How is the project physically integrated with the urban fabric? 
Has the experience here been useful for subsequent projects? How? 
Relationship with the delivery bodies 
a. Who is the client? Who are they accountable to? 
b. Decision-making to solve the problems 
5. Development (Implementation) (how-what) 
Procedure for the selection of development companies 
a. Public competition? Requirements 
b. Importance of networking 
Interests of actors 
a. Incentives to participate. Why was it interesting to participate in this project 
from the point of view of the developer? 
b. Economic returns? 
c. Have these projects opened up opportunities for more work? 
Relationship with the delivery bodies 
a. Who is the client? Who are they accountable to? 
b. Decision-making to solve the problems 
6. Communication and marketing (how) 
Public information during the different phases of design and development.  
a. What information does the public get? Has the information about the real 
financial costs of the project been made available to the public? 
b. Has there been a democratic debate about costs and benefits? What has the role 
of the press been? 
How has the project been marketed? 
a. Objectives of the marketing 
b. Audience to which it is directed 
What has been the reception of the project 
a. By the local population in general 
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b. Internationally 
c. By the specialised public 
7. Evaluation (what) 
Have the objectives been met? 
What are the benefits of the project? 
a.  for Valencia in general  
b. for the residents of the area  
Is the general public satisfied with the project? Is there any kind of opposition? 
Are there any negative sides to it? Impacts? Things that could have been done better? 
Have new opportunities for Valencia been opened up as a result of the project? 
Have new opportunities for development in the area been opened up as a result of the 
project? 
Sum-up 
Which is the significance of the project for Valencia? 
Is there a Valencian way of doing regeneration different, for instance, from Madrid and 
Barcelona? 
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APPENDIX B. LIST OF INTERVIEWEES  
Interview 1: José Luis Marín Sendra, Director of the CBRE Richard Ellis Valencia and Palma 
Offices, May 11, 2009 
Interview 2: Fernando Gaja, Senior lecturer of Urbanism at Valencia’s Polytechnic University and 
member of the grassroots group “Terra Crítica”, May 11, 2009 
Interview 3: Juan Piqueras, Professor of Geography at University of Valencia, May 12, 2009 
Interview 4: Albert Taberner, Ex-candidate to the Presidency of the Regional Government of 
Valencia, member of the Valencian Parliament for the left-wing party Esquerra Unida, May 12, 2009 
Interview 5: Adolfo Rodríguez, Ex-director of the Calatrava office in Valencia, May 14, 2009 
Interview 6: Mª Luisa Peydró, Member of staff of CeyD (Centre for Strategy and Development of 
Valencia), June 6, 2009 
Interview 7: Clementina Ródenas, Mayor of Valencia 1989-91, June 23, 2009 
Interview 8: Belén Hernández, Architect at Nebot Arquitectos, author of the plot distribution project 
of La Torre (Sociopolis), June 25, 2009 
Interview 9: Josep Sorribes, Head of the Mayor’s Office (1983-89), Senior lecturer of Economy at 
University of Valencia, June 30, 2009 
Interview 10: Alfonso Pastor, Solicitor of the Irrigation Canal of Favara, June 30, 2009 
Interview 11: Javier Quesadas, Director General for Economy of the Regional Government (1995-
98), July 1, 2009 
Interview 12: Cristina Martínez, Director of Architecture of the Calatrava office in Valencia, July 1, 
2009 
Interview 13: Pau Rausell, Senior lecturer of Economics at University of Valencia, July 2, 2009 
Interview 14: Vicent Soler, Regional minister of public administration (85-87), Councilor of the 
Valencia city council, July 2, 2009 
Interview 15: Josep Gavaldá, Member of the grassroots group “Per l'Horta”, July 3, 2009 
Interview 16: David Estal, Consultant of the Institute of the Territory of Valencia, July 3, 2009 
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Interview 17: Eugenio Burriel, Regional Minister of Public Works and Transport (1990-95), July 6, 
2009 
Interview 18: Joaquín Maudos, Economist of the IVIE (Valencian Institute of Economic Research) 
and author of the economic impact studies of the City of Arts and Sciences, July 7, 2009 
Interview 19: Vicente González Móstoles, Director of Town-Planning services in Valencia City 
Council (1981-84), Head of the Service of Urban Architecture of the Valencia City Council (1984-
87), July 7, 2009 
Interview 20: Ignacio Jiménez  de Laiglesia, real estate investor, July 8, 2009 
Interview 21: José Salinas, Director of Valencian Convention Bureau, July 9, 2009 
Interview 22: Javier Obartí, Author of the environmental impact study of Sociopolis, July 9, 2009 
Interview 23: José Mª Tomás, Architect, author of the America’s Cup master plan, July 10, 2009 
Interview 24: Carlos González Triviño, Secretary of studies and programs of the socialist party in the 
city of Valencia, July 10, 2009 
Interview 25: Lourdes García Sogo, Director of Sogo Architects, September 17, 2009 
Interview 26: José Antonio Pérez, Director General for Budget of the Regional government (1982-
95), September 18, 2009 
Interview 27: Luis Sendra, President of the Architects’ Professional Association of Valencia, 
September 21, 2009 
Interview 28: José Miguel Iribas, Social scientist specialized in territorial, town-planning and tourist 
diagnosis, September 22, 2009 
Interview 29: Miguel Arenas, Engineer of Necso at the Museum of Sciences working site, September 
23, 2009 
Interview 30: Andrés García Reche, Regional Minister of Industry, Commerce and Tourism (1987-
93), September 23, 2009 
Interview 31: Juan Lagardera, Editor-in-chief of the Valencia City magazine, September 25, 2009 
Interview 32: Joaquín Azagra, Regional Minister of Public Administration (1987-89), September 28, 
2009 
Interview 33: José Mª Gil Suay, Council Commissioner for the America’s Cup, September 29, 2009 
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Interview 34: Juan Antonio Delgado, Director of Commercial Strategy and Corporative Development 
of the Port Authority of Valencia, September 30, 2009 
Interview 35: Manuel Toharia, Scientific Director of CACSA (City of Arts and Sciences 
Corporation) and Director of the Science Museum, October 1, 2009 
Interview 36: Juan Añón, Architect, author of the interior urban design of the harbour for the 
America’s Cup, October 1, 2009 
Interview 37: Arturo Virosque, President of the Chamber of Commerce of Valencia and of the 
Council of Chambers of the Valencian Community, October 2, 2009 
Interview 38: Adolf Beltrán, Journalist of El País in Valencia’s editorial office, October 2, 2009 
Interview 39: Jordi Paniagua, Knowledge Management Director of Valencian Community 
Investment Corporation, October 5, 2009 
Interview 40: Joan Romero, Regional minister of Education (1993-1995), Secretary-general of the 
Valencian socialist party (1997-99), October 7, 2009 
Interview 41: Francisco Carmona, Architect working at the Museum of Science Project, first for 
Calatrava’s office and then for a Construction company, October 22, 2009 
Interview 42: Alejandro Escribano, Architect, Director of the 1989 Urban Plan of Valencia, October 
26, 2009 
Interview 43: Marta del Olmo, Business director of CACSA (City of Arts and Sciences Corporation), 
October 27, 2009 
Interview 44: Rafael Navarro, Director of the editorial office of El Mundo in Valencia, October 27, 
2009 
Interview 45: Leandro García, Director of Valencia Port Foundation, October 28, 2009 
Interview 46: Enrique Martínez, Architect at AUMSA (public corporation responsible for Valencia’s 
urban planning), October 28, 2009 
Interview 47: Manuela Gras, Project and Conservation Manager of America’s Cup Consortium, 
October 29, 2009 
Interview 48: Javier Soriano, Former architect at IVVSA (Valencian Institute of Housing), October 
30, 2009 
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Interview 49: Mª José Broseta, President of the Federation of Residents’ Associations of Valencia 
November 2, 2009 
Interview 50: Alberto Sanchís, Head of the Professional Support Service of the Regional Ministry of 
Territory and Housing, November 3, 2009 
Interview 51a: Ana Botella, socialist party city councilor, November 3, 2009 
Interview 51b: Miquel Villanueva, adviser to the socialist group at city hall, November 3, 2009 
Interview 52: Emiliano García, Tourism representative in CEV, (Valencian Business Confederation) 
and CEPYMEV (Confederation of small and medium-size businesses), November 4, 2009 
Interview 53: Armando Llopis, Architect, co-author of the Integral Development Plan Avenida 
Francia, November 5, 2009 
Interview 54: Ángel Martínez, Architect, co-author of the Integral Development Plan Avenida 
Francia, November 5, 2009 
Interview 55: José Camarasa, Member of the Valencian Regional Parliament (Socialist party), 
November 6, 2009 
Interview 56: Mª Jesús Rodríguez, Director General of Housing of the Regional Ministry of 
Environment, Water, Urbanism and Housing, November 9, 2009 
Interview 57: Fernando Huet, ex-director of America’s Cup Consortium, November 10, 2009 
Interview 58: Benjamín Muñoz, Secretary-General of FPIAUCV (Federation of Property Developers 
and Urbanizing Agents on the Valencian Community), November 10, 2009 
Interview 59a: Mª Ángeles Mallent, Administration director of CACSA (City of Arts and Sciences 
Corporation), November 10, 2009 
Interview 59b: Ascensión Gil, Architect at CACSA (City of Arts and Sciences Corporation), 
November 10, 2009 
Interview 60: Vicente Guallart, architect, author and promoter of Sociopolis, December 14, 2009 
Interview 61: Miguel Moreno, Farmer and resident of La Torre, adviser for Sociopolis master plan, 
December 15, 2009 
Interview 62: Eduardo Beut, Secretary-General of FECOVAL: Federation of Companies of the 
Valencian Community which are Building Contractors for the Public Administration, December 18, 
2009 
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APPENDIX C. LIST OF PRESS ARTICLES 
C.1. The City of Arts and Sciences (from 1 January 1989 to 22 March 2010)  
1 El Gulliver pretende popularizar un cauce muy poco utilizado. El País. December 26, 1990 
2 Las grandes obras de Valencia están financiadas hasta 1995 dice Ródenas. El País. May 5, 
1991  
3 Lerma presenta una torre de comunicaciones que ha de ser "emblema" de la ciudad de 
Valencia. El País. September 13, 1991   
4 Desbloqueado el proyecto de la Ciudad de las Ciencias. El País. September 6, 1992  
5 El desarraigo cívico. El País. March 17, 1993   
6 La Ciutat de les Ciències se presentará en mayo como el mayor  proyecto urbanístico del 
Consell. El País. April 27, 1993   
7 El ayuntamiento da luz verde a la Ciutat de les Ciències. El País. May 20, 1993  
8 Calatrava "la Ciutat de les Ciències es mi proyecto de mayor trascendencia urbanística". El 
País. June 1, 1993   
9 La crisis lleva al Consell a buscar más apoyo privado a la Ciutat de les Ciències. El País. 
September 13, 1993   
10 El ayuntamiento da luz verde a la torre  de la Ciutat de les Ciències. El País. January 18, 
1994  
11 El plan general de urbanismo de Valencia empieza a dar frutos cinco años después de su 
aprobación. El País. February 21, 1994   
12 El Consell pone hoy en marcha el proyecto de la Ciutat de les Ciències. El País. May 9 , 
1994  
13 El Consell saca a concurso las obras de la Ciutat de les Ciències un año antes de las 
elecciones. El País. May 10, 1994   
14 La adjudicación de la Ciutat de les Ciències atrae a las principales constructoras españolas. El 
País. August 17, 1994   
15 Las obras de la Ciutat de les Ciències serán adjudicadas en 20 días. El País. December 9, 
1994  
16 Las constructoras  ajustan sus ofertas al presupuesto de la Ciutat de les Ciències. El País. 
January 14, 1995   
17 La Ciutat de les Ciències se pone en marcha con una exposición ciudadana. El País. January 
21, 1995  
18 VACICO adjudica hoy las obras de la Ciutat de les Ciències. El País. January 27, 1995  
19 Enhebrar la aguja. El País. January 31, 1995   
20 La construcción de la tercera torre más alta del mundo. El País. January 31,  1995  
21 La torre de Valencia obligará a reorientar las antenas de tv. El País. March 8, 1995  
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22 Díaz Alperi paralizará los proyectos de la torre de comunicaciones de Calatrava y la estación. 
El País. May 31, 1995   
23 El PSPV pide a Barberá que defienda la Ciutat de les Ciències. El País. September 19, 1995 
24 UV está dispuesta a dejar en minoría al PP  en las cortes  para defender la Ciudad de las 
Ciencias. El País.  September 30, 1995   
25 UV y la izquierda apoyarán en las cortes la Ciudad de las Ciencias. El País. September 30, 
1995  
26 La duda demoledora del PP. El País. October 1, 1995   
27 Olivas dice  que el Consell mantendrá la inversión en la Ciutat de les Ciències. El País. 
October 19, 1995   
28 Economía asegura que decidirá antes de dos semanas si paraliza las obras de la Ciutat de les 
Ciències. El País. October 27, 1995   
29 Zaplana garantiza a los empresarios que la Ciutat de les Ciències se construirá, aunque 
modificada. El País. October 31, 1995   
30 El Consell cuestiona la torre de Calatrava sin conocer su posible explotación comercial. El 
País. November 2, 1995   
31 El solar de la Ciutat de les Ciències se convierte en la nueva puerta urbana al mar. El País. 
November 5, 1995   
32 La urbe indecisa. El País. November 5, 1995   
33 Olivas sostiene que el proyecto de la Ciutat de les Ciències "no lo necesita ni lo demanda 
nadie". El País. November 24, 1995   
34 Olivas asume toda la responsabilidad por la nueva Ciudad de las Ciencias. El País. December 
8, 1995   
35 El carpetazo a la Ciudad de las Ciencias muestra cómo el Consell sólo ha actuado por vía 
negativa. El País. December 10, 1995   
36 Emblemáticos desbarajustes. El País. December 11, 1995   
37 Calatrava renuncia  a explicar su obra en Valencia al desmantelar el PP la Ciudad de las 
Ciencias. El País. December 12, 1995   
38 El Consell ratifica la decisión de enterrar la Ciudad de las Ciencias. El País. December 13, 
1995  
39 Rita Barberá deberá convocar un pleno sobre la Ciudad de las Ciencias. El País. December 
14, 1995  
40 Los socialistas piden a Olivas que remita los contratos de VACICO a la Sindicatura de 
Comptes. El País. December 15, 1995   
41 Olivas dice ahora que su alternativa a la Ciudad de las Ciencias no está cerrada. El País. 
December 16, 1995   
42 Unión Valenciana discrepa del PP y apoya la torre de Calatrava en la Ciudad de las Ciencias. 
El País. December 17, 1995   
43 Fichas para jugar a la Ciudad de las Ciencias. El País. December 17, 1995  
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44 La Politécnica aconseja no repetir "la locura del 92" con la torre de Calatrava. El País. 
December 18, 1995  
45 Socialistas y regionalistas pactan una estrategia de "pinza" para que el PP invierta más en 
Valencia. El País. December 20, 1995  
46 El PP mantiene su plan de la Ciudad de las Ciencias pese a la amenaza de UV. El País. 
December 20, 1995   
47 El choque del PP y UV por la Ciudad de las Ciencias abre la mayor crisis del Consell. El 
País. December 21, 1995   
48 La politécnica se desmarca y reclama consenso. El País. December 21, 1995  
49 La disputa sobre la Ciudad de las Ciencias abre la mayor crisis de la coalición del PP y UV. 
El País. December 21, 1995   
50 Unión Valenciana acusa al PP de carecer de una alternativa seria para la Ciudad de las 
Ciencias. El País. December 22, 1995   
51 El PP no tiene una alternativa seria a la Ciudad de las Ciencias, según UV. El País. 
December 22, 1995   
52 UV se ofrece para propiciar el consenso en la Ciudad de las Ciencias. El País. December 23, 
1995   
53 Rita Barberá promociona entre los niños la torre de Calatrava. El País. December 27, 1995 
54 Los socialistas emplazan a Zaplana a que explique su plan para la Ciudad de las Ciencias. El 
País. December 27, 1995   
55 Zaplana niega que existan estudios a favor de la Ciudad de las Ciencias. El País. December 
28, 1995  
56 Los socialistas acusan al Consell de ser incapaz de dar alternativas al proyecto de Calatrava. 
El País. December 28, 1995   
57 Calatrava y Raimon reciben la medalla de oro de las Bellas Artes. El País. December 29, 
1995  
58 Valencia tiene proyector para un planetario en duda. El País. December 29, 1995  
59 El PP carece de documentos que avalen su acusación de favoritismo contra el PSPV en la 
carpa de las ciencias. El País. December 29, 1995   
60 Barberá logra que el ayuntamiento apoye la supresión de la Ciudad de las Ciencias. El País. 
December 30, 1995   
61 Olivas: "con lo que vale la torre de Calatrava se pueden hacer dos hospitales". El País. 
January 9, 1996   
62 Francisco Camps. El País. January 21, 1996  
63 Los socialistas instan a Olivas que diga de una vez si construirá o no la Ciudad de las 
Ciencias. El País. January 25, 1996   
64 Un centenar de personas se unen para defender la Ciudad de las Ciencias. El País. February 
6, 1996   
65 Ródenas acomete contra Olivas por la Ciudad de las Ciencias. El País. March 23, 1996  
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66 La inactividad de VACICO le permite obtener 30 millones de intereses. El País. March 26, 
1996  
67 El PP consigue apoyo parlamentario para crear una comisión de investigación sobre 
VACICO. El País. March 28, 1996  
68 El Consell rectifica y decide contratar a Calatrava para la Ciudad de las Ciencias. El País., 
March 28,1996   
69 El PP fuerza la presencia socialista en la mesa de la comisión sobre VACICO. El País. April 
27, 1996  
70 Amigos de la Ciudad de las Ciencias afirman que "Olivas ahuyenta las inversiónes". El País. 
April 28, 1996   
71 Santiago Calatrava presenta su nuevo proyecto de la Ciudad de las Ciencias de Valencia. El 
País. June 21, 1996    
72 La torre de la discordia. El País. March 4, 1998    
73 Tres versiones distintas y una paternidad en disputa. El País. April 16, 1998  
74 L’Hemisféric ya mira al cielo. El País. April 17, 1998    
75 Al final del río. El País. April 17, 1998    
76 La licencia de actividad del edificio es provisional. El País. April 18, 1998   
77 Hemisferios. El País. April 20, 1998    
78 L’Hemisfèric despega. El País. April 22, 1998    
79 El PSPV pregunta por las obras concedidas a firmás de Cotino. El País. May 20, 1998   
80 El fallo que anula el plan de la Ciudad de las Artes se recurrirá. El País. May 22, 1998   
81 Una firma que controla obras de CACSA fue creada después de ser adjudicadas. El País. 
May 23, 1998    
82 Calatrava reduce a la mitad el coste de su último puente para Valencia; el proyecto final se 
quedará en 1.500 millones. El País. July 15, 1998    
83 El Consell se atribuye el mérito de la bajada de los tipos de interés y la mejora de 
infraestructuras. El País. August 4, 1998    
84 Josep Sorribes, economista: "Sin Parque Central, el crecimiento de Valencia aislará los 
barrios del sur". El País. August 20, 1998    
85 Emblemás como coartada. El País. September 7, 1998    
86 La deuda de los entes autónomos y empresas públicas de la Generalitat ha crecido un 236% 
desde 1995. El País. October 2, 1998    
87 El Consell se endeudará en 27.170 millones para impulsar sus grandes proyectos de ocio la 
Ciudad de las Artes, Terra Mítica y Castellón Cultural piden un 61% más de créditos. El 
País. November 1, 1998   
88 Las obras del Parque Oceanográfico acabarán en verano, dice Olivas; la fecha de 
inauguración depende de la aclimatación de los animales. El País. December 31, 1998   
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89 Una funcionaria municipal será directora de la Ciutat de les Arts i les Ciències. El País. 
January 27, 1999    
90 Desaceleración. El País. March 1, 1999    
91 Valencia quiere estar en la élite de los museos de la ciencia. El País. March 7, 1999   
92 Un año del Hemisfèric. El País. April 17, 1999    
93 La mar de bé. El País. April 20, 1999    
94 Asunción acusa a Zaplana de ocultar con ilusionismo la ausencia de gestión; Moreno atribuye 
al PP los modos de la derecha reaccionaria. El País. April 23, 1999    
95 La Junta Electoral suspende la campaña publicitaria del Consell en internet. El País. May 7, 
1999  
96 Asunción exige al PP que explique en qué ha gastado los 750.000 millones que debe el 
Consell. El candidato socialista reivindica la labor de Joan Lerma como aval del PSPV. El 
País. May 9, 1999   
97 El País. May 17, 1999    
98 La Comunidad de los prodigios. El País. May 20, 1999    
99 Valencia, un turismo urbano de calidad. El País. May 26, 1999    
100 Edificios singulares. El País. May 27, 1999   
101 Una obra inacabada. El País. June 10, 1999   
102 Carles Francesc el Museo de las Ciencias, Grisolía y los siete "nobeles". El País. June 24, 
1999   
103 El Consell tiene vacantes en presidencia y seis consejerías. El País. September 17, 1999  
104 La Ciudad de las Ciencias amplia en 5.000 millones su capital. El País. October 15, 1999  
105 Barberá encarga a Aumsa la rehabilitación del Mercado de Colón. El País. October 19, 1999  
106 La Ciudad de las Ciencias suscribe un préstamo de 35.000 millones. El País. October 19, 
1999   
107 Olivas anuncia un plan de espacios turísticos para ordenar la oferta. El País. October 21, 
1999   
108 Zaplana inaugura el pabellón valenciano en una feria turística en Londres. El País. November 
16, 1999    
109 las pernoctaciones en hoteles crecen un 24% en Valencia y rozan los 1,4 millones. El País. 
December 15, 1999    
110 Turismo limita sus promociones a proyectos inaugurables en el 2000. El País. December 21, 
1999  
111 Un museo en movimiento. El País. January 26, 2000    
112 El PP pronostica toda clase de males si hay pacto. El País. January 29, 2000   
113 Fenómenos. El País. February 1, 2000    
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114 Un rascacielos sobre cada estudio de detalle. El País. March 19, 2000   
115 La Generalitat paga con suelo el 40% del capital social de CACSA. El País. May 31, 2000  
116 El director del 'banco' de la Generalitat creo una sociedad para gestionar su patrimonio con 
ventaja; el responsable del Instituto Valenciano de Finanzas no puede tener ninguna actividad 
privada. El País. June 8, 2000    
117 El PSPV exige una comisión de investigación sobre la contratación del Parque Oceanográfico 
de Valencia. El País. June 9, 2000    
118 Cultura proyecta una sala permanente de arte contemporáneo en la Ciudad de las Artes. El 
País. June 29, 2000    
119 Valencia deja de ser una ciudad de paso gracias a su nuevo auge turístico; el aumento de 
viajeros y de pernoctaciones supera la media española. El País. August 4, 2000   
120 El valle de los huesos. El País. August 30, 2000    
121 Edificios emblemáticos que encierran la cultura la Ciudad de las Artes y las Ciencias de 
Valencia encabeza las infraestructuras para el nuevo milenio. El País. October 9, 2000   
122 El Consell 'hipoteca' la Ciudad de las Ciencias como garantía para hacer frente a los créditos 
todas las acciones de la empresa pública están pignoradas por los bancos acreedores. El País. 
November 12, 2000    
123 Un éxito de público basado en una gestión deficitaria. El País. November 12, 2000   
124 El planeamiento urbanístico y la cesión de inmuebles son elementos claves de la ingeniería 
financiera de la Ciudad de las Artes y las Ciencias. El País. November 12, 2000   
125 El Museu de les Ciències que se inauguro hace 20 meses abre al público. El País. November 
13, 2000    
126 Valencia abre al público uno de los mayores museos de la ciencia del mundo. El País. 
November 14, 2000    
127 Zaplana afirma en la apertura del Museu de les Ciències que su intención es que sea rentable; 
los socialistas lamentan el sectarismo del partido popular y critican la mala gestión 
económica. El País. November 14, 2000    
128 Cambia la piel de la ciudad. El País. November 16, 2000    
129 El Consell adjudicó el proyecto con unas garantías irreales de plazo y presupuesto. El País. 
December 27, 2000    
130 La Sindicatura cuestiona las contrataciones en CACSA. El País. December 27, 2000   
131 Un contrapeso para Barcelona. El País. January 14, 2001    
132 El PSPV pide un plan de viabilidad para la Ciudad de las Artes; considera que la empresa 
está en situación de quiebra financiera. El País. January 24, 2001    
133 Galiano subraya el predominio de la "arquitectura del espectáculo". El País. January 26, 2001  
134 Zaplana se adjudica el crecimiento del turismo y Pla dice que el modelo del PP está agotado; 
el líder del PSPV dice en Fitur que los populares tutelan y dirigen demásiado el sector. El 
País. February 2, 2001   
135 Zaplana busca captar más visitantes alemanes. El País. March 7, 2001   
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136 El certamen Operalia se celebrara en el Palau de les Arts en 2003. El País. March 14, 2001  
137 2.000 millones de la CAM para la Ciudad de las Artes. El País. March 23, 2001  
138 La CAM aprueba una operación financiera de 2.000 millones con la Ciudad de las Artes; la 
entidad alicantina da luz verde a un modesto plan de apertura de oficinas en Valencia. El 
País. March 23, 2001    
139 Urbe oferta a empresas y público 30 millones de metros cuadrados de promociones 
inmobiliarias; los constructores valencianos organizan una feria propia para captar nuevos 
inversores. El País. April 25, 2001   
140 Retraso del Oceanográfico. El País. April 27, 2001    
141 La desazón del inspector. El País. April 29, 2001    
142 Zaplana pide al Consell que controle el gasto pero exige nuevas iniciativas las "fórmulas 
imaginativas" de financiación generan nuevas deudas. El País. April 29, 2001    
143 El Consell niega las irregularidades en la Ciudad de las Artes que refleja el último informe de 
la sindicatura. El País. May 8, 2001    
144 Argüelles dice ignorar el coste de mantenimiento del Palau de les Arts. El País. June 6, 2001  
145 Hacienda concede avales a la Ciudad de las Artes por 17.470 millones. El País. June 19, 
2001   
146 Los bancos extreman las cautelas. El País. June 28, 2001    
147 El Consell autoriza más avales por valor de 17.470 millones para financiar la Ciudad de las 
Ciencias; la Generalitat transmitirá la titularidad de los edificios para respaldar las acciones 
pignoradas. El País. June 28, 2001   
148 El Consell avala nuevos créditos a la Ciudad de las Ciencias por 17.470 millones. El País. 
June 28, 2001    
149 Los socialistas acusan al Consell de abrir unas grietas económicas insalvables en la Ciudad 
de las Ciencias. El País. June 29, 2001    
150 Parque temático de Alicante pagará 400 millones por el control de las obras de la Ciudad de 
la Luz. El País. July 27, 2001    
151 La Generalitat 'inventa' la sociedad pública de responsabilidad limitada; la fórmula restringe 
los órganos de gobierno y la información pública. El País. August 16, 2001    
152 Hacienda traslada 814 millones del servicio de la deuda para pagar las cargas de Ferrocarrils; 
el compromiso con FGV abre la vía para dotar las obligaciones de otras empresas públicas. 
El País. August 21, 2001   
153 Hacienda paga las cargas de FGV y abre la vía a otras empresas públicas. El País. August 21, 
2001   
154 El operador del Oceanográfico definirá costes, inversiónes y tarifas sin asumir riesgo alguno; 
la Generalitat sostiene que los auditores propusieron dividir CACSA en sociedades limitadas. 
El País. August 24, 2001    
155 PSPV y EU piden una moratoria para el litoral; propuestas. El País. September 14, 2001  
156 El País. September 19, 2001    
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157 Císcar aboga por ubicar los institutos del cine y de la música en la Ciudad de las Artes y las 
Ciencias. El País. October 9, 2001    
158 La Ciudad de las Artes y el Instituto de Finanzas agudizan el riesgo financiero de la 
Generalitat; una agencia alerta del incremento de la deuda. El País. October 12, 2001   
159 PSPV y EU dicen que los cambios son para "colocar amigos". El País. October 31, 2001  
160 Zaplana refuerza el área de política social y potencia la figura de Rafael Blasco en el Consell; 
el presidente rescata a Miguel Navarro, número dos de la Consejería de Innovación y 
Tecnología. El País. October 31, 2001    
161 El presupuesto de las empresas públicas sube un 46%. El País. November 1, 2001   
162 El Consell presenta un presupuesto expansivo para 2002 frente a la contención del gobierno; 
el capítulo de gasto corriente se incrementa un 23,7% y el de personal un 5,7%. El País. 
November 1, 2001   
163 Las deudas de las empresas públicas superarán en 2002 el medio billón de pesetas; Hacienda 
les da margen para que aumenten su endeudamiento en casi 90.000 millones. El País. 
November 2, 2001    
164 Visitas millonarias. El País. November 10, 2001    
165 Una invitación a la última maravilla del Turia. El País. November 12, 2001   
166 La discrepancia sobre el impacto de la crisis marca el debate de presupuestos en las Cortes; 
rechazadas las enmiendas a la totalidad de la oposición a las cuentas presentadas por el 
Consell. El País. November 20, 2001    
167 Rambla dice que la oposición "sigue sin saber leer los presupuestos". El País. November 22, 
2001  
168 El PP rechaza 50 comparecencias que pide el PSPV para explicar el informe del Síndic; los 
socialistas consideran que el "crítico" documento desvela múltiples irregularidades. El País. 
January 11, 2002   
169 El Museu de les Ciències concentra las visitas concertadas y reduce las de otros centros; el 
IVAM esquiva la tendencia a la baja con un aumento de público en 2001. El País. January 
16, 2002   
170 El Consell adjudica a Parques Reunidos la gestión de l’Oceanogràfic. El País. January 24, 
2002   
171 La vida sigue igual. El País. January 24, 2002    
172 CACSA prevé beneficios de 8,4 millones en l’Oceanogràfic. El País. January 25, 2002   
173 El País. January 26, 2002    
174 Standard & Poor's sugiere subidas de impuestos para mantener ingresos. El País. February 7, 
2002    
175 VPO. El País. February 14, 2002    
176 La Ciudad de las Artes arrastra ya una deuda de 679 millones de euros, según la oposición el 
PP dice que el proyecto es "económicamente viable" y rechaza un plan de saneamiento. El 
País. March 22, 2002    
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177 El País. April 3, 2002    
178 En Valencia, las cosas no va tan bien. El País. April 8, 2002    
179 Una progresión peligrosa. El País. May 2, 2002    
180 "La inversión pública será de 'Guinness". El País. June 2, 2002    
181 Acuario. El País. July 8, 2002    
182 Falta de voluntad política. El País. July 9, 2002    
183 Lujo sin servicios. El País. July 17, 2002    
184 El turismo tropieza con la crisis, julio arranca con una caída de la ocupación entre el 4% y el 
25% en las principales zonas del país. El País. July 21, 2002    
185 Olivas toma posesión arropado por tres ministros y mantiene el Consell de Zaplana el nuevo 
presidente de la Generalitat solo introducirá cambios en el 'segundo escalón'. El País. July 24, 
2002    
186 Olivas lleva a presidencia el área de ciencia y tecnología y rescata la Consejería de Industria. 
El País. July 25, 2002    
187 Un río de propuestas. El País. October 8, 2002    
188 Interior eleva a 500 los efectivos de la policía autonómica. El País. October 16, 2002   
189 Los hoteleros advierten de que en 2005 sobrarán 5.000 alojamientos en la ciudad de Valencia 
la capital contará dentro de cuatro años con 43 nuevos establecimientos. El País. October 16, 
2002   
190 Decisiones tardías. El País. October 25, 2002    
191 Porqués. El País. October 29, 2002    
192 El PP defiende sus previsiones con informes de "agencias de prestigio". El País. November 3, 
2002    
193 Camps viaja a Munich para proponer a Zubin Mehta que dirija la futura orquesta autonómica 
si gana el PP. El País. November 8, 2002    
194 El País. November 10, 2002    
195 La oposición cree que la situación de Terra Mítica y CACSA amenaza las finanzas de la 
Generalitat. El País. November 27, 2002    
196 La oposición presenta más de 4.000 enmiendas a los presupuestos de la Generalitat. El País. 
November 30, 2002    
197 A toda máquina en l’Oceanogràfic. El País. December 8, 2002    
198 El baile de los presupuestos. El País. December 9, 2002    
199 Un paseo entre tiburones. El País. December 13, 2002    
200 Los 45.000 animales de l’Oceanogràfic convierten Valencia en un nuevo polo de atracción 
turística. El País. December 13, 2002    
201 Peces. El País. December 16, 2002    
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202 Turismo cultural en Valencia. El País. December 16, 2002    
203 Bancaixa entra con un 12,5% en la sociedad de l’Oceanogràfic por medio millón de euros. El 
País. December 19, 2002    
204 L’Oceanogràfic y l'Albufera. El País. December 21, 2002    
205 Ferrando quiere cambiar el modelo turístico y pide revisar la incidencia del sector en el IPC. 
El País. January 29, 2003    
206 L’Oceanogràfic de Valencia tiene reservadas ya 275.000 entradas. El País. February 8, 2003  
207 L’Oceanogràfic  abre sus puertas. El País. February 15, 2003   
208 La Ciudad de las Ciencias genera 80 millones al año. El País. March 4, 2003   
209 Placido Domingo prueba la acústica del Palau de les Arts con unas notas de 'La Walkyria'. El 
País. March 13, 2003    
210 Camps califica de ruinoso el modelo turístico del PSPV. El País. April 20, 2003   
211 Valencia, entre Madrid y Barcelona El País. May 12, 2003    
212 El Consell dobla el capital social de la firma que gestiona Terra Mítica El País. June 10, 2003  
213 Jesús Císcar Dos 'Ents' de Greenpeace protestan ante el Palau contra la madera ilegal. El 
País. June 10, 2003    
214 Camps delega competencias entre los miembros de su equipo para reforzar su perfil político. 
El País. June 22, 2003    
215 Camps afirma que el tren de alta velocidad será "una realidad en nuestra Comunidad en 
2007". El País. June 23, 2003    
216 Expectativas de destino. El País. July 4, 2003    
217 L’Oceanogràfic recibe al visitante un millón. El País. July 17, 2003    
218 El PSPV califica de "escandaloso" el montante de impagados del Consell. El País. August 
18, 2003    
219 El IVF presto 384 millones de euros a las Pymes en 2002. El País. September 28, 2003   
220 Herencias que pesan. El País. October 12, 2003    
221 La Generalitat adquiere otras 52.000 acciones de Terra Mítica por 16 millones de euros. El 
País. October 14, 2003    
222 La deuda de las empresas públicas se ha multiplicado por dos en los últimos tres años. El 
País. October 30, 2003    
223 La Ciudad de las Ciencias multiplica por cinco su inversión con el grueso de la obra ya 
realizada. El País. October 31, 2003    
224 La Ciudad de las Artes quintuplica su inversión para pagar obras ya hechas. El País. October 
31, 2003    
225 Pla asegura que las cuentas del Consell revelan que la caja esta vacía y propone sanearla. El 
País. November 1, 2003    
226 De la Copa América a CACSA. El País. November 13, 2003    
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227 Colomer denuncia la falta de dinero para el Planetario de Castellón. El País. December 9, 
2003   
228 La Ciudad de las Artes y las Ciencias registra más de 100.000 visitantes durante el puente. El 
País. December 9, 2003    
229 Camps anuncia cambios en la Consejería de Bienestar Social. El País. December 20, 2003  
230 CIEGSA adjudica siempre colegios por cantidades superiores a los presupuestos de 
licitación. El País. December 24, 2003    
231 L’Oceanogràfic: un diseño para todos. El País. December 31, 2003    
232 Calendario de goma. El País. January 4, 2004    
233 Calendarios de goma. El País. January 4, 2004    
234 Pla exige a Camps explicaciones inmediatas en las Cortes sobre las finanzas de la Generalitat. 
El País. January 8, 2004    
235 "Las bienales ya no tienen sentido: son parques temáticos". El País. January 11, 2004   
236 Uiso Alemany. El País. January 17, 2004    
237 Camps, a diferencia de Zaplana, invita a Pla y a Alborch a los actos del día valenciano en 
Fitur El País. January 30, 2004    
238 El Consell inyecta 107 millones de euros en CACSA para sanear sus finanzas. El País. 
February 4, 2004    
239 El País. February 16, 2004    
240 L’Oceanogràfic ingresa 27 millones y recibe dos millones de visitas en un año. El País. 
February 18, 2004    
241 El Palau de les Arts cuesta ya 160 millones de euros. El País. February 18, 2004   
242 El nuevo Gobierno repercutirá en varios proyectos estrella del , PERO. El País. March 16, 
2004   
243 La Ciudad de las Ciencias registra un record de visitas en la semana de Fallas. El País. March 
22, 2004    
244 La deuda del Consell ronda los 10.000 millones con las empresas públicas. El País. March 
26, 2004    
245 Camps reconoce que el coste del Palau de les Arts ya se ha duplicado. El País. May 18, 2004  
246 Un experto cifra la deuda del Consell en 10.678 millones y califica la situación de encubierta 
suspensión de pagos. El País. June 3, 2004    
247 La deuda valenciana sube otra vez y alcanza ya el 11% del PIB. El País. June 25, 2004   
248 El Consell prevé déficits presupuestarios en el próximo trienio y una deuda mayor. El País. 
June 26, 2004    
249 El Consell inyecta 67 millones a la Ciudad de las Artes y enjuga perdidas por 145,8 millones. 
El País. July 1, 2004    
250 De la autonomía a la independencia. El País. July 1, 2004    
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251 La factura de los grandes proyectos emblemáticos asciende ya a 230 millones. El País. July 
1, 2004    
252 La Ciudad de las Ciencias recibe 1.700.000 visitas entre junio y agosto. El País. September 6, 
2004    
253 Hacienda exige a Solbes capacidad para enjugar en tres años 971 millones de déficit de 2003. 
El País. September 14, 2004    
254 Los 'pozos sin fondo' del Consell. El País. September 17, 2004    
255 Cultura a punta pala. El País. October 21, 2004    
256 Camps y Barberá intentan cerrar el complejo de la Ciudad de las Ciencias con otro proyecto 
de Calatrava. El País. November 7, 2004    
257 El decano de los arquitectos considera que "sobra espectáculo" y falta rigor en el desarrollo 
de Valencia. El País. November 9, 2004    
258 El sector de promotores ve inviable el nuevo proyecto de Calatrava. El País. November 10, 
2004   
259 Rentabilidad social. El País. November 10, 2004    
260 Miradas sobre Valencia. El País. November 14, 2004    
261 La ciudad prudente. El País. November 17, 2004    
262 Los proyectos de urbanización de Valencia, de la costa y los campos de golf protagonizan 
Urbe. El País. November 26, 2004   
263 El PSPV propone a Camps que gaste los 147 millones previstos para parques temáticos en 
medidas sociales. El País. November 27, 2004    
264 Cuentos de contar cultura. El País. December 1, 2004    
265 Calatrava defiende sus torres como un hito que se verá en toda la ciudad. El País. December 
2, 2004    
266 El coste final del Palau de les Arts cuadruplicará el presupuesto inicial. El País. December 4, 
2004  
267 Rubio alerta de que en las torres de Calatrava se han de edificar 450 VPO. El País. December 
24, 2004    
268 Más pérdidas en Parques Temáticos y desvió del 219% en la Ciudad de las Artes. El País. 
December 31, 2004    
269 La deuda atenaza las cuentas de la Generalitat. El País. December 31, 2004    
270 La ciudad de los prodigios. El País. February 2, 2005    
271 El Consell amplia otros 105 millones el capital para pagar la deuda de la Ciudad de las Artes. 
El País. February 26, 2005    
272 El Consell destina otros 105 millones a la deuda de la Ciudad de las Artes. El País. February 
26, 2005    
273 Calatrava plantea tres torres sobre una estación de AVE para rematar la Ciudad de las 
Ciencias. El País. February 27, 2005    
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274 El apeadero del AVE que pide Camps obligaría a replantear el plan ferroviario de Valencia. 
El País. March 1, 2005    
275 Rubio asegura que Camps y Barberá actúan "como agentes inmobiliarios" con las torres de 
Calatrava. El País. March 1, 2005    
276 El gerente de riesgos del IVF asume la dirección de la Ciudad de las Artes. El País. March 
12, 2005    
277 El tiempo da la razón, y la seguirá dando. El País. March 19, 2005    
278 Camps fijo la inauguración en octubre para no dilatar más la puesta en marcha del Palau. El 
País. March 31, 2005    
279 Calatrava nombra a Villalonga director de su estudio en Valencia. El País. April 15, 2005  
280 Placido Domingo abrirá la temporada regular del Palau de les Arts, que se llamara Reina 
Sofía. El País. April 30, 2005    
281 Nueva York se rinde ante el arte de Santiago Calatrava. El País. May 1, 2005    
282 Los vecinos de Valencia destacan la Ciudad de las Artes como referencia. El País. July 21, 
2005   
283 Calatrava inventa el rascacielos corporal. El País. August 27, 2005   
284 Valencia rejuvenece por verano. El País. September 11, 2005    
285 Camps destituye al director de grandes proyectos Gonzalo Morell. El País. September 17, 
2005   
286 El Consell cesa al director de grandes proyectos. El País. September 17, 2005    
287 Santiago Calatrava recibirá la Alta Distinción de la Generalitat el próximo 9 d'Octubre. El 
País. October 6, 2005    
288 Helga Schmidt, Intendente del Palau de les Arts Reina Sofía: "En España no hay una gran 
orquesta internacional". El País. October 7, 2005    
289 Reuters: “Valencia estrena su espectacular Palau de les Arts”. El País. October 8, 2005   
290 Calatrava. El País. October 8, 2005    
291 Rubio denuncia que el Palau de les Arts no tiene licencia de actividad ni informe de 
bomberos. El País. October 11, 2005    
292 El Palau de les Arts no cumple la norma de emergencias, según Rubio. El País. October 14, 
2005  
293 El glamour golpea a la oposición. El País. October 16, 2005    
294 Santiago Calatrava ensena en el Metropolitan su 'escultura dentro de la arquitectura'. El País. 
October 19, 2005    
295 Los socialistas piden amparo para obtener documentación de Economía. El País. October 28, 
2005  
296 El Consell reconoce que ha gastado más de 760 millones en la Ciudad de las Artes y las 
Ciencias. El País. October 28, 2005    
297 Rita, dígalo. El País. November 1, 2005    
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298 La deuda de las empresas públicas se dispara en 2006 hasta superar los 6.000 millones de 
euros. El País. November 2, 2005    
299 El Consell anuncia 26,5 millones para iniciar las obras del Ágora de la Ciudad de las 
Ciencias. El País. November 9, 2005    
300 Arquitectura para admirar y no tocar. El País. November 20, 2005    
301 El País. November 21, 2005    
302 Maciá dice que el PSPV está abierto a la venta de terrenos para salvar Terra Mítica. El País. 
December 15, 2005    
303 Font de Mora replica a la socialista Ana Noguera desde el escaño que ella provocó el fuego 
en Ciegsa. El País. December 21, 2005    
304 Los socialistas piden una solución a largo plazo para levantar la suspensión de pagos de Terra 
Mítica. El País. December 30, 2005    
305 Cuentas y cuentos. El País. December 30, 2005    
306 Un río de gente para disfrutar del ocio. El País. January 9, 2006    
307 El Ágora de la Ciudad de las Artes sale a información pública. El País. January 24, 2006  
308 Arquitecturas. El País. January 28, 2006    
309 El Palau de les Arts abrirá con 'Fidelio' su primera temporada. El País. February 2, 2006  
310 Valencia, ciudad de hitos urbanos y políticos. El País. February 5, 2006    
311 Ubicuo Calatrava. El País. February 5, 2006    
312 El Consell liquida las cuentas de 2005 con un déficit de 91 millones frente a los 545 de 2004. 
El País. February 18, 2006    
313 El País. February 20, 2006    
314 El Consell adjudica la obra del Ágora a una UTE liderada por Lubasa. El País. March 29, 
2006   
315 Camps identifica los rascacielos y el Ágora de Calatrava con modernidad. El País. April 7, 
2006   
316 Un parque controlado por personas de confianza del ex presidente. El País. May 16, 2006  
317 Pla asegura que Terra Mítica es la "punta del iceberg". El País. May 16, 2006    
318 ¿Cuánto nos costara el Palau de les Arts? El País. May 25, 2006    
319 "Alternativa real de gobierno". El País. May 26, 2006    
320 ¿Cortar o tender puentes? El País. May 30, 2006    
321 El PSOE denuncia que el Consell adeuda 121 millones de impuestos en Valencia. El País. 
June 6, 2006    
322 Rubio denuncia que el Consell no ha pagado 121 millones que debe a Valencia por 
impuestos. El País. June 6, 2006    
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323 Las obras ejecutadas por el Ayuntamiento de Valencia sobrepasan en un 53,41% su coste 
inicial, según Rubio. El País. June 12, 2006    
324 Camps inicia otra precampaña. El País. June 14, 2006    
325 CACSA fuerza a coger vacaciones a un grupo de trabajadores por la visita del Papa. El País. 
June 14, 2006    
326 Polémica por los gastos de la directora del Palau de les Arts, Helga Schmidt. Facturó 3.000 
euros por dos noches de hotel. El País. June 24, 2006    
327 La gran noria. El País. July 25, 2006 Tuesday    
328 El titular de Economía no sabe cuánto costó al Consell la visita del Papa. El País. August 3, 
2006 Thursday    
329 El PSPV acusa al Consell de querer ocultar el gasto de la visita de Benedicto XVI. El País. 
August 4, 2006 Friday    
330 Barberá pide un hito a Calatrava para conmemorar la visita del Papa. El País. September 2, 
2006 Saturday    
331 Turbulencias de moda. El País. September 12, 2006 Tuesday   
332 El PSPV denuncia que el Palau de les Arts paga sueldos millonarios a 10 cargos. El País. 
September 24, 2006 Sunday    
333 El PP ve ridícula la iniciativa y achaca la corrupción al PSPV. El País. October 5, 2006 
Thursday   
334 ¿Síntoma o enfermedad? El País. October 9, 2006 Monday    
335 Ros Casares anuncia carga de trabajo para Izar por 100 millones. El País. October 21, 2006 
Saturday    
336 El Palau de les Arts de Valencia se atasca. El País. December 3, 2006 Sunday    
337 En el camino. El País. December 5, 2006 Tuesday    
338 La avería del escenario del Palau de les Arts deja en precario la programación. El País. 
December 6, 2006 Wednesday    
339 La sociedad de grandes proyectos sigue la vía de RTVV y se sitúa en quiebra técnica. El 
País. December 23, 2006 Saturday    
340 El coste del Palau de les Arts se triplica hasta alcanzar los 332 millones el pasado año. El 
País. December 23, 2006 Saturday    
341 El informe del Síndic confirma el estado de "colapso" de la Generalitat, según el PSPV. El 
País. December 27, 2006 Wednesday    
342 El PSPV exige al Síndic que detalle las empresas que contrató el Consell de forma irregular. 
El País. January 12, 2007 Friday  
343 Competitivos. El País. January 16, 2008 Wednesday   
344 Hacienda dedica 211.000 euros a explicar sus deducciones fiscales. El País. January 17, 2007 
Wednesday  
345 El PSPV alerta sobre el caos de la Ciudad de las Artes. El País. January 24, 2008 Thursday 
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346 Motivos para callar. El País. January 29, 2007 Monday    
347 "Ocultaban facturas en un cajón bajo llave". El País. March 2, 2007 Friday    
348 Canal 9 emitirá publicidad del Consell en horario de máxima audiencia durante la campaña 
electoral. El País. March 10, 2007 Saturday    
349 Internet se llena de referencias elogiosas sobre el evento y la ciudad. El País. April 18, 2007 
Wednesday    
350 El País. April 23, 2007 Monday    
351 La Generalitat alquila L'Umbracle para abrir una terraza de copas. El País. May 5, 2007 
Saturday  
352 Cuidado con las rebajas. El País. May 8, 2007 Tuesday    
353 El PP acepta pedir informes de la terraza de copas de L'Umbracle. El País. May 8, 2007 
Tuesday  
354 Barberá mantiene la mayoría sin signos de fatiga en sus votantes. El País. May 21, 2007 
Monday  
355 El PAI La Punta subasta unas 120 hanegadas de huerta en Valencia. El País. July 13, 2007 
Friday  
356 Un fallo informático genera protestas y largas colas en la Ciudad de las Artes. El País. 
August 8, 2007 Wednesday    
357 La Ciudad de las Artes ingresa 32,4 millones de Euros pero sus gastos anuales son de 
197cuatro. El País. August 16, 2007 Thursday    
358 Terrenos, palacios y pignoraciones. El País. August 16, 2007 Thursday    
359 Signes considera "intolerables" las ayudas del Consell a fundaciones "afines al PP". El País. 
August 21, 2007 Tuesday    
360 Millón y medio de visitas a CACSA en verano El País. September 4, 2007 Tuesday   
361 El PP reduce al mínimo el debate sobre el nuevo plan urbano de Valencia. El País. 
September 29, 2007 Saturday    
362 Calatrava apunta hacia el jardín elevado como causa. El País. October 13, 2007 Saturday  
363 El riesgo de inundaciones del Palau de les Arts se conoce desde hace 10 años. El País. 
October 16, 2007 Tuesday    
364 Un pretil separará el Palau de les Arts del antiguo río para evitar inundaciones. El País. 
October 18, 2007 Thursday    
365 Escuchar con los ojos cerrados. El País. October 23, 2007 Tuesday    
366 La programación del Palau de les Arts naufraga por las inundaciones. El País. October 23, 
2007 Tuesday    
367 Bofill dice que el Palau de les Arts "no está bien ubicado" en el cauce. El País. November 13, 
2007 Tuesday    
368 Los arquitectos son de Venus. El País. November 15, 2007 Thursday    
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369 Calatrava confía la ejecución de las torres a la decisión de Camps. El País. December 16, 
2007 Sunday    
370 La Generalitat lleva gastados 1.128 millones en la Ciudad de las Artes. El País. December 
22, 2007 Saturday      
371 El Consell deberá indemnizar por un terreno de la Ciutat de les Arts. El País. March 8, 2008 
Saturday    
372 La parcela desierta de las torres de Calatrava. El País. March 8, 2008 Saturday    
373 Moody's alerta al Consell que debe frenar la deuda y el gasto sanitario. El País. March 20, 
2008 Thursday    
374 La deuda de la Generalitat crece en un año 619 millones y suma ya 11.500. El País. March 
27, 2008 Thursday    
375 Luna reclama al PP que colabore con Madrid. El País. March 28, 2008 Friday    
376 La avería del escenario costó medio millón al Palau. El País. May 7, 2008 Wednesday   
377 Los socialistas ven temerarios los proyectos faraónicos del Consell. El País. July 11, 2008 
Friday   
378 El Consell afirma que CACSA ingresó 40,5 millones y el PSPV, que perdió 62. El País. 
August 6, 2008 Wednesday    
379 Nuevo cruce de cifras por la Ciudad de las Artes. El País. August 6, 2008 Wednesday   
380 De superávit a déficit. El País. August 8, 2008 Friday    
381 El pozo sin fondo de las empresas públicas. El País. August 8, 2008 Friday    
382 El consejero insiste en negar el déficit. El País. August 9, 2008 Saturday    
383 Los socialistas proponen "un gran pacto valenciano" para salir de la crisis. El País. August 
16, 2008 Saturday    
384 El País. August 20, 2008 Wednesday    
385 El País. August 21, 2008 Thursday    
386 CACSA no pagó los 2,58 millones de intereses de su deuda en 2007. El País. August 28, 
2008 Thursday    
387 El Consell espera el enésimo estudio de viabilidad sobre Mundo Ilusión. El País. September 
2, 2008 Tuesday    
388 Calatrava atribuye la inundación del Palau a las obras para el altar del Papa. El País. 
September 4, 2008 Thursday    
389 El PP de Valencia rechaza exigir al Consell el fondo de financiación local. El País. 
September 26, 2008 Friday    
390 Camarasa pide responsables de la grave inundación. El País. October 9, 2008 Thursday   
391 La crisis tumba las torres de Calatrava. El País. October 28, 2008 Tuesday    
392 Emblemás con recorte. El País. October 30, 2008 Thursday    
393 El País. November 2, 2008 Sunday    
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394 El Ágora acelera por el tenis. El País. November 8, 2008 Saturday    
395 El sueldo de Calatrava es "confidencial", según el Consell. El País. November 11, 2008 
Tuesday   
396 Gerardo Camps elude otra vez explicar en las Cortes la inundación del Palau. El País. 
November 20, 2008 Thursday    
397 Gerardo Camps y la crisis mundial. El País. November 21, 2008 Friday    
398 Camps insinúa que el Palau se inundó por la desidia de Barberá. El País. December 4, 2008 
Thursday    
399 La obra sufrió roturas por un fallo de montaje. El País. December 11, 2008 Thursday   
400 El Síndic reclama una nueva financiación. El País. December 23, 2008 Tuesday   
401 Los modificados de Calatrava lastran la Ciudad de las Artes. El País. December 23, 2008 
Tuesday  
402 Las empresas públicas toman la deuda que la Generalitat no puede permitirse. El País. March 
20, 2009 Friday    
403 El Consell amplía de nuevo el capital de la Ciutat de les Arts. El País. April 4, 2009 Saturday  
404 Proyectos en apuros. El País. April 27, 2009 Monday    
405 Hitos arquitectónicos lastrados por la crisis. El País. April 27, 2009 Monday    
406 La recesión cuestiona la viabilidad de proyectos urbanísticos faraónicos. El País. April 27, 
2009 Monday    
407 Camps defiende la concesión del aeropuerto de Castellón. El País. June 19, 2009 Friday  
408 El chocolate del loro. El País. July 28, 2009 Tuesday    
409 El sobrecoste de la Ciudad de las Artes supera el 200%. El País. August 12, 2009 Wednesday  
410 90 millones para un Ágora con urinarios provisionales. El País. August 27, 2009 Thursday  
411 El Consell aumenta la vida útil del Palau de les Arts de 100 a 300 años para ahorrar. El País. 
September 15, 2009 Tuesday    
412 Y ahora, los Juegos Olímpicos. El País. October 30, 2009 Friday    
413 El PSPV culpa a Barberá de no cumplir con el 63% de sus promesas electorales. El País. 
November 17, 2009 Tuesday    
414 El PSPV tilda de 'incapaz' a Barberá por los presupuestos. El País. November 21, 2009 
Saturday   
415 La reforma del modelo económico de la CEV incluye a las inmobiliarias. El País. November 
27, 2009 Friday    
416 El Consell niega al PSPV los contratos del Ágora y de la Fórmula 1. El País. December 12, 
2009 Saturday    
417 El Consell reordena parte del segundo escalón meses después de la remodelación. El País. 
December 19, 2009 Saturday    
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418 La Sindicatura de Comptes no audita las empresas vinculadas a Gürtel. El País. December 
24, 2009 Thursday    
419 La Ciudad de las Artes sólo se mira. El País. January 17, 2010 Sunday    
420 La Sindicatura rechaza el patrocinio público de actividades privadas. El País. January 21, 
2010 Thursday    
421 El descontrol del PP se apodera de las Cortes. El País. February 18, 2010 Thursday   
422 La fundación que gestiona el turismo en Valencia evita el control externo. El País. February 
25, 2010 Thursday   
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C.2. The America’s Cup (from 1 April 2003 to 22 March 2010)  
1 Valencia quiere la 'Formula 1' de vela. El País. April 9, 2003  
2 El Gobierno central apoyará a Valencia si es elegida sede de la regata Copa de América. El 
País. September 16, 2003  
3 La Copa de América obliga a rediseñar el acceso norte del puerto. El País. September 24, 
2003  
4 Consorcio para la Copa de América. El País. September 30, 2003  
5 Rajoy asegura que si es presidente impulsara las grandes infraestructuras que reclama el 
Consell. El País. October 11, 2003  
6 Rajoy asume ante Camps las grandes infraestructuras que reclama el Consell. El País. 
October 11, 2003  
7 El presupuesto municipal de Valencia crece un 2,6% y no incluye previsiones para la Copa 
de América. El País. November 22, 2003  
8 Valencia espera ser elegida hoy sede de la Copa de América. El País. November 26, 2003  
9 La Copa de América convierte a Valencia en capital mundial de la vela. La ciudad prevé unos 
beneficios de 1.500 millones de euros. El País. November 27, 2003  
10 Valencia, en el mapa. El País. November 27, 2003  
11 Jordi Vicent, Valencia se hace con la Copa de América, la F-1 de la vela. El País. November 
27, 2003  
12 La ACM explotará la zona del puerto que albergara a los barcos de la Copa de América. El 
País. November 28, 2003  
13 Los puertos deportivos ofrecen amarres y esperan albergar entrenamientos de los equipos de 
la regata. El País. November 28, 2003  
14 Las inmobiliarias auguran subidas en los alquileres. El País. November 28, 2003  
15 Malestar por la marginación de Zaplana en los actos de la Copa de América. El País. 
November 28, 2003  
16 Fomento no garantiza que el AVE llegue a Valencia en 2007 y funcione durante la Copa de 
América. El País. November 28, 2003  
17 El País. November 29, 2003  
18 El desafío. El País. November 29, 2003  
19 El PSPV insta al Consell a plantar cara a Madrid para acelerar el AVE y Camps dice que está 
en obras. El País. November 29, 2003  
20 Ventajas fiscales para la vela. El País. November 29, 2003  
21 Pla lanza la idea de una televisión de alta definición para la regata. El País. November 29, 
2003  
22 "La Copa es una puesta de largo de Valencia en el mundo". El País. November 29, 2003  
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23 El Consell acelera la creación de 10.000 amarres y tres puertos privados con motivo de la 
Copa de América. El País. November 29, 2003  
24 El reto de la Valencia de 2007. El País. November 30, 2003  
25 "Maragall metió la pata con el agua del Ebro". El País. November 30, 2003  
26 La Copa del fin de Zaplana. El País. November 30, 2003  
27 Unas regatas que dan toda la ventaja al PP. El País. November 30, 2003  
28 Camps anuncia un departamento dedicado a la Copa de América. El País. December 1, 2003  
29 El 'New York Times' subraya el cartel que supone el desafío para Valencia. El País. 
December 1, 2003  
30 El Consell creará una secretaría autonómica de la Copa de América. El País. December 1, 
2003  
31 De la Copa. El País. December 2, 2003  
32 La oposición critica el anuncio de nuevos cargos por la copa de vela. El País. December 2, 
2003  
33 Copa de América. El País. December 2, 2003  
34 Femeval insta a aportar tecnología para la Copa de América. El País. December 3, 2003  
35 La CEV creara una comisión de trabajo encargada de elaborar propuestas ante la Copa de 
América. El País. December 5, 2003  
36 La Copa. El País. December 6, 2003  
37 Resaca. El País. December 7, 2003  
38 "El puerto se ha integrado en la ciudad". El País. December 8, 2003  
39 Valencia se abre al mar. El País. December 8, 2003  
40 Más turismo y de calidad. El País. December 8, 2003  
41 El Gordo. El País. December 8, 2003  
42 El Puerto de Valencia domina el tráfico de contenedores pero crece menos que Barcelona. 
Fomento subraya el carácter de plataforma logística de las instalaciones mediterráneas. El 
País. December 9, 2003  
43 E la nave va... El País. December 9, 2003  
44 Pacto urbanístico. El País. December 9, 2003  
45 Camps busca integrar a todo el territorio en el reto de la Copa de América. El País. December 
10, 2003  
46 Ya piensan en el después. El País. December 11, 2003  
47 'Valencia 2007'. El País. December 11, 2003  
48 El Cabanyal explicará su causa a la empresa de la Copa de América. El País. December 11, 
2003  
49 El País. December 12, 2003  
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50 Un documento de Fomento confirma que la llegada del AVE a Valencia en 2007 es inviable 
El País. December 12, 2003  
51 Cascos solo se compromete a tener la línea de alta velocidad tres años después de la Copa de 
América. El País. December 12, 2003  
52 Una oportunidad para poner orden El País. December 13, 2003  
53 La sombra de Cataluña es alargada. El País. December 13, 2003  
54 A todo evento El País. December 14, 2003  
55 El Metro que enlazara el aeropuerto de Valencia y el puerto inicia las obras para atravesar el 
Turia. El País. December 15, 2003  
56 El País. December 16, 2003  
57 El Consorcio de la Copa de América busca financiación privada El País. December 16, 2003  
58 El PP rechaza en el Senado más inversiónes para la Copa de América. El País. December 18, 
2003  
59 Rubio critica que la Copa de América no está en los presupuestos. El País. December 19, 
2003  
60 El puerto de Valencia aprovecha la Copa de América para recuperar la ampliación norte. El 
País. December 30, 2003  
61 Felicitación de Giscard por la Copa de América. El País. December 31, 2003  
62 Socialistas y vecinos advierten de que la ampliación norte del puerto agravara la regresión de 
las playas. El País. December 31, 2003  
63 Camps centra en el pleno empleo, el AVE y la Copa de América los retos inmediatos del 
Consell. El País. January 2, 2004  
64 De Natzaret a Malvarrosa. El País. January 12, 2004  
65 El Ayuntamiento crea el Centro de Estrategias para "repensar" la ciudad de Valencia. El País. 
January 22, 2004  
66 Dudas sobre el turismo con la Copa de América. El País. January 23, 2004  
67 La ciudad de Valencia supera el millón de visitantes en 2003 y aspira a duplicar esa cifra en 
siete años. El País. January 28, 2004  
68 Arquitectos alertan contra el desorden del frente marítimo de Valencia. El País. January 28, 
2004  
69 Copa de América. El País. January 29, 2004  
70 AENA invirtió cinco millones en los aeropuertos valencianos en 2002 frente a 807 en los 
catalanes. El País. February 1, 2004  
71 El Centro de Estrategias y Desarrollo prepara un plan para difundir la imagen de Valencia. El 
País. February 4, 2004  
72 Valencia construye unas sofisticadas piscinas de alta competición bajo una cubierta de teflón. 
El País. February 8, 2004  
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73 Camps y Barberá presentan la Copa de América en la Unión Europea. El País. February 9, 
2004  
74 Cultura presenta en Arco la Bienal del agua y la Copa de América. El País. February 11, 
2004  
75 Camps y Barberá presentan la Copa de América en Bruselas. El País. February 12, 2004  
76 El Consell ve la vela como el recambio a los fondos de la UE. El País. February 13, 2004  
77 El Puerto se anticipa al Consorcio de la Copa de América y licita obras por 124 millones. El 
País. February 14, 2004  
78 El Puerto adelanta al consorcio de la Copa de América con obras que consumen la cuarta 
parte del presupuesto. El País. February 14, 2004  
79 Rubio acusa a Blasco y Barberá de alentar la especulación en L'Albufera. El País. February 
17, 2004  
80 Más apoyo al puerto. El País. February 18, 2004  
81 Valencia tiene suelo edificable para los próximos 18 años sin recalificar huerta, según el 
PSPV. El País. February 20, 2004  
82 Camps no descarta la modificación del concurso de privatización de Canal 9 tras el revés 
judicial. El País. February 20, 2004  
83 Blasco prepara un decreto para construir en suelo del parque de L'Albufera. El País. February 
29, 2004  
84 El Ayuntamiento estudia la obra del canal del puerto. El País. March 5, 2004  
85 Sombras sobre L'Albufera. El País. March 8, 2004  
86 "El Palau de les Arts es un artefacto de pesadilla". El País. March 14, 2004  
87 El decano de los arquitectos critica el urbanismo espectáculo. El País. March 14, 2004  
88 El nuevo Gobierno repercutirá en varios proyectos estrella del PP. El País. March 16, 2004  
89 Menos obstáculos en el camino del PSPV. El País. March 16, 2004  
90 Alborch: "Zapatero hará lo que esté en su maño para entenderse con Camps". El País. March 
16, 2004  
91 El PSOE controlará la Agencia Tributaria y la fiscalía tras el relevo en el Ejecutivo central. El 
País. March 16, 2004  
92 Los empresarios esperan un nuevo modelo de plan hidrológico. El País. March 16, 2004  
93 "La Zona de Actividades Logísticas llega con 20 años de retraso y es pequeñísima". El País. 
March 21, 2004  
94 La vivienda de segunda mano sube un 27% en Valencia y un 21% en la provincia en 2003. El 
País. March 23, 2004  
95 Rubio sospecha que el puerto usará la Copa de América para su ampliación. El País. March 
25, 2004  
96 Rita en la meca del lujo. El País. March 27, 2004  
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97 García Antón reclama al PSOE la inversión de 3.000 millones. El País. March 31, 2004  
98 El Puerto de Valencia cree que el PSOE no cuestiona su desarrollo. El País. April 1, 2004  
99 Los ingresos por habitación de hotel en Valencia caen un 10% en 2 meses. El País. April 1, 
2004  
100 El País. April 2, 2004  
101 El movimiento vecinal exige participar en la Copa de América. El País. April 2, 2004  
102 Esta playa es tu herencia. El País. April 5, 2004  
103 Camps y Pla se reúnen con serias diferencias sobre el PHN y el AVE. El País. April 5, 2004  
104 Los 'copa América' cruzan impresiones. El País. April 6, 2004  
105 El País. April 12, 2004  
106 La oposición pide a Camps la reforma del Estatuto. El País. April 17, 2004  
107 Varios colectivos sociales plantean una modernidad sostenible para la Valencia de la Copa de 
América. El País. April 23, 2004  
108 Media Planning ubica en Valencia su centro operativo del Mediterráneo. El País. April 30, 
2004  
109 El canal de la Copa de América repercutirá de forma "severa" sobre la playa de la 
Malvarrosa. El País. April 30, 2004  
110 La oposición pide un menor impacto ambiental de la Copa de América. El País. May 1, 2004  
111 El País. May 9, 2004  
112 Los retos pendientes. El País. May 9, 2004  
113 Reconquista de la ciudad. El País. May 9, 2004  
114 Una oportunidad para un nuevo rumbo. El País. May 9, 2004  
115 Vecinos a la espera de participación. El País. May 9, 2004  
116 Valencia afronta el reto de convertir la Copa de América en un revulsivo para la ciudad. El 
País. May 9, 2004  
117 Camps y Sevilla acuerdan revisar en el consejo de Política Fiscal la financiación de la 
sanidad. El País. May 11, 2004  
118 PP y PSPV se acusan de la falta de apoyo a la Copa de América. El País. May 12, 2004  
119 El Santander patrocina la Copa de América y será su banco oficial. El País. May 13, 2004  
120 Camps advierte a Zapatero de que marginara a los valencianos si no invierte lo pactado con 
Aznar. El País. May 14, 2004  
121 Un experto propone tres alternativas de menor impacto al nuevo canal del Puerto de 
Valencia. El País. May 15, 2004  
122 El Gobierno se compromete con la Copa de América y la sitúa al mismo nivel que unos 
Juegos Olímpicos. El País. May 15, 2004  
123 Cuatro UTE compiten por el canal de la Copa de América. El País. May 19, 2004  
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124 La Cámara y CC OO alertan de la debilidad del sistema productivo. El País. May 19, 2004  
125 El País. May 24, 2004  
126 Impacto ambiental de la nueva bocana del puerto. El País. May 24, 2004  
127 Un nuevo canal y una ampliación controvertida. El País. May 24, 2004  
128 Fomento reitera su apoyo a la Copa de América pero quiere evitar que se especule como en 
Terra Mítica. El País. May 27, 2004  
129 La Federación de Vecinos reclama un proyecto global para la Valencia de la Copa de 
América. El País. May 28, 2004  
130 El País. May 30, 2004 (1) 
131 El País. May 30, 2004 (2) 
132 Influencia de la Copa en el turismo de Valencia. El País. May 30, 2004  
133 Mucho (o todo) por hacer. El País. May 30, 2004  
134 Una ciudad con expectativas turísticas. El País. May 30, 2004  
135 Rubio se opone a que el canal de la Copa de América sirva de excusa para ampliar el puerto. 
El País. June 2, 2004  
136 Camps reivindica la centralidad valenciana en el desarrollo español y reclama mayores 
inversiónes. El País. June 2, 2004  
137 Rubio rechaza que la Copa de pie a ampliar el puerto. El País. June 2, 2004  
138 El Gobierno designa a sus delegados en la Copa de América. El País. June 3, 2004  
139 Banco Santander compra un edificio de apartamentos en Valencia. El País. June 4, 2004  
140 Malestar en el Ejecutivo por el uso que hace el PP de la Copa de América. El País. June 4, 
2004  
141 Solo el 14% de los grandes empresarios estudian las oportunidades que abre la Copa de 
América. El País. June 5, 2004  
142 Ordenación sanitaria. El País. June 5, 2004  
143 Copa. El País. June 7, 2004  
144 La alcaldesa reclama al Gobierno socialista 1.000 millones más de los que solicitó al 
Ejecutivo de Aznar. El País. June 9, 2004  
145 Las contradicciones del PP. El País. June 9, 2004  
146 Barberá pide 1.600 millones a Solbes para pagar el coste de todas las obras de la Copa de 
América. El País. June 9, 2004  
147 El Gobierno estudia que una sociedad estatal gestione el proyecto de la Copa de América. El 
País. June 10, 2004  
148 Barberá asegura que pidió inversiónes a un director general de Hacienda del PP. El País. June 
10, 2004  
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149 Barberá aceptará cualquier solución para financiar la Copa de América. El País. June 11, 
2004  
150 El puerto llevará este mes al Gobierno la ampliación y asume la posible pérdida de suelo por 
la Copa. El País. June 12, 2004  
151 El País. June 13, 2004  
152 Solbes estudia crear una sociedad estatal para la Copa de América. El País. June 14, 2004  
153 La alcaldesa pide el mismo trato que recibieron en 1992 Barcelona y Sevilla. El País. June 
14, 2004  
154 El Gobierno espera que Barberá y Camps aporten financiación a la Copa. El País. June 16, 
2004  
155 El Gobierno pide más peso en el Consorcio de la Copa de América dada su aportación 
económica. El País. June 17, 2004  
156 Sevilla toma contacto con la firma suiza de la Copa de América. El País. June 18, 2004  
157 Salir del aislamiento. El País. June 18, 2004  
158 Los empresarios se reunirán con Sevilla para analizar la Copa de América. El País. June 19, 
2004  
159 La retransmisión de las regatas esta pendiente de un acuerdo con TVE. El País. June 21, 2004  
160 El Consejo de Ministros aprobará en breve la ventanilla única para atender a los regatistas. El 
País. June 21, 2004  
161 Tres semanas frenéticas para presentar una solución factible. El País. June 21, 2004  
162 El Gobierno quiere modificar la bocana del canal y eliminar el túnel del puerto de Valencia 
para la Copa. El País. June 21, 2004  
163 El Ayuntamiento y el Consell aceptan el plan del Gobierno para las obras de la Copa de 
América. El País. June 22, 2004  
164 Jordi Sevilla pide que se involucre toda la sociedad para que Valencia "de el salto adelante 
que necesita". El País. June 22, 2004  
165 El puerto se desmarca del plan del Gobierno para el canal de la Copa. El País. June 22, 2004  
166 Rubio invita a los empresarios a que inviertan en promocionar Valencia para la Copa de 
América. El País. June 23, 2004  
167 Dársena sin acceso norte. El País. June 23, 2004  
168 Los socialistas invitan a los empresarios a invertir en la Copa de América. El País. June 23, 
2004  
169 Sevilla recuerda al PP que en la Copa de América solo pone dinero el Gobierno. El País. June 
24, 2004  
170 El Consejo de Ministros aprobará hoy la creación de una Oficina Estatal de apoyo a la Copa 
de América. El País. June 25, 2004  
171 El Ejecutivo crea 20 nuevas plazas en la carrera fiscal. El País. June 26, 2004  
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172 El PP se opone a pedir colaboración económica a los empresarios para promocionar 
Valencia. El País. June 26, 2004  
173 Pla pide al Consell que fije su aportación. El País. June 26, 2004  
174 Puerto. El País. June 28, 2004  
175 El presidente del puerto corrige a Barberá y asegura que votó contra el retraso del túnel. El 
País. June 29, 2004  
176 La alcaldesa defiende la gestión del Consorcio y exige al Gobierno que se "vuelque" en la 
Copa de América. El País. June 29, 2004  
177 Del Moral corrige a Barberá y dice que voto "no" en el Consorcio de la Copa. El País. June 
29, 2004  
178 Los 500 millones que el Consell asigna a la Copa de América incluyen proyectos antiguos. El 
País. June 30, 2004  
179 El presidente rectifica, ¿qué hará ahora la alcaldesa? El País. June 30, 2004  
180 Fomento replica a Del Moral que no tiene fondos porque no presentó proyecto. El País. June 
30, 2004  
181 Camps anuncia ahora una inversión de 500 millones para la Copa de América. El País. June 
30, 2004  
182 Sevilla anuncia que el Gobierno aportará al menos 1.000 millones a la Copa de América. El 
País. July 1, 2004  
183 El Gobierno invertirá al menos 1.000 millones en la Copa de América. El País. July 1, 2004  
184 Del Moral pidió que el acta del Consorcio indicara que votó en contra del nuevo canal. El 
País. July 2, 2004  
185 El Consell hará juzgados, ampliara el Clínico y mejorará el paisaje de la huerta para la Copa 
de América El País. July 3, 2004  
186 El País. July 4, 2004  
187 "Al puerto no le sobra ni un metro cuadrado". El País. July 4, 2004  
188 Cyes acomete un plan de expansión territorial y opta a obras ferroviarias y de carreteras. El 
País. July 8, 2004  
189 El Consorcio estudia el relevo de Salinas y prepara una sociedad para ejecutar las obras. El 
País. July 8, 2004  
190 Pacten o márchense. El País. July 8, 2004  
191 Bertarelli se queja del Consorcio de la Copa de América ante el Rey. El País. July 8, 2004  
192 Las Cámaras congelan el estudio de obras paralizadas por el Gobierno. El País. July 9, 2004  
193 Vivir del turismo. El País. July 9, 2004  
194 Discordia. El País. July 10, 2004  
195 "Los hechos se impondrán a la propaganda". El País. July 11, 2004  
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196 Rubio pide a Camps que gaste el dinero de la Copa en servicios para Valencia. El País. July 
15, 2004  
197 Las primeras obras de la Copa de América estarán listas en septiembre. El País. July 17, 2004  
198 El País. July 18, 2004  
199 La ciudad pendiente. El País. July 18, 2004  
200 Mónica Torres: “El Consorcio de la Copa de América revisa las obras”. El País. July 25, 
2004  
201 El Consorcio de la Copa del América aborda el relevo del director general. El País. July 27, 
2004  
202 El Consorcio de la Copa del América aborda el relevo del director general El País. July 27, 
2004  
203 El Consorcio aplaza a septiembre el cambio de director y la creación de una sociedad estatal. 
El País. July 28, 2004  
204 El Consorcio de la Copa de América licita las obras por 202 millones. El País. July 28, 2004  
205 Los vecinos plantean a Sevilla sus dudas sobre la Copa de América. El País. July 29, 2004  
206 El Gobierno ha disipado dudas de la Copa de América, dice el PSPV. El País. August 1, 
2004  
207 Los constructores trasladan su 'guerra' al mar. El País. August 22, 2004  
208 Rafael Aznar presidirá el puerto de Valencia al dimitir Del Moral. El País. September 8, 
2004  
209 Del Moral pasa el testigo del puerto de Valencia a una persona de la confianza de Rita 
Barberá. El País. September 9, 2004  
210 Camps: "Lo exigimos todo". El País. September 9, 2004  
211 El Ejecutivo exige para 2007 el AVE que Cascos anunció para 2010. El País. September 11, 
2004  
212 Rubio critica el dramatismo de Barberá con la Copa de América. El País. September 14, 
2004  
213 Apoyo a la Copa de América y a la Constitución Europea. El País. September 17, 2004  
214 Pla acusa al PP de cerrar Valencia "en la urna de la Copa de América". El País. September 
19, 2004  
215 Los clubes náuticos piden a Sevilla que agilice los amarres para la Copa. El País. September 
24, 2004  
216 Las prerregatas de la Copa de América arrancan esta semana con la medición e inspección de 
los barcos. El País. September 27, 2004  
217 Barberá pide una reunión urgente del Consorcio Valencia 2007. El País. September 28, 2004  
218 Gobierno y Consell aceleraran la V-30, el aeropuerto y el 'by pass'. El País. September 29, 
2004  
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219 Barberá se resiste a ceder el Balcón al Mar para que el Gobierno recupere la inversión en la 
Copa. El País. September 29, 2004  
220 Una empresa estatal gestionará durante 20 años las infraestructuras de la Copa de América. 
El País. September 29, 2004  
221 El Gobierno valenciano acepta la financiación de la Copa de América. El País. September 30, 
2004  
222 Barberá busca un acuerdo con el Gobierno tras perder peso en la organización de la 
competición. El País. September 30, 2004  
223 Pagar y poner la cama. El País. September 30, 2004  
224 El Consell respalda el plan de financiación del Gobierno central para la Copa de América. El 
País. September 30, 2004  
225 Barberá y Camps aceptan la sociedad estatal del Gobierno para la Copa de América. El País. 
October 1, 2004  
226 Barberá acepta la sociedad estatal para la Copa. El País. October 1, 2004  
227 La ACM repartirá entre los equipos de la Copa de América 13,2 millones de euros. El País. 
October 3, 2004  
228 El Gobierno aprueba hoy crear nuevas tasas y modificar otras 15. El País. October 8, 2004  
229 El Gobierno crea tasas nuevas y modifica alrededor de 15. El País. October 8, 2004  
230 El puerto de Valencia vive su primer día frenético de visitantes desde que comenzaron las 
regatas. El País. October 10, 2004  
231 Sevilla dice que la Copa de América obtendrá un apoyo similar al que se dio a los Juegos de 
Barcelona. El País. October 10, 2004  
232 Camps reclamará a Solbes que financie las obras de embellecimiento de Valencia que pide 
Barberá. El País. October 13, 2004  
233 A pocos metros de la Copa de América. El País. October 14, 2004  
234 Barberá se resiste a ceder el control de la Copa de América. El País. October 14, 2004  
235 200 personas se manifiestan en Natzaret para exigir las indemnizaciones por la inundación. 
El País. October 15, 2004  
236 Sevilla aboga por profesionalizar la Copa de América frente al protagonismo político. El 
País. October 15, 2004  
237 La Copa De América se presenta en Génova. El País. October 16, 2004  
238 Siete meses de tensión. El País. October 19, 2004  
239 El Gobierno se hace con el control de la gestión de la Copa de América. El País. October 19, 
2004  
240 El Consell exime de impuestos a los participantes en la Copa de América. El País. October 
21, 2004  
241 Sifre y Recuenco piden a Barberá más inversión en políticas de empleo. El País. October 22, 
2004  
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242 Salinas dice que lo importante es que los problemás de la Copa se resuelvan. El País. October 
22, 2004  
243 1.000 metros entre el lujo y la droga. El País. October 24, 2004  
244 Lecciones después de un ensayo. El País. October 25, 2004  
245 Barcelona entra de lleno. El País. October 25, 2004  
246 El Consorcio de la Copa de América nombra a Huet. El País. October 26, 2004  
247 'Valencia Summit' se cierra con la protesta de grupos vecinales. El País. October 30, 2004  
248 El Puerto convoca hoy la mesa que adjudicará las obras previstas para la Copa de América. 
El País. November 5, 2004  
249 Gerardo Camps destaca el esfuerzo en política de empleo y en prevención de riesgos 
laborales. El País. November 5, 2004  
250 El Puerto de Valencia agiliza las obras para la Copa de América. El País. November 5, 2004  
251 Adjudicadas las obras del canal y la bocana de la Copa de América. El País. November 6, 
2004  
252 El Gobierno subraya su apuesta de invertir mil millones de euros para la Copa de América. El 
País. November 6, 2004  
253 Arquitectos internacionales aspiran a diseñar la conexión urbana de Valencia con el mar. El 
País. November 10, 2004  
254 Figuras veteranas y profesionales en alza. El País. November 10, 2004  
255 Zaera, Koolhaas y Pei, entre los 15 arquitectos que aspiran a diseñar la conexión de Valencia 
con el mar. El País. November 10, 2004  
256 El Ayuntamiento de Valencia apuesta por un "diseño de vanguardia" para urbanizar El Grau. 
El País. November 11, 2004  
257 Nouvel propone una integración de Valencia con el mar desde el respeto a la historia y la 
huerta. El País. November 12, 2004  
258 Esencia y carácter. El País. November 12, 2004  
259 Sevilla y Rubio destacan los avances en la Copa de América. El País. November 12, 2004  
260 Nouvel presenta un proyecto de conexión de Valencia con los barrios marítimos, la huerta y 
el puerto. El País. November 12, 2004  
261 Socialistas y EU presentan más de 100 enmiendas a la ley de acompañamiento. El País. 
November 13, 2004  
262 Arquitectos internacionales se interesan por Valencia. El País. November 14, 2004  
263 Urbanismo. El País. November 15, 2004  
264 Sevilla aboga por el consenso para que Valencia desarrolle un proyecto como el de Nouvel "o 
parecido". El País. November 18, 2004  
265 Portela critica la tendencia de buscar espectáculo en la arquitectura. El País. November 19, 
2004  
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266 Cyes apuesta por su especialidad y compra un barco para obra marina. El País. November 20, 
2004  
267 "Hemos planteado el desarrollo de Valencia en términos sensibles". El País. November 21, 
2004  
268 ACM insta a los empresarios valencianos a aprovechar la plataforma de las regatas por la 
Copa de América. El País. November 25, 2004  
269 Barberá amplia al suelo portuario el diseño de la conexión de Valencia con el mar. El País. 
November 25, 2004  
270 Barberá amplia al puerto el diseño de la apertura de Valencia al mar. El País. November 25, 
2004  
271 Un año de 'glamour' y veleros. El País. November 26, 2004  
272 El Náutico de Valencia se desmarca del único equipo español que hay en marcha para la 
Copa de América. El País. November 28, 2004  
273 Santiago Carregui: “Ciclistas contra la especulación urbanística”. El País. November 29, 
2004  
274 El 78% de los valencianos valora la Copa de América y cree que subirá los precios, según 
una encuesta del PSPV. El País. November 30, 2004  
275 La Generalitat pretende implicar al Gobierno en la financiación del costoso Palau de les Arts. 
El País. December 3, 2004  
276 La obra del canal de la Copa de América arrancara en dos semanas. El País. December 3, 
2004  
277 Las pasiones y los intereses. El País. December 7, 2004  
278 Los arquitectos Koolhaas, Zaera y Pei, entre los seleccionados para ordenar El Grau. El País. 
December 11, 2004  
279 La vicepresidenta del Gobierno ofrece a Camps que proponga un cupo de traductores en la 
UE. El País. December 11, 2004  
280 El Gobierno acepta que Barberá rebase el límite de deuda para invertir en la Copa de 
América. El País. December 12, 2004  
281 El Gobierno autorizará a Barberá créditos extra para la regata de 2007. El País. December 12, 
2004  
282 Rubio dice que incluir el puerto en el plan de El Grau rompe el acuerdo para la Copa. El País. 
December 14, 2004  
283 Proyectos "concretos" para la Copa de América. El País. December 15, 2004  
284 Iberdrola fuerza un acuerdo entre el Náutico de Valencia y 'El Reto' para la Copa de América. 
El País. December 16, 2004  
285 Paradores retoma el plan de reforma de El Saler para la Copa de América. El País. December 
17, 2004  
286 'El Reto-Iberdrola' se inscribe hoy para la Copa de América. de 2007 El País. December 17, 
2004  
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287 La obra principal de la Copa de América se abre paso en el puerto. El País. December 17, 
2004  
288 AENA inicia la ampliación de la terminal de pasajeros, la pista y el aparcamiento del 
aeropuerto de Manises. El País. December 21, 2004  
289 El puerto de Valencia se unirá al 'lobby' por un eje ferroviario de mercancías entre España y 
Alemania. El País. December 23, 2004  
290 La oposición tacha el discurso de puro artificio teatral. El País. January 2, 2005  
291 El Consorcio aprueba nuevas obras para la Copa de América. El País. January 4, 2005  
292 Sevilla y Barberá se reúnen hoy para tratar proyectos de cara a 2007. El País. January 12, 
2005  
293 Barberá pide al Gobierno que le facilite inversiónes por 240 millones de cara a la Copa de 
América. El País. January 13, 2005  
294 Felicidades por la parte que te toca... de caos. El País. January 15, 2005  
295 Ignacio Jiménez de Laiglesia, promotor del proyecto Valencia Litoral: "Todo el mundo tiene 
vela en este entierro". El País. January 16, 2005  
296 Rubio reclama a Barberá un estudio financiero de la deuda de Valencia de cara a 2007. El 
País. January 18, 2005  
297 Barberá afronta la Copa de América con unas arcas exhaustas tras triplicar la deuda desde 
1991. El País. January 22, 2005  
298 Compás de espera. El País. January 22, 2005  
299 Barberá afronta la Copa con unas arcas exhaustas por la elevada deuda. El País. January 22, 
2005  
300 Premios de Hostelería para modernizar el sector de cara a la Copa de América. El País. 
January 25, 2005  
301 El día después de la Copa de América. El País. January 26, 2005  
302 La alcaldesa, que pidió 240 millones, dice que el préstamo es insuficiente para Valencia. El 
País. January 26, 2005  
303 El Gobierno autoriza a Barberá a endeudarse en solo 50,8 millones. El País. January 26, 2005  
304 La Copa de América no es un bálsamo. El País. January 27, 2005  
305 El Gobierno pagará 100 millones para sacar las torres del Parque Central y aumentar la VPO. 
El País. January 28, 2005  
306 Déficit en Valencia. El País. January 28, 2005  
307 Repensar el frente marítimo. El País. February 3, 2005  
308 TVE ofrece a Camps una amplia cobertura de la Copa de América. El País. February 4, 2005  
309 Agricultura resolverá este mes 600 expedientes de la helada de 2004. El País. February 5, 
2005  
310 Camps acusa a Valenzuela de "irresponsabilidad política" por asegurar que la Generalitat 
margina a Alicante. El País. February 5, 2005  
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311 Zapatero reitera su apoyo a la Copa de América e insiste en que es un proyecto de todos los 
españoles. El País. February 6, 2005  
312 El presidente de los constructores pide al Consell que se endeude más si es preciso para 
invertir. El País. February 10, 2005  
313 Barberá pierde protagonismo en la gestión de la Copa de América con los nuevos estatutos 
del Consorcio. El País. February 13, 2005  
314 Los vecinos de Valencia piden inversiónes de cara a la Copa de América. El País. February 
16, 2005  
315 Sevilla y Barberá abogan por que los nuevos estatutos aclaren la financiación local. El País. 
February 17, 2005  
316 Valenzuela aboga por la creación de un grupo de presión para demandar las necesidades de 
Alicante. El País. February 18, 2005  
317 Inversiónes para la Copa de América. El País. February 18, 2005  
318 Los hoteleros esperan que pare el 'boom' de aperturas tras dos años de malos datos. El País. 
February 19, 2005  
319 "El victimismo de Valenzuela está fuera de lugar", dice Justo Nieto. El País. February 23, 
2005  
320 El gobierno de Barberá dejo de invertir 55,9 millones en 2004 y ve "normal" estar al límite de 
la deuda. El País. February 24, 2005  
321 Rubio acusa a Barberá de propiciar 'pelotazos' en Tabacalera y El Cabanyal. El País. 
February 26, 2005  
322 Los hosteleros de Valencia prevén invertir 40 millones para renovar el sector de cara a la 
Copa de América. El País. March 1, 2005  
323 Sevilla asegura que la sociedad valenciana ha sufrido demasiado por problemas de identidad. 
El País. March 2, 2005  
324 Nuevas obras para la Copa de América. El País. March 9, 2005  
325 El Consorcio iniciará este año los planes de uso de la dársena tras la Copa de América. El 
País. March 11, 2005  
326 La coordinadora contra los abusos urbanísticos se extiende a Valencia. El País. March 11, 
2005  
327 Campos opina que Zapatero maltrata a la Generalitat porque tiene sentido de Estado. El País. 
March 14, 2005  
328 El 'Desafio' español echa a andar. El País. March 15, 2005  
329 Rubio asegura que la alcaldesa de Valencia practica el absolutismo y pretende eliminar a la 
oposición. El País. April 5, 2005  
330 Del Rio denuncia que el coste de limpiar Valencia se dispara un 83%. El País. April 9, 2005  
331 "Nuestra 'chance' es entrar en Europa desde la periferia". El País. April 10, 2005  
332 Sevilla autorizará a Barberá a endeudarse en 4 millones más para la Copa América. El País. 
April 10, 2005  
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333 Álvarez advierte al 'lobby' AVE que, a diferencia de Cascos, no asumirá compromisos que no 
pueda cumplir. El País. April 12, 2005  
334 Camps: "Hoy no es día de más peticiones a la ministra”. El País. April 12, 2005  
335 Escribano opina que Valencia aun no tiene un plan "coordinado" para unir la ciudad y su 
frente litoral. El País. April 26, 2005  
336 El jefe del Consell promocionará la Copa de América en Nueva York. El País. April 27, 2005  
337 Camps dice en Nueva York que la Copa de América es la embajadora de Valencia. El País. 
April 29, 2005  
338 La política se calienta y el presidente viaja. El País. May 1, 2005  
339 Ocho arquitectos concursan a instalaciones de la Copa de América. El País. May 5, 2005  
340 La arquitectura de lo 'normal'. El País. May 6, 2005  
341 Jeb Bush se compromete con Camps a visitar Valencia en 2007 durante la celebración de la 
Copa de América. El País. May 6, 2005  
342 Chipperfield contra Nouvel, o Necso contra Dragados. El País. May 8, 2005  
343 Solo 4 propuestas para diseñar El Grau en Valencia. El País. May 9, 2005  
344 El Consell cede por otros 10 años las instalaciones que ocupa RTVE. El País. May 10, 2005  
345 ACM buscara acercar el evento al público en las regatas de junio. El País. May 10, 2005  
346 Una comisión de expertos evaluara los 8 diseños de la zona de ocio de la Copa de América. 
El País. May 10, 2005  
347 La Cámara ofrece 25.000 proveedores a los equipos de la Copa de América. El País. May 12, 
2005  
348 Rubio exige a Barberá que decida el concurso de El Grau. El País. May 12, 2005  
349 El Ayuntamiento aprueba la urbanización de varias calles del centro histórico por 3.300.000 
euros. El País. May 14, 2005  
350 El informe del concurso del Grau se inclina por el arquitecto Von Ger-kan. El País. May 14, 
2005  
351 Valencia: el puerto, 'mar adentro'. El País. May 17, 2005  
352 Camps pide a Zapatero 600 millones extra para cubrir el déficit sanitario. El País. May 18, 
2005  
353 El Consell exige al Estado que doble la inversión de la Copa de América. El País. May 18, 
2005  
354 Defensa de la ciudad continua. El País. May 21, 2005  
355 El puerto aprovecha la Copa de América para crecer por el norte. El País. May 21, 2005  
356 Una playa en peligro. El País. May 21, 2005  
357 Bernabé critica a Barberá su postura en la Copa desleal con el Gobierno. El País. May 26, 
2005  
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358 El pulso político de la Copa de América no preocupa a Bonnefous. El País. May 31, 2005  
359 La Generalitat hace otro plan sin concretar para la Copa de América. El País. June 2, 2005  
360 Los arquitectos exponen sus diseños del 'Foredeck' al jurado del concurso. El País. June 3, 
2005  
361 El proyecto de la dársena tendrá un coste de 35,1 millones de euros. El País. June 4, 2005  
362 Chipperfield y Vázquez ganan el concurso para el edificio de invitados de la Copa de 
América. El País. June 4, 2005  
363 Tania Castro: “Las obras de la Copa de América estarán en marzo de 2006”. El País. June 7, 
2005  
364 El País. June 8, 2005 (1) 
365 El País. June 8, 2005 (2) 
366 El País. June 8, 2005 (3) 
367 Los hoteleros reclaman a las administraciones coordinación para promocionar Valencia. El 
País. June 9, 2005  
368 Barberá anuncia que repetirá como candidata a la alcaldía de Valencia en las elecciones de 
2007. El País. June 11, 2005  
369 El paraíso del 'megayate'. El País. June 18, 2005  
370 El Rey, tripulante 18 del 'Iberdrola'. El País. June 20, 2005  
371 Rubio pide que la ampliación del puerto se retrase hasta evaluar el impacto del canal en las 
playas de Valencia. El País. June 21, 2005  
372 Rodríguez Zapatero visitará el domingo las instalaciones de la Copa de América en Valencia. 
El País. June 23, 2005  
373 Zapatero aplaza a julio la visita a la Copa de América por su agenda. El País. June 24, 2005  
374 La oposición acusa al PP de "falsear" las cuentas de Valencia. El País. June 25, 2005  
375 Los visitantes de la Copa de América gastaron 538 Euros de media. El País. June 30, 2005  
376 Los ecologistas alertan de la construcción de 768.000 viviendas en la costa española. El País. 
July 6, 2005  
377 Los puertos se reunirán para buscar sinergias en logística. El País. July 6, 2005  
378 Las obras de la Copa de América hacen desaparecer la lonja de pescadores. El País. July 7, 
2005  
379 Industria y regatas. El País. July 8, 2005  
380 Barberá ve en la Copa de América su mayor logro en este mandato. El País. July 9, 2005  
381 Rubio dice que la Copa de América se logro con dinero y apoyo de todos. El País. July 13, 
2005  
382 Zapatero afirma que la Copa de América es un proyecto de Estado para hacer una Valencia 
moderna. El País. July 15, 2005  
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383 El PSPV dice que el Consell ofrece una "sobredosis de propaganda y mentiras" en vez de 
explicar su gestión. El País. July 17, 2005  
384 "La Copa de América debe beneficiar a toda la ciudad de Valencia". El País. August 15, 
2005  
385 El Consell cifra en 20 millones el impacto turístico de las prerregatas Louis Vuitton. El País. 
August 22, 2005  
386 La conquista Suiza. El País. August 22, 2005  
387 Natzaret teme a la lluvia. El País. September 2, 2005  
388 El Consell y el Gobierno consideran clave la población para revisar la financiación sanitaria. 
El País. September 3, 2005  
389 El encuentro de Valencia se suma a los proyectos internacionales. El País. September 9, 2005  
390 El Colegio de Arquitectos recurrirá a los juzgados para restablecer la racionalidad 
urbanística. El País. September 10, 2005  
391 AVE se compromete con la Autoridad Portuaria a urgir los accesos y la integración entre 
Valencia y Sagunto. El País. September 17, 2005  
392 Barberá pide 774 millones al Gobierno en 2006 para la Copa de América. El País. September 
17, 2005  
393 Sevilla ofrece a Pérez Casado ser alto comisionado de la Copa de América. El País. 
September 17, 2005  
394 Pérez Casado acepta ser alto comisionado de la Copa de América. El País. September 20, 
2005  
395 Barberá deja en el aire el concurso internacional que convoco para la conexión urbana de 
Valencia con el mar. El País. September 20, 2005  
396 El País. September 25, 2005  (1) 
397 El País. September 25, 2005  (2) 
398 "Solo haremos enmiendas consensuadas con el PP". El País. September 25, 2005  
399 Dos comisionados y una presidenta. El País. September 26, 2005  
400 Las Cortes rechazan una moratoria urbanística y la agencia del agua. El País. September 29, 
2005  
401 El PP reanuda las críticas a Zapatero tras el debate de política general. El País. September 30, 
2005  
402 La urgente necesidad de un ataque de cordura. El País. October 13, 2005  
403 Pérez Casado es nombrado comisionado de la Copa de América. El País. October 14, 2005  
404 El 'Alinghi' echa el ancla en el puerto. El País. October 16, 2005  
405 El 'Alinghi' estrena su base en el puerto de Valencia. El País. October 16, 2005  
406 El País. October 21, 2005  
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407 Las tres administraciones aparcan diferencias y se comprometen a hacer de la Copa "un 
éxito". El País. October 21, 2005  
408 Pla ve imposible nuevos pactos con el PP y pide la movilización de "todos" para ganar en 
2007. El País. October 23, 2005  
409 Mucho futuro y difícil seguimiento. El País. October 23, 2005  
410 Barberá endeuda a Valencia en otros 30 millones para la Copa de América. El País. October 
25, 2005  
411 Ocho nuevas empresas públicas para la Copa de América y para proyectos de Blasco y de 
Fabra. El País. November 1, 2005  
412 El Consell gastará más en promoción ante la supuesta desatención del Gobierno a la Copa. El 
País. November 4, 2005  
413 Vigilados por mil ojos. El País. November 6, 2005  
414 El aeropuerto de Manises alcanza los 4,5 millones de pasajeros, un millón más que el año 
pasado. El País. November 12, 2005  
415 Embarcaciones de recreo protestan en Gandía contra los yates de la Copa de América que 
ocuparan sus amarres. El País. November 13, 2005  
416 El Gobierno invierte 2 millones en promoción de la Copa de América. El País. November 18, 
2005  
417 El PSPV destaca la inversión del Estado en Valencia y el PP critica que no hay obra nueva. 
El País. November 18, 2005  
418 Aeropuertos en la pista de despegue. El País. November 18, 2005  
419 Un puerto entre la ciudad y los grandes buques. El País. November 18, 2005  
420 Unos presupuestos generales de Estado por debajo del 10%. El País. November 18, 2005  
421 El interior, a la espera de un gran eje. El País. November 18, 2005  
422 Valencia apuesta por las inversiónes en el plan de El Cabanyal, Ciutat Vella y la Copa de 
América. El País. November 19, 2005  
423 Otro comisionado para la Copa de América. El País. November 19, 2005  
424 El País. November 21, 2005  
425 Los vuelos de bajo coste suponen casi el 40% del volumen de pasajeros de Manises y L'Altet. 
El País. November 21, 2005  
426 Rubio critica que Barberá pida ahora apoyo empresarial a la Copa de América. El País. 
November 24, 2005  
427 Barberá ensalza la inversión del Consell en obras y en la Copa de América. El País. 
November 25, 2005  
428 PP y PSPV se enfrentan por el tercer comisionado de la Copa de América. El País. 
November 26, 2005  
429 Camps viaja a Nueva York para promocionar la Comunidad. El País. November 27, 2005  
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430 Dragados, Drace y Sedesa harán por 37,6 millones la mayor obra del puerto vinculada a la 
Copa de América. El País. December 2, 2005  
431 Nueva ordenación del tráfico que rodea la dársena del puerto de Valencia. El País. December 
16, 2005  
432 Los socialistas vuelven a reclamar un cambio de modelo urbanístico y la destitución del 
consejero Blasco. El País. December 18, 2005  
433 Quejas de los pescadores de Valencia por las obras de la Copa de América. El País. January 
4, 2006  
434 El puerto de Valencia contara con una marina urbana menor de la que pretendía. Barberá El 
País. January 12, 2006  
435 Pérez Casado lamenta que Barberá avale un concurso de ideas sobre la dársena interior sin 
proyecto de ciudad El País. January 15, 2006  
436 Marcos dice que el PP y el PSOE equivocan las prioridades para la Comunidad. El País. 
January 15, 2006  
437 Zapatero promete la alta velocidad para 2007 y Pla, una alternativa de acción y no de 
palabras. El País. January 16, 2006  
438 Zapatero ofrece respaldo incondicional a Pla en su carrera a la presidencia de la Generalitat. 
El País. January 16, 2006  
439 Barberá acusa a Zapatero de paralizar proyectos importantes para el desarrollo de Valencia. 
El País. January 19, 2006  
440 El comisionado estatal para la Copa de América ficha a Vicent Añó. El País. January 19, 
2006  
441 Rubio reta a Barberá a asumir la inversión de la Copa de América. El País. January 20, 2006  
442 El Puerto de Valencia reivindica el eje mediterráneo y el de Lisboa. El País. February 23, 
2006  
443 Hacienda exigirá a Barberá un plan para bajar la deuda. El País. February 24, 2006  
444 El PP achaca la deuda al Gobierno y la oposición ve Valencia en bancarrota. El País. 
February 25, 2006  
445 Camps y Barberá discrepan sobre el rol de Baleares en Copa de América. El País. March 1, 
2006  
446 La Copa de América y la escasa oferta elevan un 113% el precio de la vivienda en Valencia. 
El País. March 2, 2006  
447 Nuevas obras de la Copa de América. El País. March 21, 2006  
448 Bernabé asegura que la ampliación del aeropuerto estará para las prerregatas de la Copa de 
América. El País. March 25, 2006  
449 Las obras para la Copa de América eliminan el muro que separa el paseo marítimo de 
Valencia del puerto. El País. March 29, 2006  
450 Rubio tacha de opaca la nueva sociedad para la Copa de América. El País. April 5, 2006  
451 Camps dice que las obras de la Copa de América están adelantadas. El País. April 6, 2006  
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452 Los futuros arquitectos diseñan El Grau tras la Copa de América. El País. April 7, 2006  
453 Barberá recibe un premio que concede el Ayuntamiento. El País. April 10, 2006  
454 Una treintena de entidades piden el 0,7% de la Copa de América para cooperación. El País. 
April 12, 2006  
455 El País. April 13, 2006  
456 El Rey presidirá un acto de presentación de la Copa de América organizado por el Gobierno 
en Madrid. El País. April 20, 2006  
457 Las obras en la avenida y por la Copa de América colapsan el tráfico del puerto. El País. 
April 22, 2006  
458 Un 33% de la franja costera valenciana esta urbanizada, según un informe de Greenpeace. El 
País. May 1, 2006  
459 Camps encarga las políticas industriales al consejero de Economía en detrimento de Nieto. El 
País. May 6, 2006  
460 La invitación del Rey evita el boicot del PP al acto del Gobierno por la Copa de América. El 
País. May 9, 2006  
461 Malcriados. El País. May 9, 2006  
462 Rubio promociona con una campaña la labor estatal en la Copa de América. El País. May 11, 
2006  
463 Colas para ver las regatas de la Copa de América. El País. May 12, 2006  
464 Ejecutivos de 10 multinacionales constatan el auge del turismo y la construcción en 
detrimento de la industria. El País. May 18, 2006  
465 El Consell critica el trato "residual" de RTVE a la Copa de América. El País. May 18, 2006  
466 La Guardia Civil ocupa 17 patrulleras en la Copa de América en plena crisis inmigratoria. El 
País. May 19, 2006  
467 "El PAI es un Ferrari sobre un camino sin señales de tráfico por el que pasa mucha gente". El 
País. May 21, 2006  
468 Camps remodela el Consell para cambiar a Blasco. El País. May 30, 2006  
469 "Los eventos no son rentables". El País. May 31, 2006  
470 Sevilla asegura que la nueva dirección de la Copa de América es provisional. El País. June 3, 
2006  
471 Rambla se estrena como portavoz con ataques al Gobierno socialista. El País. June 3, 2006  
472 El puerto de Valencia crecerá más en superficie que el de Hong Kong. El País. June 11, 2006  
473 Chipperfield abre un curso de arquitectos estrella de la UPC. El País. June 13, 2006  
474 El País. June 14, 2006  
475 La Generalitat limpia de basura el campo de regatas El País. June 19, 2006  
476 El País. June 21, 2006 (1) 
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477 El País. June 21, 2006 (2) 
478 El País. June 21, 2006 (3) 
479 El País. June 21, 2006 (4) 
480 El autor del plan maestro de la Copa pide que el interés social prime sobre la ampliación del 
puerto. El País. June 23, 2006  
481 La ZAL de Valencia sigue parada seis meses después del fin de las obras. El País. June 25, 
2006  
482 Barberá acusa a Zapatero de no invertir y de eludir responsabilidades en vísperas de su visita. 
El País. June 30, 2006 Friday  
483 La ministra de Fomento dice que se esforzará aunque el compromiso del AVE es para 2010. 
El País. July 1, 2006 Saturday  
484 Un concurso de ideas determinará los usos de la dársena tras la Copa de América. El País. 
July 4, 2006 Tuesday  
485 Valencia anda sobrada de marcas. El País. August 4, 2006 Friday  
486 El Consell anuncia su oposición frontal a las prospecciones petrolíferas frente a El Saler. El 
País. August 24, 2006 Thursday  
487 Valencia deja de ser Badajoz. El País. August 27, 2006 Sunday  
488 Rubio pide que se expongan al público los proyectos de la futura marina. El País. September 
8, 2006 Friday  
489 El Puerto de Valencia avisa de que se perderán mil millones si no crece. El País. September 
21, 2006 Thursday  
490 Los arquitectos europeos premian el edificio Veles e Vents. El País. September 23, 2006 
Saturday  
491 Valencia ya tiene su "milla de oro". El País. September 27, 2006 Wednesday  
492 La Generalitat dejará de ingresar 175 millones por rebajar la presión fiscal. El País. 
September 30, 2006 Saturday  
493 El PP afirma que los Presupuestos Generales son un fraude y aportan 396 millones menos 
que la media. El País. October 1, 2006 Sunday  
494 El Consell ignora las críticas al impacto de la ampliación del puerto de Valencia. El País. 
October 2, 2006 Monday  
495 El País. October 14, 2006 Saturday  
496 60.000 Euros por un anuncio. El País. October 17, 2006 Tuesday  
497 El PP ve escasa la inversión que prevé el presupuesto estatal. El País. October 20, 2006 
Friday  
498 Campos defiende la subida del 39% del gasto previsto en Presidencia. El País. November 4, 
2006 Saturday  
499 Un gran grupo con Bancaixa, Lubasa y Sacyr, favorito en la subasta de suelo de El Grau. El 
País. November 8, 2006 Wednesday  
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500 Bancaixa, Lubasa y Sacyr se adjudican el suelo de El Grau por 320 millones. El País. 
November 9, 2006 Thursday  
501 Consell y PP arremeten contra el Gobierno por la "paralización". El País. November 17, 2006 
Friday  
502 El Gobierno apoyará la ampliación del puerto de Valencia si no daña las playas. El País. 
November 22, 2006 Wednesday  
503 La Comunidad Valenciana logra la mayor ocupación hotelera de España en octubre. El País. 
November 27, 2006 Monday  
504 Barberá destinará sólo 4 millones a promover Valencia el año de la Copa de América. El 
País. December 6, 2006 Wednesday  
505 Camps reclamará la revisión del sistema de financiación. El País. December 29, 2006 Friday  
506 Camps pide al Gobierno más dinero por el aumento de un millón de habitantes. El País. 
January 2, 2007 Tuesday  
507 Valencia carece de preacuerdo con ACM para acoger otra vez la Copa de América. El País. 
January 7, 2007 Sunday  
508 La Copa de América no tira del precio de la vivienda, pero sí el nuevo Mestalla en Campanar. 
El País. January 10, 2007 Wednesday  
509 Clos subraya el impacto de la Copa de América. El País. January 20, 2007 Saturday  
510 Sevilla destaca la división del PP y que su proyecto está "agotado y sin ideas". El País. 
January 28, 2007 Sunday  
511 Barberá crea marcas y firmas con la excusa de la Copa de América. El País. January 30, 2007 
Tuesday  
512 La oposición a la Copa de América, principal argumento de la precampaña de EU en 
Valencia. El País. January 31, 2007 Wednesday  
513 Los planes urbanísticos sustituyen a los parques temáticos como reclamo en Fitur. El País. 
February 1, 2007 Thursday  
514 Las soflamas del presidente. El País. February 11, 2007 Sunday  
515 Barberá centrará su campaña en los barrios y los grandes eventos. El País. February 13, 2007 
Tuesday  
516 Barberá anuncia más inversiones al bajar la deuda al 105,6% en 2006. El País. February 17, 
2007 Saturday  
517 Los técnicos destacan 11 proyectos de la marina del puerto de Valencia. El País. February 
27, 2007 Tuesday  
518 ¿Ideas para la basura? El País. March 1, 2007 Thursday  
519 Oportunidades. El País. March 4, 2007 Sunday  
520 La Valencia del futuro se abre paso por el mar. El País. March 4, 2007 Sunday  
521 2.000 agentes y 24 barcos velarán por la seguridad de la Copa de América. El País. March 8, 
2007 Thursday  
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522 Manises despega. El País. March 9, 2007 Friday  
523 Jordi Sevilla propondrá una sede eventual del Instituto Español de Oceanografía en Gandía. 
El País. March 13, 2007 Tuesday  
524 Sevilla garantiza la seguridad en la Copa América y censura a Rambla. El País. March 15, 
2007 Thursday  
525 ACM busca el calor del público con grandes conciertos. El País. March 16, 2007 Friday  
526 Sevilla planta cara a Barberá en el puerto. El País. March 24, 2007 Saturday  
527 Manises estrena la terminal que debe cubrir sus necesidades para cuatro años. El País. March 
26, 2007 Monday  
528 El Gobierno y la Generalitat pelean hasta por las infraestructuras. El País. March 26, 2007 
Monday  
529 La Copa tendrá un impacto económico de 3.600 millones de euros. El País. March 27, 2007 
Tuesday  
530 Como las Olimpiadas. El País. March 27, 2007 Tuesday  
531 Sevilla controlará con una sociedad estatal el futuro del frente portuario tras la Copa. El País. 
March 27, 2007 Tuesday  
532 El peor escenario del día después. El País. March 27, 2007 Tuesday  
533 Barberá replica que la mitad del puerto es de la ciudad. El País. March 27, 2007 Tuesday  
534 El Gobierno reta a Barberá a demostrar qué terrenos tiene la ciudad en el puerto. El País. 
March 29, 2007 Thursday  
535 Virosque considera politizada la Copa de América. El País. March 30, 2007 Friday  
536 Barberá discute que el Estado tenga derechos sobre la dársena. El País. March 30, 2007 
Friday  
537 Viaje de Zapatero para inaugurar el aeropuerto y ver la Copa de América. El País. April 3, 
2007 Tuesday  
538 Los concejales de Valencia incluyen al puerto entre sus logros económicos. El País. April 4, 
2007 Wednesday  
539 El Estado acredita que sólo son municipales tres tinglados del puerto de Valencia. El País. 
April 8, 2007 Sunday  
540 Vender grandes eventos, silenciar grandes políticas. El País. April 8, 2007 Sunday  
541 Valencia y el mar. El País. April 9, 2007 Monday  
542 La reforma de la dársena abre un nuevo espacio ciudadano de ocio en Valencia. El País. 
April 10, 2007 Tuesday  
543 Zapatero visita hoy un puerto y un aeropuerto renovados. El País. April 10, 2007 Tuesday  
544 Zapatero asegura haber recuperado el tiempo perdido por el PP en Valencia. El País. April 
11, 2007 Wednesday  
545 El País. April 11, 2007 Wednesday  
278 
 
546 El 'lobby' valenciano hace piña contra el último informe. El País. April 12, 2007 Thursday  
547 La Copa de América dejará en Valencia siete veces más dinero que en Auckland 03. El País. 
April 15, 2007 Sunday  
548 Olas, fuegos y luces. El País. April 15, 2007 Sunday  
549 Pasarela de ilustres de la mano de la Copa de América. El País. April 16, 2007 Monday  
550 El Levante proyecta su nuevo estadio en la dársena del puerto de Valencia. El País. April 19, 
2007 Thursday  
551 El puerto acredita que es titular de la dársena de Valencia. El País. April 28, 2007 Saturday  
552 La Valencia del bien y del mal. El País. April 30, 2007 Monday  
553 "Exigiremos la moratoria urbanística". El País. May 5, 2007 Saturday  
554 Lo que la sexta se llevó. El País. May 5, 2007 Saturday  
555 Viento favorable a los 'cinco estrellas'. El País. May 7, 2007 Monday  
556 Cuidado con las rebajas. El País. May 8, 2007 Tuesday  
557 El reclamo de los grandes eventos. El País. May 10, 2007 Thursday  
558 La Copa de América genera 2.500 contratos de servicios hasta abril. El País. May 11, 2007 
Friday  
559 Principales propuestas. El País. May 11, 2007 Friday  
560 ¿Hay vida más allá del ladrillo? El País. May 12, 2007 Saturday  
561 Zapatero afirma que los principios del PP "son de hojalata, como su patriotismo". El País. 
May 13, 2007 Sunday  
562 El PP miente cuando denuncia la falta de inversión del Estado, según Zapatero. El País. May 
13, 2007 Sunday  
563 Barberá elude el debate con Alborch. El País. May 15, 2007 Tuesday  
564 La ampliación del puerto dificulta que Valencia vuelva a ser sede de la Copa Bonnefous: "Si 
gana el Alinghi, la próxima edición será en Europa en 2009 o 2011". El País. May 15, 2007 
Tuesday  
565 Ya sólo circo. El País. May 16, 2007 Wednesday  
566 "El puerto de Valencia no debe ser una parcela de lujo". El País. May 16, 2007 Wednesday  
567 Valencia en tres dimensiones. El País. May 17, 2007 Thursday  
568 Pla pide la colaboración de los empresarios para recuperar el tiempo perdido por el PP. El 
País. May 17, 2007 Thursday  
569 El ministro Sevilla y Bonnefous hablan del futuro de la Copa. El País. May 18, 2007 Friday  
570 Andreu: "Es una humillación". El País. May 19, 2007 Saturday  
571 Compromís destapa el patrimonio acosado por el urbanismo salvaje. El País. May 20, 2007 
Sunday  
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572 Camps consolida la hegemonía del PP en la Comunidad Valenciana. El País. May 20, 2007 
Sunday  
573 Barberá mantiene la mayoría sin signos de fatiga en sus votantes. El País. May 21, 2007 
Monday  
574 "Hemos puesto a la ciudad en el mapa". El País. May 22, 2007 Tuesday  
575 Camps amplía la mayoría absoluta. El País. May 28, 2007 Monday  
576 La tecnología española supera el déficit comercial con EE UU. El País. June 5, 2007 Tuesday  
577 Peralta critica al Gobierno por falta de seguridad ante el riesgo de un atentado. El País. June 
7, 2007 Thursday  
578 Los economistas celebran el impulso turístico de la Copa de América. El País. June 8, 2007 
Friday  
579 Los ganadores del concurso de la marina critican la apertura al tráfico de la dársena. El País. 
June 12, 2007 Tuesday  
580 Vecinos del Marítimo de Valencia critican la aprobación sin consulta del plan de la Fórmula 
1. El País. June 13, 2007 Wednesday  
581 Bertarelli ve incompatible la ampliación del puerto con la Copa de América. El País. June 16, 
2007 Saturday  
582 Rita Barberá acentúa su apuesta por la Valencia de los grandes eventos. El País. June 17, 
2007 Sunday  
583 Rita y el puerto. El País. June 18, 2007 Monday  
584 El Ejército se suma al dispositivo de seguridad de la Copa de América. El País. June 19, 
2007 Tuesday  
585 Los hoteleros piden que se doble el presupuesto del área de Turismo. El País. June 21, 2007 
Thursday  
586 "Valencia da mucha importancia a estar en el mundo y descuida el día a día". El País. June 
23, 2007 Saturday  
587 El Consell acusa al Gobierno de entorpecer su defensa en la UE. El País. June 23, 2007 
Saturday  
588 Nouvel y GMP inician el diseño del nuevo barrio de El Grau sin la dársena. El País. June 23, 
2007 Saturday  
589 Cirugía en un paciente que corre. El País. June 23, 2007 Saturday  
590 La Copa de América estrecha los lazos entre Valencia y Suiza. El País. June 24, 2007 Sunday  
591 Zapatero ha aumentado un 60% la inversión del Estado por valenciano. El País. June 24, 
2007 Sunday  
592 Valencia acogerá de nuevo la Copa de América si amplía el puerto en Sagunto. El País. June 
25, 2007 Monday  
593 Un pulso entre dos modelos económicos. El País. June 25, 2007 Monday  
594 No se arrodillen ante Bertarelli. El País. June 26, 2007 Tuesday  
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595 El parador de El Saler reabre en un acto sin presencia municipal. El País. June 27, 2007 
Wednesday  
596 Los vuelos chárter e internacionales de Manises se disparan. El País. June 30, 2007 Saturday  
597 La ampliación, a Sagunto. El País. July 2, 2007 Monday  
598 La Copa deja una lluvia de millones y un récord de público. El País. July 4, 2007 Wednesday  
599 Ferrando: "No hay excusa para dilatar la ampliación del Puerto de Valencia". El País. July 5, 
2007 Thursday  
600 La Copa sólo seguirá en Valencia si se frena la ampliación del puerto industrial. El País. July 
6, 2007 Friday  
601 Bertarelli ha creado un negocio millonario y tiene el apoyo de la Administración para 
repetirlo. El País. July 6, 2007 Friday  
602 El puerto como metáfora. El País. July 6, 2007 Friday  
603 La ampliación del puerto se retrasa a 2009 tras las exigencias de ACM. El País. July 7, 2007 
Saturday  
604 El País. July 10, 2007 Tuesday  
605 Los controles en el puerto desaparecen tras el final de la Copa de América. El País. July 11, 
2007 Wednesday  
606 Valencia atraerá nuevas inversiones inmobiliarias, dice una consultora. El País. July 12, 2007 
Thursday  
607 Bertarelli y Prodi analizan el traslado de la Copa de América a Cerdeña. El País. July 13, 
2007 Friday  
608 El circuito de F-1 obliga a reformar la dársena del puerto de la Copa de América. El País. 
July 14, 2007 Saturday  
609 "Queremos utilizar Valencia como el 'hub' tecnológico del Mediterráneo". El País. July 16, 
2007 Monday  
610 El puerto de Valencia asume retrasos en la ampliación tras reclamar que era urgente. El País. 
July 16, 2007 Monday  
611 Las administraciones y ACM negocian una nueva edición de la Copa en Valencia. El País. 
July 18, 2007 Wednesday  
612 Las administraciones y ACM intensifican la negociación para otra edición de la Copa. El 
País. July 19, 2007 Thursday  
613 Los turistas utilizan las tarjetas de crédito un 68% más que en 2006. El País. July 20, 2007 
Friday  
614 El País. July 20, 2007 Friday  
615 Elena Salgado representará al Estado en la Copa de América. El País. July 21, 2007 Saturday  
616 Diez borrones en el litoral español. El País. July 23, 2007 Monday  
617 Una piscina y una escuela. El País. July 24, 2007 Tuesday  
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618 Acuerdo global para que Valencia repita como sede de la Copa de América. El País. July 25, 
2007 Wednesday  
619 Las obras del puerto sólo se pararán durante las regatas. El País. July 25, 2007 Wednesday  
620 "Hemos elegido Valencia porque ha demostrado ser una sede fantástica". El País. July 26, 
2007 Thursday  
621 Satisfacción y alegría tras las tensiones de la negociación. El País. July 26, 2007 Thursday  
622 Alborch propone abrir el diseño del frente litoral de Valencia al debate ciudadano. El País. 
July 27, 2007 Friday  
623 El Consorcio Valencia 2009 se queda con la gestión de 600 amarres de la dársena deportiva. 
El País. July 27, 2007 Friday  
624 Barberá rechaza crear una comisión sobre el frente litoral. El País. July 28, 2007 Saturday  
625 La ampliación del puerto de Valencia se condiciona a la preservación de las playas. El País. 
August 1, 2007 Wednesday  
626 Carmen Alborch advierte de los riesgos de la ampliación del puerto para las playas y 
L'Albufera. El País. August 2, 2007 Thursday  
627 El precio de los alquileres y de las VPO expulsa a los jóvenes de Valencia. El País. August 3, 
2007 Friday  
628 Una costa con puntos y banderas negras. El País. August 14, 2007 Tuesday  
629 Lo que queda de la Copa de América. El País. August 19, 2007 Sunday  
630 El Gobierno quiere una presidencia rotatoria para el consorcio de la Copa. El País. 
September 1, 2007 Saturday  
631 El frenazo de la construcción en agosto provoca un alza del desempleo del 6,7%. El País. 
September 5, 2007 Wednesday  
632 Barberá y Camps arremeten contra el Gobierno por el control de la Copa. El País. September 
5, 2007 Wednesday  
633 Sevilla descarta un congreso del PSPV antes de elecciones. El País. September 7, 2007 
Friday  
634 El Gobierno hace valer su poder en la Copa y provoca la cólera del PP. El País. September 8, 
2007 Saturday  
635 Barberá acusa al Ejecutivo de prepotencia y rechaza el "trágala". El País. September 8, 2007 
Saturday  
636 El turismo subió un 20% en Valencia durante julio y agosto. El País. September 8, 2007 
Saturday  
637 El PP califica el cambio de estatutos de la copa de "atraco a maño armada". El País. 
September 9, 2007 Sunday  
638 Alborch insta al PP a dejar el victimismo y negociar la Copa de América. El País. September 
10, 2007 Monday  
639 Barberá califica de antidemocrático al Gobierno por modificar los estatutos del Consorcio. El 
País. September 12, 2007 Wednesday  
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640 El Consell insiste en el Consorcio actual de la Copa que el Gobierno descartó en julio. El 
País. September 13, 2007 Thursday  
641 El Gobierno le sostiene el pulso a Barberá por el control de la Copa. El País. September 14, 
2007 Friday  
642 El País. September 16, 2007 Sunday  
643 El Gobierno retrasa el pago del canon a ACM e insiste en el Consorcio. El País. September 
20, 2007 Thursday  
644 Las diez exageraciones del PP sobre Zapatero. El País. September 21, 2007 Friday  
645 El Gobierno garantiza el pago a ACM y Barberá critica que no cumple el plazo. El País. 
September 21, 2007 Friday  
646 El Consell se aleja de la ampliación del puerto. El País. September 23, 2007 Sunday  
647 Aznar afirma que la ampliación del puerto empezará en 2007 o 2008. El País. September 25, 
2007 Tuesday  
648 Las 70 mayores ONG acusan al Consell de "colapsar" la ayuda al Tercer Mundo. La 
Generalitat anunció que daría el 0,7% a combatir la pobreza y lo ha rebajado al 0,22%. El 
País. September 27, 2007 Thursday  
649 Fomento acelera la inversión en los ejes viarios alternativos a la autopista AP-7. El País. 
September 27, 2007 Thursday  
650 Camps y Hacienda negocian sobre la Copa. El País. October 3, 2007 Wednesday  
651 ACM alerta de que el pleito entre Alinghi y Oracle amenaza la Copa de América en 2009. El 
País. October 4, 2007 Thursday  
652 Las tres administraciones lanzan un mensaje de tranquilidad y afirman que las regatas se 
harán. El País. October 4, 2007 Thursday  
653 El gasto del tramo del puerto se recuperará con concesiones. El País. October 4, 2007 
Thursday  
654 El Gobierno confía en crear en breve el Consorcio de la Copa y pagar a ACM. El País. 
October 5, 2007 Friday  
655 Catástrofe y oportunidad. El País. October 14, 2007 Sunday  
656 Barberá pide al Gobierno otros 867 millones. El País. October 26, 2007 Friday  
657 Veles e Vents también hace agua. El País. October 29, 2007 Monday  
658 Alborch pide un debate serio sobre el frente litoral. El País. November 16, 2007 Friday  
659 Valencia se juega con el puerto el futuro de su frente litoral. El País. November 17, 2007 
Saturday  
660 La Copa de América se aplaza a 2011. El País. November 20, 2007 Tuesday  
661 Barberá se declara "encantada" de que se retrase la Copa de América. El País. November 21, 
2007 Wednesday  
662 El puerto prevé atrasos si hay más regatas El País. November 21, 2007 Wednesday  
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663 Barberá pone buena cara al retraso de la Copa a 2011. El País. November 21, 2007 
Wednesday  
664 El Consorcio de la Copa caduca en diciembre. El País. December 1, 2007 Saturday  
665 Oracle desea la 33 y la 34 Copa de América en Valencia. El País. December 6, 2007 
Thursday  
666 El Consell cubre gastos de la Copa de América. El País. December 6, 2007 Thursday  
667 Las dudas sobre la Copa obligan a mantener un Consorcio a medio gas. El País. December 
11, 2007 Tuesday  
668 Las dudas de la Copa ponen el Consorcio a medio gas El País. December 11, 2007 Tuesday  
669 El puerto de Valencia licita el dique de 3 kilómetros para su ampliación. El País. December 
14, 2007 Friday  
670 La dársena sigue en manos de ACM. El País. December 18, 2007 Tuesday  
671 La Copa de América benefició a la economía en 2.724 millones. El País. January 5, 2008 
Saturday  
672 El futuro es una incógnita. El País. January 13, 2008 Sunday  
673 La incógnita sobre la Copa obliga al Consorcio a gestionar la dársena. El País. January 15, 
2008 Tuesday  
674 El Consorcio controlará la dársena de la Copa. El País. January 15, 2008 Tuesday  
675 De la Vega quiere que la dársena ofrezca ocio, música y arquitectura. El País. January 20, 
2008 Sunday  
676 Los hoteles se vacían cuando pasan los grandes eventos. El País. January 27, 2008 Sunday  
677 Hoteles vacíos tras los grandes eventos. El País. January 27, 2008 Sunday  
678 Camps asegura que el beneficio de los grandes eventos es indiscutible. El País. February 1, 
2008 Friday  
679 "El Gobierno cooperará con la Generalitat, lo quiera o no". El País. March 7, 2008 Friday  
680 La 33ª edición de la Copa de América se aleja de Valencia. El País. March 19, 2008 
Wednesday  
681 La expectativa de negocio se desinfla. El País. March 19, 2008 Wednesday  
682 El juez da la razón al Oracle y aleja la Copa de Valencia. El País. March 19, 2008 
Wednesday  
683 Barberá opina que las dudas de la Copa se despejan. El País. March 20, 2008 Thursday  
684 El PP de Castellón pretende prohibir la videncia y el tarot en la calle. El País. March 20, 
2008 Thursday  
685 Oracle se compromete a traer de vuelta la Copa a Valencia si gana. El Alinghi y los 
estadounidenses no logran pactar las fechas de la 33ª edición. El País. March 27, 2008 
Thursday  
686 "El circuito urbano de Valencia requiere muchas explicaciones". El País. May 2, 2008 Friday  
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687 Los visitantes de crucero en Valencia caen un 82%. El País. May 9, 2008 Friday  
688 La Copa de América en 2009 obliga a retocar el contrato. El País. May 14, 2008 Wednesday  
689 El Consell insta al Gobierno a ejecutar el trasvase a Barcelona. El País. May 31, 2008 
Saturday  
690 La Copa rompe con Valencia. El País. June 28, 2008 Saturday  
691 Nadie da la cara por la Copa. El País. July 1, 2008 Tuesday  
692 La ampliación del puerto alejará el mar 100 metros en la Malvarrosa. El País. July 10, 2008 
Thursday  
693 Una urbanización cara y de calidad. El País. July 12, 2008 Saturday  
694 Calma chicha en la dársena. El País. July 13, 2008 Sunday  
695 Con las maletas preparadas. El País. July 13, 2008 Sunday  
696 La polvareda y el ruido de las obras afectarán a la dársena deportiva. El País. July 31, 2008 
Thursday  
697 Las obras del puerto de Valencia chocan con el uso de la dársena El País. July 31, 2008 
Thursday  
698 Más logotipo que atributos. El País. August 17, 2008 Sunday  
699 El Gobierno mantendrá las exenciones fiscales de la Copa de América. El País. October 22, 
2008 Wednesday  
700 Alinghi llama a inscribirse en la 33ª Copa en Valencia. El País. October 23, 2008 Thursday  
701 Las reservas en los grandes hoteles de Valencia caen el 50%. El País. November 3, 2008 
Monday  
702 El Gobierno aprueba beneficios fiscales a la Copa de América. El País. November 15, 2008 
Saturday  
703 Las administraciones dan por hecha la Copa de América. El País. December 6, 2008 
Saturday  
704 Valencia, un modelo insostenible. El País. December 7, 2008 Sunday  
705 El País. December 9, 2008 Tuesday  
706 El enredo de la Copa de América. El País. December 10, 2008 Wednesday  
707 Los barcos de la Copa navegarán otra vez en Valencia. El País. December 13, 2008 Saturday  
708 Protesta vecinal, acto en Valencia contra el abandono de las instalaciones de la F-1 y la Copa. 
El País. December 14, 2008 Sunday  
709 El puerto anuncia la cesión de la dársena a Valencia. El País. December 19, 2008 Friday  
710 La vía americana del presidente. El País. December 21, 2008 Sunday  
711 ACM reclama otro contrato de la Copa de América con el litigio abierto. El País. January 17, 
2009 Saturday  
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712 El Gobierno sólo firmará para otra Copa de América si acaba el litigio. El País. January 29, 
2009 Thursday  
713 Los grandes eventos, cuestionados. El País. January 31, 2009 Saturday  
714 Una sociedad para gestionar los grandes eventos. El País. February 11, 2009 Wednesday  
715 Los ojos en la Copa. El País. February 12, 2009 Thursday  
716 Copa de América, Valencia acogerá regatas en julio y octubre. El País. February 14, 2009 
Saturday  
717 Luna visita hoy la sociedad para grandes eventos. El País. February 16, 2009 Monday  
718 Cinco consejerías y tres entidades contrataron con Orange Market. El País. February 26, 
2009 Thursday  
719 Camps se enroca en los eventos mientras aprietan el paro y la crisis. El País. March 5, 2009 
Thursday  
720 El Gobierno rechaza pagar 20 millones a Bertarelli por dos regatas. El País. March 26, 2009 
Thursday  
721 Los políticos se apuntan a la batalla naval. El País. March 30, 2009 Monday  
722 El PP ultima el acuerdo para dos regatas en Valencia. El País. April 1, 2009 Wednesday  
723 Camps y Barberá aceptan el coste de 9 millones por una regata. El País. April 2, 2009 
Thursday  
724 Auckland, más barato. El País. April 2, 2009 Thursday  
725 Cronología del conflicto judicial entre el Alinghi y el Oracle. El País. April 3, 2009 Friday  
726 El Oracle gana el pleito al Alinghi y deja en evidencia a Camps y Barberá. El País. April 3, 
2009 Friday  
727 "Si no hay prerregatas múltiples rescindiríamos el contrato". El País. April 3, 2009 Friday  
728 Nueva York falla a favor de BMW-Oracle en su pleito con el Alinghi, el fiasco de Barberá y 
Camps. El País. April 3, 2009 Friday  
729 Valencia pierde opciones como base de la Copa de América. El País. April 4, 2009 Saturday  
730 El Gobierno considera "irresponsable" el fiasco de Barberá y Camps en la Copa. El País. 
April 4, 2009 Saturday  
731 El Consorcio de la Copa hace aguas. El País. April 6, 2009 Monday  
732 Vela, Alinghi espera organizar la Copa en Valencia. El País. April 9, 2009 Thursday  
733 Salgado rechazó el contrato por prematuro y abusivo. El País. April 10, 2009 Friday  
734 Barberá rompe cinco días después el contrato de las regatas con ACM. El País. April 10, 
2009 Friday  
735 Barberá pierde credibilidad con el fiasco de las regatas, afirma Alborch. El País. April 12, 
2009 Sunday  
736 Virosque: "Mejor la ONU que la Copa". El País. April 17, 2009 Friday  
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737 Economía ,Virosque matiza sus críticas a la Copa de América. El País. April 18, 2009 
Saturday  
738 Benidorm registra el peor trimestre turístico de los últimos 15 años. El País. April 22, 2009 
Wednesday  
739 Barberá pide otra vez diálogo para no perder la Copa. El País. April 30, 2009 Thursday  
740 Los grandes eventos, en el aire. El País. May 4, 2009 Monday  
741 El Consell da a la Copa un millón que era de agricultura, según el PSPV. El País. May 4, 
2009 Monday  
742 Los dos grandes eventos de Valencia se tambalean. El País. May 4, 2009 Monday  
743 Presidencia negó contratos de la trama para la Copa de América. El País. May 5, 2009 
Tuesday  
744 Special Events se 'coló' en la Copa. El País. May 5, 2009 Tuesday  
745 "Se ha perdido una gran oportunidad". El País. June 15, 2009 Monday  
746 "No tienen lealtad institucional". El País. June 25, 2009 Thursday  
747 Juego sucio con la ciudad. El País. July 29, 2009 Wednesday  
748 Una competición de ida y vuelta. El País. August 6, 2009 Thursday  
749 Del fiasco de las prerregatas al abandono definitivo. El País. August 6, 2009 Thursday  
750 Adiós a la Copa de América. El País. August 6, 2009 Thursday  
751 El buque insignia hace agua. El País. August 7, 2009 Friday  
752 "Hay que aprovechar la dársena y no dejarla vacía". El País. August 7, 2009 Friday  
753 Adiós a la Copa de América. Los vecinos reclaman el uso de la dársena "privatizada". El 
País. August 7, 2009 Friday  
754 Peralta pide una reflexión para recuperar la dársena interior del puerto de Valencia. El País. 
August 29, 2009 Saturday  
755 Vecinos y hosteleros reclaman que se relance la dársena de Valencia. El País. September 7, 
2009 Monday  
756 "No se ha cumplido ninguna de las expectativas". El País. September 13, 2009 Sunday  
757 La ruina de los 'megayates'. El País. September 13, 2009 Sunday  
758 El presupuesto estatal rebaja el dinero para la N-340 tras el bloqueo del PP.  El País. October 
1, 2009 Thursday  
759 Font de Mora dirige la FP hacia la Fórmula 1 y la Copa de América. El País. October 6, 2009 
Tuesday  
760 Corrupción: la parte valenciana del iceberg. El País. October 25, 2009 Sunday  
761 Barberá se aleja de Bertarelli y apuesta por el Oracle porque deja la Copa en Valencia. El 
País. November 7, 2009 Saturday  
762 Las administraciones piden cautela. El País. November 11, 2009 Wednesday  
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763 Camps y Barberá celebran que la Copa vuelva tras dos años de dudas. El País. November 12, 
2009 Thursday  
764 Los tres socios del Consorcio aplauden que la Copa vuelva. El País. November 12, 2009 
Thursday  
765 La Copa de América ingresará diez veces menos que en 2007. El País. November 13, 2009 
Friday  
766 La Copa dará diez veces menos ingresos que en 2007. El País. November 13, 2009 Friday  
767 ¿Será por dinero? El País. November 23, 2009 Monday  
768 Valencia prevé crecer un 7% en turismo durante 2010. El País. November 27, 2009 Friday  
769 El PSPV denuncia que el gerente de Turismo cobra más que Zapatero. El País. November 28, 
2009 Saturday  
770 Dos millones para una sociedad casi inactiva. El País. December 13, 2009 Sunday  
771 Consorcio y equipos discrepan sobre el inicio de la Copa de América. El País. December 18, 
2009 Friday  
772 Gobierno y equipos piden unas regatas sin gran fasto. El País. December 26, 2009 Saturday  
773 Ana Botella, concejal socialista en el Ayuntamiento de Valencia: "Si no aclaran las cuentas 
de las fundaciones, iremos a los juzgados". El País. December 27, 2009 Sunday  
774 La Copa de América recupera la idea de Valencia como enclave tecnológico. El País. 
January 11, 2010 Monday  
775 Una nueva oportunidad. El País. January 11, 2010 Monday  
776 La Copa reaviva la idea del 'hub' tecnológico en Valencia. El País. January 11, 2010 Monday  
777 La Copa, a sólo tres regatas y pendiente de la novena demanda. El País. January 14, 2010 
Thursday  
778 Valencia ultima la organización de una regata menor en la 33ª Copa de América. El País. 
January 16, 2010 Saturday  
779 Barberá: "¿Es que hay que convocar el Consorcio?". El País. January 20, 2010 Wednesday  
780 7,8 millones para la Copa de América más atípica. El País. January 26, 2010 Tuesday  
781 Valencia perdió 130.000 turistas en el año pasado. El País. January 27, 2010 Wednesday  
782 Los patrocinios no cubren los 7,8 millones para la Copa. El País. February 5, 2010 Friday  
783 La crisis tumba la rentabilidad turística de los grandes eventos. El País. February 8, 2010 
Monday  
784 La llegada de turistas cae a los niveles previos a la Copa de América de 2007. El País. 
February 8, 2010 Monday  
785 La hostelería constata el escaso impacto económico de la Copa. El País. February 9, 2010 
Tuesday  
786 Rita Barberá, Alcaldesa de Valencia: "Ser el centro de atención mundial no tiene precio". El 
País. February 9, 2010 Tuesday  
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787 El PP y el centro del mundo. El País. February 10, 2010 Wednesday  
788 Valencia descubre su potencial como centro tecnológico. El País. February 10, 2010 
Wednesday  
789 Peralta pide un plan para la dársena y la alcaldesa se aferra a otra Copa. El País. February 16, 
2010 Tuesday  
790 Peralta pide un plan para la dársena de Valencia. El País. February 16, 2010 Tuesday  
791 La dársena de Valencia espera un impulso más allá de los eventos. El País. March 1, 2010 
Monday  
792 La dársena de Valencia sigue sin plan de usos. El País. March 1, 2010 Monday  
793 Luis Martí: "El turismo vive en Valencia uno de sus peores momentos". El País. March 20, 
2010 Saturday 
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C.3. Sociopolis (from 1 June 2003 to 22 March 2010)  
1 La Bienal de Valencia potencia la ciudad como el escenario de la diversidad artística. El País. 
June 7, 2003  
2 Arquitecturas con trozos de utopía. El País. June 8, 2003  
3 La Bienal también es su contestación. El País. June 15, 2003  
4 En dos trazos. El País. June 22, 2003  
5 Lourdes García Sogo, arquitecto: "Valencia debería comprar la huerta". El País. June 22, 
2003  
6 Valencia, la guapa. El País. July 5, 2003  
7 Los espacios de la Bienal abren sus puertas hoy antes de su clausura. El País. September 29, 
2003  
8 La Generalitat anuncia que la proxima Bienal se dedicara al agua bajo el lema 'Sin ti, no soy'. 
El País. October 15, 2003  
9 Impactante reflexión. El País. October 18, 2003  
10 Ideas valencianas para Silicon Island. El País. November 21, 2003  
11 Soler augura cinco años más de "fuerte tirón" en el sector inmobiliario. El País. November 
22, 2003  
12 El director de la Bienal cobro casi un millón de euros. El País. December 24, 2003  
13 La Bienal costo más del doble del presupuesto oficial de 4,2 millones. El País. March 4, 2004  
14 Falta de debate. El País. July 18, 2004  
15 El País. June 13, 2004  
16 Vicente Guallart, arquitecto: "La ciudad tiene que crecer hacia dentro". El País. June 13, 
2004  
17 Huerta y cemento en torno a La Torre. El País. October 13, 2004  
18 Un "borde urbano". El País. October 13, 2004  
19 El Architekturzentrum de Viena expone el proyecto Sociópolis. El País. November 1, 2004  
20 Un plan conservacionista y polémico. El País. November 1, 2004  
21 Paisajes habitados: nuevos modelos. El País. March 7, 2005  
22 Luz verde para Sociópolis. El País. June 6, 2005  
23 El País. June 8, 2005  
24 Valencia planea su crecimiento a costa de la huerta con miles de pisos pendientes de 
construir. El País. June 27, 2005  
25 El PGOU ha sufrido un centenar de modificaciones, según el PSPV. El País. June 27, 2005  
26 La universidad de L'Horta pretende aportar planes para conservarla. El País. July 19, 2005  
27 Territorio ratifica el plan especial de Sociópolis en La Torre El País. September 11, 2005  
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28 Territorio cambia el plan especial de Sociópolis en La Torre sin someterlo de nuevo a 
exposición pública. El País. October 7, 2005  
29 La oposición de Valencia denuncia una operación de permuta para adquirir VPO a costa de 
suelo escolar. El País. October 25, 2005  
30 Apocalipsis urbanístico. El País. November 3, 2005  
31 La oferta de vivienda protegida aun resulta escasa. El País. November 25, 2005  
32 Los alicantinos de Aranea, los arquitectos más jóvenes en el MoMA. El País. February 5, 
2006  
33 Suturas verdes. El País. March 5, 2006  
34 Sociópolis plantea un nuevo tipo de ciudad para Valencia. El País. May 26, 2006  
35 Sociópolis plantea un nuevo tipo de ciudad para Valencia en un hábitat solidario. El País. 
May 26, 2006  
36 La huerta no está en venta. El País. June 2, 2006  
37 Barberá sólo ha aprobado un centenar de licencias de vivienda protegida desde enero. El 
País. July 24, 2006  
38 Datos. El País. August 19, 2006 Saturday  
39 "La Ciudad del Conocimiento hay que demostrarla con hechos". El País. August 19, 2006 
Saturday  
40 Valencia, a zarpazos. El País. September 18, 2006 Monday  
41 Territorio frena el plan de Sociópolis impulsado por Blasco en La Torre. El País. October 22, 
2006 Sunday  
42 El País. November 24, 2006 Friday  
43 Gran muestra de la velocidad y una del peluquero Tono Sanmartín. El País. December 22, 
2006 Friday  
44 Rubio critica que Sociópolis se construya con normas al margen del plan general. El País. 
January 7, 2007 Sunday  
45 La mercantil constituida por CSIF para la promoción de viviendas protegidas desata un cisma 
en el sindicato. El País. March 22, 2007 Thursday  
46 Territorio pide más informes del PAI de Gran Manises y aplaza el de Nou Mil.leni de 
Catarroja. El País. April 11, 2007 Wednesday  
47 El País. April 12, 2007 Thursday  
48 Territorio se niega a firmar un acuerdo con Trujillo porque Vivienda no financia Sociópolis. 
El País. April 24, 2007 Tuesday  
49 "No pararemos hasta que la Generalitat respete las competencias del Estado". El País. May 
21, 2007 Monday  
50 Venta de parcelas en Sociópolis. El País. September 11, 2007 Tuesday  
51 El IVAM recoge la obra del arquitecto Vicente Guallart. El País. September 14, 2007 Friday  
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52 Unos 100 millones de metros cuadrados de suelo rústico están en proceso de recalificación. 
El País. October 5, 2007 Friday  
53 Escasez de VPO en Valencia. El País. October 25, 2007 Thursday  
54 Chacón firma 15 convenios sin aceptar preguntas. El País. December 4, 2007 Tuesday  
55 Un urbanismo favorable al negocio. El País. February 11, 2008 Monday  
56 Más de 22.000 viviendas públicas atadas a la renta libre. El País. March 30, 2008 Sunday  
57 Valencia tiene suelo para crecer otros 20 años sin tocar la huerta. El País. April 11, 2008 
Friday  
58 Vivienda, el PSPV pide transparencia al adjudicar las VPO. El País. April 15, 2008 Monday  
59 Alborch denuncia el "engaño" de Sociópolis. El País. July 19, 2008 Saturday  
60 'Outlet' inmobiliario en Urbe. El País. November 20, 2008 Thursday  
61 Rebajas en el sector inmobiliario. El País. November 21, 2008 Friday  
62 "El de arriba es muy grande". El País. November 23, 2008 Sunday  
63 Poca vivienda protegida y de la más cara. Valencia se ve superada por otras grandes ciudades 
en el impulso a los pisos asequibles y fía un tardío despegue a la reserva en planes 
urbanísticos pendientes de desarrollo. El País. November 24, 2008 Monday  
64 Las inmobiliarias exhiben un triunfalismo sorprendente tras la clausura de Urbe. El País. 
November 24, 2008 Monday  
65 PP y PSPV se enzarzan por Sociópolis y la vivienda social. El País. November 25, 2008 
Tuesday  
66 Inmobiliaria Rover Alcisa construirá 500 viviendas de VPO. El País. February 27, 2009 
Friday  
67 Camps apuesta por el ladrillo. El País. March 24, 2009 Tuesday  
68 "Si no vas, te llaman para decirte que no te han visto". El País. March 25, 2009 Wednesday  
69 Las cifras del plan. El País. May 3, 2009 Sunday  
70 Sociópolis aguarda el despegue. El País. May 3, 2009 Sunday  
71 Valencia prevé dar vía libre a 7.000 VPP en tres años. El País. September 22, 2009 Tuesday  
72 El presidente de Urbe pronostica el derrumbe de las inmobiliarias. El País. November 21, 
2009 Saturday  
73 Barberá hace caja con el subsuelo. El País. December 22, 2009 Tuesday  
74 El Gobierno aprueba el 77% de los proyectos de Barberá. El País. February 25, 2010 
Thursday 
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